Stewardship Theory and Information on Family Firm Performance in Vietnam

DAO,, T. T. B. , & HOANG,, L. C. (2022). Stewardship Theory and Information on Family Firm Performance in Vietnam. The Journal of Distribution Science, 20(12), 13-22, https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.15722/jds.20.12.202212.13

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Abstract

Purpose: The paper contributes to the existing literature on Vietnamese corporate governance and firm performance with a focus on listed family firms and the use of a more suitable econometric framework to analyze firm performance. The study investigates how family firm performance is affected by corporate governance under the standpoint of stewardship theory in Vietnam. Research design, data and methodology: With the use of different measures for firm performance (Tobin's Q, ROA, and ROE), regression models were estimated using Generalized Least Square (GLS) method on a panel data of a total of 113 listed companies during the five-year period from 2015 to 2019. Results: We found that family ownership as the main characteristic of the stewardship theory affects family firms positively. In addition, several other characteristics in corporate governance as board composition (board independence, board audits, and board committees), CEO (age and tenure) and firm characteristics (size, age, expansion, and annual sales) showed significant impacts on firm performance. Our findings also suggest that family firm performance can be either positively or negatively affected based on the characteristics of corporate governance. The findings can help companies evaluate the significance of corporate governance through deciding board structure and the selection of CEOs to match family firm characteristics. It also gives insights for investors, rating agencies, and policymakers for relevant purposes.

keywords: Stewardship Theory, Governance, Family-Firm Performance, Empirical - Quantitative, Retailing And Wholesaling, Inventory

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Article Contents

Vol.20 No.12

Stewardship Theory and Information on Family Firm Performance in Vietnam

Abstract

Reference

The Journal of Distribution Science