E-ISSN : 2233-5382
Purpose - During the past twenty years, China has developed rapidly in economy. Meanwhile China's economic development has brought great many problems. Sustainable development is to achieve coordination in the ecological, economic and social aspects. Among them, the environment and resource issues are the most critical issues which affecting sustainable development in China. With China's rapid economic development, China's ecological environment is facing the most serious threat in water pollution, air pollution, solid waste pollution and the destruction of forests and biodiversity, resulting in a significant loss of the national economy. This research aims to examine whether the tragedy of the commons has hindered the sustainable development of China's economy or not. On the other hand, we try to analyze a solution to improve this situation. Research design, data, and methodology - Theoretical background study, finding optimization models, and data analysis. Results - In the case of a clear definition of property rights, the air will have a market price. The market price will coordinate pollutant emissions. Conclusions - The tragedy of commons has hindered the sustainable development. The model of China's Economic development should be changed.
Buchanan, James M., & Yoon, Yong J. (2000). Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons. Journal of Law and Economics, 43(1), 1-13.
Coase, R. H. (1937). The Nature of Firm. Economic, November, 386-405.
Coase, R. H. (1960). The Problem of Social Cost. Journal of Law and Economics, 3(October), 1-44.
Hardin, Garrett (1968). The Tragedy of the Commons. Science, 162, 1243-1248.
Heller, Michael A. (1998). he Tragedy of the Anticommons:Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets. Harvard Law Review, 111(3), 621-688.
Hess, Charlotte, & Ostrom, Elinor (2003). Ideas, artifacts, and facilities: information as a common-pool resource. Law and Contemporary Problems, 111-145.
Ostrom, Elinor (1998). A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action. The American Political Science Review, 92(1), 1-22.
Ostrom, Elinor (2000). Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14(3), 137-158.
Schlager, Edella, & Ostrom, Elinor (1992). Property-rights regimes and natural resources: A conceptual analysis. Land Economics, 68(3), 249-262.