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ISSN : 1738-3110

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Vol.19 No.1
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The Effect of Managerial Ownership on Stock Price Crash Risk in Distribution and Service Industries

The Effect of Managerial Ownership on Stock Price Crash Risk in Distribution and Service Industries

The Journal of Distribution Science(JDS) / The Journal of Distribution Science, (P)1738-3110; (E)2093-7717
2021, v.19 no.1, pp.27-35
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.15722/jds.19.1.202101.27
RYU, Haeyoung (Department of Business Administration, Hansei University)
CHAE, Soo-Joon (Department of Business Administration & Accounting, Kangwon National University)
RYU, Haeyoung, & CHAE, Soo-Joon. (2021). The Effect of Managerial Ownership on Stock Price Crash Risk in Distribution and Service Industries. The Journal of Distribution Science(JDS), 19(1), 27-35, https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.15722/jds.19.1.202101.27
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Abstract

Purpose: This study is to investigate the effect of managerial ownership level in distribution and service companies on the stock price crash. The managerial ownership level affects the firm's information disclosure policy. If managers conceal or withholds business-related unfavorable factors over a long period, the firm's stock price is likely to plummet. In a similar vein, management's equity affects information opacity, and information asymmetry affects stock price collapse. Research design, data, and methodology: A regression analysis is conducted using the data on companies listed on the Korea Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI) between 2012-2017 to examine the effect of the managerial ownership level on stock price crash risks. Results: Logistic and regression results indicate that the stock price crash risk was reduced as managerial ownership levels are increased. The managerial ownership level has a significant negative coefficient on stock price crash risk, negative conditional return skewness of firm-specific weekly return distribution, and asymmetric volatility between positive and negative price-to-earnings ratios. Conclusions: As the ownership and management align, the likeliness of withholding business-related information is reduced. This study's results imply that the stock price crash risk reduces as the managerial ownership level increases because shareholder and manager interests coincide, thereby reducing information asymmetry.

keywords
Managerial Ownership, Information Asymmetry, Stock Price Crash Risk, Distribution and Service Industries

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