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Corporate Governance and Cash Holdings in Retail Firms

The Journal of Distribution Science / The Journal of Distribution Science, (P)1738-3110; (E)2093-7717
2016, v.14 no.12, pp.129-139
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.15722/jds.14.12.201612.129
Lee, Jeong-Hwan
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Abstract

Purpose - This paper examines the explanatory power of the agency theory in the determination of cash holdings for Korean retail firms. If the agency theory holds, a firm with strong corporate governance structure tends to have low cash holdings. A strong governance structure makes the CEO of this firm to behave in the interests of shareholders and thus the CEO has low incentive to stockpile cash holdings, which can be easily diverted for the CEO's own managerial purposes. We investigate this relationship between corporate governance structure and cash holdings, by using corporate governance scores as a proxy variable that captures the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanism. Research design, data, and methodology - We adopt the sample of publicly listed retail firms in KOSPI market from 2005 to 2013. Financial and accounting statements are gathered from the WISEfn database. We also use the corporate governance scores published by Korean Corporate Governance Service. The relationship between the corporate governance scores and cash holdings is cross-sectionally estimated based on the ordinary least square method. This estimation method is widely accepted in the existing literature. The sample of large conglomerates, Chebol, and the remainder firms are separately examined as well, to account for the distinctive internal financing environment in these large conglomerates. Results - We mainly contribute to the extant literature by providing empirical evidence against the agency theory of cash policy. Unlike the prediction of agency theory, we confirm statistically insignificant or even positive correlations between the set of corporate governance scores and cash-asset ratios. Almost all the major corporate governance attributes including total score, shareholder rights, board structure, and the quality of information disclosure do not show negative correlations with cash holdings, which poses a strong challenge to the validity of the agency theory in the determination of retail firms' cash holdings. Conclusions - This study presents interesting empirical results with respect to the cash policy in Korean retail firms. Consistent to prior studies, I verify that the agency theory only limitedly explains the level of cash holdings. Future studies may obtain more robust results by examining a longer sample period.

keywords
Agency Theory, Corporate Governance Score, Cash Holdings, Retail Industry

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The Journal of Distribution Science