

Multi-Stakeholders in Public and Cultural Diplomacies as Seen through the Lens of Public-Private Partnerships: A Comparative Case Study of Germany and South Korea¹

Hwa Jung Kim ²

With the emergence of partnerships with private actors in public and cultural diplomacies, complexity in the relations among the various stakeholders involved has arisen, and yet the relevant research is insufficient to shed any beneficial light on such issues. By looking at public-private partnerships, the present study determined that resource dependence, trust, and risk are the main factors affecting the feasibility of partnerships, and inductively developed propositions on their effects. In an explorative case study, Germany (decentralized mode of governance) and South Korea (centralized mode of governance) were compared as exemplary contrasting system designs. The results revealed that risk and trust are likely to affect the feasibility of partnerships, whereas resource dependence is not. The following additional findings also were made: (1) there are cultural actors in a 'for profit, but with non-profit purposes' sector; (2) an interpersonal level of trust positively affects partnerships; (3) 'taking risks' brings about 'innovation'; (4) the existence of international commonalities between any two cases depending on the actors' shared role, whether public or private; (5) public actors' emphasis on mutual trust, program budget and execution, innovations coming from taking risks, commitment and ownership, and unexpected situations; (6) private actors' consideration of 'publicness' and grant-seeking or financial support as important incentives, and their desire that public actors to show more trust, professionalism, and ownership with less control over budget execution. With its qualitative approach and in-depth analysis, the present study yielded new insights, notwithstanding the relatively small sample data.

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Introduction

Non-governmental entities including independent agencies, private actors and non-profit organizations have emerged as non-state Public Diplomacy (PD) actors. This has brought about

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² Postdoctoral Research Fellow, supported by National Research Foundation, at Institute of International Affairs, Seoul National University, E-mail: lisa1052@snu.ac.kr and lisa1052@gmail.com

various types of partnerships with individuals ranging from trained Public Relations (PR) experts to political communications professionals³. The growing influence of global media, with the ever-expanding Internet, allows for no secrets in the conduct of diplomacy, and thus, governments need to interact with private actors (Pigman and Deos, 2008, Ordeix-Rigo and Duarte, 2009, Cohen, 2013).

Serious problems also arise in relation to the management and coordination of non-state actors, and raise fundamental questions as to whether social actors can actually influence the formation of national governments' foreign policies (Batora, 2005). Different stakeholders might cause fragmentation and conflict if delivering different messages to foreign publics (Widvey, 2003); indeed, multi-stakeholder diplomacy explains the transition from hierarchies to networks, which incurs boundary-, capacity- and legitimacy-related dilemmas (Hocking and Smith, 2011).

Meanwhile, there have been requests for PD privatization, mainly in the field of arts and culture, as accompanied by criticism of government budget cuts, particularly following the global financial crisis. In reality, culture-related businesses maintained by public funds or grants have been at risk, but the substance that PD actors deal with in international relations is produced by cultural actors in the private sector. What are known as Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), however, in attempting to align the different directions and priorities of private actors' long-term goals, public officers' internal goals, and a government's short and mid-term goals, generate difficulties related to transparency, accountability and legitimacy. This eventually causes conflict between and among the various stakeholders in PPPs.

The present study determined that complexity comes from uncertainty, not accountability, arising as it does from a lack of knowledge and information, and that it affects the behaviors of individuals. When considering the complexity that occurs in PPPs, it is worthwhile to focus on institutional uncertainty. By definition, PPPs participants, coming from different organizations, administrative levels, and networks, have different perceptions, objectives, and interests; subsequently, it is difficult for such actors to interact, as their behaviors are constrained by the "tasks, opinions, rules and languages of their own organizations," and thus, their interactions too often can be characterized as "clashes between divergent institutional regimes" (Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004, p. 7).

Regardless of the problematic complexity caused by the crossing of public and private sectors, there has been little research on this topic. The current study, then, undertook to investigate whether the partnerships of multi-stakeholders crossing public, private, and nonprofit sectors can be applied to the field of arts and culture in the conduct of diplomacy. By way of an explorative case study comparing Germany and South Korea, which countries were selected for their different system designs, we sought to unveil pertinent and important themes and issues, asking the following research questions: (1) How can the recent phenomenon of multi-stakeholders and

³ Pigman and Deos (2008) find that the success of PD activities in association with private actors depends on whether the objectives of the activities are pursued from the public's perspective, in an honest and sincere manner.

partnerships be explained? (2) What are the factors affecting and determining the feasibility of partnerships in public and cultural diplomacies? In attempting to answer those questions, we first extended the trajectories of public and cultural diplomacies, as observed through the lens of PPPs; then, we inductively developed and formulated three propositions. Finally, in these pages, we analyze our results and discuss our study's limitations.

Literature Review

Extending the Trajectories of Public and Cultural Diplomacies

Soft power conceptually supports the importance of culture in the conduct of PD (Melissen, 2005, Batora, 2005, Lee, 2009, Potter, 2009, Snow, 2009, Fitzpatrick, 2010, d'Hooghe, 2010, Nye, 2008, Lee, 2011). It provides the formula for international cultural exchanges and programs, and enables utilization of arts and culture in contemporary diplomatic activities. Attendant on the paradigm shift that PD underwent as a result of the information and communication technology revolution in the 1990s and the 9/11 terrorist attacks, New Public Diplomacy (NPD) has become an important foreign policy tool throughout the world (Melissen, 2005, Cull, 2006, Roberts, 2006, Gilboa, 2008, Gregory, 2008, Snow, 2009, Nye, 2010, Pamment, 2011, Kim, 2012, Sharp, 2013). In the course of developing the concept of PD, not much of literature dealt with why Cultural Diplomacy (CD) was considered as a subset of PD.

In a previous study, we discovered a conceptual gap between NPD and CD. In the context of U.S. foreign policy, CD had been underestimated due to its pejorative connotations acquired during the Cold War, and was loosely defined as a strand of NPD; Western European countries, by contrast, widened the scope of CD and developed the concept of International Cultural Relations (ICR). This broader conceptual perspective allowed CD's origins to be traced all the way back to the 17th and 18th centuries, an era in which private initiatives led governments' engagements in cultural exchanges among states. Thus cultural affairs from the late 19th Century, when Western European countries began to actively institutionalize government-affiliated or arms-length organizations, to the end of Cold War, can be distinguished from the Old Cultural Diplomacy (OCD) of those earlier centuries. In this respect, we define New Cultural Diplomacy (NCD) as an intersectional concept between NPD and ICR⁴. The arrow in Figure 1 indicates how the three phases of cultural affairs developed over time and affected the next phase of the development of CD.

⁴ We applied our definitions of NPD, NCD, and ICR to the present study. First, NPD is defined as "a government's concerted efforts to achieve credibility, trust, and mutuality through two-way, symmetric communications to deal with public opinion between that government and foreign and global publics by engaging non-state actors and fostering partnerships as a means of embedding foreign policies with soft power." Second, NCD means "a cultural actor's attempts to cultivate cultural understandings through international cultural relations in line with a government's concerted efforts to achieve credibility, trust, and mutuality with normative values and shared goals beyond national interests." Lastly, ICR is developed from private initiatives and affected by OCDs and NCDs. This includes "such cultural exchange programs and activities as multicultural events, art exhibitions, performing arts concerts, popular cultural arts, international festivals, and others." (Kim, 2017, p. 317).




Figure 1 New Cultural Diplomacy as an Intersectional Concept
(adapted from Kim, 2017, p. 317)

One issue to consider is that NPD, NCD as well as ICR can be conceptualized as a state government’s institutionalization of its cultural affairs. Another issue is that the starting point of the institutionalization of CD comes from private initiatives for cultural exchanges. Various types of actors from both the private and public sectors have inevitably played significant roles and collaborated with each other in the field of arts. This is how PPPs have occurred, in the development of CD, over the course of centuries, as discussed above. In parallel with the late-twentieth-century erosion of high culture, and as a consequence of the latter’s market-driven blending with popular culture in advertising, performing arts, dance, and music⁵, the arts have expanded while the demand for the various forms of artwork has increased (Dimaggio, 2000). Since then, nonprofits have emerged as important actors in the arts field. Institutional sponsorships probably have been key to this change, as funding for nonprofits increased dramatically between 1950 and 1980 in response to large deficits within not-for-profit arts organizations. Despite their often different motives, nonprofit and commercial art organizations have an extensive history of cooperation with public and private actors, according to three logics: access (between grant funders and the recipient organizations), accountability (reducing the viability of non-bureaucratic organizations and concentrating power for management of conflicts with trustees), and constituency formation (enabling appropriate funds from government to expand the number of art agencies on the local level).

⁵ As consequences of this blending, there were three changes in the field of arts and culture: the first was in “social structure (transformation of elites and the rise of a massive, college educated, mobile upper middle class);” the second was “the eclipse of private patronage and the rise of institutional patronage from private foundations, corporations, and an expanding state;” the third was “a managerial revolution in the arts” (Dimaggio, 2000, p. 48).

Accountability, the second logic of cooperation, is a factor key to the understanding of how multi-stakeholders in PPPs are likely to cause complexity due to multi-directional modes of relationships among the public, private, and non-private sectors. Within accountability structures, social sectors overlap, each complemented or combined through accountability with one another. In turn, this implies “sector blurring”, which, it is important to note, can result in negative impacts on networking across the three sectors (Koliba et al., 2011, p. 251). Considering that a stakeholder, any group or individual, can “affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives” (Michell, Agle, and Wood, 1997, p. 869), sector blurring makes multi-stakeholders’ interrelations even more complicated and difficult to define. On the basis of three attributes (power, legitimacy, and urgency) of stakeholders, seven types of stakeholders⁶ (dormant, discretionary, demanding, dominant, dangerous, dependent, and definitive) can be characterized. This overall conceptualization scheme allowed the present study to delve into the concept of multi-stakeholders in PPPs as it applies to the field of arts and culture and the conduct of diplomacy.

This study first distinguishes Public Actors (the main actors in diplomacy) from Cultural Actors (those taking on the role of boundary spanning both at home and abroad). Public Actors can be defined as Government, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Culture, Governmental Agencies, Arms-length Institutions, and others. Cultural Actors can be divided into three sectors: Public Sector (publicly owned institutions such as national museums, public arts galleries, state orchestras, performing arts public companies, etc.), the Private Sector (profit-making institutions like commercial galleries), and the Nonprofit Sector (international festival organizations, civil organizations, volunteers, etc) (Table 1). Specific organizations and institutions under the rubrics of these typologies can differ, depending on the degree of institutionalization regarding the NPD, NCD, and ICR of a state government.

⁶ The seven types are (1) *Dormant Stakeholders*, whose power to impose their will on a firm remains unused because of not having legitimate relationships or an urgent claim; (2) *Discretionary Stakeholders*, who possess the attribute of legitimacy, but have no power to influence the firm and no urgent claims; (3) *Demanding Stakeholders*, those with urgent claims without having power or legitimacy; (4) *Dominant Stakeholders*, who possess both powerful and legitimate influence, and as such are likely to form the dominant coalition; (5) *Dangerous Stakeholders*, those with urgency and power, but no legitimacy, who used to be coercive and violent; (6) *Dependent Stakeholders*, those having urgent legitimate claims without much power, depending on others for any power they might have or acquire; (7) *Definitive Stakeholders*, those possessing both power and legitimacy, being part of the firm’s dominant coalition and having a clear and immediate mandate to attend to and give priority to those stakeholders’ claims (Michell et al., 1997. p. 872).

Table 1 Typologies of Multi-stakeholders in Cultural Diplomacy (CD)

Public Actors	Cultural Actors (Home and Foreign)		
	Public Sector	Nonprofit Sector	Private Sector
Government, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Culture, Governmental Agencies, Arms-length Institutions	National Museums, Public Arts Galleries, State Orchestras, Performing Arts Public Companies etc.	International Festival Organizations, Civil Organizations, Non-Governmental Organizations, Volunteers etc.	Profit-Making Institutions, Commercial Galleries, Commercial Theaters, Agencies of Classical Music Orchestras etc.

The present study looked at NPD through the lens of PPPs to search for a new approach to CD, as there are several documents regarding partnership PD activities, whereas scholars in the field of CD have yet to deal with partnership discourse in their theory-building. Assuming that NPD is an umbrella concept for NCD, it is expected that a comprehensive theoretical perspective on PPPs in NPD will enable the development of conceptual frameworks for PPPs in NCD and thus provide valuable insights to multi-stakeholders in the field of arts and culture.

Increasingly, PD⁷ focuses on PPPs and collaborations as globalization spurs multidimensional network environments, power shifts in the world order, and heteropolarity. PD needs to consider the missing dimensions of the politics of PD, namely ‘vision and mission’ and ‘ways of work’ (Brown, 2013). In this context, the role of relationships within PD recently has been explored by some scholars (Arsenault and Cowan, 2008, Hocking, 2008, Zaharna, 2010, Fisher, 2013), while others have posited that the nature of PD is its ability to span boundaries, building networks among ideals, customs, and political communities (Cohen, 1969, Tushman, 1977). Hocking and Zaharna particularly apply, to PD, the concepts of ‘boundary spanners’ and ‘network weavers’ as borrowed from the field of network analysis (Krebs, 2002, Rogers, 1995, Valente, 2010); these concepts, which offer the potential for any actors in a network to influence outcomes (Fisher, 2013), have become focal points of network approaches to PD.

PPPs, meanwhile, have spread widely in industrialized, emerging, and developing economies since the early 1990s. The recent PPP trends show diverse fields of application in practice, and multidisciplinary approaches to PPP definitions in theory. From Welfare State theory to New Public Management theory and Governance, the definition of PPPs is still hotly contested by a number of scholars (Bovaird, 2010), and thus, there is no consensus on how to define PPPs or how to catch up with the relevant recent trends. Nevertheless, PPPs serve to signify the importance of governance (Rhodes, 1997, Kooiman, 1993, Kickert, Klijin, and Koppenjan, 1997). In line with the recent trends, the aforementioned PPPs and collaborations in the conduct of NPD have occurred in the context of the privatization of PD activities, which is exemplified by the creation

⁷ In this section, both terms, PN and NPD, will be used interchangeably, though without any intention of skewing scholars’ original meanings or intentions with respect to their own arguments.

of the Salzburg Seminar, the Amerika Institute in Munich, the German Association for American Studies (GAAS), and so on (Fisher, 2013).

This paper argues that there are commonalities between NPD and PPPs, as follows. First, both arose and became widespread in multidimensional networked environments as means of coping, policy- and policy-performance-wise, with the complexity of an increasingly multidirectional world. Second, in both cases, actors have morphed into multi-stakeholders who are increasingly interdependent, which fact has resulted in multi-hubs and multi-direction policy performance. Additionally, in the course of conducting either NPD or PPPs, mutual benefits should be pursued; that is, both NPD and PPPs can be seen as the policy fruits of multi-stakeholders' performances in seeking mutual benefits through interdependencies in multidimensional network environments.

A New Approach to Public-Private Partnerships

Huxham (1993) asserts that collaborative advantage is associated with 'the creation of synergy created between collaborating organizations' and signifies the importance of achieving 'higher-level meta-objectives; objectives for society as a whole rather than just for the participating organizations' (p. 603). In the development of the idea of collaborative advantage, Huxham insists that successful collaboration is achieved when each participating organization has reached their individual goals that could not have been achievable without the help of other, collaborating organizations. There is also the possibility that overall, higher-level objectives can be fulfilled. Thus, voluntary collaboration requires that each organization consider, in order to justify their collaborative efforts, the individual benefits that can be gained by such participation. Relationship-oriented approaches to collaboration can be explained in this way also if we consider the perspectives of empowerment or conflict resolution. Rather than to secure a competitive advantage, collaboration often is done to legitimize activities and resource investments as well as to attain the individual goals of the participating organization and promote the possibility of reaching higher-level objectives. Huxham defines 'collaboration as a means of tackling social issues' by presenting such key themes as 'community development, community empowerment, coordinated service provision, environmental issues, conflict resolution, health and social policy development' (Huxham, 1996, p. 16).

It is notable that collaborative advantage, an idea that emerged in the late twentieth century, provides market, quasi-market and contractualized relationships with an alternative to public management reform; also, it emphasizes the significance of delivering programs for the welfare state by having public service organizations at arm's length from the existing bureaucratic and hierarchical attributes (Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998). Further, Huxham and Vangen (2013) provide overviews of a selection of conceptualizations and frameworks pertaining to the management of goals, trust, culture, and leadership on the basis of the theory of collaboration advantage, a practice-based theory about management collaboration that was derived from practitioners' concerns over partnerships. They argue that collaboration is paradoxical in that the potential for collaborative advantage exists because inherent contradictions and mutually exclusive

elements also exist, and thus, that there is a tension between ‘*Collaborative Advantage*—the synergy that can be created through joint working—and Collaborative Inertia—the tendency for collaborative activities to be frustratingly slow to produce output or uncomfortably conflict ridden’ (p. 52).

In particular, power sharing is an important factor that affects behaviors, and so careful intervention and management are necessary for collaborative advantage. Managing collaboration is “a highly complex endeavor” (Huxham and Vangen, 2013, p. 66). In a similar vein, Kamensky and Burlin (2004) emphasize that collaboration between public and private actors can become more effective through networks and partnerships. Whereas these new approaches are difficult for many governments and leaders, due to their differences from past approaches, they can achieve positive results that citizens care about. The bureaucratic model, focusing on individual, result-based agencies, has changed to a more customer-centered approach. Certainly, networks and partnerships are becoming more efficient tools for the achievement of national objectives.

Through this approach, the present study defined PPPs as collaborative networks of interdependences based on structures of governance and processes with multiple, public sector (the State and bureaucrats) and private sector (private institutions, individuals, or civilians) stakeholders all in pursuit of higher-level, public and mutual objectives. This affords the ability to cope with the complexity of an increasingly multidirectional world, to increase mutual benefits within the given context or institutional settings, and to achieve good governance and accountability for civil society.

It is imperative that *interdependence* between public and private actors maximizes effectiveness, because combining resources and sharing across sectors can increase problem-solving capacities. The notion behind ‘interdependence’ is ‘resource dependence’. Resource dependence in fact was an important driver of the development of PPPs since the mid-1970s, given especially the increasing constraints on public resources. This caused governmental organizations to consider whether multi-agency partnerships including public and private sectors could offer more resource efficiency. Therefore, the present study began with resource dependency as a unit of analysis to inductively draw propositions as to what affects the feasibility of partnerships in public and cultural diplomacies.

According to Börzel and Risse (2005), *resource dependency* issues have emerged since the mid-1970s, when dependency on resources from external sources began to play a huge role in UK public service agencies’ ability to form partnerships. The past 40 years have seen increased constraints on public resources, causing those agencies to reach out to new financial sources and work together with public, private, voluntary, and community organizations. The use of existing resources better spurs innovation and synergy. These interdependent relationships also allow for the securing of new resources in the forms of grants or market access. This phenomenon has led to the emergence of partnerships between public and private actors, which have offered more resource efficiency. The types of multi-agency partnerships can reduce duplication of resources and allow for sharing of overheads, which fosters innovation and the ability to overcome public resource constraints.

To obtain more insights, this study delved into the theoretical roots, namely Resource Dependence Theory, which was initiated and developed by Pfeffer and Salancik ([1978] 2003). This theory is based around three themes. The first is that organizations are parts of networks and interdependent with others. External sources are looked to for the appropriation of financial, physical, and informational resources, giving the name to this Resource Dependence Theory. Secondly, organizations are able to maneuver themselves in some respects, so as to relieve the obvious constraints that come from this dependence. Lastly, intra- and inter-organizational behavior can be better understood by looking at the constructs of power. Stemming from the ideas of dependence, interdependence, constraints, and mitigation of those constraints, is the importance of social power. Additionally, Pfeffer (1987) succinctly explains that internal power dynamics also have an effect on external resource dependencies in that the individuals or groups within organizations that are able to minimize uncertainties and assist with securing resources hold more power because of their critical roles in helping the organization prosper. This point of view enables this study to determine the second and the third units of analysis—*trust* and *risk*.

Trust also can be associated with an accountability structure overlapping the three sectors (Public, Private and Nonprofit), within which structure, initiatives in the forms of partnerships and networks among multi-stakeholders have arisen. In the PPPs literature, trust plays an important role in the interdependence of various actors. Tsasis (2009) argues that one organization can benefit from another, that several organizations can all be interdependent, and that there are other, non-economic variables such as trust, relationship building, goals, and consensus, that create interdependence among competitive organizations. Also, he found that inter-organizational relationships require both dependence and autonomy. Positive attributes including attitudes and trust at the personal level between and among respective organizations' personnel build positive relationships. This study found that interdependencies among organizations can be associated with collaborative relations, international trust, and the mitigation of uncertainties, because they require social interactions among actors beyond boundaries.

The relationships among trust, uncertainty, and risk were delineated by Yamagishi, Cook, and Watabe (1998). Their argument underlines that social interactions with others face the problem of social uncertainty. While people interact with others to benefit themselves, interactions also create vulnerabilities, because people are constantly seeking to improve themselves while taking the risk of incurring costs. Establishing trust is a solution to this problem of social uncertainty, defined as 'existing for an actor when (1) his or her interaction partner has an incentive to act in a way that imposes costs (or harm) on the actor and (2) the actor does not have enough information to predict if the partner will in fact act in such a way' (p. 170). Therefore, it is imperative to have an interpersonal level of trust through collaboration in interdependencies.

As abovementioned, *risk* is closely associated with trust when interdependencies occur in the form of partnerships. Risk, in relation to trust, is the flip side of the coin, and inevitably affects whether partnerships among multi-stakeholders are initiated, implemented and executed. Thus, the present study regarded risk as the third unit of analysis.

In a similar vein to Yamagishi et al. (1998), Adobor (2006) stresses the role of personal relationships in inter-firm alliances. Whereas strategic alliances can be beneficial for organizations and increase competitiveness, there are risks entailed. These risks can be reduced by relying on personal relationships, which provide the foundation for trust building and long-term commitment, rather than relying on entire organizations to form relationships. Key individuals within the organization can provide representation and build trust, but there must be a balance between using these ties for advancement and understanding their limitations (p. 477-85). Therefore, Lowndes and Skelcher (1998) argue that partnerships must consider more than simply resource interdependence. This includes integration in an ever increasingly fragmented environment. Organizations are becoming more decentralized, power coming to be distributed to several different units. There are also an increasing number of organizations involved, which may cause difficulties in dealing with all stakeholders and incur risks in not proceeding with collaboration. Nevertheless, partnerships create a web of connections among multiple organizations, thereby increasing interdependency and spurring collaborative efforts to achieve common goals (p. 315).

This study defined *Resource Dependence* as inter-organizational collaborative relations caused by the flow of financial resources in competitive interdependent situations. Trust means that an interpersonal level of trust brings about international trust by mitigating uncertainty; Risk is the difficulty in dealing with all stakeholders involved in proceeding with collaboration. We considered both trust and risk as factors affecting the feasibility of partnerships in public and cultural diplomacies. Based on this, we formulated three propositions (Yin, 2009) for our case study, as follows:

P1⁸ : The greater the degree of resource dependence, the higher the likelihood of partnership across the public, private, and nonprofit sectors.

P2: A high degree of trust will be associated with positive partnerships among multi-stakeholders in the three sectors.

P3: A high degree of risk will be associated with negative partnerships among multi-stakeholders in the three sectors.

These three propositions, drawn from an inductive approach to PPPs, lay the theoretical foundations for the explanation of the recent phenomenon of multi-stakeholders and partnerships and what affects the feasibility of partnerships in public and cultural diplomacies. The present study, following the difference systems design (Ragin, 1994), selected Germany and South Korea as the case study subjects, since they represent contrasting instances of state governance and the institutionalization of public and cultural diplomacies.

Case Study

⁸ P=Propositions of the study

Germany and South Korea

Not only with regard to the obvious issue of reunification, but also for a wider range of research areas, analogies between South and North Korea and West and East Germany have been widely drawn (Habermas, 1996, Paik, 1996, Metzler, [1996] 2014, Inglehart, 2000, Merkel 2009, Brubaker and Kim, 2011).

More pertinently to present purposes, governance and institutionalization of NPD, NCD, and ICR in those countries have had, according to our literature review, significant impacts on how multi-stakeholders in cultural affairs are associated with partnerships. We found, as already alluded to above, that the embedded governance systems of Germany (federalism) and South Korea (presidential system) differ from each other. Additionally, the two cases show opposite directions with respect to the paths followed to institutionalize NPD, NCD, and ICR in recent years. Germany broadened the concept of CD into ICR, and recently adopted NPD. By contrast, South Korea rigorously initiated and implemented NPD with a focus on CD, and then institutionalized ICR. These divergent approaches of Germany and South Korea to NPD, NCD, and ICR provide rationales as to why and how different modes of governance and institutionalization affect multi-stakeholders of PPPs in public and cultural diplomacies. In its comparison of the two nations, our case study focused on three themes: 1) the historical perspective; 2) the institutional arrangements, and 3) the legal grounds for cultural policy and CD.

From the historical perspective, there is a significant similarity for West Germany and South Korea in having had an ideological opponent within a divided nation (1949–1990 and 1950–present, respectively). There are also some similarities between the two countries in terms of each nation's goals and objectives over time. Government-led CD was conducted in early West Germany (Adenauer era) and South Korea (from dictator President Park Jung-hee to democratically elected President Roh Tae-woo) in order to compensate for the negative image perceived by the rest of the world and to cope with ideological opponents—East Germany and North Korea, respectively. The role of the German Directorate Culture of the Federal Foreign Office can be compared with that of the Ministry of Culture of the South Korean government at the times of Adenauer era of Germany and South Korea's authoritarian Park regime.

The different cultures and systems of governance of Germany and Korea have led to very different impacts on the development of cultural and public diplomacies. Germany never uses the term 'public diplomacy' officially, instead preferring 'cultural diplomacy'; and yet, Germany has been ranked number one in PD in a couple of polls (Nation Brand Index, BBC Country Rating Polls). Germany's PD is regarded as a good example of what Nye (2011) highlights when saying that the best propaganda is conducted when there is no propaganda (Nye, 2011, p. 101). Nevertheless, the prelude of PD was seen in Kozeption 2000 (Auer and Srugies, 2013), and more recently, PD was installed within the central government. After conducting an extensive review on foreign policy in 2014 under Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier's leadership in his second term, the Federal Foreign Office created, in the second half of 2017, the following PD subdivisions: (1) Public Diplomacy on European Policy under European Directorate-General, (2) Public Diplomacy, Civil Society, Academia under Directorate-General for International Order, the United Nations and

Arms Control, and (3) Public Diplomacy under Directorate-General for culture and Communication.

By contrast, South Korea has shown rapid development in actively incorporating PD into foreign policy objectives since the Cultural Affairs Bureau and the Public Diplomacy Division were established in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) in 2010 after the Presidential Council on Nation Branding in 2009. Although criticisms of the redundancy of cultural programs of the Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism were prevalent, MOFA created new activities and programs, identified PD-related activities in existing programs, and sought for a concerted effort, through partnerships with other ministries, to embrace PD-related programs; consequently, in 2016, South Korea enacted the new Public Diplomacy Act (Ayhan, 2016a). This Act enables MOFA to coordinate and cooperate with other ministries more effectively; consequently, MOFA recently released a five year plan (2017-2021) to clarify the country's objectives and strategies for PD policy with three pillars of PD—Cultural Diplomacy, Knowledge Diplomacy, and Policy Advocacy Diplomacy.

In terms of the legal grounds for cultural policy and CD, in Germany, Article 30 of the Fundamental Law stipulates that culture and arts are matters that fall under the jurisdiction of the Länder. This is deeply rooted in the Cultural Federalism of West Germany. As such, each state has a cultural policy bureau that implements its own cultural policies according to its peculiar regional characteristics. Länder governments routinely organize cultural-minister conferences to consult on cultural policies and discuss matters of common interest. The federal government does not have a department in charge of culture; rather, the federal government is only indirectly involved in cultural policies, in ways that include the protection of cultural assets, the prevention of the smuggling of those assets overseas, and the application of international laws related to culture, copyright, and publications (Cho, 2007, Lee, 2015, Jung, 2015).

On the other hand, South Korea's Fundamental Law of Culture law, Article 5, signifies the importance of maintaining a balance between central and local governments to reduce the cultural gap between people in metropolitan cities and people in outlying regions. Under this law, a cultural impact assessment system to enhance the quality of people's lives is run by presidential executive order. More recently, the International Cultural Relations Act gave authority to the Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism to conduct cultural affairs abroad. This might conflict with the Public Diplomacy Act, which enables the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to coordinate and conduct PD activities across central governments, government affiliated agencies as well as local governments (The National Law Information Center).

The contrasting systems of governance of Germany and South Korea lead to a significant difference in institutionalization. Cultural federalism in West Germany, which is considered a decentralized mode of governance, mitigates the role of the central government, enhances the role of the Länder and municipalities, and gives autonomy to arms-length institutions such as the Goethe Institute and the World Culture House. On the contrary, South Korea's CD tends to be influenced by the Presidential Office and thus, its development depends on how a president's administration leads the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Culture. Within this

centralized mode of governance, the two main public actors, the Korea Foundation and the Korea Culture Center, are in parallel, because they are subordinate to different ministries—the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Culture. This shows how these two nations’ cultural diplomacies have been profoundly shaped by sharply differing governance structures.

Methodology and Research Procedure

Based on the formulation of our propositions, we conducted an exploratory case study. This methodology, chosen due to the lack of research on PPPs of multi-stakeholders in public and cultural diplomacies and the need for a qualitative analysis, yielded new insights for better understanding of the phenomenon (Yin, 2009, Ayhan, 2016b).

Unstructured interviews were conducted with cultural officials in both Germany and South Korea from March to June, 2015, based on ‘focus groups’ for the purpose of our comparative case study of the different systems’ designs. The cultural officials included public actors who had had more than 10 years of experience in the field of international cultural relations along with private actors who had been recommended by the public actors as effective partners. These interviewees acted as informants, providing their opinions on the feasibility and success of CD partnerships within their respective organizations. A content analysis of their responses provided qualitative data that could be applied to a descriptive analysis. The object was to determine whether the predicted partnerships were actually affected by resource dependence, trust, and risk when multi-stakeholders were involved in a project. Through a snowball sampling procedure, this study also scrutinized how the role of public actors of CD affects the multi-layered stakeholders, entities, and actors in the network. The unstructured interviews were conducted face-to-face and took place at each interviewee’s office or work site.

Unstructured Interviews

The unstructured interviews, consisting of each with twenty-four questions (divided into four sections) drawn from applied PPPs theory, were designed. The questionnaires, developed based on a literature review of multi-stakeholders and PPPs, provided the criteria for interpretation of the findings without any validity or replication concerns. Therefore, the interviewees and we went through all of the questions together, which took approximately one hour and a half. During the survey, each interviewee added comments to his or her answers as necessary, and we asked at the end of the interview for further descriptions or explications of specific programs mentioned during the survey and for the interviewee’s personal opinions on the current system of international cultural activities facilitated by state actors or private initiatives, as well as desirable institutional arrangements for CD (Table 3).

Six unstructured interviews were conducted with cultural actors: two German public actors (a Goethe Institute executive and a diplomatic official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the

German Federal Government)⁹; two South Korean public actors (an executive from the Korea Foundation and a manager from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Korean Government)¹⁰; one German private actor (chosen by German public actors as one of the most successful cases of German cultural activities in partnership with the Korean private sector), and one Korean private actor (indicated by Korean public actors as one of the most successful cases of South Korean cultural partnership programs held abroad).

Table 2 Research Design

Purpose	Applied Method	Interviewees' Demographics
To determine whether the predicted partnerships are actually affected by resource dependence, trust, and risk when multi-stakeholders are involved in a project	Unstructured, face-to-face interview	German public actors (2) 1 executive at the Goethe Institute 1 diplomatic official at MFA German private actor (1) successful case selected by one of the public interviewees South Korean public actors (2) 1 executive at KF 1 manager at MFA Korean private actor (1) successful case selected by one of the public interviewees
Total number of interviewees: 6		

Questionnaire for Explorative Case Study

As an important case study tool, the questionnaire is carefully designed on the basis of the relevant theoretical background. It is composed of four sections: (1) the respondent's information; (2) the respondent's subjective perception of better partnership between public and private actors; (3) the

⁹ The German public cultural actors were identified through archival research as follows: Foreign Office, Federal Commissioner for Cultural and Media Affairs (BKM), other ministries (Federal Ministry of Education and Research, Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development), and intermediary organizations funded by the Federal Foreign Office (Goethe Institute (GI), German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), Institute for Foreign Cultural Relations (ifa), Alexander von Humboldt Foundation (AvH), and the German UNESCO Commission (DUK)).

¹⁰ The Korean public cultural actors were identified through archival research as follows: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Culture, Sports, Tourism, Korean Culture, other ministries, and intermediary organizations (Korea Foundation, and Information Service, Arts Council Korea (ARKO), Korea Arts Management Service (KAMS), King Sejong Institute).

respondent’s subjective perception of successful partnership; and (4) the respondent’s subjective perception of unsuccessful partnership.

The first section asks about the extent of work experience in the field of international cultural relations, the interviewee’s position in his/her work place, and gender. The second section asks the interviewee to choose which statement(s) best describes cultural actors in the public domain or cultural actors in the private domain. The interviewees were allowed multiple choices among Public, Not-for-profit, For-profit, and None in cases where more than one category was relevant. Table 3 shows the factors related to the statements, and indicates the further statements that were developed on the basis of practice in cultural affairs. The domain is divided into three categories, the public sector, the private sector, and nonprofit sector. In consideration of possible cases in which the given statement fits none of the categories, the questionnaire provides a ‘None’ column.

Table 3 The Second Section of the Questionnaire

Literature Domain	Variables	Statements	Indicators
Resource Dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978)	Resource dependence (P1)	It is easy to share financial burdens with partners if necessary.	Domain of three categories: public, private, nonprofit sectors ‘Public’ to indicate cultural actors in the public sector such as national museums, public art galleries, state orchestras, performing arts public companies, etc.
		It is easy to receive financial support from other sources if necessary.	
Social Uncertainty (Yamagishi et al, 1998)	Trust (P2)	I trust the identity of partners.	‘Not-for-profit,’ nonprofit sector, with examples being international festival organizations, civic organizations, volunteers, etc. ‘For profit’ to identify profit-making institutions in private sector such as commercial galleries.
		I trust the competence of partners in the field of arts and culture.	
		It is expected that partners will contribute to the development of domestic arts and culture.	
		It is expected that partners will contribute to raising awareness of our national image abroad.	
Social Uncertainty (Adobor, 2006)	Risk (P3)	In the preparation stage, difficulties caused by partners are likely to happen.	‘None,’ in the case that the given statement fits none of Public, Not-for-profit, For profit.
		In the process stage, difficulties caused by partners are likely to happen.	
		Risk management is relatively easy.	
		Risk sharing with partners is feasible.	

		Risk transfer to partners is possible.	
		Risk assessment can be conducted.	

The third section, asking about a respondent’s most successful case, consists of 11 questions (for which the best answers are chosen from among 5-7 options) and evaluation of partnership in successful cases (checking the best answer, “Yes”, “No”, and “Don’t Know”, for 27 statements). The fourth section provides the same questions and evaluation as the third section, and additionally asks about the respondent’s least successful case in order to derive success determinants from a comparison of failure with success. Table 4 summarizes main variables, questionnaires and indicators/values.

Table 4 The Third/ Fourth Section of Questionnaires

Literature Domain	Variables	Questionnaires	Indicators/Values
Social Sector Model (Koliba et al., 2011)	Multi-stakeholders	-When you think about the case of international cultural relations, which one was your partner? (5.1. successful case, 6.2. unsuccessful case)	Public, Not-for-Profit, Profit
Resource Dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978)	Resource Dependence (P1)	- What was the financial structure? (5.8. successful case, 6.8. unsuccessful case)	Direct state sponsorship, Indirect state sponsorship, Direct non-state sponsorship, Indirect non-state sponsorship, Shared with partners’ sponsorship
Collaborative Advantage Theory (Huxham, 1993, Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998, Huxham and Vangen, 2013)	Multi-stakeholders in partnerships	-What was your role? (multiple answers are acceptable) (5.10. successful case, 6.10. unsuccessful case) -What was your partner's role? (multiple answers are acceptable) (5.11. successful case, 6.11. unsuccessful case)	<your role> Supervising the activity, Managing the activity, Liaison with host country/organization, Facilitating ideas, Providing financial support, Providing manpower, Providing technical support <hr/> <partner’s role> Participation/performance at the event/program/activity, Contribution to program development, Contribution to

			taking initiatives on a program in an early stage of ideation, Providing professional knowledge, Sharing financial burdens, Building new networks with foreign publics, Sustaining current relationships with foreign publics
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Findings of the Case Study

Analysis of Proposition 1

Proposition 1 theorized a positive association with resource dependence such that a greater degree of resource dependency among sectors would tend to bring more partnerships between public and private actors. The survey revealed that the likelihood of partnership is not necessarily affected by the degree of resource dependency. Only the South Korean private actor agreed with the statement, while three interviewees (two German public actors and one Korean public actor) disagreed. The remaining interviewees (one German private actor and one Korean public actor) checked the “don’t know” option in response.

Both German public actors and the South Korean public actor who disagreed with this proposition emphasized that the primary concern for entering into partnerships with private sector actors was “public purpose” rather than resource dependence. For public actors, resources can be considered in relation to two concepts: “expertise on arts and culture” and “financial resources.” According to the responses from public actors, they generally take the role of providing grants or funding for international projects, and those who receive the grants or funds, usually individual artists or nonprofit organizations, are likely to provide “expertise on arts and culture” such as visual arts, performing arts, or platforms for artists instead of “sharing financial burdens.” Additionally, public actors tend to put more emphasis on whether their decisions on grants and funds for international projects can, in turn, contribute to the development of domestic arts and culture, which refers to “public responsibility and support” for arts and culture. Therefore, although cultural actors in the public sector, such as national galleries, public museums, and city orchestras, previously had a large enough budget to share financial burdens, public actors try to involve more private actors (individual artists) in the hopes that public grants will turn into “seed money” for developing the domestic arts industry. Even the one Korean public actor who replied “don’t know” emphasized that “public responsibility and public purpose are the most important when considering partnership.” Further, not only individual artists but also for-profit companies are likely to enter into partnerships with public actors only when they have a “not-for-profit purpose.”

One German public actor gave an example of partnering with a Korean private company as a successful case and highlighted “innovation” coming from partnerships across sectors; thus, the actor asserted, public actors’ partnerships with private companies should be encouraged under the

condition of not-for-profit purposes. Likewise, the Korean public actor who disagreed with this proposition signified that “innovation” can be created by the synergy of partnerships with private sectors, particularly small and medium-sized art companies who fear criticism of their artistry, creativity, or experimental performances. Another German public actor and a Korean public actor also stressed that grants should be given to benefit the public because the funds consist of taxpayers’ money.

The individual who agreed with this proposition was the South Korean private actor, who said that a grant or funds from the public sector is mandatory for him to proceed with collaborative arts projects with foreign artists, because his projects are not likely to be funded by the private sector due to a lack of commercial interest. He also expressed that a partnership with the private sector is sometimes more desirable than a partnership with the public sector, because of increased work efficiency (“quick decision making processes and less complicated administrative work”). However, what hinders partnerships with the private sector, in his opinion, is the fact that the results of projects carry higher expectations of commercial success in the private sector. Therefore, he has to depend on public grants or funds instead.

This response is similar to that of the German private actor who chose “don’t know” in regard to this proposition. He emphasized that although it is preferable to work with private foundations for efficiency, public funds and grants are the most important source for artists to create new projects. He was unsure whether resource dependency affects PPPs and signified that the reason behind partnerships with the public sector is to raise their reputation by “publicness,” not because of resource dependency. As to partnerships with the private sector, he said that difficulties come from the necessity of commercial success, because an artist’s artistry does not always meet private companies’ demands; thus, the commercial standards of the private sector discourage creativity, experimental spirit, and innovation. In short, private actors in both nations tend to forge partnerships with public actors in order to express their artistry without profit-making purposes. In this respect, we conclude that “interdependence of resources” can provide a strong incentive for private actors to have partnerships with the public sector.

Analysis of Proposition 2

Proposition 2 predicted that the dimension of trust would have a positive association with partnerships among multi-stakeholders in the public, private, and nonprofit sectors. Our unstructured interviews showed that trust had a positive impact on partnerships, since five of the six interviewees responded “yes.” One German public actor chose “don’t know” because trust is an important factor to “maintain existing partnerships,” but in the beginning stages there are other things to consider such as “artistry,” “reputation,” and “creativity” of partners. Excluding this, all of the other interviewees agreed with Proposition 2 by emphasizing that trust had positive impacts on every stage of partnering (initiation, implementation, execution, and evaluation) and determined whether the partnership would continue for future projects.

In particular, one Korean public actor emphasized the significance of the role of the contact person, particularly in the cases of small and medium-sized organizations in the private sector, stating that “we [Korean public actors] know that high-quality artistic performance is created by small and medium-sized organizations because they are not afraid of anything and they are pretty much artistry-driven rather than commercially-driven like large organizations in the private sector, but what makes us hesitant is that they are not well-systemized and organized. Here comes the risk.” This statement implies that trust is closely related to risk and that trust can be inspired by the contact person of a small or medium-sized organization.

Both German and Korean private actors similarly responded that there is no doubt of the importance of trust when working with public actors, because public organizations already have “publicness” and “reputation.” However, favorability toward public actors determines whether partnerships are developed, and this depends on the public actor’s degree of expertise in arts and culture. The German private actor expressed that “it is much more favorable to work with public actors who have a professional perspective, which makes me trust their organizations in terms of artistry.” A Korean private actor also puts more value on a public sector person in charge. This person said: “Once I trust the official, the partnership tends to be successful and it is more likely to yield projects in the future.” Therefore, trust that is formed at the individual level positively affects the institutional levels of partnerships.

Analysis of Proposition 3

Proposition 3 predicted that high degrees of risk will be associated with negative partnerships among multi-stakeholders in the public, private, and nonprofit sectors. The unstructured interviews proved this proposition to be correct. Risk has a negative association with partnerships, as all of the interviewees answered “yes” to this proposition. However, it is important to note that in the pre-partnership stage, taking risks can lower the possibility of actualizing partnerships, but can also bring about innovation. When it comes to “risk taking bringing innovation,” one Korean public actor mentioned that risk comes from small or less reputable organizations, but that it is hard to deny that innovative works of art come from small and medium-sized organizations or individual artists. He explained that “incubating innovative organizations and artists is essential work for public actors because we [Korean public actors] are injecting public money for the purpose of publicness. Absolutely, they are the driving force of our domestic arts industry and, in turn, the domestic arts industry contributes to national culture and identity, and finally we have substance to promote abroad.” Therefore, risks not only have negative impacts on partnerships at every stage, but also have the potential to generate innovation.

Additional Findings of the Unstructured Interviews

In addition to the three propositions drawn from the analytical frameworks of the multi-stakeholders, this study closely examined subjective perceptions of partnerships with both public

and private actors and differences between Germany's and Korea's CD. The role of government or the public sector could be differentiated from the role of the private sector regardless of the differences between the two nations. First, this study outlined how public actors in CD view partnerships with private actors. Second, this study inferred how private actors subjectively evaluate partnerships with public actors.

There were six characteristics drawn from public actors' subjective perceptions of partnerships with the private sector. First, "mutual trust" is the most significant factor in every stage of the project because it affects the effectiveness of CD activities and the long-term relations with the partner. Second, "program budgets and execution" make PD activities realistic. Thus, public actors tend to choose cultural actors in the public sector to reduce financial concerns, because they generally have sufficient financial resources compared with cultural actors in the private sector. The sharing of financial burdens often drives partnerships with cultural actors in the public domain as opposed to the other sectors. Third, "innovations" come from taking risks. This is because cultural actors in the public sector tend to have stable performances, standardized performing formats, and relatively high reputations with sufficient financial and human resources. In turn, national cultural actors tend to be rigid and to sustain existing frameworks (in terms of institutional structure and the process of performing practice). In contrast, cultural actors in private and nonprofit sectors are flexible in seeking creativity and innovation to compete with others, which often results in greater competency in artistry compared with cultural actors in the public sector. At the same time, cultural actors in the private and nonprofit sectors are more likely to pursue changes and be innovative in their artistic performance. This can be a strong incentive for both public and private actors to enter into partnerships with each other. In this analysis, three public actors intuitively chose domestic private actors for partnerships. Only one German public actor preferred partnerships with foreign private actors. Fourth, it is important to ensure the "commitment/ownership" of private actors throughout a project. Public actors from both nations blamed the lack of commitment/ownership of private actors in the least successful cases. Fifth, "unexpected situations" occur not only because of unreliable partners, but because of changes in government policy, top management, heads of governmental agencies, and other contingencies. Lastly, public actors define the success of projects as completion of the process of governance including initiation, implementation, execution, evaluation, and consideration of future partnerships.

Meanwhile, four characteristics were identified through private actors' subjective perceptions of partnerships with the public sector. First, "publicness" is a strong incentive to develop partnerships with public institutions as noted in Propositions 1 and 2. Second, "grant-seeking/financial support" is another incentive, which depends on the size of private actors. For private actors, incentives include not only motivations, but also role capabilities and contributions. Third, it is requested that public actors have more trust in their partners' performance and less control over budget execution. Too much administrative process within the public sector hinders the quality of projects. Fourth, successful partnership depends on whether the public manager in charge of the project is capable of offering expertise; hence, unsuccessful partnerships come from a lack of ownership of the public

manager in charge. All of the German and Korean private actors tended to choose domestic public actors when comparing successful partnerships and unsuccessful partnerships.

Furthermore, this study determines that there is an additional category of “for-profit, but non-profit purpose” actors in the private sector, which makes for an additional category of stakeholders in CD, as indicated in Table 5 (see the shaded column on the right side).

Table 5 Revised Category of Stakeholders in Cultural Diplomacy (CD)

Public Actors	Cultural Actors (Home and Foreign)			
	Public Sector	Nonprofit Sector	Private Sector	
			For-profit	For-profit, but non-profit purpose
Government, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Culture, Governmental Agencies, Arms-length Institutions	National Museums, Public Arts Galleries, State Orchestras, Performing Arts Public Companies etc.	International Festival Organizations, Civil Organizations, Non-Governmental Organizations, Volunteers etc.	Profit Making Institutions, Commercial Galleries, Commercial Theaters, Agencies of Classical Music Orchestra etc.	Profit-Making Companies Exceptionally Collaborate without Any Commercial Purposes

Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research

Although the present study contributes to the refinement of the definitions of multi-stakeholders and PPPs in public and cultural diplomacies in attempting an empirical study, it has a limitation in having examined only two cases and interviewed only a small number of interviewees. These facts incur potential further limitations in the interpretation of the unstructured interview findings, which could lead to generalization of propositions. Since the research questions were designed to avoid validity and replication concerns, it was impossible for us to modify the questionnaires in the course of the study. It is up to readers to have an open mind in further exploring and investigating new insights into the topic. Also, the fact that we relied on a series of subjective responses to describe ostensibly objective partnerships (which necessitated a brief word on our standards of interpretation), might limit the generalizability of our findings.

Our aim was to uncover differences in the responses given by Germans and Koreans to questions related to resource dependence, trust, and risk that characterize their multi-stakeholders in partnerships based on different modes of governance. Nonetheless, there was not much to report in terms of national differences; rather, the distinction between public and private actors was much more salient. Thus, the study of Germany and Korea raises future research questions as to how different modes of governance affect institutionalization of NPD, NCD, and ICR: What is the optimal level of resources needed to conduct public and cultural diplomacies in partnerships? What

constitutes incentives for public and private actors in partnerships? Which benefits and risks do public and private actors take, and how do they affect the result of public and cultural diplomacy activities?

Conclusion

By conducting unstructured interviews, this study examined partnerships in public and cultural diplomacies according to three units of analysis (resource dependence, trust, and risk) in a survey comprising 6 unstructured interviews with 2 German public actors, 2 South Korean public actors, 1 German private actor, and 1 South Korean private actor. Proposition 1, that a greater degree of resource dependency tends to bring more partnerships across the public, private, and nonprofit sectors, turns out to be false, because both public and private actors are driven by public purposes or ‘publicness,’ and therefore, the flow of resources does not affect the likelihood of partnerships. Proposition 2, that trust has a positive association with partnerships among multi-stakeholders in the three sectors, as well as Proposition 3, that high degrees of risk are associated with negative partnerships among multi-stakeholders, appear to be true.

Additionally, the survey finds that cultural actors in the for-profit sector actually participate in CD activities with non-profit purposes (the category “for-profit, but with non-profit purposes” was added to the private sector), that an interpersonal level of trust positively affects partnerships, and that ‘taking risks’ can bring ‘innovation’ to CD. There was no significant difference between German and South Korean cultural diplomacies; however, there were many commonalities, depending on actors’ roles, whether public or private. Public actors emphasize mutual trust, program budgeting and execution, as well as innovations coming from risk taking, commitment and ownership, and from unexpected situations caused by external factors. Private actors consider publicness and grant-seeking or financial support as important incentives, and want public actors to exercise more trust, professionalism, and ownership, with less control over budget execution. .

Despite ongoing cooperation between public and private actors in the field of public diplomacy, private actors are still associated mostly with CD programs and activities, because CD is rooted in private initiatives, and it is likely to remain so. However, the contexts of diplomatic functions, as altered and shaped by globalization and the information age, dictate that attention must be given to a range of new aspects of partnerships in CD. This is where the lens of PPPs enables the possibility of effective public and cultural diplomacies; in fact, the present study proves the applicability of PPP theory to public and cultural diplomacies, having obtained meaning results through a case study.

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