E-ISSN : 2233-5382
Purpose: This study attempted to examine the risk of stock price plunge according to the firm's management strategy. Prospector firms value innovation and have high uncertainties due to rapid growth. There is a possibility of lowering the quality of financial reporting in order to meet market expectations while withstanding the uncertainty of the results. In addition, managers of prospector firms enter into compensation contracts based on stock prices, thus creating an incentive to withhold negative information disclosure to the market. Prospector firms' information opacity and delays in disclosure of negative information are likely to cause a sharp decline in share prices in the future. Research design, data and methodology: This study performed logistic analysis of KOSPI listed firms from 2014 to 2017. The independent variable is the strategic index, and is calculated by considering the six characteristics (R&D investment, efficiency, growth potential, marketing, organizational stability, capital intensity) of the firm. The higher the total score, the more it is a firm that takes a prospector strategy, and the lower the total score, the more it is a firm that pursues a defender strategy. In the case of the dependent variable, a value of 1 was assigned when there was a week that experienced a sharp decline in stock prices, and 0 when it was not. Results: It was found that the more firms adopting the prospector strategy, the higher the risk of a sharp decline in the stock price. This is interpreted as the reason that firms pursuing a prospector strategy do not disclose negative information by being conscious of market investors while carrying out venture projects. In other words, compensation contracts based on uncertainty in the outcome of prospector firms and stock prices increase the opacity of information and are likely to cause a sharp decline in share prices. Conclusions: This study's analysis of the impact of management strategy on the stock price plunge suggests that investors need to consider the strategy that firms take in allocating resources. Firms need to be cautious in examining the impact of a particular strategy on the capital markets and implementing that strategy.
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