

Triple Helix for Social Innovation: The Saemaul Undong for Eradicating Poverty

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This study aims to examine and develop a Triple Helix model for social innovation to eradicate pervasive poverty in developing countries. To do this, this study explores and analyzes the Rural Saemaul Undong (RSU), a rural community development movement for eradicating poverty that was driven by the South Korean government during the 1970s. First of all, this study explores the characteristics of the RSU and explains why the RSU was a social innovation. To support and explain why the RSU was a successful social innovation, this study analyzes the roles and activities of three distinct actor groups: the chief policymaker and his aides who presented the vision and purpose, or the “why” of the Saemaul Undong; central and local government officials who were the planners and managers who showed “how” to plan and drive it; and village Saemaul leaders as the drivers and coaches showing rural villagers “what” to do. Based on this analysis, this study develops an actor-based Triple Helix model for social innovation to eradicate poverty.

Key Words: Rural Saemaul Undong, Triple Helix, social innovation, eradicating poverty, Golden Circle

Introduction

There have been many studies of the Rural Saemaul Undong (RSU), but only recently have researchers begun to study RSU as an aspect of social innovation. “The Role of The Saemaul Leaders as Social Innovator” (Rho, 2013b) is a good example. When we perceive the RSU as a social innovation, we can understand some new characteristics of the RSU and construct a solid foundation for theorization. This study will clarify the characteristics of the RSU as a social innovation and analyze the ways in which three groups of actors—the chief policymaker and his aides, central and local government officials, and the Saemaul leaders—could successfully drive the RSU in mutual interaction processes. Based on this empirical analysis, this paper develops an actor-based Triple Helix model to explain the successful driving processes of the Saemaul Undong during the 1970s in South Korea, and argues that the model has persuasive power to explain successful innovation promotion processes for social innovation.

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Methodology

For this study, methods of literature review and interviews were used. In order to analyze policies for eradicating poverty during the 1960s and 1970s, preceding research literatures as well as various government published documents including *History of Saemaul Undong: 1971-1980*, and *Agricultural Statistical Yearbook* were employed. In order to examine the activities of government officials and Saemaul leaders, some local government officials who were in charge of Saemaul Undong at the county government and Myeon during the 1970s and some Saemaul leaders who worked during the 1970s were interviewed. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3 analyzes policies to eradicate poverty during the 1960s and presents lessons learned through those poverty eradication policies. Section 4 analyzes approaches to the RSU during the 1970s and discusses its characteristics as social innovation. Section 5 examines mutual interactions and the role of the each actor during the implementation processes of Saemaul policies. Section 6 discusses each actor group's motivation for participating in the RSU and lessons learned from the emergence of the Saemaul spirit. Section 7 is conclusion.

Policies to eradicate poverty during the 1960s

Structural change and poverty problems during the 1960s

The most important characteristic of South Korean population distribution during the 1960s was that more than 72 per cent of the South Korean people lived in rural communities in the early 1960s, but this decreased rapidly to 59 per cent in 1970 (Park, 1999: 39). Per capita income in South Korea was 79 USD in 1960 and 203 USD in 1970 (Rho, 2013a: 51). In this situation, the most crucial social problems South Korean society faced were poverty, poor living conditions, and the absence of the spirit to overcome hardship. Compared to urban people, the relative income of rural people was low. The per capita disposable income of workers in South Korea was 83.8 USD in 1965, and that of rural community workers was 68.4 USD, which was about 81.6 per cent of all the workers in the nation (Agricultural Cooperative Association, 1970: 280). This means that poverty in rural society was very severe during the 1960s. An even more severe problem was that the debt of farmers was increasing very quickly. From 1962 to 1969, farmers' debts increased an average 16.4 per cent annually. As a result, the average farmer's debt, which was 19 USD in 1962, reached 50 USD in 1969. Over 8 years, debt increased about 2.6 times (Agricultural Cooperative Association, 1970: 280). Therefore, rapidly increasing poverty was the most urgent problem that South Korean society had to solve at that time.

Policy endeavors for eradicating poverty and developing rural communities during the 1960s

During the 1960s, the South Korean government had tried to solve the poverty problems that prevailed in South Korean society by introducing policy measures aimed at reducing the burden of rural people's loans with high interest rates. The South Korean government also adopted the People's Movement for National Reconstruction (PMNR). The Korean military government declared in May 1961 that loans with an annual interest rate of over 20 per cent would be called high interest rate private loans, and these had to be reported to the Regional Committees for Re-adjustment (RCR). The RCR designed various measures to reduce debtors' burdens. For exam-

ple, the government took various measures to mitigate high interest burdens, such as issuing agricultural financial bonds to partially support the burdens of debtors (Rho, 2013b: 7-8).

Policy measures aimed at reducing the burden of rural people's high interest rate loans were evaluated as partly successful because rural people's income, those measures was not accompanied with new income generation methods, could not increase continuously. Therefore, the policy reform aimed at reducing the burden of loans with high interest rates and increasing the income of the poor was evaluated not to be as successful as expected. The main reason was that the result of the collection of the capital funds used to reduce private loans with high interest rates was not so high, and farmers negatively evaluated the results of the reduction of high interest rates on private loans (Lee, 1984: 355).

People's Movement for National Reconstruction (PMNR)

After the military coup d'état on May 16, 1961, the group that led the coup d'état declared the PMNR to get full support from the people for the ideologies of the military revolution. In order to instruct the populace about the new character of the nation, the main power group of the military coup d'état energetically promoted educational projects to infuse a new image of the nation and the people into the people's minds (Lee, 1962: 8-9). They spent about 30 percent of the whole budget of the PMNR on educational programs, concentrating on these under the premise of the development of all the programs of the PMNR (Hong, 1965: 162). They established several training institutes. At the headquarters, a central training institute was established to train instructors of cities and counties. In the provinces, regional training institutions were established to train instructors of the towns and myeons (sub-counties). The people were educated on spiritual enlightenment and the development of democracy (Lee, 1962: 8-9). However, the PMNR could not accomplish its goals. The main reason was that they tried to read the intentions of the powerful government organizations, and they pushed forward their order and promoted by bureaucratic top down ways (Hong, 1965: 164).

Lessons learned through the poverty eradication movement

Among the other policy measures taken during the 1960s to eradicate poverty, policy measures aimed at reducing the burden of rural people's loans with high interest rates (the people's loan reduction program) were target-oriented policy measures. On the other hand, the PMNR was a social movement approach to solve the poverty problem through the spiritual enlightenment of the people using spiritual education for the general public (Lee, 1962:8-9). The people's loan reduction program could not greatly contribute to farmers' poverty reduction because this program was carried out with no relationship to farmers' abilities to increase their income (Han, 1999: 118-119). A lesson learned through the people's loan reduction program was that even though policy measures could succeed in removing one aspect of the poverty problem, measures could not succeed in eradicating poverty without being accompanied by measures to increase income for farmers over the long run. Another aspect learned from the PMNR was that the spiritual enlightenment of the general public and the interactive resonance with leaders of the PMNR could not occur through spiritual education of the general public using a bureaucratic top-down approach without accompanying income generation policy measures. But much more important lessons were learned about social innovation in the case of the PMNR. For instance, in order to succeed, the chief policymaker's presentation of his vision and his purpose in leading the social

movement as well as the frontline leaders' actions as social innovators were needed, (Rho, 2013b: 11-13).

Approaches to the RSU during the 1970s and its characteristics as social innovation

Why can the Saemaul Movement be regarded as a social innovation?

Social innovation is a novel solution to a social problem that is more effective, efficient, or sustainable than existing solutions, and for which the value created accrues primarily to society as a whole, rather than to private individuals. This view of value creation puts a great deal of weight on the difference between social and private problems to be solved on the one hand, and the social and private value created as consequences of novel solutions on the other (Phills, Deiglmeir and Miller, 2008: 34-43; Auerswald, 2009: 52). During the 1960s and early 1970s when the RSU began, the most crucial social problems South Korean society faced were poverty, poor living conditions, and the absence of the spirit to overcome these hardships. Therefore, making society better-off was the most urgent task at that time in South Korea, and arousing the spirit to be well-off was the most important task for social innovation. Therefore, during the 1970s, the social innovation task was to solve the problems that South Korean rural villages faced through the creation and development of new social capital, which was lacking at that time.

The Saemaul spirit as social capital

The Saemaul Undong was created to make society better-off and create livable communities. The Saemaul spirit was diligence, self-help, and cooperation. This Saemaul spirit included a “can do” spirit and was the social capital for solving social problems and forming the foundation for social development (Goh, 2010: 35-36). Also, social capital was needed to make use of technology for farming and the improvement of living and environmental conditions for community well-being. Therefore, the RSU, as an antipoverty policy, was intended to create social capital for the development of South Korean society during the 1970s to address the problems of poverty. In order to create social capital, the RSU needed to adopt new approaches and systems to set and carry out Saemaul-related policies. These new approaches were an integrated system model, and this new delivery system was a Triple Helix model. Because the RSU adopted new approaches and systems to carry out Saemaul-related policies, the RSU can be regarded as a social innovation.


Strategy of integrated rural development

The People's National Reconstruction Movement (PNRM) put emphasis on reforming rural mentality, but ended in failure as the government failed to provide enough economic incentives to ensure success. Another project called the Special Project for Rural People's Income Increase was made in the latter part of the 1960s. This did not succeed because it put emphasis on economic aspects only, neglecting the spiritual aspect of reforming rural mentality. These two failures provided an empirical foundation upon which both spiritual and economic aspects could be integrated into the RSU (Goh, 2010: 35).

An integrated system model of social belief, technology use and environment

The RSU sought to pursue social values that could make “my village” the best place to live. These social values included diligence, self-reliance, and cooperation, as well as trust and creativity. The RSU model that inspired the emergence of social value was an integrated systems model combining social belief, the use of technology, improvement of a living environment, and agricultural knowledge and technology, as shown in [Figure 1].


Figure 1: Integrated system model of social belief, use of technology, and living environment



Triple Helix model to carry out Saemaul policies

The success of the RSU resulted from active interactions and mutual influences among the three actor groups, those being the chief policymaker and his aides, central and local government officials, and Saemaul leaders in rural areas as shown in [Figure 2].

Figure 2: Triple Helix model for the RSU



In the processes of implementing the RSU, the president and his aides offered a new vision and strategies; central and local government officials planned Saemaul projects, developed incentive systems, and conducted result-oriented management; and Saemaul leaders as well as other rural village leaders designed new projects to resolve difficult community problems, acting as the catalysts, positive deviants (PD), and supporters of new farming enterprises.

Mutual interactions and the role of the each actor during the implementation processes of Saemaul policies

Major roles of the chief policymaker

South Korean President Park Chung-hee proposed the RSU in 1970 as a self-help rural development campaign in a determined effort to eradicate rural poverty in South Korea (Goh, 2010: 30; Cheongdo-Gun, 2012: 26-34). President Park defined the purpose and concept of The Saemaul Undong:

“...To put it more easily, the Saemaul Undong is a campaign to live a better life. What is a better life? A better life is where people escape from poverty, income increases so that rural communities can become affluent and enjoy an elegant and cultural life, neighbors share friendship and help one another, and a good and beautiful village to live in is created. Although it is important to have a good life today, it is a bigger ambition to create a better life for tomorrow and for our offspring. Let’s discover the philosophy of The Saemaul Undong.(Gyeongsangbukdo The Saemaul Undong Center, 2012: 11).”


The president exerted transformative and generative leadership to support the RSU in many ways including the following: 1) initiating the RSU; 2) proposing a future vision for transformation; 3) modifying administrative systems to help successfully drive the RSU; 4) supporting the budget, which was the energy needed to push the movement forward; 5) nurturing the Saemaul leaders who would promote the movement at the local community level; 6) holding Saemaul cabinet meetings on a regular basis to identify and remove obstacles to the Saemaul Undong; and 7) hosting conferences where the Saemaul leaders presented their best practices with an aim to motivate other Saemaul leaders.

Generative leadership

The primary objective of generative leadership in facilitating emergence is to foster and amplify novelty generation within an ecology of innovation. In an organization or local community, emergence is closely related with the idea of self-organizing understood as a supposedly spontaneous process. This view, however, resulted in the mistaken belief that leaders could be passive and simply allow emergence to take place, once command and control mechanisms were relaxed. More rigorous research and experimentation have proven that emergence hardly comes about spontaneously – indeed, it demands rigorous containing, constraining, and constructional operations (Goldstein, Hazy and Lichtensein,2010: 14). Complexity researchers have also found that emergence requires the presence of a substrate order that can be transformed, as well as structures that contain or channel the emergence processes (Golstein, Hazy and Lichtenstein,2010:

81). When applying these ideas informs similar emergent processes in organizations, enabling the processes of emergence becomes an active and generative, as opposed to passive, leadership endeavor that requires containing, constraining and constructional operations. These are the roles and functions of generative leadership. Therefore, the president as the chief policymaker played a key role as a generative leader during the process of carrying out Saemaul policies to facilitate the emergence of the Saemaul spirit.

Figure 3: Organizational arrangement of the RSU



Source: Ministry of Home Affairs, 1973, p. 37, and Kim (et al.), 1979, pp. 20-34; Kim, 2013, p. 68.

Administrative structure and the role of government officials for the RSU

During the 1970s, the government set up an organizational arrangement with a series of committees. A series of councils was formed with government agencies from the central government and local governments as shown in [Figure 3]. These organizations developed plans to carry out and support the Saemaul Undong and implemented these plans. The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) integrated and coordinated government policies. The new Saemaul Undong Central Consultative Council promoted and managed overall planning for the Saemaul Undong. The upper-level councils gave the lower-level councils the plans and guidance for carrying out the projects. The lower-level councils had to report the results of the Saemaul Undong in their own jurisdic-

tions and had the authority to ask the upper-level councils for government support for projects. This organizational arrangement covered all the related government agencies and was beneficial in enhancing coordination and information-sharing among authorities concerned, as well as promoting efficient planning and implementation of Saemaul projects (Whang, 1983; Eom, 2011a, 596-597; Kim, 2013: 68).

Each level of government was also accountable for coordinating the activities of the lower-level government, as well as for delivering feedback from the bottom. In addition, local administrations monitored the results and achievements of Saemaul projects in the villages in their own jurisdictions, and the central government allocated budgets. The government chose the village as the strategic unit of community action. That is, villages rather than individual farmers were chosen as the targets of support for rural modernization projects (Goh, 2010: 33-34). The South Korean government's material support was designed to work as a common resource for the infrastructure projects of villages. This collective aid was intended to help generate villagers' enthusiasm for self-help and voluntary cooperation (Goh, 2010: 34).

Government support was designed to spark and continuously stimulate farmers' motivation for participation in self-help rural development, as opposed to fostering their dependency on the government. Government support was provided in a careful, strategic, and steady manner for the entire period of the movement (Goh, 2010:43).

Table 1: Criteria for village classification and required standard projects for promotion

Projects	Basic	Self-help	Self-sufficient
Village road	Main village road	Branch village road	-
Farm road	Village entry farm road	Cultivation farm road	-
Small river	Small river inside village	Small river between village	Small and medium size river outside village
Agricultural water	Irrigation 70%	Irrigation 70%	Irrigation 85%
Agricultural machine	-	Power-driven machine for prevention of breeding	Power tiller, power threshing machine
Cooperative farming	Cooperative work team	Cooperative production team	Cooperative production team
Village fund	\$ 1,200 per village	\$ 2,000 per village	\$ 4,000 per village
Income per household	\$ 2,000 per household	\$ 3,200 per household	\$ 5,600 per household

Source: Ministry of Home Affairs, 1980, pp. 215.

On a periodic basis, the government evaluated the self-help capability of all 33,000 villages, which was the total number of villages during the 1970s. This evaluation was used as the criteria for different levels of government support. The more successful the village performance in the Saemaul project implementation, the more support it could get from the government.

Villages were classified into three categories: basic, self-help, and self-sufficient. They could be promoted on the basis of good evaluation scores. Government authorities evaluated each village's performance every year in accordance with predetermined criteria. Each village was in Saemaul competition with neighboring villages. The more participative the villagers were, the more successful their Saemaul Undong, and the better off all the villagers were (Goh, 2010: 43-44; Kim, 2013: 61). The evaluation criteria for village classification and the required standard projects for promotion are shown in [Table 1]. The government established three stages of goals

to be attained through the RSU. These three goal stages were the basic stage, the self-help development stage, and the self-supporting stage, as shown in [Table 2].

Table 2: Goal attainment stages of the Saemaul Undong

Baseline formation (1971-1973)	Self-help Development (1974-1976)	Independent (1977-1981)
Basic village: 30% Self-help village: 60% Self-sufficient village: 10%	Self-help village: 60% Self-sufficient village: 40%	Self-sufficient village: 100% (Income increase only through self-help endeavors)

Source: Oh, 2008a, p.7.

With limited resources available for development, village competition proved to be a good means for the government to understand where investment might be most fruitful. The government concentrated its support on villages that were competitive and positive toward the Saemaul projects. At the end of 1972, the number of self-sufficient villages was 2,307 (7%), that of self-help villages was 13,943 (40%) and that of basic villages was 18,415 (53%). At the end of 1975, the number of self-sufficient villages was 10,049 (29%), that of self-help villages was 20,936 (60%), and that of basic villages was 4,046 (11%). Finally, at the end of 1979, the number of self-sufficient villages was 33,893 (97%), and that of self-help villages was 976 (3%). (Oh Ryue-Suck, et al, 2008b: 17). Based on these statistics, the RSU exceeded its own goals.


Implementation of Saemaul policies by an integrated model and roles of RSU (Saemaul) leaders

The people who assumed the leadership of the RSU were as follows: 1) Saemaul leaders, 2) village chiefs, and 3) public officials assigned to each village (Im, 2013: 83-89). The first category of village-level leader was comprised of Saemaul leaders. From the initial stage of the RSU, the government had emphasized the importance of leadership for successful rural development and characterized Saemaul leaders as people who were sincere, persuasive, creative, and devoted to the development of villages (Eom, 2011b, 605; Im, 2013, 83- 100). All these leaders were involved in setting goals and making decisions about Saemaul projects, according to the survey on the initiation of the Saemaul projects. The leaders collectively made efforts to initiate projects and set goals. The Saemaul leaders and village chiefs introduced government guidelines and persuaded villagers to participate in the RSU. Among the village leaders, the Saemaul leaders played roles central to the RSU. Therefore, we will concentrate our analysis and explanation on the roles of the Saemaul leaders as social innovators.

The model for the RSU and the roles of the Saemaul leaders were closely related. Therefore, we need to look first at the integrated model for the RSU to analyze the roles of the Saemaul leaders. [Figure 1] above shows the integrated model for the RSU, which the Saemaul leaders used to drive movement forward. In doing so, the Saemaul leaders were catalysts in project development processes for the construction of infrastructure and the improvement of , village environmental conditions experimenters and supporters of novel agricultural cultivation methods, and example-setters and illuminators for spiritual and behavioral modernity (Interview with Mr. Yu, Young-mo, Ms. Kim Sun-kyu, Mr. Park, Cheol-gue, Mr. Lee, Ju-seon, and Mr. Jung Yeong-ju, 2012) . In the process of driving the Saemaul movement, Saemaul leaders played different roles depending on the four purposes of the RSU that were included in its integrated system model. The main responsibilities of the Saemaul leaders were to coach the village leaders and residents to build their own capability to plan and conduct the Saemaul projects; to learn and to

understand the importance of the Saemaul projects and their deployment methodology; and to translate knowledge into action. By doing so, the Saemaul leaders helped villagers take ownership of the RSU projects. Coaching activities of the Saemaul leaders were four-fold, as shown in [Figure 4] (Rho, 2013; 75).

Figure 4: The goals of Saemaul projects and coaching roles



Source: Rho, Yukyeong, 2013, p. 75.

In the pursuit of the four goals of the Saemaul projects, the coaching strategies of the Saemaul leaders were aimed at improving the knowledge of village leaders and residents through educating and empowering them. Then leaders helped villagers to translate this into action so they could take ownership of given Saemaul projects. Key content for education included ways to: 1) recognize needs; 2) determine the current situation; 3) recognize issues; 4) develop plans and pursue plans to deal with recognized issues; 5) ways to seek help when they felt a lack of knowledge and capability while pursuing projects; 6) ways to identify strategies, implement projects, etc. (Rho, 2013; 74-77).

The key strategy in implementing the Saemaul projects was getting scattered villagers to cooperate with each other. For example, the Saemaul leaders encouraged villagers to exchange information and to support and cooperate with each other to implement Saemaul projects such as renovating thatched roofs into tiled roofs, building new sewer systems, renovating traditional kitchens into Western-style kitchens, and setting up orchards (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2080; 205-213).

The catalysts' roles were played during the implementation of Saemaul projects, such as building infrastructure to use technology and improving village environmental conditions (Rho, 2013: 77-79). The roles of experimenter, introducer, and supporter were played during the process of developing knowledge, technology, and new agricultural cultivation methods. Good examples of this were vegetable cultivation in vinyl greenhouses that was tried by Saemaul leaders (Yu, and Ha, , 2012) and a new agricultural method of creating a chestnut tree complex, which was tried by a female Saemaul leader (Jung, , 2012). So, the Saemaul leaders played roles as example-setters and illuminators transforming the pre-modern mentalities and attitudes of village residents into modern ones, which were perceived by the Saemaul leaders as the largest cause of poverty in rural villages (Ha, Lee, and Jung, 2012). We can see that the Saemaul leaders didn't


force or direct village residents to transform their pre-modern mentalities and behaviors into modern ones. Rather, the leaders set examples as positive deviations with modern mentality, and persuaded people to participate and to interact with them, which resulted in interaction resonances (Goh, 2010: 36-38).

Motivation for participating in the RSU and lessons learned from the emergence of the Saemaul spirit

The goal of the RSU was to construct a good society in which to live. This ultimate goal of the RSU could be achieved only when rural community people agreed with the goal of the RSU, as presented by the chief policymaker, and then actively participated in the RSU. No matter how high the grand vision and goals of the RSU were, if rural people did not participate in the movement enthusiastically, this goal could not be realized. Then, how could the core leading group of the RSU inspire the rural people, who were the objects of the movement, to take part in the movement enthusiastically? We can find clues to the answer for this question in the marketing theory of Simon Sinek.

Sinek developed a Golden Circle model to explain buying behavior in the market (Sinek, 2009). He identified “why,” “how to,” and “what” as factors used in marketing to incite people’s desire to buy goods. He then established relationships among these factors, as shown in [Figure 5]. He argued that manufacturing companies generally use a strategy of propagating “what” or “how to” in order to induce the people to buy products (Sinek, 2009).

Figure 5: The Golden Circle



Source: Sinek, 2009: 37.

Here, “what” includes the products’ functions, properties, uses, etc. “How to” includes the production processes such as materials used, techniques, etc. Finally, “why” means purposes, beliefs, or causes for which people or the company exist. The marketing messages of most companies move from the outside to the inside of the Golden Circle, starting with some statement of what the company does or makes, followed by how they think they are different or better than the competition, followed by some call to action. With that, the company would expect some behavior in return, in this case, a purchase (Sinek, 2009: 40).

He explained companies’ marketing strategies further. Generally, communication is organized in an attempt to convince someone of a difference or superior value. Most companies utilize manipulation to increase transactions. Manipulations are perfectly valid strategies for driving a

transaction or any behavior that is only required once or on rare occasions. Generally, the manipulation will work if the incentive feels high enough to mitigate the risk. In any circumstance in which a person or an organization wants more than a single transaction, or if there is a hope for a loyal, lasting relationship, manipulation does not help (Sinek, 2009: 31). In order to form a lasting relationship with customers, companies have to inspire people to act.

Golden Circle theory explains how companies, as well as leaders, can inspire people to give their loyalty. The Golden Circle provides compelling evidence of how much more we can achieve if we remind ourselves to start everything we do by first asking, “Why?” To support this argument, Sinek gave various examples such as the companies Apple, Southwest Airlines, and great men such as Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and John F. Kennedy. He argued that the Golden Circle offers clear insight into how Apple is able to innovate in so many consumer electronics and never lose its ability to do so. It even gives some clarity as to why people followed Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. in a movement that changed a nation and why Americans took up John F. Kennedy’s challenge to put a man on the moon even after he died. The Golden Circle, Sinek insisted, shows how these leaders were able to inspire action by starting with the “why” instead of manipulating people to act (Sinek, 2009: 38).

In the Golden Circle shown in [Figure 5], “why” is the vision and purpose of the social innovation movement. In a large-scale social innovation movement such as the RSU, the chief policymaker and his aides develop and present a vision and the purposes of social innovation. That is, the chief policymaker and his aides inspire the other actor groups by presenting the “why” with a vision and purposes. In contrast to this, central and local government officials develop plans and incentive systems to carry out the vision and purposes presented by the chief policymaker. This means that government officials develop a method of “how to” realize the vision and values based on their knowledge. On the other hand, the “what” is the projects and activities that frontline leaders as social innovators carry out in cooperation with the people.

Just as mentioned above, the three actor groups involved in a large-scale social innovation movement play different roles, and they lead the innovation movement in mutual interactions. In the RSU, as a large-scale social innovation movement, these three actor groups each played roles and led people during the innovation movement processes. The Golden Circle theory developed mostly as a marketing theory to explain buying behaviors. However, if we can further develop this Golden Circle theory by modifying some aspects, this Golden Circle theory can be used to explain why people decide to participate with enthusiasm in a large-scale social innovation movement such as the RSU. In a large-scale social innovation movement like the RSU, the “why” in the Golden Circle not only inspired people who are the objects of the movement, but also acted to inspire other actor groups who served in the functions of “how to” and “what.” In marketing theory, the function of “why” is to inspire buyers’ loyalty to the company’s products. However, in a large-scale social innovation movement, “why” should inspire the objects of innovation and also the actor groups, who function as the “how to” and “what,” in order to increase loyalty to them. With this enhanced loyalty, actor groups in the function of “how to” and “what” can carry out their roles honestly and enthusiastically (Eom, 2011c: 111-117). Then, if the actor groups who are in charge of “how to” and “what” can be inspired to increase their loyalty to the vision and purposes of the social innovation movement, the movement can succeed in attaining its goals.

We previously analyzed the roles of three actor groups and their activities in the RSU. That is, the chief policymaker and his aides developed and presented a vision and purpose of the RSU; central and local government officials developed and carried out plans and incentive systems to

realize the vision and purpose; and Saemaul leaders as social innovators acted as catalysts for the development and implementation of rural village modernization projects. In addition, they were supporters of new innovative ideas in farming and positive deviants for the spiritual enlightenment of rural villagers. On April 26, 1972, President Park Chung-Hee wrote to express his philosophy and belief about the RSU in detail at The Saemaul Income Increasing Conference, as previously described:

“...What is the Saemaul Undong (purpose and concept)?..... To put it more easily, the Saemaul Undong is a campaign to live a better life. What is a better life? A better life is one where people escape from poverty, income increases so that rural communities can become affluent and enjoy an elegant and cultural life, neighbors share friendship and help one another, and a good and beautiful village to live in is created. Although it is important to have a good life today, it is a bigger ambition to create a better life for tomorrow and for our offspring...” (Gyeongsangbukdo The Saemaul Undong Center, 2012: 10-11).

Figure 6: Fusion and sharing of belief and knowledge among three actor groups



The philosophy and belief connected with the RSU presented by President Park Chung-Hee clarified the vision and purpose of the RSU, as well as the reasons common people, as well as the other two actor groups, should actively participate in the RSU. In particular, President Park’s philosophy and belief inspired government officials as well as the Saemaul leaders of rural villages and other cooperative rural villages’ leaders to work harder and with enthusiasm by giving them a sense of purpose or belonging, thereby enhancing their loyalty to the Saemaul Undong. As a result, almost all of the rural villages evaluated reached self-sufficiency by the end of the 1970s (Oh, 2008a:7). This means that the RSU during the 1970s was as successfully driven as planned. The “why” in the center of the Golden Circle in the social innovation movement inspired two other actor groups who were in charge of the “how to” and “what.” That is, actors who developed plans and incentive systems, as well as the other actors who implemented programs at the frontline, enhanced their loyalty to the movement. These two actor groups worked as the governance power to carry out the Saemaul Undong successfully. “Why” is based on one’s

belief, while “how to” and “what” are based on belief and knowledge. Therefore, we can infer that those who were in charge of “how to” and “what” were inspired by the “why,” so that the fusion of belief and the knowledge for carrying out the movement occurred. This fusion and sharing of belief and knowledge to carry out the social innovation movement minimized uncertainty occurring in the driving processes of the social innovation movement. Therefore, the probability of carrying out the movement successfully could be increased. That is, the mutual interaction of the three actor groups based on “why” could enhance the fusion and sharing of beliefs and knowledge among the three actor groups while working to minimize entropy for the successful drive of the social innovation movement.

As we can see in [Figure 6], the fusion and sharing of ideologies and knowledge for driving a social innovation movement—in other words, the “why,” “how to,” and “what”—among three actor groups carrying out the movement can raise the probability of success in driving the movement by creating resonance during mutual interaction processes. However, if the degree of the fusion and sharing of them is low, then the probability of successful completion of the movement can be greatly diminished. This is the lesson learned through the experience of driving the RSU during the 1970s. That is, if actor groups who were in charge of “how to” and “what” were inspired by the belief of “why,” the loyalty of these actor groups to the ideologies of the social innovation movement could be enhanced and in turn, “why” could be conjoined with “how to” and “what.” If the three actor groups who play different roles in the social innovation movement share belief and knowledge and interaction resonance can be elevated, then the possibility of successfully driving a large-scale social innovation movement can be enhanced because the entropy of the shared driving force can be greatly lowered. These lessons learned through the experience of the RSU during the 1970s can be developed as the logic of an actor-based Triple Helix theory to explain the successful driving of a large-scale social innovation movement.

Conclusion

This study analyzed and re-evaluated the RSU during the 1970s from the perspective of social innovation. This analysis focused on the roles and activities of the chief policymaker and his aides, central and local government officials, and the Saemaul leaders who played major roles during the processes of the RSU. This analysis also focused on how the chief policymaker inspired the other two actor groups.

Based on this analysis, this study developed an actor-based Triple Helix model for social innovation which explains how it drove the RSU successfully and attained the goal of constructing good and beautiful villages to live in by eradicating the severe poverty that pervaded Korean rural communities during the 1970s.

It is reported that over 24 per cent of the world’s people live on less than 1.25 USD per day (UN, 2012: 7). If we can further develop and refine the Triple Helix model for social innovation, which we developed through this study, and if we can adopt this model for reducing poverty in other developing countries, this model can greatly contribute to eradicating poverty in developing countries. This model can also contribute to the attainment of one of the most important Millennium Development Goals adopted by the United Nations. We hope this study can assist in opening new insight into developing a Triple Helix model for social innovation to eradicate poverty worldwide.

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Appendix 1

List of successful Saemaul leaders who were interviewed (Name, address and date of interview)

- ① Mr. Ha, Sa-yong, Chung-buk Province, Chungwon Geun, Jungjung 3 ri, August 14, 2012.
- ② Ms. Jung, Mun-ja, Jun-buk Province, Imsil Geun, SungSu Myeon, September 11, 2012.
- ③ Mr. Jung, Yeong-ju, Gyung-buk Province, Chungdo Geun, Poong Myeon, September 4, 2012.
- ④ Ms. Kim, Sun-kyu, Gyung-gie Province, Seong Nam city, July 17, 2012.
- ⑤ Mr. Lee, Ju-seon, Gyung-buk Province, Chungdo Geun, Chungdo, September 4, 2012.
- ⑥ Mr. Park, Chul-giu, Gyung-buk Province, Chungdo Geun, Iseu Myeon, September 4, 2012.
- ⑦ Mr. Yu, Young-mo, Gang-won province, Hongchun Geun, Seuseuk Myeon, Jun 1, 2012.