An Attempt to Search for The New Paradigm in Moral Development

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This paper has examined three major approaches in moral development and proposed the new paradigm, an interpretive developmental approach. Social learning theory has been less useful in accounting for the development of both behavior and self-regulatory systems, neglecting affect-related concepts in the context of moral action. The Freudian model is recognized as severely limiting when applied to the totality of mental life. Kohlberg's work based on cognitive-developmental theory lacks any necessary connection with moral action and overlooks human feelings. Even though these three approaches differ in their method and view of morality, they are basically adhered to the same paradigm. They regard mind and body belonged to two parallel but fundamentally different realm and adopt the empirical method. Moral development are not the results of solitary construction by individual minds but are organized by the social interchange that people are constantly engaged in together. In hermeneutic approach, moral development can be understood as a sequence of forms of practical activity, and as motivated by a search for meaningfulness and fluency in practical action.

Reviews of morality research typically divide the field into behavior, affect and cognition. According to this scheme, behaviorists study behavior, cognitive develomentalists study cognition and psychoanalysts study affect. It is often presumed that different psychological mechanisms govern these three facets of morality ; conditioning and modeling govern behavior ; cognitive conflict and equilibration govern thinking ; and the vicissitudes of libido and the superego govern feelings. These three approaches have by-passed one another in attending to different aspects of morality None of the three theoretical approaches offers an adequately comprehensive view of the psychology of morality.

Even though these three approaches differ markedly in their method and view of morality, they are basically adhered to the same paradigm (Capra, 1982). They are all based not only on the Cartesian paradigm but also on Newtonian concepts of reality. They regard mind and body belonged to two parallel but

fundamentally different realm, each of which could be studied without reference to the other. They all adopt the experimental and empirical methods.

Moral development are not the results of solitary construction by individual minds, but are organized by the social interchanges that people are constantly engaged in together. This social interaction (indeed, human action) has certain unique and peculiar characteristics that require a method of research investigation that is radically different from the empiricist and exprimental approaches psychologists generally employ. This is the purpose of this paper to search for the new paradigm in moral development--interpretative developmental approach.

Historical background of the psychology of moral development

The major dividing line in the history of psychology in the United States is probably the introduction of scientific approach to the study of man, an approach imported from the newly founded discipline in Germany at the end of the nineteenth century. At about same time that Wundt was founding his laboratory at Leipzig, William James was moving on the direction of the scientific study of psychology from his position in the philosophy department at Harvard.

The early American universities were originally established to provide local training ground for the political, religious, educational, and medical needs of the emerging country. Even on relatively scholarly and academic disciplines, particularly philosophy department from which the early psychology depart-

ment emerged, a practical and applied emphasis was clearly evident. Many of universities, like Harvard and Princeton, had long traditions as divinity schools which produced clergy for a rapidly growing society. Because of Protestant emphasis of these universities, the philosphical perspective of England tended to prevail. Thus the psychology that was in evidence before the impact of the new German scientific emphasis was essentially philosophical in its methodology, pragmatic in its values and based on empirical foundations.

Another important influence on the emergence of the psychology of moral development was the scientific enthusiasm that followed the impact of the evolutionary theory of Darwin. The new insights on biology, and through them, the development of sociology and related fields were to have a profound influence on the way the psychology of moral development was conceptualized. The new point of veiw which emerged from this biological foundation drew its dynamism and functionalism from an evolutionary perspective, took a scientific approach based on the experimental method and was shaped by the prevailing pragmatic perspectives.

The theological and moral perspectives which previously encouraged a definite adherence to tradition now looked to the new technology to understand and promote the character development of the youth.

The influence of the experimental method

In the last decade of the 19th and the first decade of the 20th century, the scientific innovations began in Germany by Wundt were being imported into

North America with impressive vigor. Within the next few years, dozens of laboratories were established.

In this context, an important division among psychologists developed — one maintaining the method of study of Wundt, and the other following in the American tradition of James and Dewey and emphasizing individual differences, with a focus on behavior and a Darwinian evolutionary perspective. The latter position was generally labelled functionalism, and the former was called structualism.

Because of its American emphasis, functionalism became the predominant posture of American psychology. It had a definite and emerging scientific methodology and was able to articulate theoretical conceptualizations.

These factors led to the rapid development of the science of psychology in North America. This development embodied the combination of the rigorous experimental method of the German laboratories with emphasis on individual difference and application to the practical problems of the day. These included those associated with the education of the young and was accomplished by an emphasis on moral development.

The testing movement following World War I, with its emphasis on rigor of observation, quantification, and the development of concepts in a highly empirical and at the same time functional context, was to lead the development of behaviorism in the early 20th century. This approach served to reduce moral behavior to a complex set of mechanistic reflexes which have been acquired through conditioning. Behaviorism involved total determinism. There was no room for self-direction or moral choice. There was also an extreme emphasis on the role of the environment. Individual differences were attributed to differences in the individual's experience with environment. While this position was rather extreme, it became a dominant force in American psychology.

The influence of dynamic psychology

The clinical movement shaped by the development of dynamic psychology and the clinical method have had a major impact on thinking about moral development. Freud was foremost a practitioner and clinician in this movement. He had little regard for the experimental method as an appropriate source of information about human behavior. Freud placed a great deal of emphasis on the unconsciousness and its role in determining behavior and moral choice. His theory is one of intrapsychic conflict between the deeply unconscious components of the personality : The id, a residue of primodial instinctual impulses which are basically sexual in nature, and the superego, a repressed but very active suppressor mechanism derived from the limits imposed on impulse expression by those in environment. Through a process of identification with parent figures, the superego is formed. Its function in terms of psychoanalytic theory is similar to that of the conscience, although it is an unconscious component of the personality. Through its theory of personality development, psychoanalysis provides a highly organized and developed formulation of the origin of morality.

The influence of recent experimental psychology

In the 1930's behaviorism began to develop more refined approaches to theorizing. Behaviorist began to move toward developing hypothetical constructs that to some extent went beyond the range of observable behavior. The experiments were designed with very great care and, although much of the research was conducted on lower organisms, by extending to more complex sequences of behavior these theories made possible a more sophisticated and experimentally relevant theory which did not clash with everyday experience. This theory assumes that behavior is the product of patterns of reinforcement and has no reference to any moral quality.

With the development of more theoretically oriented learning systems, researchers began to turn their attention to more complex patterns of human behavior, including cognition, social interaction and personality. Much of the empirical research on moral behavior is being done by investigators who can be classified under the category of social learning theorists. They embrace moral development as a product of learning and reject cognitive structures as meaningless. They utilize experimental approaches to research, and much of their data comes from the laboratory. Their approach is generally that of somewhat molecular studies of discrete or specific behavior. Typically, children are studied and a developmental approach is taken.

From these early positions of psychology three major perspectives in moral development theory are emerged.

Three major approaches in moral development

Social learning approach

The behavioral and social learning theories find their philosophical framework in the empiricist tradition of John Lock, who used association as the mechanism to explain the acquisition of ideas, knowledge and cognitive skills.

The essential notion of this approach is that all behavior can be adequately explained in terms of the associative bonds between stimuli(that is, an environmental event that has an effect on the response of an individual) and response (that is, a movement on the part of the individual under the control of environmental stimuli). Stimulus-response connections (S-R) are made through reinforcement. Thus, S-R units form the molecules of behavior. Very complex patterns of behavior can be built up on the basis of carefully worked out S-R patterns. This approach lends itself well to careful and meticulously designed research, modeled after Newtonian physics, a factor which has enhanced its appeal to scientifically minded researchers. They saw no essential difference between human and animal. Man is an animal different from other animals only in types of behavior he or she displays (Watson, 1970). They regard human as a complex machine reactiong to external stimuli. So any notion of unlearned structures, schemata, or categories is rejected. The whole concept of consciousness which resulted from introspection, and all the related terms, like 'mind', 'thinking' and 'feeling', were eliminated from the theory.

An important aspect of learning theories is the general position that social factors are responsible for the acquisition of moral concepts and moral judgement processes. They propose that much of our social behavior is learned through observing the behavior of others. Learning is controlled by the process of attention and retention. Performance of a behavior is influenced by response consequences (e.g., reinforcement) to the model and/or to the observer. Three types of behavior related to morality-- prosocial behavior, resistance to temptation, and delay of gratification--also can be acquired by the same process. They can be learned either through direct instruction, through visual observation of the behavior of others, or through hearing a verbal description of a behavior. Once these behaviors are learned, positive reinforcement will increase the likelihood of their occurence. Complex processes, such as imitation, modeling and role-playing, are invoked to explain the ways in which the environment shapes the behavior of and individual(Bandura, 1977 ; Hoffman, 1971).

However, the status of social learning theory as an adequate explanation of development has been questioned recently(Perry & Bussey, 1977). Social learning theorists have tended to adopt a process orientation in order to account for social behavior, including moral action. This process orientation produced an interest in identifying principles of learning that were universally applicable to a wide variety of social behaviors across a broad range of persons. Consequently, social learning explanations have generally ignored developmental influence. The lack of attention given to these influences by social learning theorists is, in some respects, suprising. Given its strong emphasis on the cognitive capacities of the person as a determinant of social behavior, at least those developmental influences related to cognition would seem readily amenable to social learning analyses(Yando et al, 1978).

The limited theoretical and empirical attention given to developmental factors by social learning theorists is not without its consequences for moral action and character. Social learning theory provides an insightful account of the relationship between moral action and the moral person. In particular, social learning theory provides a vehicle for understanding how various behavioral capacities, expectancies, and values are initially acquired by linking these facets of the person to the individual social learning history. Yet little is known regarding the developmental course of these behaviors and processes.

A related weakness shaped by social learning approach concerns the regulation of social action. That behavior is under the influence of external control systems (e.g., parents) during early phases of development and that behavior becomes increasingly subject to self-regulation as we mature and develop seems agreed upon. But the processes that underlie the transition from externally to internally located systems of control have not received the explicit attention by social learning theory. They largely ignored the mutual interplay and interdependence between a living organism and its natural environment, which is itself an organism.

The most serious limitation of social learning ex-

planations of all types of human behavior involves the conceptual status of affect. Affect seems to be a pervasive and fundamental component in much psychological functioning(Lazarus, 1984). Yet, these affect-related concepts are not well integrated into the nomological network of social learning theory. These theorists only saw human being as a machine, whose activity is limited to conditioned response to environmental stimuli. This neglect of affect by social learning theory is especially problematic in the context of moral action and moral character. It has been suggested that affect is central to an adequate understanding of the moral person (Ellord & McLean, 1986).

In sum, social learning theory has been most productive in explaining the way in which behavior is acquired. It has, however, been less useful in accounting for the development of both behavior and self-regulatory systems. This neglect has important consequences for a social learning perspective on moral action and moral character. Current social learning formulations seem to portray persons as 'bloodless' information processors.

Psychoanalytic approach

Psychoanalysis was a method, designed and utilized as a treatment for neurosis and emotional disorders. It was a treatment method that Freud derived from his practical experience and reflections on this experience. Psychoanalysis is also a major theoretical system which has a great deal to say about human development in general and moral development in particular.

Freud(1853－1966) emphasized the centrality of sexuality and the dynamism of sexual energy in all of human behavior, the presence and importance of infantile sexuality, and the universal significance of the unconscious. These ideas were perceived to conflict directly with the prevalent religious teaching only hightened their controversial characters, particularly as applied to moral development.

Freud had little regard for the experimental method as an appropriate source of information about human behavior. He felt the insights derived from psychoanlytic treatment were so rich that their complexity could never be achieved in laboratory analogues. This position put him into conflict with the scientific community.

Freud placed a great deal of emphasis on the unconscious and its role in determining behavior and moral choices. His theory is one of intrapsychic conflict between the deeply unconscious components of the personality ; the id, ego, superego. The id represents the animal-like instinctual impulses (largely of an unconscious sexual nature), the very core of human being and the repository for primary thought process. The id signifies what we premordially desire to do if there were in fact no restrictions in our desires. These desires are most clearly demonstrable in dreams, fantasies, and similar unconscious thought phenomena. Freud hypothesizes that the id plays a predominant role in infancy and early childhood development, a period he considers most crucial in the overall development of the individual.

To counter-balance the id, ego signifies self-regulating product of secondary (more conscious and ra-

tional) thought process which serves to bring the id under some tenuous executory control. However, ego functions are refined only slowly and gradually, as the child grows and matures.

The superego, most important for moral development in Freud psychology is the inhibiting, restraining, prohibiting standards imposed on the child by outside social forces, initially and primarily by one's parents and later by teachers and other adult authority figures. From these parental and other external social sources, the child develops an ego-ideal and conscious. For Freud, guilt operating via the conscience is a form of 'social glue' which cements the cultural bonds of any society. Without guilt and conscience, life would degenerate into a societal chaos.

Freud casts the foundation stones of morality in the parable of the primal horde and the tragedy of Oedipus and Electra. In the Primal horde parable, the sons of clan commit patricide in order to replace the feared, dominating father figure. In terms of Oedipus and Electra, Freud hypothesizes that young boys fear castration and thus internalize and identify with father. It is fear of castration which permits growth in morality in the male child's youthful development. But, on Freud terms, it becomes a psychological impossibility for girls to achieve a strong sense of morality because of what he assumes to be weaker superego development in female.

As a depth psychologist who 'pried open' the primacy of sexuality and the unconscious in a relatively closed Victorian world, Freud also carried on a battle similar to that waged by Durkheim in the sociological sphere. That is, Freud, like Durkheim, was interested principally in balancing the often irreconcilable demands of individual versus social life. Given his own theoretical constructs, Freud admits that the task of morality is ridden with unpleasant, almost impenetrable, conflict. But he was unable to view the social context surrounding woman dilemma. He viewed woman as the temptress and scorner of civilization, the Eve-like character who squanders men's attempt to sublimate their psychic energy, which is not limitless, into higher cultural task.

> The neat discord is caused by women, who soon become antithetical to cultural trends, and spread around the their conservative influence--the woman who at them beginning laid the foundation of culture by the appeal of their love. Women represent the interests of the family and sexual life ; the work of civilization has become more and more men's business ; it confronts them with even harder tasks, compels them to sublimation of instinct which women are not easily able to achieve. Since man has not an unlimited amount of mental energy at his disposal, he must accomplish his tasks by distributing his libido to the best advantage. What he employs for cultural purposes he withdraws to a great extent from women and his sexual life.(Freud, 1961, p.73)

In above quotation, Rich and Devitis (1985) found the troublesome features in Freudian thought ;

(a) It's superimposition of an outmoded Newtonian (energy) model of physics onto psychic life.

To formulate a scientific theory of the psyche and human behavior, Freud tried to use the basic concepts of classical physics in his description of psycho-

logical phenomena and establish a conceptual relationship between psyc-hoanalysis and Newtonian mechanics. The close relationship between psychoanalysis and classical physics are well explained by Capra (1982, pp. 180-187). According to Capra, Freud established psychological space as a frame of reference for the structures of the mental apparatus as Newton established absolute Euclidean space as the frame of reference in which material objects are extended and located. The psychological structures which Freud based his theory of human personality--id, ego, and superego-- are seen as some kind of internal 'objects', located and extended in psychological space. Spatial metaphors, such as 'depth psychology', 'deep unconscious' and 'subconscious', are prominent throughout the Freudian system.

The dynamic aspect of psychoanalysis, like the dynamic aspect of Newtonian physics, consists in describing how the 'material objects' interact with one another through forces that are essentially different from 'matter', The most fundamentals among them are instinctual drives, in particular sexual drive. The nature of the libido had always been a problematic and controversial issue in Freud's theory as the nature of the force of gravity was in Newton's.

As in Newtonian physics so also in psychoanalysis, the mechanistic view of reality implies a rigorous determinism. Every psychological event has a definite cause and gives rise to a definite effect, and the whole psychological states of an individual is uniquely determined by 'initial conditions' in early childhood.

(b) a bifurcation of the instincts and rationality in another classic western formulation of 'lower' and 'higher' thought functions, assuming those functions can be so easily divided.

(c) a resultant positing of frustration for both men and women, the locus of that frustration resting on the roles assigned to the players.

In our society, an exaggerated importance is attached to masculinity, and the inferiority of the female sex is assumed as a generally established principle. From the earliest days, the child is led to believe that the male is the more valuable sex.

(d) Freud's almost imperceptible admission that those roles may be more or less changeable, after all. (that is, "that civilization has become more and more men's business".)

Hogan (1975) argues that the dominant thrust of contemporary psychological theory has tended to wed to western thought to an 'individualistic' perspective, thereby submerging such issues as 'cooperation' and 'social equality'. These dominant models focus primarily on internal, individual, and differential measures of men and morality in their reliance as such constructs as 'genetic difference', 'weak superego' and 'pre/post conventional personalities'. As a result of such theoretical construction, a certain set of preconceptions about the nature of human beings, their morality, and the possibilities (or impossibilities)of socio-educational change begins to emerge. The formulations tend to 'blame the victims', rather than the larger social order, for any obstacle or difficulty that the individual cannot overcome.

These shortcomings in Freud's approach are due

partly to the limitation inherent in the Cartesian-Newtonian framework and in part to Freud's own cultural conditioning. Recent development in psychology has begun to produce a new view of the human psyche, one in which the Freudian model is recognized as extremely useful for dealing with certain aspects or levels of the unconscious but as severely limiting when applied to the totality of mental life. The situation is not unlike that in physics, where the Newtonian model is extremely useful for the description of a certain range of phenomena but has to be extended, and often radically changed, when we go beyond that range.

Cognitive-developmental approach

In the cognitive theory, the study of moral development is just an approach to the study of intellectual development as it bears on the specific topic of ethical cognition. Since intellectual growth proceeds through a specific sequence of stages, moral judgements will also advance in stages related to the changes in the child's general cognitive development.

The cognitive structural theorist who have had a considerable impact on the field are Piaget and Kohlberg. Piaget(1932) conceived of people as individuals who are acting instrumentally in the world. He viewed the endpoint to cognitive development as achieving knowledge about the world similar in form to the operational intelligence that he took physicists to have ; the result of planned operation upon objects, guided by theory and by the generation of hypotheses.

Piaget, like Kant, regarded knowledge as having an epistemological priority over action. As a result, his account of the relationship between person and the world has troublesome aspect. Piaget's world alternates unhappily between an unknowable realm of things in themselves and a concrete objective universe, a naive scientific realm. This epistemic split between subject and object explains the difficulty of extending Piaget's theory to social understanding and action.

In cognitive-developmental scheme, there is a parallel ambiguity to the development of knowledge. Development is the progressive construction of representations of reality. Although nominally this is both a logical and an empirical process, at the same time it frequently has the connotation of a movement toward reconstruction of a fixed, objective reality (Bruner, 1986 ; Shweder, 1982). Adequately equilibrated cognitive constructions are, paradoxically, representations of an autonomous and defined real world. Piaget emphasized the development of reversibly applied cognitive operations, which he saw growing out of a reflexive abstraction from the instrumental nature of interaction with the material world. The mature form of representation of the world seen from the cognitive-developmental perspective explicitly parallels that of physical or biological scientist.

Kohlberg, indebted to Piaget's pioneering work, is the most prominent scholar in the contemporary moral education whose works dominate the discussion of moral education in the university world, seminar and journals. His work is in the tradition of Piaget, but in more elaborate delineation of the stages of moral development. His fundamental assump-

tion is that moral reasoning is limited by cognitive development in general. He postulates a kind of 'logical universality' of moral development. His theory is a stage sequential theory in which moral development follows a fixed and invariant pattern.

Kohlberg's(1966, 1984) study yields six developmental stages alloted three moral levels.

1. Preconventional level

Stage 1 : Orientation to punishment, obedience, and physical and material power. Rules are obeyed to avoid punishment.

Stage 2 : Naive instrumental hedonistic orientation. The child conforms to obtain rewards.

2. Conventional level

Stage 3 : 'Good boy' orientation designed to win approval and maintain expectations of one's immediate group. The child conforms to avoid disapproval. One earns approval by being 'nice'

Stage 4 : Orientation to authority, law, and duty, to maintain a fixed order, whether social or religious. Right behavior consists of doing one's duty and abiding by the social order.

3. Postconventional, autonomous, or principled level

Stage 5 : Social contract orientation, in which duties are defined in terms of contract and the respect of other's rights. Emphasis is upon equality and mutual obligation within a democratic order. There is an awareness of relativism of personal values and the use of procedural rules in reaching consensus.

Stage 6 : The morality of individual principles of conscience that have logical comprehensiveness and universality. Rightness of acts is determined by conscience in accord with ethical principles that appeal to comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency. These principles are not concrete (like the Ten Commandments) but general and abstract (like the Golden Rule, the categorical imperative).

Stages are defined according to response to moral dilemmas classified in terms of a scoring scheme. Validating studies include a twenty-five-year study of 50 Chicago area boys, middle and working class ; a six-year study of Turkish village and city boys of the same age and various cross-sectional studies in Britain, Canada, India, Israel, Honduras, Taiwan, and Yucatan.

As seen above, the stages have three charateristics. First, the stages are organized systems which imply qualitatively different mode of thinking. This means that children are different from the adults by their sizes and also by their qualities. Second, stages form an invariant sequence. All movement is forward and does not omit steps even though children move through the stages at varying speeds. Third, the stages are hierachical insofar as thinking at a higher stage comprehends within it thinking at lower stages. Individuals prefer the highest stage available to them in their thinking because higher stages can more adequately organize the multiplicity of data, interests, and possibilities open to each person. The higher stages are not only more socially adaptive but are philosophically superior because they move the individual closer to basing

moral decisions upon a concept of justice (stage 6). This is the level of principles which can be universalized (i.e., applied to all person everywhere), where the individual views moral judgement not from his or her individual perspective or society's values, but from the perpectives of any human being. Thus, following Kant, highest stage universalizes moral principles.

Kohlberg searches for the objective foundation of moral judgements in an abstract-formal logical realm far removed from everyday thoughtful talk. He tries to establish that moral disputes could be resolved by the mothods assocated with genuine science, by inductive inference from indisputable facts or by deductive reasoning from undeniable premises. As a cognitive moral theorist, his goal is to build an abstract aintght moral systems whose rational appeal will be universally obvious to any competent thinker whether a Hindu priest, an African bushman, a Korean, or a Radcliffe undergraduate.

His work ultimatlely reflects the search of late twentieth century American education and psychology for a definitive value gospel and faith as a response to the value relativism and malaise of mid-century America (Sullivan, 1977). He is singular among recent theorists of moral education in his quest for a synthesis of the spheres of philosophy, psychology, sociology, and education into a integrated theory and practice of moral education. Philosophically, his work represents a reaction to the analytic direction of much of twentieth centrury educational philosophy. Psychologically, he attempts to replace the alleged control of moral education by

Freudians and Skinnerians with an alternative psychological basis (Kohlberg, 1966). Sociologically, Kohlberg proposes a new universalism of the modern age. Educationally, he presents a practice of moral education that teachers can understand and implement.

The cognitive—developmental theory has attracted scholarly attention internationally, but numerous critics emerged. Williams and Williams (1970) argue that the stages lack any necessary connection with moral action and therefore what has been provided are stages of general cognitive, rather than moral, development. Although Kohlberg (1971) insists persons at a higher level of moral development not only reason better, but they act in accordance with their judgement, he still is considered to overlook human feelings--sympathy, compassion and human concerns which interplay with moral action on the behalf of Kantian right and impartiality.

The most severe criticism on the cognitive-developmental theory comes from the feminist researchers. Gilligan (1977, 1982) notes that Kohlberg finds women, in light of their strong interpersonal orientation, to favor stage 3, a stage he held to be functional and adeqate for them. She laments that the traits that have conventionally defined to the goodness of women--their care and sensibility to the need of others--are those that mark them as deficient in moral development. The focus in this society on individuation and individual achievement has led to devaluing the relational, caretaking roles of women. The ability to achieve intimacy maintains relationships and acts as caretakers, though valued,

typically have been considered 'intuitive' or 'instinctive', the function of anatomy coupled with destiny (Gilligan, 1977, 1982).

Rest and others (1978) point that historical events that individuals encounter as they develop may contribute to their view of morality.

> Consider the subject tested in Kohlberg's twenty-year longitudinal study, initiated in the mid 1950s. Over the period in which these subjects have been assessed for moral judgement, Americans have experienced the civil rights struggle, student protests, the Vietnam war, Watergate and the women's movement. All of these events have raised issues of justice and have focused attention on moral concerns. It seems highly likely that these social events have had a general impact on people's concepts of fairness, and would cause them to have differing concepts of moral and social justice from those of other generations developed during different social times such as the Depression in the 1930s or World War II in the 1940s. Changes in moral judgement scores over the past 20 years, therefore, may reflect cultural change as well as individual ontogenesis.(p.272)

Kohlberg's paradigm may be explained in part by its tendency to reinforce current dominant views about pluralistic democracy and justice as fairness. In other words, Kohlberg's model of justice may be part and parcel of that strong core of 'liberal individualism' so popular in western culture.

Toward a new paradigm :
Hermeneutic-developmental approach

Social and moral development are not the results of solitary construction by individual minds, but are fostered and organized by the social interchanges that people are constantly engaged in together. For the past 30 years, social and moral thinking have been the focus of developmental research, as this has been defined by the cognitive-developmental paradigm. Reasoning about moral and social situations and issues has been the most frequent object of inquiry, with moral and social beliefs and attitudes a close second. But, if social processes influence development, then we need to conduct research on people's action together as well as their reasoning and knowledge. However, there is much confusion as to just what this means. Blasi (1980) describes two distinct approaches to the study of action ; a behaviorist and a formalist, cognitive-developmental one. Parker (1985) argued that these are both inadequate ; the limitations of behaviorist approaches to human behavior are well known, and there are also many difficulties in conceptualizing human action within the cognitive-developmental paradigm (Locke, 1983).

Social interaction(indeed, human action in general)has certain unique and peculiar characteristics that require a method of research investigation (and an understanding of the research enterprise) that is radically different from the empiricist and experimental approaches psychologists generally employ, different from the formalist program that characterizes much of cognitive science (Gardner, 1985), and different from the methods of cognitive-developmental study of social and moral thinking.

Social action has a special ontological status. Unlike biological processes, it has a semantic level of or-

ganization to it. Social events and actions have influence and significance by virtue of the meanings people find in them, not by virtue of material causation, or logical necessity. Consequently, practical activity is different from the formal, logical organization that characterizes abstract system of systematic reasoning. Practical activity is intrinsically ambiguous. Every social act can be understood in a variety of different ways, depending on the perspective from which one views it, and the context in which one encounters it. This does not mean that any interpretation can be made of an action. But, in general, any human action or event is open to being understood in a range of possible ways. Yet these central characteristics of human behavior is denied or ignored by the majority of methodologies currently employed in psychological research.

Social actions and events gain their meaning in a specific context or social setting that cannot be captured by operationalized coding schemes. Social exchanges are complex, intricate and confusing. We can make sense of them, only progressively, in an inductive manner that is ruled out of court by the traditional hypothetico-deductive research canon.

That social action is a practical activity means that it involves a certain kind of involvement between people. Heidegger (1962) distinguished between modes of engagement people have with the world ; the ready-to-hand, the unready-to-hand and the present-at-hand. In everyday practical activity people are in the ready-to-hand and the unready-to-hand modes. When we reason about abstract moral or social problems, when we speculate about hypothetical dilemmas, we are in a distinct detached mode, the present-at-hand.

Hermeneutic approach takes this ready-to-hand practical activity to be the primary origin of our understanding of the social world. People's spontaneous everyday practical involvement with other people, with equipment and social artifacts, provides the foundation for all our organized knowledge about society, psychological development, history and so on. This approach avoids the decontextualization that positivist and formalist methods produce, as they abstract behavior from their historical and personal situation.

How shall this approach understand the interaction between people and their social world? People are reflective practitioners(Schon, 1983) ; they are always engaged in practical activity of a variety of kinds, and this is the primary mode of engagement in the world. Social reality is not an objective matter. It rests on and is constituted by the beliefs, wishes, interpretations, and actions of its members. Yet at the same time, it has an objective aspect.

> An institutional world is experienced as an objective reality. It was there before the individual was born, and it will be there after his death. He must go out and learn about it, just as he must learn about nature. This remains true even though the social world, as a humanly produced reality, is potentially understandable in a way not possible in the case of natural world. (Berger & Luckmann, 1967, p.60)

We can contrast the sorts of conflicts that arise on the practical level, for someone engaged in practical

social projects, with those experienced by a Kantian or Piagetian intellectual subject. As a social agent, we cannot simply construct our world in the way a transcendental ego could. The social world resists in tangible ways our efforts to impose structure on it, because it is a joint social construction that we as individuals are partly able to structure but that also structures us (Giddens, 1976).

Then in what direction do moral developments proceed in this practce? New approach should emphasize that of becoming increasingly fluent in social practical activity. This social fluency is important for social moral development as is the formation of explicit theories, principles and hypotheses about social world (Schutz & Luckmann, 1974).

Fluency in practical activity occurs when one's practices are meaningfully connected. It is a value-laden concept, and a value-laden phenomenaon; to achieve fluency is to know how it is to do things right.

But, this fluency must not be confused with a final endpoint. Human development is historically open-ended; its highest achievements change over history. Development cannot anticipate its ending ; it cannot even anticipate a specific historically grounded final form. Development on a process can only deal with local improvements and with proximal change. So to say the telos of development is fluency is to say not that this fully defines the outcome, but that this is what is proximally sought.

We are socially fluent when our actions form a coherent unity, when they are organized by an underlying concern. A persisting concern gives us a project, structure, or organization to our actions, and enables a clear identification of the facts, precisely because they are always aspects of a perspectival frame of understanding that has not been uncovered as the basis for action. Fluent action is action structured by a concern. A variety of different kinds of concern arise in practical social activity; concerns over moral responsibility, intimacy, and many others (Schutz, 1970).

Concerns become addressed and uncovered by practical deliberation. Deliberation led to an articulation and explicit entering into discourse of the concerns manifest in action, and of other components of the framework organizing that action. So, young children do develop forms of expert conduct not in a deliberate and planful manner but, first, because they found themselves already involved in meaningful social practices; the culture's forms of conduct that accomplish the myriad of everyday social tasks. It is impossible for a child not to be caught up and engaged in social praxis. Children ultimately take up and acquire some degree of control and guidance over action they find themselves already doing.

In new paradigm, moral development also can be understood as a sequence of forms of practical activity, and as motivated by a search for meaningfulness, expertise and fluency in practical action. The moral development as the prognessive movement through distinct way of living or 'spheres' can be understood by Kierkegaard's ethical development.

Kierkegaard (1968, 1971) distinguished four spheres, which he named the Aesthetic, the Ethical, Religiousness A and Religiousness B. In addition,

there is a preliminary undifferentiated stage, the Present Age. These four resemble stages that a structuralist would recognize in that they form an ordered sequence of maturity, self-development, and understanding are qualitatively distinct from one another, each involving a reorganization and a loss of the forms of activity of the previous ways of living.

But, there are several important differences between Kierkegaard's and a structuralist characterization of developmental progression. For Kierkegaard, development is a matter of the struggle to form a self, a praxis that is correlative with the search for a meaningful way of living. Each sphere is a temporary solution to these problems. In Kierkegaard's account, the move from one sphere to the next and progression within a sphere are emotional and valuative movements. The impetus to move on is provided not by logical contradiction or cognitive conflict, but by a learning out; a meaningfulness and loss of significance to the world that is experienced as despair, and that renders action impossible. At the end of each sphere, a form of life whose telos was finding a coherent scheme of meaning to the world and to active results, instead, is a breakdown of coherence. Each sphere ends in despair, when it is discovered that the way of organizing one's life that it entails has to fail to fulfill the search for coherent and meaningful social relations. The transition to the next sphere requires a leap, with associated anxiety and fear, rather than being a smooth and logically necessary transition. Each leap is intrinsically unreasonable, since reasons are always defined by a sphere, and the sphere that one must leap out of has

ceased to provide good reasons. And since it is a leap into a new form of ready-to-hand action, one has no reflective awareness of what it is to come. A further difference from the cognitivist stage progression view of development we have come to take for granted is Kierkegaard's view that the fourth sphere—Religiousness A—can itself fail, and the only move then is a return to the superficialities of the Present Age. As an example of a nonformal account of ethical development, Kierkegaard's work could well bear further examination by developmental psychologists.

Interpreted in this light, Kierkegaard's spheres represent a series of distinct forms of social fluency of coherent and meaningful practice. Each involves a central project that provides a point of view within which situations are coherently understood. Each sphere is, at its best, a coherent way of living, a style of acting, that is fluent and meaningful. Each has its own unique central concern, providing focus and clarity to the world and enabling action to be conducted in an unproblematic manner. Fluency of action is the telos each sphere pursues, and action is fluent when it is organized as a whole project, as a coherent style of practical activity. The achievement of this fluency is what makes each of spheres; the ultimate failure to sustain fluency leads to despair and the leap to a new sphere and life-style.

Kiekegaard's account claims that when it comes to moral development and moral action, fluency can be achieved only temporarily. No matter which of his spheres we find ourselves trying to live fully, there is always the possibility that meaningfulness will be lost and expertise will collapse. This may seem a pes-

simistic account of morality. It realistically reflects our sense that moral development is unlike cognitive development. Its accomplishments are not automatically sustained. Both individuals and cultures are unlikely to regress in their level of cognition, but the same is not true of their ethical status. Loss of commitment, failure of nerve, weakness of the will, all these are phenomena of moral reversal, decline and even collapse.

Kohlberg(1971) made the claim that a philosophical theory of the adequacy of one form of ethical reasoning over another and a psychological theory of the development from one stage to the next were "one and the same theory extended in different directions"(p. 154). The parallel we want to point out is between hermeneutic inquiry, as a form of philosophical activity and a basis for a psychological method, and practical deliberation, something people do with their own actions. In other words, interpretation, the articulation of accounts of one's own unreflective actions, is, rather than logical reasoning, what unites psychology and philosophy, as we are interpreting them and ordinary everyday human activity. We need to look beyond ideals of rationality, confront the complexity of everyday acivity in our various social world, and begin our psychological study there. The approach to moral development should focus our attention not on the acquisition of knowledge of social phenomena, or on patterns of thinking about the world, but, first of all, on the development of skillful social practices.

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도덕 발달에 대한 새로운 접근 방향의 탐색

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　도덕 발달의 3가지 주요 이론을 검토한 후, 새로운 접근 방식이 제안되었다. 사회적 학습이론은 행동이 획득되는 과정을 설명하는데 매우 유익하지만 행동과 자기규제의 관계를 밝히는데 미흡하며 도덕적 행동에 내포된 정의적 측면을 동한시하였다. 프로이드의 정신분석이론은 무의식의 여러가지 면을 잘 제시하고 있으나 정신세계의 전체적인 면에 적용하기에는 한계가 있다. 인지발달이론에 입각한 콜버그의 연구는 서구사회의 민주주의와 정의에 대한 지배적인 견해를 반영하여 학문적 관심을 끌어왔으나 도덕적 행동과의 연관성과 정의적인 요소를 경시하였다. 이 3가지 접근방식은 방법 및 도덕성에 관한 견해에서 큰 차이가 있지만 기본적인 동일한 전형을 택하고 있다. 즉 심신은 기본적으로 서로 다른 영역에 속하는 것으로 간주하며, 실증적 방법을 채택하고 있다. 도덕 발달은 개인의 의식의 독자적인 산물이 아니고 사람들간의 부단한 상호교류에 의해서 이루어진다. 해석학적인 (hermeneutic)접근방식에서는 도덕발달이 실제적 활동의 형태로 이해되며 그 안에서 의미를 탐색함으로써 이루어진다.