Democracy after Democratization: Political Crisis and Democratic Consolidation

‘Democracy’ is defined in many different ways, but in general is conceptualized as “a political system in which rulers acquire legitimacy to govern by the consent of ordinary citizens and the representatives are selected through free and fair elections”.² When we discuss democracy, it is often related to polyarchy. If the core of democratic political system is described as a polyarchy, it should meet some conditions. First, meaningful ‘competition’ among individuals or organized groups must be guaranteed. In this competition for public positions, all participants should follow predetermined rules while resorting to violence is not allowed. Second, comprehensive ‘political participation’ is permitted in selecting leaders and policies through fair elections conducted lawfully. Third, ‘political and civil freedom’ is not constrained so that the above mentioned elements are fully expressed and realized.³ Extending this concept, ‘democratic consolidation’ means that “a newly formed democratic system is sustained and attempts to return to authoritarianism or to reverse democracy are prevented.”⁴

However, polyarchy is a democracy in minimalist sense.⁵ Democratic consolidation is not automatically guaranteed after democratization. A new regime may swing back and forth between authoritarianism and democracy.⁶ For a political system to be democratic, we need more than polyarchy. Today, many debates on democracy only touch on procedural and institutional democracy, i.e. ‘electoral democracy’. This concept, however, faces criticism that electoral democracy has institutional features to elect representatives in a fair and democratic manner, but it has limitations in terms of securing the interests of minorities and promoting social tolerance, and may be limited by low civil participation. Thus, it still falls short of fully guaranteeing civil liberty and rights.⁷ Electoral democracy promotes competition among political actors. It cannot, however, in its real operation, effectively prevent the emergence of hegemonic parties nor prevent the abuse of political power. This abnormality may endanger democratic politics and bring about a competitive but authoritarian system.⁸

Therefore, we need more than simple electoral democracy and this is what we mean by democratic consolidation. Then, what constitutes a consolidated democracy? For a democracy to continue to exist and to be consolidated, both democratic institutions and the substance to operate the institutions are needed as preconditions. That is what is meant by ‘substantive’ democracy, as compared to ‘institutional’ or ‘procedural’ democracy.⁹ The level of democracy is gauged by the political orientations of political leaders and ordinary citizens. If democratic transition means institutional change, then consolidation can be understood in the context of political attitude and orientation. If ‘procedural-institutional’ means how to elect political leaders, ‘substantive’ means what political actors do and how in actual politics.¹⁰

Establishing institutional and procedural democracy in the process of democratization and democratic transition does not guarantee the success and continuity of a new democracy. Without substantive conditions such as a democratic attitude and orientation in civil society, the new democracy is vulnerable to political crisis. Newly established democratic political institutions and electoral competition are often abused by political leaders, who remain comfortable with authoritarian practices, to maintain and prolong political power. The former authoritarian political attitude and orientation of civil society, which may not adapt to the changed environment but instead repeat old practices, can invite political crisis as well. ‘Delegative’, ‘immature’, ‘imperfect’, and ‘unstable’ democracy describes such situation.¹¹ Symptoms of such political systems include imbalances of power distribution, a lack of checks and balances, the deprivation of minority political rights, unaccountable government, and corruption. If these symptoms are rampant, then it causes a return to authoritarianism or setback of democracy.¹²

The concept of ‘illiberal democracy’ is an example of distorted democracy at the stage of democratic transition and consolidation.¹³ Illiberal democracy “allows wide civil liberty, but at a critical juncture this liberty is partly or totally denied”.¹⁴ In other words, liberal and illiberal elements are all mixed in a transitional political structure and orientation of people in the transition period from authoritarianism to democracy.¹⁵ Such political systems are neither democratic nor authoritarian in terms of political attitude and orientation. On the one hand, institutionally and procedurally democratic elements are in place, unlike in authoritarian systems where political competition is not allowed. On the other hand, however, many old authoritarian political practices remain.

New democracies not only face the problem of old authoritarian legacies, but they also have to tackle new issues that spring up in the process of democratizing political structures and society.¹⁶ Politics is a process in which solutions for social issues are searched for through interactions between political leaders and people. Also it is a power phenomenon that causes political and social changes. Therefore, the attitudes and orientations of political leadership and civil society can cause political crises in the process of democratic transition and consolidation.¹⁷ The behavior and strategy of political leaders who mobilize political support and resources to fulfill specific political purposes is important in transition. In addition, low political participation of civil society and gradually increasing individualism may endanger the basis of nascent democracy. In a new democracy, if political leaders and civil society do not credit newly established political institutions and do not have mutual confidence, the political system is destined to face grave crisis.¹⁸

The new leadership style needed in the transition and consolidation stage is not a leadership of ‘order and control’, prevalent under authoritarian governance, but a leadership of ‘mediation and coordination’ that works out compromise among the competing interests. This shift from ‘order and control’ to ‘mediation and coordination’ means a transition from an authoritarian leadership to a democratic leadership.¹⁹ The most common problem with political leadership in transition periods is protracted ‘monarchical’ political leadership, a legacy of authoritarian politics. With such leadership, political leaders in transition period try to exercise absolute power, concentrating political power in their own hands. Also, the leaders attempt to rationalize the centralization of political power with people’s support and procedural-institutional justification. Political leadership has significant impacts not only in the transition period, but also during the consolidation process. In this process, the major questions to the political leadership are what tasks must be accomplished and how to best accomplish them, differentiating it from authoritarian leadership.

The political attitude and orientation of civil society is also crucial in democratic consolidation. For a democracy to function effectively, a system of checks and balances must be established, and this system must function such that civil society can feel confident that the state is acting in accordance with the laws set out in the constitution. Civil society in a postdemocratization period faces a dilemma. On the one hand, the capacity of civil society and of political actors that brought about democratization suddenly decreases after democratization. On the other hand, conflicts along ethnic and religious divisions and socioeconomic gaps emerge as major threats to new democracies.²⁰ Undemocratic attitudes and behaviors of civil society, which were grown under authoritarian suppression in the old days, must be checked incessantly. Otherwise, democratic system in post democratization period cannot be sustained. In addition, problems in civil society such as non-democratic practices, lack or weakness of organizations by which civil society can represent its interests, and the lack of healthy relationships between civil society and political parties should be fixed for a more complete democracy.^{21​​​​​​​}

In conclusion, democratic consolidation based on the substantive concept of democracy is that political actors including political leaders and civil society deem democratic institutions and procedures most appropriate and this belief is embedded and internalized in their social and political life.²² To maintain and sustain democracy, autonomy of political life and social life should be found in the context of rule of law.²³ This means that political leaders and civil society alike have to consider democratic practice as the sole ‘rule of game’ that defines political process. Political stability and social order is decided by the relationship between political leaders and ordinary citizens. Therefore, democratic consolidation requires more effort by the political leadership and civil society to embed and internalize democratic procedures and practices.

Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation:

Between Political Leadership and Civil Society

Democratization in Korea was a consequence of strategic choices made by authoritarian and democratic forces.²⁴ Since 1984, critical social movements grew in civil society, indebted to softer control of the society by the state. In 1985, the New Democratic Party emerged as the primary opposition party through the 12th general election. Since then, Korean politics has swung back and forth between negotiation and confrontation, i.e. mass mobilization against authoritarian power and coercion of it by the authoritarian power. In 1987 the government heightened the level of suppression to regain control over society. At the end, negotiations for direct popular presidential elections were shattered. The government’s attempt to conceal the death of a student protester, Park Jong Chul, who died after torture while in policy custody, was revealed. These two events dramatically ignited the June Democratic Struggle (Yuwol Minjuhangjaeng).

Essentially, democratization in Korea was a compromise between mass mobilization from the bottom and concession from the top. The compromise took the form of the “6.29 statement” (Yukigu Sunun) by then presidential candidate, Roh Tae Woo, of the ruling party. A good chance for power transition came with the 1987 presidential election and the 13th general election in 1988. A democratic force including opposition parties, however, failed to field a single candidate for the presidential election and continuously exposed internal divisions. Thus, Roh Tae Woo from the ruling party won the election. Thereafter, the dominant authoritarian bloc and the smaller democratic bloc entered into a prolonged contest for power and democratic political reforms have been achieved in a piecemeal and gradual manner over the course of the next few elections.

Although democratization is no longer considered a linear process, democratization in Korea, from the decay of authoritarian rule to democratic transition, was relatively quick and straightforward.²⁵ According to the Freedom Index by Freedom House, as shown in Table 1, other East Asian democratized countries made slow progress toward ‘Free’ status.²⁶ But Korea swiftly moved to ‘Free’ status in 1988 and maintained that status thereafter. In addition, while some countries like Thailand and the Philippines marched slowly to ‘Free’ status and regressed to ‘Partly Free’ status, Korea has maintained its ‘Free’ status without break.

Unlike what was shown in Table 1, however, Korea’s democratic transition and consolidation was not without problems. Various challenges to political leadership caused political crises. The political leadership in Korea since the democratization is not a genuine democratic leadership. Presidential leadership after democratization still had authoritarian nature and did not shed off the old role of president as a commander rather than facilitator or coordinator.²⁷ Former authoritarian presidents often exploited Confucian ideals and values, characterized by hierarchical and authoritarian order, to justify non-democratic political institutions and practices. Even after democratization, political leaders were tempted to rely on authoritarian legacies to legitimize the arbitrary use of state power for their own political purposes.²⁸ We can put aside former president Roh Tae Woo who became president right after 1987 democratization. Civilian presidents after democratization such as Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung were not free from criticism of their leadership styles.²⁹ Their leadership often is described as ‘monarchical leadership’ which did not depart much from authoritarian legacy.30 Rather than seeking cooperation and compromise when their ruling parties were in the minority, these two presidents caused conflict and confrontation with opposition, bringing about political instability. Most political leaders who took power after democratization did not completely do away with past authoritarian political behavior, but spent most of their time and energy in playing with rhetoric of reform. After retirement, their images were further ruined by corruption cases.³¹

Corruption has weakened the political leadership of every president since the democratization. Each administration, in its initial stage, renewed pledges to clean up corruption and attempted related law-making. All these efforts, however, were tarnished when almost every president’s close allies or family members were revealed to have been involved in corruption cases.³² President Roh Tae Woo, who was a president in the transition period from authoritarianism to democratization, was sentenced and put into jail because of a so-called ‘ruling fund,’ raised and kept illegally. President Kim Young Sam announced ‘no–holds-barred clearing up corruption’ and ‘reform from above’, but his leadership was severely damaged by a corruption case in which his son was involved.³³ Likewise, President Kim Dae Jung did well in early days of presidency, as his moves such as successful management of economic crisis, North-South Summit and so on. He received popular support, but his success was short-lived. He lacked skill in coordinating and managing policies such as healthcare. His early success was further undermined by corruption cases in which his son and close allies were involved. Regarding rooting out corruption, President Kim Dae Jung announced strong anti-corruption policies, especially focusing on bureaucracy, which was symbolized by the establishment of the Korea Independent Commission Against Corruption (KICAC).³⁴ But, cleaning corruption was not an easy task. His leadership was damaged when his sons were also found guilty of corruption.

Political behavior and orientation as well as the role of civil society are crucial in stabilizing democratic transition and consolidating democracy. After democratization in Korea, the power balance between the state and civil society has changed dramatically. The activities of civil organizations have increased substantially and the cooperative relationship between the government and the civil society has increased substantially. This lively civil society prompted the coining of a new term, ‘NGO phenomenon’. The president and the national assembly could not ignore the influential opinions of the civil organizations.³⁵ For example, the movement of blacklisting irrelevant candidates for the 2000 National Assembly election displayed the power and influence of the civil organizations. In addition, an open primary was held for the presidential election in 2002. In that election, civil organizations including netizen’s participation in the electoral process via the internet had very decisive impact on the election result.

This significant development of civil society was, however, not without problems. Korean civil society has strong faith in democratic principles such as popular voting, political participation, freedom of press, and the rights to criticize the government, but they do not trust political organizations and the government. In addition, they have a relatively low sense of political efficacy.³⁶ Citizen’s evaluations of democracy after democratization are ambivalent. On the one hand, they want a good quality of democracy, but on the other hand, they do not have faith in public institutions.³⁷ As we can see in Table 2, the level of Korean people’s trust and faith in public institutions, compared to that of 2002, is steadily rising, but there is still much to be desired. People especially distrust the National Assembly and the presidential office. People’s trust in civil organizations was high in 2002, but it dropped significantly in 2007.

The legacy of the authoritarian period, i.e. the structure of conflict between democratic forces and authoritarian forces still overshadows Korean politics and causes fragmentation and mutual distrust between public institutions like the National Assembly, the administration, and civil society. This explains the low level of trust toward decision making and implementation by the National Assembly and by the administration. After democratization, the expansion of the values of post-industrialization improved civil society’s political and civic tolerance which is a condition for a genuine democracy, but its trust in political and social institutions is still very low.³⁸ This low trust is often expressed in violent protests, and resistance against governmental decision making and implementation of policies. Even after democratization, violent demonstrations, strikes and illegal actions by some civil organizations cause political instability.

Political Crisis and Response of Civil Society:

Beyond the Presidential Impeachment in 2004

A common difficulty that new democracies face in transition and consolidation is clearing out the old legacies of authoritarianism and establishing new democratic laws and orders. In the case of Korea, the process of democratic transition and consolidation was also challenged by various crises of political leadership that had negative impacts on the democratization trend. Political pathology after democratization in Korea can be epitomized as follow: undemocratic party politics plagued by political parties’ short-term interests; corruption cases resulting from close and improper connections between politicians and businesses; and political leadership and governance still caught by authoritarian inertia.³⁹ Abuses of power, ineptitude and corruption among the political leadership after democratization also invited political crises in the nascent democracy. Particularly, the 2004 presidential impeachment was crucial because the national assembly, for the first time in Korean history, attempted to oust a president elected by the people. However, the political crisis caused by the impeachment attempt was not just a crisis; it was an opportunity for the deepening of Korean democracy.⁴⁰

President Roh Moo-Hyun, who achieved victory in the 16th presidential election held in December 2002, owed his electoral success to the support of the younger generation and the progressives. They were motivated by his reputedly impeccable personal integrity and were mobilized by means of newly developed Internet communication techniques. Many Koreans expressed high hopes that Roh’s electoral victory, achieved “without money, organization, and factional ties,” would mark the end of bossism politics, namely “three Kims politics”⁴¹ of the previous era. In 2003, however, Korean society was further polarized and fragmented by the confrontation between political groups generally referred to as conservatives and progressives. Korean society was further plagued by social conflicts in the form of frequent labor strikes and organized protests. Reports of political corruption and scandals touched the president’s trusted confidants and dominated the center stage of politics.

President Roh Moo-Hyun, who achieved victory in the 16th presidential election held in December 2002, owed his electoral success to the support of the younger generation and the progressives. They were motivated by his reputedly impeccable personal integrity and were mobilized by means of newly developed Internet communication techniques. Many Koreans expressed high hopes that Roh’s electoral victory, achieved “without money, organization, and factional ties,” would mark the end of bossism politics, namely “three Kims politics”⁴¹ of the previous era. In 2003, however, Korean society was further polarized and fragmented by the confrontation between political groups generally referred to as conservatives and progressives. Korean society was further plagued by social conflicts in the form of frequent labor strikes and organized protests. Reports of political corruption and scandals touched the president’s trusted confidants and dominated the center stage of politics.⁴²​​​​​​​

In terms of political leadership, president Roh had neither the power nor the leadership skills that Rhee Seung Man, Park Jung Hee or so called ‘three Kims’ had nor the leadership of consensus to mediate and coordinate major political interests and blocs. In addition, unlike former leaders, he attempted to get close to ordinary people, but these attempts were interpreted as inexperienced and populist, and as destructive to the basic authority required in a political leader.⁴³ Since his inauguration in 2003, President Roh was notable for rhetoric that divided the progressives and the conservatives, and for a series of verbal mistakes. His remarks such as, “I would like to give up presidency. It’s too hard.”⁴⁴ and “I’ll ask the people directly if they still support me or not.(after revelations of corruption cases in which his allies were involved)”⁴⁵ damaged his authority and status as president. In addition, his rhetoric dividing conservatives and reformists, and the haves and the have-nots invited criticism and complaints from the conservative bloc. Particularly, his statement, “If the illegal fund built in my election camp is more than a tenth of what the Grand National Party (GNP) illegally used, then I’ll resign.”⁴⁶ extracted a strong response from opposition parties including the GNP.⁴⁷

President Roh left the New Millennium Democratic Party (NMDP) and established a new party called the Open Uri Party (OUP) with his followers, causing political tension.⁴⁸ As we can see in Table 3, the NMDP was a minority in the National Assembly when he became president in 2003. Therefore, president Roh had to get cooperation from the majority opposition GNP for smooth governing. He, however, formed a new, but small OUP and this put him in a more difficult situation for governing.⁴⁹ With Roh’s defection and formation of OUP in 2003, NMDP, which had been the ruling party, suddenly became an opposition. Consequently, president Roh made another political enemy and had to deal with two political fronts – GNP and NMDP.

On the surface, the main reason behind Roh’s impeachment was his statement supporting his own party for the coming general election in April 2004. The statement was controversial and was ruled inappropriate by the National Election Commission. Opposition parties including the GNP and the NMDP demanded Roh’s apology and pledge not to make such statements again, but Roh refused to do so. Furthermore, president Roh said that the Korean people would judge his statement in the coming 17th general election. Roh’s refusal and statement further exacerbated an already tense relationship between the president and the opposition.⁵⁰ Following this, the opposition parties led by the NMDP decided to impeach the president, which was passed at the National Assembly, taking advantage of their numerical power in the assembly.⁵¹ According to the opposition, there were three reasons for the impeachment: 1) violation of the election law through his public support of the OUP; 2) financial wrongdoings of Roh’s relatives and close supporters; and 3) economic mismanagement resulting in a near crisis situation during the first year of the Roh administration.⁵² Eventually, the case of presidential impeachment was sent to the constitutional court which constitutionally has the power of final judgment. Political turmoil and instability was expected with the judgment by the constitutional court.⁵³

Civil society was divided and polarized by pros and cons of the impeachment.⁵⁴ This, however, does not mean that there was serious political chaos in Korea. Some people led by conservative organizations expressed their support for the impeachment. Some others, notably Nosamo (Korean acronym of ‘a group of people loving Roh Moo Hyun) staged candle vigils, demanding the retraction of the impeachment. In the midst of pro and con assemblies and gatherings all over the Korea, however, physical clashes or violence were hardly reported and street gatherings and expressions of political views were peaceful. Most people remained calm waiting for the final judgment of the constitutional court and the prime minister, as interim president, managed daily administrative affairs without turbulence.

People chose to judge the impeachment in the 17th general election held on 15th April 2004. This election, held before the judgment of the constitutional court, became a de-facto referendum on the presidential impeachment.⁵⁵ Influenced by the impeachment, president Roh’s OUP won more than a half of the national assembly seats. For the first time after democratization, a presidential party became the majority in the national assembly. Korean voters, having an unfavorable view of the impeachment, had gone to the polls and had given Roh’s OUP a legislative majority.⁵⁶ Regardless of their support for president Roh, people were hurt by the impeachment and the loss of the nation’s top leader, the president. After the election, the NMDP became a small party of only nine seats and the GNP had to admit that their decision to impeach the president was wrong.

Eventually, the election result was followed by the Constitutional Court’s decision to reinstate the impeached president, Roh Moo-Hyun, ending his two-month incapacitation on 14 May.⁵⁷ President Roh came back to office with his party being the majority in the National Assembly, which gave Roh the power to implement his policies more easily. The political parties that led the impeachment accepted the court’s decision and did not pursue any further actions. Therefore, the controversies and turmoil surrounding the impeachment concluded. In this crisis, the Korean political system survived the turmoil and in the end produced a result that was both constitutionally and democratically legitimate.⁵⁸

In sum, if democracy in Korea from 1987 to 2004 was the building of democratic institutions, the restored democratic institutions were fully put into practice over the course of events in the 2004 presidential impeachment. Despite the political crisis stemming from the divisions among the president, ruling party, opposition parties and civil society, the impeachment in 2004 was a good test of the democratic political culture and civic conscious after democratization in Korea. The presidential impeachment stemmed from the lack of political leadership demonstrated by the president. The political divisions caused by the presidential impeachment were ruled in the constitutional court. People’s views were expressed in the 17th general election. Overall, throughout this process, divisions and tensions were not resolved by physical means causing political insatiability, but were dealt with institutionally. Civil society responded to the presidential impeachment waiting for the review of constitutional court. This experience demonstrated the consolidation of democracy in Korea and is evidence of a mature political culture.

Conclusion: For More Consolidation of Democracy

The political crisis prompted by the presidential impeachment was a joint product of a lack of leadership and of clashing interests among major political forces in Korea. At the early stage of his presidency, Roh failed to be a leader of mediation, coordination and consultation. Through abrasive and harsh remarks and statements, Roh displayed ‘politics of clash’ or ‘politics of brinkmanship,’ and invited impeachment by the strong oppositions.⁵⁹ Nevertheless, Korean civil society, rather than creating social turmoil fermented by political divisions and interests, chose political stability through democratic procedures and rules, the election, not a protest on the street, displaying mature political culture and civic consciousness.

At the time of this study, Korean politics is still clearing up the debris of the 2004 presidential impeachment. Therefore the political leadership and civil society are required to make continuous efforts to consolidate democracy. After the 2004 general election and constitutional court judgment, the reform policies of Roh’s administration did not make any visible impact, and the clashes between progressives and conservatives which are a legacy of authoritarian politics, continue.⁶⁰ At the level of political leadership, the president’s disregard for the opposition and his verbal errors continue and make political clashes. At the level of civil society, civil organizations still are not completely free from problems such as illegal strikes of labor unions and physical clashes between protesters and police at political rallies.

Consolidating a new democracy after democratization is not easy. It is not simply about repairing institutions such as the constitution, electoral laws and political party laws. It is not simply about guaranteeing civil rights, freedom of political participation and fair elections. Democratic consolidation not only requires institutional and procedural democracy, but it also calls for democratic leadership, and democratic attitude and orientation of the civil society. Challenges, not confirming existing laws and regulations, to political leadership and following political crises cause political instability. It is the result of failure to reach an agreement on the rules of political game between political leadership and civil society, and to setup democratic political model. Carving democratic law and order into a political system, and clearing up the old legacies of authoritarian politics is not simply the task of political leaders. The civil society should share the burden.

Authoritarian legacy and old political customs related to authoritarianism are not just the symptoms of the political leadership of new democracy, but are embedded in the society. The way to overcome the challenges to political leadership and political crises in the democratic transition and consolidation in a post-democratization period is to build a new democratic political model, appropriate for the new democratic law and order. In other words, political leaders and civil society have to accept democratic law and order that were established in the transition period as the only and sole ‘rule of game’ in politics and have to internalize the democratic political procedure and culture in them, on top of institutional and procedural democracy.