



## Enumerated Society: *Political Implications of Tenancy Statistics in Colonial Korea in the 1930s*

In-soo KIM

### Abstract

*The Government-General of Colonial Korea (GGCK) conducted an extensive investigation into tenant practices in colonial Korea in order to deal with the colony's social problems, especially the expansion and radicalization of tenancy disputes during the 1920s. The results of this investigation were compiled in The Tenant Practices of Korea (Chōsen no kosaku kankō 朝鮮の小作慣行; 1932). This report enumerated the complex landlord-tenant relationship into simplified statistical data, and social conflicts were moved from the field of disputes to policy discussions based on tenancy statistics and implementation of legislative measures. Based on this statistical survey, the Joseon Farmland Ordinance (Chōsen nōchi-rei 朝鮮農地令) was enacted in 1934, which fundamentally altered practices surrounding tenancy disputes. Specifically, the survey provided social median data and indicators for tenancy periods, rents, and rent reduction rates for a lean year, which became the new political apparatus for the settling of tenancy disputes. At the same time, by enumerating colonial society, the colonial state earned the opportunity to actively intervene in social conflicts. The GGCK began to present itself as the mediator or regulator of social conflicts, setting apart from the old image of target of antagonism. This is a historical case that illustrates the power effects of systematized knowledge (/statistics) on the agricultural politics of colonial society.*

**Keywords:** enumeration, statistics, tenancy disputes, The Tenant Practices of Korea (1932), Joseon Farmland Ordinance (1934), agricultural politics, knowledge power

---

This article is a revised and supplemented portion of the author's doctoral dissertation. See Kim (2013, ch. 3).

In-soo KIM is a researcher at the Academy of Korean Studies (AKS). E-mail: iskim94@gmail.com.

## Introduction

Many scholars of Korean studies in Korea, Japan, and United States have long pursued research on tenancy disputes, which lie at the core of agricultural politics in colonial Korea during the 1930s. Currently, the majority of these researchers share a common understanding that there was a grand shift in the characteristics of tenancy disputes between the 1920s and 1930s: from politico-economic demands to economic demands (changes in demands), from collective mass disputes to intensive individual disputes (behavioral changes), from a combination of both legal and illegal methods to the adoption of law-abiding strategies (changes in strategies), from ex-post direct interventions as well as systematic and violent suppressions by the authorities to preliminary/after-the-fact public adjustment (changes in the reactions of the colonial state), etc. (Soh 2007, 22; Matsumoto 1998, 139).

How, then, were these changes possible? First, compared to how the Western nations managed their colonial territories, many studies have pointed to the high level of penetration by Japan's military power, the scale of police force, and extralegal suppression as well as other institutions into colonial Korea (Matsuda 2009; Kang 2005; Kim 1994; Cumings 1981). However, what also requires consideration is the emergence in the 1930s of peasants as agents, who attempted to solve tenancy disputes based on such laws as the Joseon Tenancy Regulation Ordinance (*Chōsen kosaku chōtei-rei* 朝鮮小作調停令; 1932) and Joseon Farmland Ordinance (*Chōsen nōchi-rei* 朝鮮農地令; 1934).

Second, it is possible that those changes were the result of substantive improvements in the agricultural economy of colonial Korea in the 1930s. This possibility remains the topic of heated debate. Typically, this argument is based on Korean economic statistics from 1910 to 1960, which reveal an exponential increase in the country's gross domestic product (GDP), from US\$1,000–1,400 in the 1930s (Maddison 2001; Mizoguchi and Umemura 1988, 239). Yet this approach evokes the fundamental point that there must be a comprehensive understanding of colonized society. It is unreasonable to consider a colony as a single, independent economic unit, and scholars have

already pointed out that such arguments merely rest upon macroeconomic analyses, disregarding any elaborate consideration of the inevitable national and class conflicts (Heo 2005, 21–25; Shin 2006).

Third, consideration must also be given to societal organization in agricultural communities. As is widely known, agricultural policy in colonial Korea in the 1930s was called the “Ugaki agricultural policy,” after then Governor-General Ugaki Kazushige. Its main focus concentrated on the Rural Development Movement (Nōson sinkō undō, Nongchon jinheung undong in Korean). Some argue how this brought grand changes to the leadership structure of rural communities, exerting substantial impact on the transformation of agricultural politics in colonial Korea (Matsumoto 2005; Yoon 2006). These scholars claim that the influence of educated, mid-ranking local elites in colonial institutions increased. However, fostering of so-called mid-ranking elites who would take on local leadership was indeed an arduous task. They were unable to fully put into practice what they had learned from the newly introduced education system (Lee 2005; Itagaki 2006; 2008).

Fourth, one may look at the issue from the relational dimension between colonial state and colonial society. The concept of “colonial corporatism” has been suggested to support this perspective (Shin and Robinson 1999). It constitutes theoretical explanation to the colonial society dispute → systematization of conflict → strengthening of colonial state paradigm. However, this approach requires additional explanations on two dimensions. First, it fails to provide an elaborate analysis of the systematization process of conflicts. Without analyzing the momentum of change, it merely provides descriptive, rather than explanatory, depositions. Second, to argue that the strengthening of the colonial state occurred through the systematization of conflicts can easily lead to the idea that state systematization, or hegemonic rule, took place based on societal interests. However, in order to confirm such an argument, it is necessary to create a new analytical tool to explain the components of class interests as well as the substantive distribution structure within colonial society. Park Myoung-kyu (2001) criticizes how colonial corporatism theory places disproportional emphasis on the general theory of corporatism, to the point that the

term “colonial” can be omitted. Park also points out that, by neglecting to differentiate the temporal and spatial concept, colonial corporatism theory might exploit the case of colonial Korea to establish the superiority of the Western discourse.

This paper attempts to tackle this issue by suggesting the *power effects* of the *cognitive paradigm* computed in the statistical data found in *The Tenant Practices of Korea* (*Chōsen no kosaku kankō*, hereafter *Practices*). It is necessary to undertake a historical consideration of why tenancy disputes arose, and how and through what measures these disputes were settled. The focus of this analysis is largely on disputes related to the issue of tenancy rent, which has been neglected by previous research.

### **Theoretical Background: Rule by Numbers**

Governance is deeply related to the concept of statistics as the *science of the state*, or the accumulation and schematization of facts about the governed (Bourdieu 1994, 7). Governance is made possible by the massive inscription process of the state-led census, investigation by social reformists, surveys conducted by police forces, GDP and growth rates, inflation, and corporate accounting records and detailed statements of taxes, etc., through which *social reality* is transformed into a calculable entity. Inscription is a process through which the reality of the governed is categorized and homogenized so that it can be applied to practical policy. It is during this process that *reality* is fixated, compared, and transformed into something controllable. Enumeration often plays a decisive role in changing reality into a governable entity. Numbers can construct relationships between irrelative phenomena, allowing reality to become a calculable one with such indices as population, economic statistics, public polls, and divorce rates, etc. Enumeration is also the process that allows observation of reality *from a distance*. Numbers are eventually collected, accumulated, and generalized at the “center of calculation” (Latour 1987). Enumeration grants *calculation power* to the individuals or specific groups who have accumulated the data (Latour 1987, 232–234; Miller and Rose 2008, 65–68). Political decisions that are made

in accordance with these numbers acquire an impartial and fair aspect. Quantification, therefore, is a way to make a decision without giving the impression of decision-making (Porter 1995, 7–8). The emergence and acceptance of social indicators that enumerate social phenomena is a symptom of the beginning of rule by numbers (Land 2001; Slattery 1986; Carley 1981; Carlisle 1972; Bauer 1966).

For colonial governance, the development of enumeration carried great significance in terms of governmentality. For example, for a number of British bureaucrats, colonial India was nothing more than “a vast collection of numbers”; numbers attached “a particular form of certainty” to an odd world (Cohn 1996, 8). In addition, statistical translation of socio-economic phenomena allowed authorities to legally and systematically intervene in the affairs of colonial society. Here, enumeration was a form of political practice that constructed a new object of consensus by defining visuospatial dimension (Kalpagam 2014; 2000, 49). The enumerative strategies toward colonial society facilitated the deconstruction of communal and national identity that lay beneath colonial rule. Furthermore, statistical data often worked as a supplementary device in establishing the social and political power of the ruling bureaucracy in empire-colony negotiations during times of governing crises (Appadurai 1993, 117–119).

## **Emergence of Social Problems and Administrative Response in Colonial Korea**

### *Radicalization of Tenancy Disputes*

The First Rice Multiplication Plan (1920–1925) announced by the Government-General of Colonial Korea (hereafter GGCK) was a direct response to the deteriorating food supply in Japan following the Siberian Intervention (1918–1922) and the Rice Riots (1918). The GGCK implemented this plan in order to stabilize the supply of rice bound for the Japanese mainland (Yonetani 2006). The marketization of rice had developed rapidly, to the point that the goal of landlord management had

become subordinate to the mechanism of an empire-wide rice market. Under these circumstances, tenancy disputes in colonial Korea rapidly increased and grew radical, reaching a crescendo between 1923 and 1928. To make matters worse, the rapid decline of rice prices resulting in *poverty amidst plenty* in 1930 further stimulated tenancy disputes. The colonial state faced the necessity of taking socio-political measures to renew impoverished Korean farm villages.

The crisis of agriculture and of the farm villages, home to more than 80 percent of the population and the source of 70–80 percent of the country's production value, was a core social crisis in colonial Korea. Tenancy disputes arose led by nationalists and socialists, and which the colonial state considered a threat to its colonial rule. The peasant movement in colonial Korea is best characterized as a class conflict, centered on criticism of the tenancy system and peasant demand for drastic reforms in the area of landownership.

Peasants participated in collective demonstrations, adopting violent and revolutionary measures introduced by the Association for the Non-Payment of Farm Rent (Sojangnyo bulnap dongmaeng 小作料不納同盟). In addition, the young and intellectual leadership that initiated the unionization of tenant peasants introduced socialist ideology to the peasant movements in an attempt to develop it into a nation-wide anti-imperialist national liberation movement. After the March First Movement in 1919, the Joseon Labor Association (Joseon nodong gongjehoe 朝鮮労働共済会) was organized in February 1922, with local branches sprouting up nationwide. In July 1922, the Joseon Labor Association advocated for the voluntary alignment of the tenant peasants, arguing that the tenancy problem was the most important issue among all social issues. The Joseon Confederation of Laborers and Peasants (Joseon nonong chongdongmaeng 朝鮮労働農総同盟) was established in 1924, and the Joseon Peasant's Confederation (Joseon nongmin chongdongmaeng 朝鮮農民総同盟) became independent from the organization in 1927. A number of local unions were organized by tenant peasants across colonial Korea: in 1931, there were more than 1,700 peasants' associations nationwide. From the 1920s, tenancy disputes expanded rapidly, with the conflicts growing impetuous (Lee 2013, 111, 118–119; Kim 2007,

214). The colonial state suppressed these peasant movements and tenancy disputes by legal means, using the Code of Civil Procedure (1912), Public Security Preservation Law (1925), Act Concerning Punishment on Physical Violence (1926), Regulation Concerning Punishment on Police Offense, and the Peace Preservation Law.

Zensho Eisuke, who was commissioned by the GGCK to investigate the tenancy system and composed *The Tenant Customs of Korea* (*Chōsen no kosaku kanshū* 朝鮮の小作慣習; 1929, hereafter, *Customs*), made the following observations: “Traditionally, the relationship between landlords and tenant peasants in Korea was characterized by deep attachment and understanding toward one another, and it was rare for the two parties to fall into crude disputes. Yet, just like how economic shock and ideological confusion caused frequent rural problems in mainland Japan after the World War, even in Korea, such tenancy organizations are being formed and creating belligerent social phenomena.” In addition, Zensho expresses concerns over the expansion of progressive movements mediated by the rural issues, such as Christian and Donghak forces within nationalist movements, which invested significant financial resources for the promotion and education of agricultural communities, along with the organizations of specialized unions by the “red” peasant (*Chōsen sōtokuhu* 1929, 57–62).

### *The Colonial State's Response to the Crisis in Agricultural Politics*

In the context of these political, economic, and social crises, the GGCK came to face the necessity of finding solutions to tenancy disputes. The GGCK established an ad hoc Committee on Tenancy Investigation (*Rinji kosaku chōsa iinkai*) and convened its first meeting on February 8, 1928. This committee, “finding it necessary to deliberate the lists and outlines of investigation before deciding whether the tenancy issues should be addressed through legislative or administrative measures,” convened a total of eighteen times and consulted with the Government-General on its investigation results. According to the *Progress Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Tenancy Investigation by the Government-General of Colonial Korea*, the lists and investigation outlines concerning tenancy issues can be

summarized as follows (Chōsen sōtokuhu nōrinkyoku 1933a, 64–79):

- (1) Purpose of tenancy rights
- (2) Origin of tenancy rights (oral/written records)
- (3) Effects of tenancy rights (countervailing power, assignation, sublease, duration, durability)
- (4) Annihilation of tenancy rights
- (5) Land rent (variety and quantity, delivery, rent exemption, modification)
- (6) Liability other than land rent (geographical features, public duty, labor)
- (7) Reimbursement indemnity payment for tenanted lands
- (8) Supervising the tenant land custodians, called as *saeum* (regulation on authority and establishment of custodians and replacement of injurious ones)
- (9) Settling of tenancy disputes
- (10) Supervising tenancy farming

The discussions and resolutions presented in this report were not only brought to the GGCK for consultation purposes, but they also became the foundations of the tenancy-related lawmaking procedures after the 1930s, epitomized in the legislative process of the Joseon Farmland Ordinance (1934). The report soon served full scope to its purposes in 1928. In spring of 1928, anticipating inclement weather conditions and a consequent lean year, on July 28, 1928, the GGCK issued its “Notice Concerning Improvement of Tenancy Disputes” to all prefectural magistrates in order to present pre-emptive measures to deal with the expected increase in tenancy disputes. It was an emergency measures before any concrete legal ordinances could be made (Lee 2013, 129).

However, in dealing with tenancy crises in Korea, it was not enough to come up with ad hoc administrative actions; the government faced the necessity of constructing more fundamental provisions. The colonial state intended to resolve the issue by passing related legislation measures based on extensive investigations into tenancy practices.



## Investigations of Colonial Tenancy Practices and the Enumeration of Society

### *Genealogy of Practices (1932)*

It was in 1927 that the GGCK decided to take on a holistic project of nationwide research, investigation, and organization of Korea's contemporary tenancy practices. Substantive investigations took place from 1930 to 1932. At the end of these investigations, the two thousand-page *Practices* (December 1932) was published, comprising an extensive collections and analyses of statistical data related to tenancy practices. According to the work's preface and introductory remarks, the investigation concurrently ran reference research and hearing investigations (reports were directly made to headquarters following investigations at the *myeon* 面 level, a subdivision of a *gun* 郡). In 1930, Government-General Headquarters compiled a list of items to be investigated, and priorities were given to the investigations at the *bu* 府 and *myeon* levels throughout Korea. The results were then first compiled into into *gun* and *do* 島 divisions according to the data collected at the *myeon* levels, then these were assembled for a second time at the provincial level based on investigative reports of the *bu*, *gun*, and *do* levels before being finally submitted to headquarters. Statistical data was calculated with 1930 as the base year. *Practices* is credited as "the first organized and systematic investigations of tenancy practices in Korea" (Chōsen sōtokuhu nōrinkyoku 1932, 1:3).

In spatial dimensions, except for the names of administrative units, investigation items, survey entries, and points of concern, the arranged data found in *Practices* precisely conform to those of the tenancy investigation that took place in Japan in 1921. Both documents were intended to acquire the base materials for tenancy legislation. This accurately reflects the linkages between investigations that were conducted on Japanese mainland and in colonial Korea. In Japan, the Committee on the Tenancy System Investigation (Kosaku seido chōsa iinkai), which consisted of specialists in agricultural policies, such as government officials from Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and university professors, discussed and

outlined investigation guidelines in 1921, according to which municipal administrations undertook the research. The same set of guidelines was used in tenancy investigations in colonial Korea. This implies that the political will surrounding the investigation process operated within the same frameworks. At the same time, it is also indicative that the state's operative power penetrated to the smallest/lowest administrative unit. The administrative authority of the investigative agency must be closely analyzed in order to identify the level of *enumeration* and to assess the power effects of the overall investigations.

#### *Full-Scale Enumeration of Colonial Landlord-Tenant Relations*

What are the characteristics of *Practices* from a historical perspective? Let us compare three reports on tenancy practices: a 1925 investigation by the GGCK Division of Social Affairs (Chōsen sōtokuhu shakaika), *Customs* (1929), and *Practices* (1932).

The *Daishō jūichinengoro no Chōsen no kosaku kankō* (Tenant Practices of Korea around 1922) was a 1925 publication by Division of Agriculture, which compiled all collected data from provincial-level investigations conducted by the Division of Social Affairs. One document exists that explains how Division of Social Affairs came to bear primary responsibility in conducting these investigations: "After the Great War in Europe, ideological convulsions in Western states also ignited a rising awareness among urban workers, which led to increasing labor disputes in cities. Stimulated by this urban movement, the peasant in rural areas also began to get involved in disputes. As countermeasures to these rising disturbances, the Police Department notified all provincial governments to conduct investigations" (*Dong-A Ilbo*, October 26, 1922). This remark elucidates the characteristics of the investigation led by the Division of Social Affairs, namely that it took place with the close cooperation of the police. It is possible to point out that, in their nature, the investigations that developed surrounding tenancy disputes were conducted from the perspective of maintaining civic order.

On the other hand, the investigation report by the Division of Social

Affairs states in its introductory remarks that “this investigation aims to utilize all scientific, analytical, and systematic entries and methodologies.” However, despite the stated commitment to “scientific investigations,” the authors faced limitations: “The levels of precision vary greatly between provinces, making it difficult to uniformly arrange the concepts; this was caused by the unavailability of related opinions, but we could only lay out all items just as they were presented by provincial authorities; the investigation lacks details due to differences in both weights and depths of the incidents across regions (Chōsen sōtokuhu nōrinkyoku 1932, 2:187). This implicates the prematurity and deficiency of administrative capacity of the colonial state, as well as the authority’s limited level of penetrations into local communities in colonial Korea. Despite initial ambitions, the Division of Social Affairs investigation failed to exceed the level of investigations into tenancy “customs,” in that its substantive contents remained a mere listing of case studies.

Next, let us now take closer look at *Customs* (1929). This report is unique in the sense that the government hired Zensho Eisuke to comprehensively collect and compile all tenancy-related statistical data that GGCK had collected since the annexation of Korea in 1910. The data related to agriculture in the *Government-General of Colonial Korea Annual Statistics Report* was plainly organized. These resources contain comprehensive policy prescriptions regarding the issue of tenancy. However, the statistical data in *Customs* were largely limited to those collected at provincial levels.

Tsumagari Kuranozo, a professor at Keijo Imperial University who composed a lengthy article on Korea’s tenancy system based on the data given in *Customs* in 1929, claimed that he had read in the *Keijo Nippo* (Seoul Daily; a Japanese-language newspaper published in colonial Korea) that the GGCK was planning to appoint tenancy supervisors in every province and conduct additional investigations into tenant practices. He expressed his expectation that, with the completion of the additional research on tenancy issues, it would be “possible to obtain abundant data on tenancy issues throughout Korea” (Tsumagari 1929, 306). His statement implied that he was frustrated by the unavailability of adequate data for his research. The “additional research” Tsumagari mentioned in his article is

the set of investigation project conducted from 1930 to 1932, leading to the publication of *Practices*.

Then, what are the differences and special features of the statistical data in *Practices*, compared to *Customs* and the investigations by the Division of Social Affairs? First, *Practices* exceeded all previously existing research in both quantitative and qualitative aspects, including the scales of investigations, the administrative level of investigations (down to the *myeon*), as well as the computing of mean values on tenancy periods and rent in the *gun* units. The investigations by the Division of Social Affairs and *Customs* were mere compilations of case studies at the provincial level. *Customs*, though it successfully collected and compiled a broader range of statistical data relative to the Division of Social Affairs investigation, did not go beyond collecting of statistical data mustered at each provincial level. In the depth of investigation and administration, *Practices* by itself proves the “social infrastructural power” (Mann 1986) of the colonial state.

Substantive research has been done on the strengthening of the administrative power of the *myeon* in 1930s Korea (Yoon 2006), and the publication of *Practices*, the product of investigations into tenancy practices, was empowered by the established *myeon* system. Reversely, and at the same time, it can be pointed out that the implementation of a large-scale investigation whose primary focus was a *myeon*-based investigation led to the strengthening of the *myeon* as an administrative unit. Also, the investigators of *Practices* carried out interviews, an aspect that differentiates this investigation from the 1921 investigations that took place in Japan. In the interviews, local magnates, landlords, tenant peasants, and peasants within the jurisdiction were asked questions that were prepared in advance by the local officials. On the one hand, it was a process through which the colonial state gathered information on agricultural society within the colony, but on the other, it is also indicative of the emergence of a new phase, in which *myeon*, or the colonial state, was beginning to be indirectly recognized as an accommodating agent in the resolution of tenancy disputes.

One of distinctive characteristics of *Practices* is that it enumerated all mean values at the *gun* level by setting up *myeon* as key investigative unit. This practice was revolutionary as well as decisive for the “governance by

numbers.” In all previously existing tenancy investigations, all case studies were simply laid out by provinces and there was no standardized unit. While collected cases of customs were regarded as sources of customary laws in the court, it was far from sufficient in terms of enumeration process. On the contrary, *Practices* extracted mean values for the following data for the first time in the history of colonial Korea; (1) percentage of the agreed term of contract (*gun* level); (2) duration and proclivity of fixed-term tenants (provincial level); (3) customary length and tendencies of irregular tenants (provincial level); (4) tenancy terms by major crops (provincial level). The extraction of mean values by enumerating the reality would enhance the applicability to policy proposals. For example, the most probable contract duration recorded in *Practices* was three years, and *Joseon Farmland Ordinance* of 1934 also limits the guaranteed length of tenancy to three years.

Another significant characteristic of *Practices* is its calculation and enumeration of the mean values of tenancy rents by the quality of the farmed land (paddy field, dry field, garden field), and the forms of payment (in-kind, reimbursement, cash) based on *myeon* units. It enumerated the mean values of tenancy rents by the form of payment (fixed rent, production rate, distribution rate) by each *gun*. Data on the standard rate of tenancy rent was collected based on form of payment (regular, special) by provinces. The mean values of “ratio of rents to production output” were also calculated and classified at three levels (excellent, fair, poor) for each form of payment. Statistics for single-cropping and double-cropping were also given. Also, provincial mean values were calculated, which took into account rent reduction during lean years. The “temporal rent reduction rate” was calculated based on the production decline rate. Later, these data were to have significance during the legislative process for the Joseon Farmland Ordinance. Article 16 of the Farmland Ordinance deals directly with the temporal reduction of tenancy rent during poor harvests.


In short, all this indicates that *Practices* consisted of collected, organized, and uniformed data that were based on compartmentalized average tenancy rate at every *gun* unit throughout Korea. This means that, when complaints were filed regarding tenancy rent, this document provided the colonial state with the ability to show an average rate based on the quality of the fields,

forms of payment, medium of payment, and ratio of rent to production output. In other words, this functioned as *an indicator of tenancy rate* for every *myeon*. This document provided the *scientific* evidences for the legislation and policies in relation to the agricultural politics of the colonial state in dealing with landlord-tenant conflicts. This information formed a holistic manual for the colonial state to regulate conflicts of interest in colonial Korea.


Statistics as Regulating Measures for Social Conflict

Changing Aspects of Tenancy Disputes

How did the statistical data provided in *Practices* affect the politics of tenancy in colonial Korea? Let us have a look at a variety of indexes related to tenancy disputes in order to analyze this question.




**Figure 1.** Frequency of tenancy disputes in colonial Korea (Bureau of Agriculture and Forestry)  
Source: Data extracted from Chōsen sōtokuhu nōrinkyoku (1940b, 5–7).



**Figure 2.** Number of participants in tenancy disputes in colonial Korea (Bureau of Agriculture and Forestry)  
*Source:* Data extracted from Chōsen sōtokuhu nōrinkyoku (1940, 5–7).

Figure 1 (Frequency of tenancy disputes) and Figure 2 (Number of participants in tenancy disputes) show an aspect of tenancy disputes in colonial Korea. Two important conclusions can be pointed out from these two graphs: (1) from 1934 on, the number of complaints increases dramatically; (2) as of 1933, the number of participants per case decreases dramatically, to about two persons.



**Figure 3.** Tenancy disputes in colonial Korea by cause (%)  
Source: Data extracted from Chōsen sōtokuhu nōrinkyoku (1940, 21–24).

Next, Figure 3 breaks down the percentage of tenancy disputes by cause. Here, “cause of tenancy disputes” is defined as “direct demands and contents of disputes proposed by the involved parties” (Chōsen sōtokuhu nōrinkyoku 1940, 20). It can be observed that, though the agricultural politics division of the administration carried out the listings and sorting of *causes*, those who applied for settlement accommodation determined the relative characteristics of each dispute on their own.

Figure 3 indicates the causes of tenancy disputes in colonial Korea. As seen in Figure 1 (Frequency of tenancy disputes), the number of tenancy disputes increases dramatically from 1934, and from 1932 on, “transfer of tenancy rights” and related issues become a large majority of causes. Such trends reflect three administrative modifications made at that time: (1) the drafting of the Joseon Farmland Ordinance had begun in 1929 behind closed doors, during which a regulation was made clear regarding the duration of tenancy rights; (2) during the same period, the GGCK and agricultural-policy officials began frequently discussing the necessity of passing regulations on the tenancy system; (3) the self-management of



landlords grew significantly following the enactment of the Joseon Farmland Ordinance in 1934, and the processes for the careful selection of tenant peasants as well as tenancy right transfers extensively took place.

### *Demands for Temporal Rent Reduction and Its Index*

It is well known that the extensive investigation that took place throughout Korea, as well as the subsequent publication of *Practices*, were undertaken for the purpose of instituting a law on tenancy practices.<sup>1</sup> Shinoda Masahiro (1899–1972), an administrative officer in the Bureau of Agriculture and the editor of *Practices* who was directly involved in drafting the Joseon Farmland Ordinance, stated that all data used in the drafting process were derived from this investigation (Shinoda 1971, 6). Shinoda emphasizes that *Practices* not only provided important resources for drafting of that law, but also became a valuable barometer for the operation of agricultural policies (Shinoda 1971, 37). He also notes how, after consideration of the related data, the regular tenancy term was set at three years (Shinoda 1971, 63–64).<sup>2</sup>


The Joseon Farmland Ordinance (1934) had significant implications for the agricultural politics of the 1930s in colonial Korea. First, it determined the period of regular tenancy. Article 7 of the Ordinance recognized “real rights” for the duration of three years for regular land fields, and seven years for special lands, such as orchards. When filing complaints, peasants referred to this regulation, and as has been seen, after 1934 tenancy rights transfer became the main cause of tenancy disputes. Second, the Ordinance instituted strong regulatory provisions on tenant land custodians (Articles 3, 4, 5, 33, appendix). These provisions cannot be found in the Japanese

- 
1. Hisama Kenichi, head of the Tenancy Division in Hwanghae-do province, points out the direct relationship between the Joseon Farmland Ordinance and investigations of tenancy practices: “In order to obtain basic data for the Law on Tenancy Practice, the government launched investigations into tenancy practices in every *myeon* throughout Korea in 1930, following detailed investigative entries. The investigations were concluded by 1931, producing the most powerful data for the development of the law” (Hisama 1935, 40).
  2. In *Practices*, the most probable regional tenancy duration by region is recorded to be three years.

version of the law (Tenancy Law submitted to the 59th Imperial Diet), and only applied to the law in colonial Korea. Third, it contained a clause on “temporal rent reduction in a lean harvest,” which provided emergency measures in case of wind or flood damages and drought (Article 16, ‘A Clause on Temporal Rent Reduction and Exemption in the Years of Poor Harvest due to Natural Disasters’). Fourth, nowhere in the Law can be found a clause related to how the rent should be determined.

Owing to these characteristics of the Ordinance, the politics of tenancy in colonial Korea, and subsequent academic research, focused on the issue of tenancy rights transfer. However, this paper aims to re-structure the politics of tenancy by closely examining how the clause on “temporal rent reductions” was implemented in real situations, and also how *Practices* brought changes to social practices related to the determination of tenancy rents. The issues concerning rent reduction and determination of rent produced a direct conflict of interest between landlords and peasants, making it extremely difficult to reach an agreement that satisfied both parties. Different interests and a variety of situational factors can easily escalate tensions, and accommodating the demands of the two sides can be time-consuming. In addition, generally speaking, tenancy disputes related to rents had the high likelihood of leading to collective disputes. This means that, were it possible to present the *adjustability* of the issue with social indexes, this would have great historical significance.

The first thing that catches one’s attention when looking at the causes of tenancy disputes is the low proportion of disputes related to the issue of tenancy rents. This does not mean that the numbers of disputes concerning tenancy rents decreased; rather, disputes related to tenancy rents increased dramatically after the introduction of Joseon Tenancy Regulation Ordinance and Joseon Farmland Ordinance. Since 1934, disputes related to the procedure of “temporal rent reduction/exemption” in times of poor harvest due to natural disasters and blast disease increased rapidly. Article 16 of the Joseon Farmland Ordinance was referred to as the legal basis for the settlement of disputes. Figure 4 shows the number of recorded cases that were triggered by conflicts related to temporal rent reduction/exemption.



**Figure 4.** Number of tenancy disputes initiated by demands for “temporal rent exemption/reduction due to a lean harvest caused by natural disasters and rice blast disease”

Source: Data extracted from Chōsen sōtokuhu nōrinkyoku (1940, 21–23).

Figure 4 shows that the number of tenancy disputes began to increase dramatically in 1934, and reached peaked in 1936. For the year 1936, when drought and flooding caused serious reductions in yield, officials at the Bureau of Agriculture and Forestry assessed that the disputes had been settled rather smoothly by the Joseon Farmland Ordinance (Article 16), considering the lack of landlord understanding of legal regulations. The relatively smaller number of disputes recorded in 1938 is considered to be the result of a deepened understanding of legal procedures on the part of landlords.<sup>3</sup> In sum, the tenancy disputes took place through the law, and the regulations set forth by the law.

How, then, were the individual cases settled smoothly? It is crucial to point out that the colonial state was equipped with the power to construct

3. There are some records noting increased number of tenancy disputes in this transitional period as a result of the enactment of the Joseon Farmland Ordinance (*Maeil Sinbo*, October 28, 1934).

a standard index as a concrete problem-solving mechanism. There was a chart indicating the ratio of rent reduction/exemption to the degree of decrease in production quantity by provinces, classified by the types of rent, such as fixed rent, production rate, and distribution rate (Chōsen sōtokuhu nōrinkyoku 1932, 1:357–363). Along with this, *Practices* includes other charts that show mean values of provincial rent reduction according to quality of farmland (paddy/dry fields), types of rent (fixed rent, production rate, distribution rate), and forms of payment (in-kind, reimbursement, cash). This was a product of widely collected and carefully calculated data that enumerated the mean ratio of rent reduction to yield quantities, indicating, for example, to what percentage rent must be reduced in a lean year when the rent is paid in kind. The purpose of these indicators was not only to present peasants and landlords with the temporal rent reduction regulations for times of natural disasters, but also to allow the authorities to actively deal with the situation when a complaint was filed. In other words, these became guidelines to justify the decisions of the authorities.

Some historical materials would help identify the changing aspects of social practices and their relation to these indexes.

Unprecedented drought around the southern areas of Korea, Gyeonggi province, and Hwanghae, coupled with other disasters such as rice blast disease and drought, caused significant decreases in crop yield. As a countermeasure, Gyeonggi province officials...announced they would negotiate with the landlords to institute a complete rent exemption in areas where more than 70 percent of crops had suffered damage, and to reduce rent by half in areas where the damage was between 20–60 percent, but it is unclear as to how far negotiations were carried out... **The countermeasures initiated by the provincial authority are not as effective, and the proposed measures are said to be nothing but empty words on paper....** (*Dong-A Ilbo*, October 7, 1928; emphasis added)

This was written in 1928. This article discusses the issue of temporal rent reduction/exemption measures in areas affected by natural disaster, yet the author claims that the ratio of rent reduction/exemption as well as negotiation procedures with landlords remained obscure. Other news

articles reported that all tenant peasants could do was to play the guilt card against the landlords, and the landlord meetings produced no effective solutions (*Jungoe Ilbo*, October 19, 1928).

By comparison, after the issuance of the Joseon Farmland Ordinance (1934), the situation began to improve. For example, the authorities instructed that governors issue a notice demanding landlords “for the reduction of rent by 20 percent when the crop production is at 80 percent of full harvest, and a complete exemption when the crop yields are reduced to 30 percent, and that when poor production in a disaster area is unavoidable tenancy disputes must be prevented” (*Keijō Nippo*, October 14, 1936). The percentage of rent reduction/exemption can be observed from some cases reported in newspapers. The following case illustrates a carefully detailed reduction/exemption index:

**The landlords collected tenancy rents based on the index of traditional temporal rent reduction/exemption shown in the table.** Facing the unprecedented poor harvest of 1939, however, the administration persuaded landlords to hold a meeting in order to deal with the disaster and to determine the index of temporal rent reduction/exemption.


**According to the decisions made at this meeting, complete rent exemption was applied to the cases** where (1) planting is impossible due to drought, (2) total yield is less than 30 percent of full harvest, (3) the land tax is exempted, and (4) the total production output is equal to or less than cultivation costs such that there is no net income. When total production is less the 80 percent of full production, 20 percent rent reduction; when less than 70 percent, 30 percent rent reduction; when less than 60 percent, 50 percent reduction; when less than 40 percent, 80 percent reduction. There would no rent reduction applied when the total production exceeds 80 percent of normal production, and a complete rent exemption will be applied when the total production is less than 30 percent. (*Maeil Sinbo*, January 21, 1941; emphasis added)

It is significant that political actions were beginning to be taken by using a certain set of indexes as a means of reference. In other words, after the completion and disclosure of investigation results, class conflicts were

recognized as problems of adjustment to the numbers, rather than a struggle by collective action. These objective indexes became a legitimating foundation for political action.

*Tenancy Disputes Caused by “High Tenancy Rents” and “Expansion of Tenancy Rents” and Its Indexes*

Let us now turn to tenancy disputes related to the “expansion of tenancy rents” and “high tenancy rents.”



**Figure 5.** Number of tenancy disputes caused by the “expansion of rent” or “high rent”

Source: Data extracted from Chōsen sōtokuhu nōrinkyoku (1940, 21–23).

Note: “High tenancy rent” data reflect the numbers during each phase; “demands for reduction” (1927–1929), “high tenancy rates” (1930–1936), and “reduction of tenancy rents” (1937–1939).

Figure 5 shows that related disputes increased dramatically after 1934. The significance of these items can be summarized as follows: (1) the lack of

legal provisions in the Joseon Farmland Ordinance (1934) concerning these issues made it necessary to seek resolution outside the framework of law; (2) in order for the argument of “high” tenancy rents to be successfully carried out, a certain index or standard was required to determine whether or not the rent were indeed “high.” In other words, this issue must be preceded by a substantive foundation of comparative indexes—or benchmarks—to calculate the level of expensiveness based on region, type of field, and landlord, before the solution to the dispute might be proposed. Tenancy disputes caused by high tenancy rents emerged as “the tenant peasants demanded permanent rent reduction in response to high tenancy rents” (Chōsen sōtokuhu nōrinkyoku 1940, 21). In other words, this strongly highlights the fact that the mean values of tenancy rent by *gun* provided in *Practices* were not only acknowledged by the colonial authority but also by the tenant peasants themselves.

Some cases found in newspapers complement the above description. For example, the following statements illustrate the consultation method concerning the issue of tenancy rent in the 1920s.

**The problem of whether or not tenancy rent is high is nothing new.** The landlords insist it is not high and the peasants say it is, but the fundamental problem is that the tenant peasants become desperate because there is no hope in making their case against powerful landlords. **Another thing is that tenant peasants have been unable to provide enough evidence that they were paying too much rent....**It has become increasingly crucial to be able to provide a reasonable standard of rent and on the grounds upon which this is determined, based on which both sides should both clearly and thoroughly compare and verify what today’s rent is and what it should be. (*Dong-A Ilbo*, September 9, 1923; emphasis added)

In comparison, the method of approaching the issue of tenancy rent around the time of the publication of *Practices* (1932) and afterward is illustrated in the following excerpts.

The highest tenancy rent of 90 percent—this number came up after the investigation into tenancy practices. Such imposition of unlimited rents lies at the center of agrarian problems of Korea, and it must be fundamentally reformed....**Investigations into Korea's tenancy practices have been ongoing since 1929**, and these will form the basis for a Tenant Farming Law or Law on Tenancy Disputes in the future....**As has been assumed, such tendency toward high rent is rather controlled in the northwestern region of Korea, while the situation is still severe in the southern part of Korea.** (*Dong-A Ilbo*, April 30, 1932; emphasis added)

This article was written from the perspective of an agent who drew upon the guidelines for tenancy rents throughout Korea, after recognizing a part of the results of the investigations. While the author states that there are no great differences between the results of the investigations and previously held assumptions, this does not mean that the subjective assumptions and opinions he had held carry the same value as the *scientific* statistics enumerated through nation-wide investigations. More fundamentally, this indicates the emergence of a colonial subjectivity that internalized a *myth of legitimacy* of implemented laws and policies based on the enumerated data.

In Gunwi-gun of Gyeongsangbuk-do province...according to the petitions filed with each *gun* administration, the highest rent ratio is 95 percent while the lowest is recorded at 65 percent; and the worst case can be found on land owned by Wakabayashi Shironosuke, located in 20 Dong-mun Jeong, Daegu province. On this, the governor of Gunwi, Oh Jae-sun, stated: **"Compared to other reports submitted by each myeon, this rate is extremely high, and I have reported this to the Provincial Office.** At the council meeting hosted by the Agricultural Association, the landlords and tenant peasants decided to increase the rent by an average rate of increase in production, and I believe that the landlords will voluntarily reduce the rent soon." (*Dong-A Ilbo*, November 10, 1933; emphasis added)

This article was written in 1933 and it points to several significant developments: (1) investigations into high tenancy rents were conducted



in each *myeon* and reported back to the province; (2) the governor of the gun assessed the situation based on these reports, and asked the Provincial Office to jointly solve the problem; and (3) there existed a certain degree of agreement on rent between the landlords and tenant peasants. Also, based on these evidential reports, the author expects that “the landlords will voluntarily reduce the rent soon.”

Next, there emerged public support for the active adaptation of rent-related indexes as the basis for the implementation of the Joseon Farmland Ordinance. As it is well known, the Joseon Farmland Ordinance set the duration of regular tenancy at three years, imposing controls and supervisions of land custodians. No clause is included in the Ordinance that touches upon the determination of tenancy rents. This is the fundamental reason the Joseon Farmland Ordinance is often assessed as an aspect of conservative reform that stood on the side of landlords.

In these circumstances, *Practices* and other documents played a crucial role in the resolution of rent-related tenancy disputes. The following excerpt illustrates this point.

Kondo, chief of the Agricultural Affairs Section, who participated in coordination and mediation during tenancy disputes at Fuji Agricultural Pant (Shinuiju), stated: “The two central issues were the lowering of tenancy rents and the refund of reclamation cost, and everything else was ramifications surrounding those issues. ...a 58-percent rate is not as high as other plants. After being given a detailed explanation, the tenant peasants accepted the terms.” (*Maeil Sinbo*, October 9, 1936; emphasis added)

This excerpt elucidates the attitude of a government official who engages in the peaceful settlement of tenancy disputes. One interesting point is his statement of the tenancy rent as “not as high as other plants,” which insinuates the existence of comparable indexes for tenancy rents. Also, it is quite significant that, after the government official pointed to facts and attempted to mediate the dispute, the tenant peasants ended up agreeing to the proposed resolution.

Aspects of Tenancy Dispute Settlements

A study by Matsumoto Takenori deals in great detail with tenancy dispute settlements. Table 1 shows that, after the mid-1930s, the ratio of police decreased, and tenancy committees as well as colonial officials (provincial, gun, do, eup, myeon) became increasingly involved in the mediation process.

**Table 1.** Number of Settled Tenancy Disputes  
and Composition of Mediating Parties in Korea (%)

Year	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939
Number of settled cases	1,735	6,437	24,664	27,903	30,245	21,084	15,025
- plaintiff/defendant (%)	17.1	14.4	14.4	23.2	29.0	28.6	28.6
- mediator/adjustment (%)	83.5	85.9	86.3	75.8	68.8	70.0	69.1
Percentage of mediators by type (%)	29.6	28.8	24.6	28.0	31.1	40.8	41.8
Committee on Tenancy Farming	29.6	44.5	27.0	22.8	23.5	14.2	14.3
Policemen	17.8	19.7	24.9	25.9	19.0	19.1	20.9
Civil servants (prefecture, gun, do)	11.9	11.6	28.2	30.4	30.4	29.9	27.1
Civil servants (governors of eup, myeon)	1.2	0.2	0.5	4.3	4.9	2.1	3.2
Ward mayors, local leaders							

Source: Chōsen sōtokuhu nōrinkyoku (1940), re-extracted from Matsumoto (1998, 146).

What draws one’s attention is that a great majority of settlements were made through a public mediation (勸解) system.<sup>4</sup> The percentage of disputes that were settled or withdrawn before or after the mediation/modification process through public mediation was 78.5% in 1933, 84.8% in 1934, 92.5% in 1935, 93.5% in 1936, 92.8% in 1937, 93.9% in 1938, and 94.8% in 1939. The index data for 1938 and 1939 are broken down to more specific cases, namely “withdrawal before public mediation,” “settled

4. This public mediation system was unique to colonial Korea (*Dong-A Ilbo*, November 30, 1932). The public mediation clause also existed in Japan’s Tenant Regulation Law (1924), however, it was not compulsory. By contrast, it was compulsory in colonial Korea. The *Dong-A Ilbo* article seems to emphasize this point.

with public mediation,” and “withdrawal before adjustment.” The above table shows all combined numbers. It is adequate to point out that it was becoming increasingly common for the tenancy disputes to be adjusted and compromised via the mediation system.

## Conclusion

The aim of this paper was to explain the transition of agricultural politics in colonial Korea in the 1930s as the power effects of an *enumerated society* created through investigations into tenancy practices, as epitomized by the publication of *Practices* (1932). A variety of indexes that enumerated the colonial agricultural community and social relations not only changed the pattern of agricultural politics but also constructed a new syntax. This implies that the colonial state discovered a social equilibrium in the form of mean values of tenancy rent. Social discontent related to the issue of tenancy rent in Korea was transformed into a problem that could be adjusted based on these indexes. In other words, political disputes surrounding the tenancy issue were resolved through mere interpretation of numbers. This also stipulates that social standards set forth by *Practices* became the basis for all adjustments and regulations regarding agricultural practices. The investigations on practices produced the *mean values*, but the fundamental significance of this lies in the fact that the creation of new tenancy practices based on these numbers was attempted in the context of a political project. In other words, the conflict of interest between landlord and tenant peasant was beginning to be presented as *adjustable* through the medium of *social mean values*.

The analysis of the formative transition of tenancy disputes in 1930s Korea elucidates the process of how colonial society was investigated, analyzed, silenced, and suppressed under the uniquely produced *rationality* of enumeration. This powerful knowledge resource served as a kind of index of social phenomena, represented in the form of statistical data. While these indexes were the products of official institutions, or the colonial state, they functioned as official knowledge distributed to wider society. This *official knowledge* wiped out a variety of formerly uncontrollable disputes,

suppressing the subjective opinions in the midst of disturbances. Ultimately, through the process of production, distribution, and consumption of official knowledge, the nature of tenancy disputes transformed—from ones that required on-the-spot resolution to ones that could be accommodated and settled through specialized number-adjustment. In addition, this allowed the representation of the colonial state as *fair and neutral mediator* of social conflict. This also points to the enhanced ruling ability of the colonial state. In the end, these were symptoms of a successfully operating “knowledge state” (Choi 1992) in colonial Korea.

Needless to say, social statistics are a form of specialized knowledge within the framework of mathematics, which is nothing more than social information expressed in numbers. However, it possesses further meaning. There are only a few ways of challenging the authority of official statistics. When it is possible to control the production of official statistics, official debates can also be controlled. Seemingly neutral, official statistics are by their nature the fundamental resource of political power (Slattery 1986, 4–12). After all, through its reproduction and extraction of social relations through statistical data, *Practices* deeply restrained, limited, and transfigured the *politics of tenancy* in colonial Korea, displacing on-the-spot disputes and bringing them to a space of specialized calculation. Without taking this into account, fundamental criticism of colonialism is impossible.

---

## REFERENCES

### Primary Sources

Available at National Diet Library of Japan Digital Collections, <https://dl.ndl.go.jp/>:

Chōsen shokusan ginkō (Industrial Bank of Colonial Korea), ed. *Zensen tahata baibai kakaku oyobi shūeki chō* (Investigation on the Price and Profit of the

- Paddy and Dry Field). (1928–1940).
- Chōsen sōtokuhu (GGCK; Japanese Government-General of Korea)/Zensho Eisuke. 1929. *Chōsen no kosaku kanshū* (Tenant Customs of Korea).
- Chōsen sōtokuhu keimukyoku (GGCK, Bureau of Police). 1933. *Saikinniokeru chōsen chian jōkyō* (Recent Security Situation of Colonial Korea).
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1938. *Saikinniokeru chōsen chian jōkyō* (Recent Security Situation of Colonial Korea).
- Chōsen sōtokuhu nōrinkyoku (GGCK, Bureau of Agriculture and Forest). 1927. *Naichiniokeru kosakuhō sōan to sonokaisetsu* (Annotated Draft of the Tenant Law of Japan).
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1932. *Chōsen no kosaku kankō* 1, 2 (Tenant Practices of Korea, Vol. 1, 2).
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1933a. *Chōsenniokeru kosakunikansuru hōrei* (Tenant Law of Colonial Korea).
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1933b. *Chōsenniokeru kosakunikansuru sankojikō tekiyō* (Summary on Tenant Farming of Colonial Korea).
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1940a. *Chōsen nōchi renpō* 1 (Yearbook of Agricultural Fields of Colonial Korea).
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1940b. *Chōsen nōga keizai kaikō* (Farmhouse Economic Review of Colonial Korea).
- Chōsen sōtokuhu shakaika (GGCK, Division of Social Affairs). 1925. *Daishō jūichinengoro no Chōsen no kosaku kankō* (Tenant Practices of Korea around 1922). In Chōsen sōtokuhu nōrinkyoku (GGCK, Bureau of Agriculture and Forest). 1932. *Chōsen no kosaku kankō* 2 (Tenant Practices of Korea, Vol. 2): 187–305.

## Secondary Sources

- Appadurai, Arjun. 1993. "Numbers in the Colonial Imagination." In *Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament: Perspectives on South Asia*, edited by C. Breckenridge and P. van der Veer, 314–339. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Bauer, Raymond A. ed. 1966. *Social Indicators*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. 1994. "Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field." Translated by Loic J. D. Wacquant and Samar Farage. *Sociological Theory* 12.1: 1–18.
- Carley, Michael. 1981. *Social Measurement and Social Indicators: Issues of Policy and Theory*. London: George Allen and Unwin.
- Carlisle, E. 1972. "The Conceptual Structure of Social Indicators." In *Social Indicators*

- and Social Policy*, edited by Andrew Shonfield and Stella Shaw, 23–32. Portsmouth: Heinemann Education Books.
- Choi, Jung-woon. 1992. *Jisik gukgaron* (The Knowledge State). Seoul: Samsung chulpansa.
- Cohn, Bernard S. 1996. *Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Cumings, Bruce. 1981. *The Origins of the Korean War*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Heo, Su-yeol. 2005. *Gaebal eomneun gaebal* (Growth without Development). Seoul: Eunhaeng namu.
- Hisama, Kenichi. 1935. *Joseon nōgyō no kindaiteki yōsō* (Modern Aspects of Joseon Agriculture). Tokyo: Nishigahara kankōkai.
- Itagaki, Ryuta. 2006. “Singminji-ui uul (Colonial Depression).” In *Geundae-reul dasi ingneunda 1* (Re-reading Modernity of Korea, Vol. 1), edited by Hea-dong Yoon, 117–138. Seoul: Yeoksa bipyeongsa.
- . 2008. *Chōsen kindaishi no rekishi minzokushi: Keihoku sanjushi no shokuminchi keiken* (Historical Ethnography of Modern Korea: Colonial Experience of Sanju City, North Gyeongsang Province). Tokyo: Akashi shoten.
- Kalpagam, U. 2000. “The Colonial State and Statistical Knowledge.” *History of the Human Sciences* 13.2: 37–55.
- . 2014. *Rule by Numbers: Governmentality in Colonial India*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
- Kang, Chang-il. 2005. “Joseon chimnyak-gwa jibae-ui mulijeok giban joseongun” (Japanese Stationary Troops in Colonial Korea). *Hanil yeoksa gongdong yeongu bogoseo* (Report on Korea-Japan Joint History Research) 5: 491–522.
- Kim, Dong-no. 2007. “Ilje sidae singminji geundaehwa-wa nongmin undong-ui jeonhwan” (Colonial Modernization and Shifts in Farmers’ Movement during Colonial Period). *Hanguk sahoehak* (Korean Journal of Sociology) 41.1: 194–220.
- Kim, In-soo. 2013. “Iljeha Joseon-ui nongjeong ipbeop-gwa tonggye-e daehan jisik gukgaronjeok haeseok: Jeguk jisik chegye-ui isik-gwa byeonyong-eul jungsim-euro” (Interpreting the Legislation of Agricultural Policies and Statistics of Colonial Korea through Knowledge State Theory: Focusing on the Implantation and Transformation of Imperial-colonial Knowledge System). PhD diss., Seoul National University.
- Kim, Min-chul. 1994. “Singminji tongchi-wa gyeongchal” (Colonial Governance and the Police). *Yeoksa bipyeong* (Critical Review of History) 24: 208–222.
- Kobayashi, Yukio. 1985. *Nisso seiji gaikō shi: Roshia kakumeito chian ijihō* (Political

- History of Russo-Japan Relations: Russian Revolution and Peace Preservation Law). Tokyo: Yūhikaku.
- Land, Kenneth C. 2001. "Models and Indicators." *Social Forces* 80.2: 381–410.
- Latour, Bruno. 1987. *Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through Society*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Lee, Song-soon. 2005. "1930-nyeondae singmin nongjeong-gwa Joseon nongchon sahoe byeonhwa" (Colonial Agricultural Policy and the Change of Rural Communities in Joseon during the 1930s). *Hyeondae munhak-ui yeongu* (Journal of Modern Literature) 25: 199–228.
- Lee, Yun-gap. 2013. *Ilje gangjeomgi Joseon chongdokbu-ui sojak jeongchaek yeongu* (A Study on the Tenant Policy of the Government-General of Colonial Korea). Seoul: Jisik saneupsa.
- Maddison, Angus. 2001. *The World Economy: Historical Statistics*. Paris: OECD Development Center.
- Mann, Michael. 1986. *The Sources of Social Power*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Matsuda, Toshihiko. 2009. *Nihon no Chōsen shokuminchi shihaito keisatsu* (Japan's Colonial Rule in Joseon and the Police). Tokyo: Azekura shobō.
- Matsumoto, Takenori. 1998. *Shokuminchi kenryokuto Chōsen nōmin* (Colonial Authority and Joseon Farmers). Tokyo: Shakai hyōronsha.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2005. *Chōsen nōson no shokuminchi kindai keiken* (Experience of Colonial Modernity on Joseon Farms). Tokyo: Shakai hyōronsha.
- Miller, Peter, and Nikolas S. Rose. 2008. *Governing the Present: Administering Economic, Social and Personal Life*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Mizokugushi, Toshiyuki, and Umemura Mataji, eds. 1988. *Kyu nihon shokuminchi keizai tōkei* (Economic Statistics of Imperial Japan's Colonies: Estimates and Analyses). Tokyo: Tōyōkeizai shinpōsha.
- Nōchi seido shiryō shūsei henshū iinkai (Committee on the Compilation of Data on the Farmland System). 1969. *Nōchi seido shiryō shūsei 2 ken* (Compilation of Data on the Farmland System, Vol. 2). Tokyo: Ochanomizu shobō.
- Park, Myoung-kyu. 2001. "Singminji yeoksa sahoehak-ui sigong ganseong-e daehayeo" (A Study on the Temporality and Spatiality of Colonial Historical Sociology). In *Hyeondae hanguk sahoe seonggyeok nonjaeng* (Debate on the Social Character of Modern Korea: Colony, Class, and Ethics). Seoul: Jeontong-gwa hyeondae.
- Porter, Theodore. 1995. *Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Shin, Gi-Wook, and Michael Robinson, eds. 1999. *Colonial Modernity in Korea*.

- Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center.
- Shin, Yong-ha. 2006. *Ilje singminji jeongchaek-gwa singminji geundae hwaron bipan* (Critics of Japan's Colonial Policy and Colonial Modernization Theory). Seoul: Munhak-gwa jiseongsa.
- Shinoda, Masahiro. 1971. *Chōsen nōchirei to sono seitei ni itaru shomondai* (Joseon Farmland Ordinance and Various Issues Surrounding Its Enactment). Tokyo: Yūhō kyōkai.
- Slattery, Martin. 1986. *Official statistics*. London: Tavistock Publications.
- Soh, Soon-yeol. 2007. "1920–30-nyeondae nongmin undong-ui seongkyeok byeonhwa" (Changes in the Peasant Movement in the 1920s and 1930s). *Jiyeoksa yeongu* (Journal of Regional Studies) 15.2: 3–27.
- Tsumagari, Kuranojō. 1929. "Chōsen niokeru kosakumondai-no hattenkatei: Sono keizaiteki narabini hōritsuteki kōsatsu" (Development of Tenancy Problems in Colonail Korea: Its Economic and Legal Considerations). In *Chōsenkeizai no kenkyū* 2 (Study on Chōsen Economy, vol. 2), edited by Keijō Teikoku Daigaku Hōbungakukai Daiichibu Ronshū (First Collective Works of the Society of Law and Literature at Keijō Imperial University), 286–428. Tokyo: Tokō Shoin.
- Yonetani, Masafumi. 2006. *Nihon/Ajia* (Japan/Asia). Tokyo: Iwanami shoten.
- Yoon, Hae-dong. 2006. *Jibae-wa jachi* (Domination and Autonomy). Seoul: Yeoksa bipyeongsa.