



## “Our Local President”: *Friends and Neighbors Effect in the Presidential Elections in the Republic of Korea*

Fedor CHERNETSKII

### Abstract

*Research on localism in the form of the friends and neighbors effect (FNE) over the past 70 years has been focused on Western democracies, but has largely overlooked political contexts in other regions. This article examines the prevalence of the FNE in presidential elections in the Republic of Korea to partially fill this gap. The particular significance of this contextual electoral effect is due to the specific phenomenon of Korean regionalism, largely created by politicians. The results of the study confirm the main assumptions about the importance of geographical proximity between the candidate and the electorate for the spatial distribution of candidate support. Most candidates' electoral support levels are higher near their birthplaces. Differences in the effect's expression are observed among urban and provincial, left-wing and all other, major and minor candidates. The gradual decrease in the influence of the effect over time is consistent with the assumption of a link between the FNE and regionalism in Korea. Regionalism, created by politicians who mobilized their regional strongholds, becomes weaker due to the increasing orientation of young voters towards institutions and structures rather than personalities. Another factor mitigating regionalism is the FNE within major party strongholds.*

**Keywords:** friends and neighbors effect, elections, localism, regionalism, Republic of Korea, contextual effects

---

Fedor CHERNETSKII is a junior researcher at the Center for Russian Strategy in Asia, Institute of Economics, Russian Academy of Sciences; and a postgraduate student in the Department of Human Geography of Foreign Countries, Faculty of Geography, Lomonosov Moscow State University. E-mail: fedor.mche@gmail.com.

## Introduction

The past 15 years have witnessed a significant increase in interest among geographers and political scientists in the *friends and neighbors effect* (FNE)—a phenomenon of increased electoral activity and candidate support in their home region or in the vicinity of where they live or have lived. Some voters are motivated by a desire to increase local representation in government bodies, while others hope for favoritism from a local representative/mayor/president, etc. towards their birthplace. For other voters, the local roots of a politician create a sense of closeness and trust, and they are more likely to support *their local* politicians because they are more aware of their existence and track record than voters from other areas (Górecki et al. 2022).

However, the majority of this wave of research focuses on Western democracies (Europe, USA, Australia, New Zealand), while other political contexts (countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia) continue to receive little attention. As a result, our understanding of this contextual electoral effect may not be applicable to, for example, Japan, Pakistan, Malawi, or the Republic of Korea (hereafter, also just Korea). The Korean context is particularly interesting due to political regionalism, which defines the electoral geography and party system configuration of the country. Some authors emphasize the significance of political leaders who mobilize voters in their home districts and regions to achieve their political goals in the formation and contemporary dynamics of this regionalism (W. Kim 2003). Many components of the mechanism creating Korean regionalism resemble this friends and neighbors effect, however, previous literature did not conceptualize these two phenomena within one theory. This article examines the local and regional electoral effects created by presidential candidates in the Republic of Korea's elections since 1987. In the discussion part of the article, they are correlated with regionalism, and a perspective on its dynamics through the lens of the friends and neighbors effect is proposed.

## Friends and Neighbors Effect

In the late 1940s, the concept of the friends and neighbors effect (FNE) emerged in American political science, introduced by V. O. Key in his co-authored book, *Southern Politics in State and Nation*, which focused on politics in the southern states of the USA. In essence, it posits that under otherwise equal conditions, voters in candidates’ home districts support them to a greater extent than voters from other districts. Key demonstrated this phenomenon through electoral maps of Democratic Party primaries in Alabama and Florida, where the highest levels of support for major candidates were observed near their birthplaces or their homes where they lived for some time (Key and Heard 1949). Subsequently, McCarty and Tatalovich and confirmed the existence of this effect in other states, with Tatalovich in particular finding that the effect was stronger for newbie candidates, unfamous candidates, candidates from small districts, candidates competing against a larger number of opponents, and candidates whose birthplace was distant from the other candidates’ hometowns (McCarty 1954; Tatalovich 1975).

Ronald Johnston, with others, conducted a number of studies using examples from New Zealand and Australia to demonstrate the presence of the effect not only in national elections and primaries in the first-past-the-post voting system, but also in local elections in systems with multi-member constituencies (Johnston 1972; Forrest et al. 1977; Johnston and Forrest 1985). Johnston found that at the local level, the effect was even stronger because ideological cleavages were less important than in national elections, and candidates are *closer* to the voters. It was later shown that the effect is present in any election, even in proportional representation electoral systems with closed lists (Put et al. 2020).

Political parties themselves regularly use the FNE as a strategy to maximize votes in elections, evenly distributing their candidates across the territory (in multi-member electoral districts and party lists) (Put et al. 2020). It is important to emphasize that the FNE not only influences the electoral preferences of active voters but also mobilizes local voters who usually do not participate in elections (Górecki et al. 2022).

At first, the FNE arises from the uneven information distribution about candidates in space, which leads to their uneven support (Bowler et al. 1993). A local candidate enjoys the support of their friends, family, neighbors, former classmates, etc., who are likely to reside in the vicinity of their home or birthplace. These candidates may have previously run in local elections, so voters in the corresponding areas may have already seen their name on the ballot. The candidate's familiarity within the local community adds to their track record. As a result, in areas where the candidate is better known, the likelihood of high support for them increases (Arzheimer and Evans 2012). In some cases, a reverse effect may occur. For example, during the 1988 Texas Supreme Court elections, candidates received the highest monetary contributions for their electoral campaigns not only from counties with a high percentage of lawyers (the most informed and involved voters in these elections) and from their home counties, but also from the home counties of their opponents. In other words, some voters residing in the candidate's home district, who were more likely to be acquainted with the candidate, preferred to support that candidate's rival. This phenomenon can be termed the *friends and enemies effect*, as it involves not only the positive mobilization of voters in the candidate's home district, but also a negative mobilization (Thielemann 1993).

Another factor is behavioral or motivational. Firstly, voters may expect their chosen candidates to engage in *pork barrel politics*, where they will act almost exclusively in the interests of their electorate and district. Secondly, not only local orientation matters, but also antagonism between different areas. This phenomenon is succinctly captured in the title of Daniel Kramer's article, "Those People across the Water Just Don't Know Our Problems..." about the 61st electoral district of New York, which includes southern Manhattan and northeast Staten Island, the two separated by a six-mile strait (Kramer 1990). Thirdly, trust is an important component of electoral preferences. It can be created by the voter and candidate belonging to the same racial, ethnic, religious, class, gender, or age group. Origin or residence in the same area also creates a similar effect of trust and proximity—shared geography (Gimpel et al. 2008). Fourthly, local identity contributes to the friends and neighbors effect emergence. In this case, *place resentment* does

not act continuously but is based on a binary distinction between belonging and not belonging to a specific region or locality (Górecki et al. 2022). A sharp increase in the level of support for candidates is observed at this territorial unit border. Therefore, sometimes two levels of the FNE are distinguished: local and regional/global. The local level is limited to literally friends and neighbors and is only manifested within a few small territorial units. The influence of the FNE can extend to residents of an entire territorial unit to which the candidate is believed to belong. This discrete FNE is capable of shaping stable electoral structures: “it is important that the consolidation of territorial communities can occur around candidates from the same region, meaning that the regional dimension in this case begins to balance and even outweigh the sociocultural dimension” (Turovskii 2006, 17).<sup>1</sup>

One of the best examples of such consolidation of territorial communities is Korean regionalism, which was created not by classical factors (such as ethnic or linguistic region specificity), but in a de facto manner by the politicians’ activities. Korean regionalism has not been previously examined through the lens of the FNE, but local manifestations of the FNE in the Korean context have already been studied to some extent. For example, Chernetskii (2022a) investigated the effect of geographical proximity on Korean party presidential primaries, where it was shown that in most cases, candidates receive the greatest support in their home regions. A strong effect is observed among candidates from the Jeolla, Gyeongsang and Chungcheong regions. Politics in the Capital Region see less support from *friends and neighbors*. Jeong Soo-hyun (2017) examined the home advantage enjoyed by candidates in their constituencies in the 2016 Korean parliamentary elections, finding that it exists and is weakly expressed in the Capital Region. This present article proposes to study the friends and neighbors effect in South Korean presidential elections since 1987 and link it to the phenomenon of regionalism.

---

1. All translations are the author’s.

## Korean Context

The modern electoral map of Korea is characterized by the presence of two regions where support for the two main parties (the democratic/liberal camp and the conservative camp) can reach 90 percent. In Jeolla region, the Democratic Party (and its predecessors) and its candidates receive an absolute majority of votes from local voters. For example, in the recent 2022 local elections, the party won 115 out of 124 seats in the regional councils of Gwangju city, Jeollanam-do and Jeollabuk-do provinces, even though it lost those election. In Gyeongsang, the main opponent of the Democratic Party, the People's Power Party, won 213 out of 226 seats in the regional parliaments of the region. In other parts of the country, both of these major political blocs receive comparable levels of support from local voters. For example, in the capital Gyeonggi province, both parties won an equal number of seats in the 2022 elections. In other elections, one party regularly emerged as the winner but would often lose its leadership position in the next election. However, in Jeolla and Gyeongsang, there is a consistent and enduring dominance of local parties in elections at all levels (presidential, parliamentary, regional, and local).

Such consolidation around one party throughout a region also exists in other countries, such as Quebec, Southern Slovakia, Catalonia, Scotland, Flanders, Wallonia, the Basque Country, Kurdistan, and others. However, all of these regions are characterized by their distinct ethnic, linguistic, and/or religious makeup within their respective countries. Korea is ethnically homogeneous, and religious diversity has little influence on politics (Chernetskii 2022b). Koreans in both Jeolla and Gyeongsang consider themselves as Korean as anyone else, without attempting to separate themselves. The only noticeable difference is the linguistic peculiarities—regional dialects in Korea vary significantly. However, this factor alone is clearly insufficient to create such a strong and enduring regionalism. Furthermore, there have been no strong, significant ideological differences between the two main political camps/parties in the past (H. Lee and Repkine 2022). They differ on foreign policy issues and their approach to national history, but intra-party diversity usually exceeds inter-party

diversity on internal political issues (Chernetskii 2022b). There are also some differences in economic and social issues between conservatives and liberals. For example, conservatives tend to hold more neoliberal economic views, while liberals are more supportive of government intervention in the economy. In recent years, political polarization has become more pronounced, with young conservative politicians expressing increasingly anti-feminist views. This has led to a noticeable gender split in the electorate, with women more likely to vote for liberal candidates and men more likely to support conservative candidates (G. Kim and J. Lee 2022). However, some researchers noted the increasing influence of ideology in elections in Korea in the early 2000s (H. Kim et al. 2008).

There are two main conceptualizations of Korean regionalism: historical and behavioral/economic. According to the historical perspective, regionalism partly inherits the division of the Korean Peninsula in the first millennium into three states: Baekje, Silla, and Goguryeo. Cultural and political differences between these parts of the country manifested on electoral maps as variations in electoral preferences among voters in different regions (W. Kim 2003). This concept has been criticized because regionalism that emerged in the Chungcheong region in the 1980–2000s did not correspond to any specific ancient state. On the other hand, there is no political regionalism in the former Goguryeo regions (northern regions) or on Jeju Island. This concept also does not explain the absence of regionalism in the elections of the 1950s, but its emergence in the late 1960s, as well as its contemporary dynamics (Chernetskii 2022b).

Another theory (political-behavioral) does not deny the first one, but appeals not only to the cultural-historical differences between Jeolla and Gyeongsang, but also to the unevenness of economic development in the country during industrialization (1960–1980s). Industrialization was carried out under the slogan “growth first, distribution later” (W. Kim 2003, 9) and was characterized by the accelerated development of the Capital Region and Gyeongsang (in the southeast). The Capital Region’s development was associated with high centralization of management and its possessing a large share of the country’s overall population. Gyeongsang’s economic takeoff was linked not only to its existing industrial base, but also to regional

favoritism (Stockton and Heo 2004). After the 1961 military coup, Park Chung-hee came to power, forming military, political, and business elites mainly from among his fellow Gyeongsang people. The substantial overrepresentation of the Gyeongsang region in the power structures, in the context of a state significantly involved in the economy, contributed to the industrial growth of Gyeongsang and the specific hometowns of some leaders (W. Kim 2003).

Regional favoritism had a flip side in the form of regional discrimination against some other parts of the country. This affected Jeolla to a greater extent, where even the consolidation of regional elites was unable to help the industrial development of the region. National authorities preferred Gyeongsang when choosing locations for major industrial and infrastructure projects. As a result, Jeolla acquired an image of being excluded from modernization (Chernetskii 2022b). This image was subsequently supplemented by a number of negative traits due to the economic backwardness of the region, which became a source of urban poverty. People from Jeolla faced prejudices and stereotypes, as they were considered unreliable, rude, impolite, and dangerous by many, which made it difficult for them to find employment, advance in their careers, get married, find housing, etc. (Yea 2000).

The economic backwardness of the region, social inequality, and disregard of people from other regions contributed to the consolidation of local politically active groups and electorate, which sometimes manifested in active protests, particularly during the presidential elections of 1967 and 1971, where opponents of Park Chung-hee achieved landslide victories in Jeolla (Chernetskii 2022b). *Regional sentiment* formed the image of Jeolla as a *dissident* place, which was unequivocally associated by residents of other regions with political protest and well-known local leaders, rather than its culture or any other regional characteristics (Yea 2000).

The regionalism's height was reached during the democratization and decentralization of governance in the 1980s and 1990s. For example, during the presidential elections of 1987, significant levels of support were obtained by four candidates representing not so much different ideological directions as different regions: Kim Dae-jung (Jeolla-do), Kim Jong-pil (Chungcheong-



do), Kim Young-sam (Gyeongsangnam-do), Roh Tae-woo (Gyeongsangbuk-do) (Chernetskii 2023). The emergence of regionalism in Chungcheong, which had not previously stood out for the distinctive electoral behavior of its voters and disparities in development, and the division of the electorate of the once unified Gyeongsang based on proximity to the *home districts* of the two local candidates, indicate the increased role of individual political leaders in shaping Korean regionalism. Wang-Bae Kim put forward the thesis that regionalism in this case is "not a spontaneous phenomenon, but a blind, sociopsychological prejudice fabricated by politicians who merely seek to consolidate their political power base" (W. Kim 2003, 14). In other words, politicians formed *defensive coalitions* in the struggle for power and resources, seeking to exclude *outsiders* from them.

The best confirmation of this thesis is regionalism in Chungcheong. Until 1987, the region was not distinguished by anything particularly special. However, Chungcheong consolidated (the western and central parts) and voted for the local candidate Kim Jong-pil (a former close associate of Park Chung-hee), who received only 7.9 percent in the presidential elections and had no chance of being elected. Kim mobilized the local electorate with the idea of the necessity of regional consolidation in a situation where other regions are united around their leaders, and opposition to the derogatory stereotype of "Chungcheong bumpkin" (Chernetskii 2023). With his departure from politics in the early 2000s, regionalism in Chungcheong declined, unable to compete with Jeolla and Gyeongsang.

Within the framework of political-behavioral theory, there are two additional explanations for the emergence of this regionalism. On the one hand, voter consolidation around four main candidates in the 1987 election was the result of active political mobilization by regional leaders. This was because the candidates directly addressed regional interests (Kang 2016). On the other hand, regionalism in the Korean context can be explained by the rational choice theory. For several decades, Korean voters have witnessed vivid examples of regional favoritism and discrimination. Given the absence of significant ideological differences among the candidates, this type of regional consolidation seems to be the most logical strategy for voters (G. Kim and J. Lee 2022).

The institutionalization of regionalism and gradual departure from the tradition in which Jeolla and Gyeongsang parties always nominate local representatives in presidential elections weakened the intensity of this phenomenon in these two regions. Since the early 2000s, there has been an increase in the influence of age and ideological factors (Jhee 2021). Due to generational change and the geographical mobility of voters, regionalism is gradually eroding (Jae-mook Lee 2022). In recent elections, liberal candidates such as Moon Jae-in and Lee Jae-myung have shown record support levels in the Gyeongsangbuk-do. At the same time, Yoon Suk-yeol has received the highest support in the Jeolla region. However, regionalism still remains a key factor in Korean politics and electoral geography (G. Kim and J. Lee 2022).

For this article, it is particularly important that specific politicians have become the catalysts for political regionalism in Korea, as more attention is usually given to the role of historical or economic factors in regionalism, but which would not have been manifested on electoral maps without the conversion of *regional sentiment* into voting for a local representative. Politicians stimulated the formation of regional identity, which had been accumulating over a long period, reinforced and structured by political influence. The repetitiveness and structures of regional issues created a clear association with the issue of political power. Regional development became unthinkable for many Koreans outside the paradigm of pork barrel politics. Regional identity and cohesion around *our own local politicians* were recognized as key factors in the formation of the region as an economically developed political space (Jae-hyun Lee 2019). Regionalism has become a significant political and informal institution. It has managed to persist even after the causes that led to its emergence have disappeared. Over the past few decades, regional economic disparities have declined, but the regionalist sentiments that resulted from these disparities have persisted. There is no longer a direct correlation between economic inequalities and electoral voting patterns (H. Lee and Repkine 2020).

## Korean Regionalism and the Friends and Neighbors Effect

How is the phenomenon of Korean political regionalism related to the electoral friends and neighbors effect? On the one hand, these are two different phenomena. Regionalism is a broader and more encompassing concept, while the FNE is a more localized and contextual effect. However, on the other hand, we argue that there are some common features between these two phenomena and that they can sometimes be viewed together.

FNE is a manifestation of the influence of a politician's personal characteristics. Sometimes it takes more complex forms, but usually it boils down to the influence of one person. In Korea, politics are incredibly personalized, and political parties are weak. Furthermore, the personalization of politics is directly linked to regionalism (Stockton and Heo 2004). Regionalism formed and reached its peak largely due to the political mobilization of several major politicians in their regional electorates and/or the independent orientation of voters towards *their own*.

Kim Wook and Lee Jae-hyun identified four stages of regionalism: 1) voting for a local candidate; 2) voting for a party with a local leader; 3) voting for a candidate from a local party; and 4) voting for a candidate who promotes a policy in the interests of the region. Chungcheong regionalism has gone through all four stages, but in Jeolla and Gyeongsang, it is still in the third stage (W. Kim and J. Lee 2020). While earlier regionalism was almost completely dependent on the personalities of specific politicians (such as the three Kims—Kim Young-sam, Kim Jong-pil, and Kim Dae-jung), in the 2000s, political parties began to play a more significant role. For instance, in 2002, voters in Jeolla supported Roh Moo-hyun despite the fact that he was from Gyeongsang because he was supported by the Kim Dae-jung-led Millennium Democratic Party.

Hans Stockton and Uk Heo use the term "personality-based regionalism" to indicate the power that personalities have developed in particular parts of a country, as expressed by patterns of voting in presidential and legislative elections" (Stockton and Heo 2004, 3). In other words, the regionalism expression in election maps is largely the result of the actions of politicians. At its simplest level, this can be understood as voters

supporting a candidate who shares their geographical background.

The same principle applies to the friends and neighbors effect on voting behavior: support for a candidate from the same area. Woo Chang Kang, in his discussion of Korean regionalism, points to geography as a common “basis for interactions between voters and political agents” (Kang 2016, 250). He differentiates between two types of regional voting: based on origin and based on residence. These two types differ in their conceptualization of what constitutes a region. For the first type, region is defined as a meaningful territory that exists in the mind (Jeolla, Gyeongsang, etc.). For the second type, geographical proximity between the voter and candidate is not confined by formal boundaries. This is similar to the idea expressed in a review of FNE research on discrete and continuous forms of influence. Regionalism in the first sense (according to Kang) relies on a binary distinction between being a member of or not being a member of a specific region (similar to Górecki et al. 2022). The second type of regionalism is the continuous FNE, with a gradual decrease in candidate support.

We find the same intersections in other studies. For instance, Lee Jaemook (2022) examines the relationship between regionalism and the expression of voter regional identity. He emphasizes the sense of community among people from the same area and the feeling of hostility towards outsiders. Similarly, Hyun-chool Lee and Alexandre Repkine (2022) refer directly to Tobler’s first law of geography (‘everything is related to everything else, but near things are more related than distant things’) to explain the formation of Korean regionalism.

In its original form, Korean regionalism can be reduced to the FNE concept. Voters and politicians use the same motivations described in the theoretical section of this article to support regional interests. Some people vote for a local candidate due to *pork barrel politics* logic, while others do so because of regional identity, lack of representation in government, or simply geographical proximity.

Later, regionalism began to change. Parties began to play a larger role, so people in their *home regions* could vote for their candidates, even if those candidates lacked local ties. In these new circumstances, the candidate’s effect sometimes led to a reduction in regionalism’s severity. The decrease in

regionalism in the 2000–2010s can largely be attributed to the political efforts of Roh Moo-hyun and Moon Jae-in, who represented the liberal side, but were both born and raised in Gyeongsangnam-do province. Many voters in western Busan, Gimhae, Yangsan, and Geoje—all close to the birthplaces of Roh and Moon—switched their political support from conservative to local liberal candidates, which resulted in a similar level of support for *their* politician, albeit from a different party. At the same time, these two politicians’ massive support in Gyeongsang cannot be considered a manifestation of regionalism; it is more accurately described as a manifestation of the FNE. That is, on the one hand, FNE has promoted and supported regionalism, but on the other hand, it has the potential to weaken it. In some cases, such as Chungcheong, the dynamics of regionalism are a direct result of the mobilization of the local electorate by certain prominent politicians (Kim Jong-pil, Lee Hoi-chang, and Lee In-je). In other cases, which will be discussed in this study, FNE and regionalism are not directly linked. A candidate’s FNE may be strong in Gangwon, Incheon, or Jeju, but this does not necessarily indicate regionalism. In other words, these two phenomena overlap but are not the same.

## Data and Methods

The formation and contemporary dynamics of Korean regionalism can be explained through the lens of the FNE. This article attempts to do this by using data from the eight recent presidential elections (since 1987) in the Republic of Korea. Election results data were taken from the Korean Statistical Information Service (KOSIS) website, and candidate birthplace data were obtained from open sources. Birthplaces are used instead of residential addresses because, firstly, they are easier to establish, and secondly, according to Lee Gap-yoon, in the Korean context, a politician’s birthplace carries more significance than their current place of residence (G. Lee 1998).

In studies dedicated to friends and neighbors effect, regression models are often used to assess the relationship between the candidate support level

in a particular territorial unit and the distance from that unit to their home or birthplace. However, this method is not suitable for identifying the FNE at the national level (Turovskii 2006). In Korea, the important factor at the national level is not the geographical distance, but rather the division of the country into regions. For instance, a candidate from the southwestern Gyeongsang region might have a high level of support in their home district, while in neighboring areas located several dozen kilometers away in the Jeolla region, they might have no support. It can be difficult to use regression analysis to study elections in Korea because the distribution of support for the major parties and candidates often deviates from the normal distribution.

Spatial autocorrelation analysis and correlation analysis are more appropriate for regional and local research levels, while the cartographic method is too subjective. In this case, it is better to compare the share of votes cast for a candidate at the national level, in their home region (province/city), home municipality, home district, and at their home voting precinct/polling station (if it is possible to determine the candidate's birthplace with such precision). If candidate support increases as we move from the national level to the micro-level (precinct), it can be argued that they possess FNE. This is, in fact, the only method (along with the cartographic one) that can be used for minor candidates. Correlation analysis is not suitable for them, as outside the areas with increased support, their electoral geography is largely random and the variance is too small. However, correlation analysis can be useful for detecting FNE in major candidates. To do this, we calculate the correlation coefficient between a candidate's support level and distance from their birthplace. To avoid the regionalism influence, I limit the analysis to within the candidate's home region and subregion. I used almost the most geographically detailed data (~3.4 thousand cells), with their number varying from a few hundred to a few thousand in each region.

Another problem is the so-called *false friends and neighbors effect*. For example, a party has an area with high support, regardless of whether the candidate runs for office from it, and the candidate's birthplace coincides with this district. In this case, we detect FNE, but we cannot be sure that his

high support in this area is caused by this effect. Similarly, for candidates with weak FNE, we may not detect it if the candidate's hometown is in an area with consistently low support of his party.

These cases are difficult to detect and justify based on statistical data alone. The only way to accurately determine the presence or absence of the FNE in a specific case is through polling. However, this method is complex and expensive, and not always available, especially when dealing with past elections. We assume the presence or absence of the effect in general, or for certain candidate groups. However, we have only indirect evidence to support our assumptions, such as the strong correlation between a candidate's support and proximity to their birthplace.


### Major Candidates

From 1987 to 2022, a total of 66 candidates participated in the presidential elections in Korea (candidates who participated in two elections were counted twice), of whom 31 received more than one percent of the vote. Some of these candidates were born outside the country of its present borders, however, they generally resided in South Korea from childhood, so they may experience the same friends and neighbors effect as others. However, for such candidates, we can only determine their area of residence, while for other major candidates, more or less accurate birth addresses are known, which allows us to determine their home voting precinct. For these latter candidates, we can establish a sequence of the proportions of votes obtained by them in the country as a whole, their hometown/province, municipality (*si/gun/gu*), district (*eup/myeon/dong*), and precinct. In the *ideal* case, where FNE operates as in theory, we would observe an increase in candidate support as we move from national and regional levels to local and micro levels.

Out of the 31 major candidates, only two (Baek Gi-wan, and Ahn Cheol-soo) do not exhibit any FNE effect. This lack of effect in Baek Gi-wan's case may be due to the fact that Baek's hometown is in present-day North Korea. Another similar case is Ahn Cheol-soo, who received only

21.4 percent of the overall vote but obtained only 13.4 percent in his home region of Gyeongsangnam-do province, and a similar percentage in his home Miryang and other *home* districts of the city. However, the effect is noticeable in Busan, where Ahn’s family moved when he was only two years old. Thus, the effect is observed not at the national level but at the intra-regional level.

The same *local friends and neighbors effect* is observed in several other candidates: Park Chan-jong (1992), Lee Hoi-chang (1997, 2002), Roh Moo-hyun (2002), and Lee Jae-myung (2022). Except for Park, what unites them is that in these elections they were nominated by parties that had stable areas of high support in other regions of the country. This means that the national result was inflated relative to the levels of support in their home regions due to the party effect, while within the region, support increased as they approached their home voting precinct (Fig. 1). In addition, Roh Moo-hyun and Lee Jae-myung were born in a region (Gyeongsang) where support for their opponents’ parties has traditionally been strong, so regional effects should not have been expected in these cases. Furthermore, Lee Jae-myung moved to Gyeonggi-do province at a young age, where he pursued a political career, so he has little connection to his home region. On the other hand,



**Figure 1.** Electoral support of candidates with intra-regional FNE at different levels of their home districts


Source: Compiled by the author according to National Election Commission (NEC) data.



Lee Hoi-chang was born in present-day North Korea, so he is connected to Yesan-gun through his family and electoral history.

The same effect is observed in several other candidates: Park Geun-hye (2012) and Moon Jae-in (2012, 2017), but only at the municipality level, not at the micro level (Fig. 2). This may be due, first, to the fact that Park is from big city (Daegu). The urban electorate has a weak reaction to localism. Additionally, the difference in Park’s support at different levels is small, so there may not be any effect. Moon’s FNE is more noticeable, but his increased support is not in his home district/precinct of his home municipality, but elsewhere. Due to his lack of strong local roots (his family moved to Busan when he was young), there is no effect in his home district. Secondly, this effect can be explained by the informational component of FNE. That is, voters know about the candidate’s hometown (municipality), but they do not know the more specific location (district or precinct).

Yoon Suk-yeol, along with two other candidates, demonstrates more of a regional effect. However, Yoon’s FNE is extremely weak, and it is likely explained not by FNE, but rather by the protest vote of Seoul residents in the 2022 election. Yoo Seung-min (2017) is more popular in Daegu (12.6%) compared to the national average (6.8%), but there is no linear FNE within




**Figure 2.** Electoral support of candidates with local and regional FNE at different levels of their home districts

Source: Compiled by the author according to National Election Commission (NEC).

the city (5.7% in Jung-gu and 11.5% in Daebong-dong). Jeong Joo-young (1992) gained 24 percent support in the Gangwon-do province (he is from its northern part), while receiving only 16 percent nationwide. However, these examples cannot serve as definitive illustrations of the presence or absence of the effect, as Jeong was born in present-day North Korea, making it impossible to localize his home voting precinct or birth district. Yoo's exact address is unknown, so it is possible that there is increased support in his home voting precinct, but this cannot be stated with certainty. That is, for these six candidates, the FNE is either very weak or non-existent, but for most other candidates, it is clearly present.

The remaining 18 candidates exhibit a progressive increase in support levels in their hometowns as they transition to a more granular level of administrative division. Figure 3 illustrates the average support values for these candidates at different levels of administrative division. The largest disparity in support is observed between the national and regional levels,



**Figure 3.** Electoral support of the main candidates (>1% of voters) at different levels of their home districts

*Source:* Compiled by the author according to National Election Commission (NEC) data.

which can be attributed to regionalism.

The least differentiation is observed among socialist candidates Kwon Young-ghil (1997, 2002, 2007) and Sim Sang-jung (2017, 2022), where support is higher at more local levels than at the national and regional levels, but the difference is only 3–5 percent. This is due to the urban nature of their home districts (Changwon, Paju/Goyang), where voters have weak local roots in their districts and local communities, react poorly to FNE, as well as the fact that Kwon was born in Japan. The other factor is the composition of these candidates' electorates. Left-wing politicians in Korea stand out due to the presence of an ideologically charged electoral base. Consequently, the proportion of *friends and neighbors* in the electorate for Sim and Kwon should be lower than for other candidates.

For most of the major candidates, there is a strong negative correlation between the level of electoral support for a candidates and their distance from their birthplace (Table 1). Some candidates experience this effect not at the regional level, but at a more localized level. For instance, candidates from Chungcheong often do not experience a significant negative correlation within the entire region, but they do experience it within their home *subregion*—Chungcheongnam-do. The severity of the alleged FNE in this instance seems to coincide with the regionalism's severity, which is strongest in Chungcheongnam-do.

For eight candidates, there was no clear pattern between the studied indicators, and the correlation was not statistically significant. These are the candidates with the lowest level of support in six cases. No calculations were carried out for Chung Ju-yung, as his birthplace is outside the country.

The dynamics of the expected effect's severity also coincides with regionalism's dynamics. The peak of regionalism was recorded in 1987. After that, there was a gradual decline in its importance. However, in 2007, there was a sudden increase in the regionalist vote. In 2022, the main candidates achieved the highest success in *enemy regions*, which means that regionalism has weakened slightly again. The same dynamics can be observed for the FNE. The effect was stronger in 1987 and minimal in 2022, mainly due to a lack of effect in Yoon Suk-yeol and only a subregional effect in Lee Jae-myung.

**Table 1.** Correlation between the Level of Electoral Support for the Major Presidential Candidates and the Distance from their Birthplaces in South Korea, 1987–2022

Candidate name	Year	Electoral support (%)	Pearson correlation coefficient
Roh Tae-woo	1987	36.6	-0.70
Kim Young-sam		28.0	-0.75
Kim Dae-jung		27.0	-0.52
Kim Jong-pil		8.1	-0.84
Kim Young-sam	1992	42.0	-0.46
Kim Dae-jung		33.8	-0.53
Chung Ju-yung		16.3	no data
Park Chan-jong		6.4	-0.37 <sup>+</sup>
Baek Gi-Wan		1.0	-0.03*
Kim Dae-jung	1997	40.3	-0.50
Lee Hoi-chang		38.7	-0.56 <sup>+</sup>
Lee In-je		19.2	-0.38 <sup>+</sup>
Kwon Young-ghil		1.2	-0.04*
Roh Moo-hyun	2002	48.9	-0.37
Lee Hoi-chang		46.6	-0.65 <sup>+</sup>
Kwon Young-ghil		3.9	0.01*
Lee Myung-bak	2007	48.7	-0.59
Chung Dong-young		26.1	-0.72 <sup>+</sup>
Lee Hoi-chang		15.1	-0.65
Moon Kook-hyun		5.8	-0.34
Kwon Young-ghil		3.0	-0.16
Park Geun-hye	2012	51.6	-0.45
Moon Jae-in		48.0	-0.68
Moon Jae-in	2017	41.1	-0.67
Hong Joon-pyo		24.0	-0.51 <sup>+</sup>
Ahn Cheol-soo		21.4	-0.29 <sup>+</sup>
Yoo Seong-min		6.8	-0.62 <sup>+</sup>
Sim Sang-jung		6.2	-0.17
Yoon Suk-yeol	2022	48.6	0.05*
Lee Jae-myung		47.8	-0.54 <sup>+</sup>
Sim Sang-jung		2.4	-0.37

Source: Compiled by the author according to National Election Commission (NEC) data.


Note: <sup>+</sup>on subregional level; All coefficients are statistically significant (<0.01), except for the four indicated by \*.

## Other Candidates

In addition to the major candidates in the presidential elections in the Republic of Korea, there were 35 lesser-known candidates (with less than 1 percent of the vote). For seven of them, only their home provinces/cities are known, and they do not receive increased support from local voters. This, as well as the case for five other candidates with more detailed data but no friends and neighbors effect, may be due to their predominantly urban origin. The urban electorate is less susceptible to contextual electoral effects due to less attachment to a specific location, greater mobility, and orientation towards the personal qualities of the candidate rather than their background. There is also a higher share of young voters in cities. According to the Korean Statistical Information Service, young people (under age 40) have a sense of belonging to their area of residence of only 65 percent, while older people (over age 65) have 83 percent (KOSIS). Of those candidates who do not exhibit friends and neighbors effect, six were born in Seoul, two in Busan, and one each in Gwangju, Suncheon, and Miryang. Three other candidates only show the effect at the regional level. Only Lee Byeong-ho (1992) has a significant effect: 0.2 percent at the national level and 3 percent in Chungcheongbuk-do province, while the regional effect for the other two is small, likely because both are from Busan.

For the remaining twenty minor candidates, a strong FNE effect is observed. Figure 4 shows the average levels of support for them at different levels of data detail (exact birthplace is only known for five of them, but the home district[s] [*eup/myeon/dong*] has been established for the vast majority). They have only 0.2 percent at the national level, reach about 1.5 percent at the level of their home municipalities (*si/gun/gu*), 3 percent in their home districts, and 8.5 percent at their home voting precinct.

Lee Han-dong (2002), with a national support of 0.3 percent, received 21.1 percent in his home district (Gunnæ-myeon), 27.2 percent in his home voting precinct, and 26.2 percent in the nearest voting precinct in the neighboring district (Sinbuk-myeon). Kim Ok-sun (1992), with only 0.35 percent nationwide, received 10.5 percent in his home voting precinct, while Jang Sung-min (2017) received 0.07 percent and 5.1 percent, respectively.




**Figure 4.** Electoral support of small candidates (<1% of voters) at different levels of their home districts

*Source:* Compiled by the author according to National Election Commission (NEC) data.

Thus, for lesser-known candidates, the friends and neighbors effect is even stronger than for more well-known candidates, but it is more localized. While major candidates show a significant gap in support levels at the national and regional levels, the regional effect for minor candidates is minimal, while they stand out significantly at the micro level (home district and home voting precinct). This is because, due to their extremely low recognition, the proportion of literal friends, relatives, neighbors, former classmates, etc. in their electorate is higher than that of candidates with a broad electoral base.

The geographical distribution of support for minor candidates once again highlights the inapplicability of classical methods in studying the friends and neighbors effect in this context. Candidates whose support level does not exceed 1 percent exhibit an elevated electoral backing in their home districts; however, beyond the immediate vicinity of their hometowns, the geography of their support may be random. At the same time, we can



**Figure 5.** The geography of Kim Ok-sun and Lee In-je’s electoral support

*Source:* Compiled by the author according to National Election Commission (NEC) data.

say with a high degree of confidence that these candidates have strong FNE. For example, in the maps of Kim Ok-sun (1992) and Lee In-je’s (2007) support, their home districts (Socheon and Nonsan) are clearly visible (Fig. 5). Lee also has increased support in Goheung, where one of his party leaders (Park Sang-chun) is from. However, mathematical methods will not yield significant results, as the average support levels for these candidates are relatively low (0.36% and 0.68%).

### Conclusion and Discussion

This article examines the prevalence of the friends and neighbors effect in presidential elections in the Republic of Korea since 1987. Not all candidates

exhibit the same level of friends and neighbors effect: some only have a regional or local FNE, while most have a full-fledged effect. Popular candidates stand out with a linear increase of support levels as one moves closer to their birthplaces, there is just a significant gap between the national and regional levels—the manifestation and cause of regionalism. Minor candidates show an *exponential* increase, where support at the national, regional, and municipal levels does not differ significantly, but there is a sharp jump at the micro-level (voting precinct). For minor candidates, electoral support is more concentrated in their home district and voting precinct than for major candidates, which aligns with our hypothesis. Some of them received nearly the same percentage of votes as the main (usually two) candidates in their home districts, although they clearly had no chance of electoral victory.

Only half (out of 11) of the candidates from major cities have FNE, with only three (out of 10) in the case of candidates from Seoul, and a full-fledged effect, where the level of candidate support progressively increases with geographical detail, is observed in only one candidate. For candidates from provincial cities (*si*), such an effect is observed in the vast majority (out of 25) of candidates, while for candidates from other regions within provinces (*gun*), friends and neighbors effect is present in all candidates, with a full-fledged effect observed in 80 percent (out of 20) of them. Among all candidates from provinces, only 10 percent do not have or have a weak friends and neighbors effect, while for urban candidates, it is more than 50 percent.

This distribution partly confirms the theoretical thesis that the electorate of major cities is less susceptible to the FNE compared to the electorate of small and medium-sized cities, as well as rural voters. The effect is particularly weak in Seoul, whose residents in the 20th century regularly had to change their place of residence, so local communities rely less on local candidates than in other areas. The effect is strongest in the Jeolla region, where regionalism is most pronounced, and the local party and its candidates (Kim Dae-jung, Chung Dong-young, etc.) receive more than 70–90 percent of the votes from the electorate.

In addition to *urban* candidates, socialist candidates hardly manifest an



FNE. The effect is observed in Kwon Young-ghil, but it is related to his electoral history, as he was born in Japan. The effect is almost imperceptible in Sim Sang-jung. Apparently, their support is limited to an ideological factor, meaning that they receive the votes of only those who share their radical (for traditional Korean politics) views. However, the FNE is present in the majority of *non-urban* minor socialist candidates. Their electorate is extremely small, so it is weakly connected to the ideological base of socialist forces in Korea and is sometimes literally limited to their friends, neighbors, and relatives.

The friends and neighbors effect in Korea is directly related to regionalism. For example, regionalism in Chungcheong is a result of the political activity of Kim Jong-pil (and his party), whose support level directly correlated to the distance from his birthplace. In the 2000s, Lee In-je and Lee Hoi-chang tried to take advantage of this regional consolidation while partially supporting its intensity. The nomination of candidates from party strongholds (such as Chung Dong-young, Hong Joon-pyo, and Park Geun-hye) increased the intensity of regionalism in those areas. In contrast, the nomination of Democratic Party candidates who were not from the Jeolla region but from Gyeongsang contributed to a decrease in support for their opponents in their home regions, such as Roh Moo-hyun, Moon Jae-in, and Lee Jae-myung (Gimhae, Geoje/Busan, and Andong). This means that voters preferred to vote not based on regional solidarity but rather for the local candidate from the party they would never have voted for under different circumstances. Currently, the electorate of Gimhae (Roh Moo-hyun's birthplace) consistently supports candidates from his political camp, such as Moon Jae-in and Lee Jae-myung. Therefore, the candidate FNE can be transmitted to his *political friends* (even those without a connection to his birthplace).

The friends and neighbors effect dynamics in Korea are similar to the dynamics of regionalism, as the influence of both phenomena on the electoral geography gradually decreased. From 1987 to 2002, 60 percent of candidates exhibited a significant friends and neighbors effect, while only 10 percent did not have it at all. However, from 2007 to 2022, the absence of friends and neighbors effect was observed in 30 percent of candidates, while

45 percent showed a strong presence of FNE. It is worth noting that during the first elections in 1987, the friends and neighbors effect was present in all candidates.

The young urban electorate is becoming less oriented towards individual politicians and increasingly prefers stable structures in the form of political parties and political camps. Candidates from major parties no longer need to be from their regional stronghold, and their origins do not create new regional divisions but rather slightly weaken existing ones.

The small number of observations (candidates) in the elections under consideration and the chosen method are significant limitations of this study. However, a number of plausible and justified assumptions have been put forward about how such effects may operate in the Korean context. These limitations can be overcome in future research at regional/local levels, where more precise quantitative methods are more applicable.

Regional and local elections deserve special attention. In these contests, party effect should be weakened, and the personal characteristics of candidates (including their *local roots*) should have a greater influence on their electoral support. In the Republic of Korea, there is a strong influence of political leaders (*party bosses*) on the geography of support for their respective parties, but the extent of this influence and how electoral support for parties is influenced by lesser known and significant politicians needs to be established. Another promising area of research is the *political friends of neighbors effect*—the influence of the localness of one politician on his successors and fellow party members. In Gyeongsangnam-do province there is an example of the electoral legacy of Roh Moo-hyun and Moon Jae-in, but it is likely that something similar, more local, exists in other regions. Sometimes we can observe the *false friends and neighbors effect*. For example, a candidate's birthplace coincides with his party's electoral stronghold, where all of its candidates always receive increased support. In this case, it is difficult to differentiate the contribution of party and personal effects. In the case of famous politicians, such a problem should not arise, but in cases of candidates of small parties with a stable ideological electorate, the interpretation of the assessment results may be less clear. In several cases it is found that the candidate has lived near his birthplace for only a few

years, but has lived much longer elsewhere. In this case, the friends and neighbors effect in the birthplace is weak or absent, but is detected in the place of residence. It is therefore important to measure a difference between the effects created by different degrees of politician localness.

---

**REFERENCES**

- Arzheimer, Kai, and Jocelyn Evans. 2012. "Geolocation and Voting: Candidate-Voter Distance Effects on Party Choice in the 2010 UK General Election in England." *Political Geography* 31.5: 301–310. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2012.04.006>.
- Bowler, Shaun, et al. 1993. "Local Sources of Information and Voter Choice in State Elections: Microlevel Foundations of the 'Friends and Neighbors' Effect." *American Politics Quarterly* 21.4: 473–489. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X9302100405>.
- Chernetskii, Fedor M. 2022a. "Effekt geograficheskoy blizosti na prezidentskih prajmeriz yuzhnokorejskih partij" (Effect of Geographic Proximity on the Presidential Primaries of South Korea Parties). *Koreevedenie* (Koreanology) 1: 136–158. <https://doi.org/10.48647/ICCA.2022.71.69.008>.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2022b. "Regionalizm kak klyuchevoj faktor v elektoral'nyh processah v Respublike Koreya" (Regionalism as a Key Factor in Electoral Processes in the Republic of Korea). *Vestnik rossijskogo koreevedeniya* (Russian Koreanology Herald) 13: 67–81.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2023. "'Pragmaticchnyj regionalizm' Chhunchhona v kontekste regional'nogo protivostojaniya v Respublike Koreya" ('Pragmatic Regionalism' of Chungcheong in the Context of Regional Confrontation in the Republic of Korea). *Jevoljucionnoe stranovedenie: Teorija i praktika. voprosy jekonomicheskoy i politicheskoy geografii zarubezhnyh stran* (Evolutionary Country Studies: Theory and Practice, Questions of Economic and Political Geography of Foreign Countries) 21: 145–158.
- Forrest, J., and R. J. Johnston. 1973. "Spatial Aspects of Voting in the Dunedin City Council Elections of 1971." *New Zealand Geographer* 29.2: 166–181.
- Forrest, J., E. Marjoribanks, and R. J. Johnston. 1977. "Local Effects at New Zealand Local Elections." In *People, Places and Votes: Essays on the Electoral Geography of Australia and New Zealand*, edited by R. J. Johnston, 35–50. Department of Geography, University of New England, Armidale, N.S.W.
- Gimpel, James G., et al. 2008. "Distance-decay in the Political Geography of Friends-and-Neighbors Voting." *Political Geography* 27.2: 231–252. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2007.10.005>.
- Górecki, Maciej A., et al. 2022. "Local Voting at Local Elections Revisited: 'Friends and Neighbors Voting' at Mayoral Elections in Rural Poland." *Political Geography* 94: 2–12. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2021.102559>.
- Jeong, Soo-hyun. 2017. "Huboja-ui jiyek daepyo-seong-i deukpyoyul-gwa

- dangseonganeungseong-e michineun yeonghyangneok: Je-20-de gukhoeuiwon seongeo gyeolgwa-e daehan bunseok" (Impact of a Candidate's Regional Representation on His or Her Voter Turnout and Chances of Winning: An Analysis of the Results of the 20th National Assembly Election). *Hanguk jeongchi yeongu* (Journal of Korean Politics) 26.2: 129–157. <https://doi.org/10.35656/JKP.26.2.6>.
- Jhee, Byong-kuen. 2021. "Changing Regional Sentiment in South Korea." In *The New Dynamics of Democracy in South Korea*, edited by Chae-Han Kim, 6–29. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Johnston, Ronald J. 1972. "Spatial Elements in Voting Patterns at the 1968 Christchurch City Council Election." *Political Science* 24.1: 49–61.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1978. "On Elections, Voting and Participation: Friends-and-Neighbours Voting in Victoria: A Note." *Politics* 8.1: 151–154. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00323267808401648>.
- Johnston R. J., and J. Forrest. 1985. "Spatial-structural Effects and the Geography of Voting in Australia, 1977." *Australian Geographer* 16.4: 286–290.
- Kang, Woo Chang. 2016. "Local Economic Voting and Residence-based Regionalism in South Korea: Evidence from the 2007 Presidential Election" *Journal of East Asian Studies* 16.3: 349–369. <https://doi.org/10.1017/jea.2016.19>.
- Key, Valdimer O., and Alexander Heard. 1949. *Southern Politics in State and Nation*. New York: A. A. Knopf.
- Kim, Gi-dong, and Jae-mook Lee. 2022. "Hanguk yugwonja-ui jiyek jeongcheseong-gwa jiyekjuui taedo" (South Koreans' Regional Identity and Regionalism). *Hanguk jeongchi hakhoebo* (Korean Political Science Review) 56.1: 123–160. <https://doi.org/10.18854/kpsr.2022.56.1.005>.
- Kim, Hee-min, et al. 2008. "Changing Cleavage Structure in New Democracies: An Empirical Analysis of Political Cleavages in Korea." *Electoral Studies* 27.1: 136–150. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2007.10.004>.
- Kim, Wang-Bae. 2003. "Regionalism: Its Origins and Substance with Competition and Exclusion." *Korea Journal* 43.2: 5–31.
- Kim, Wook, and Jae-hyun Lee. 2020. "Chungcheong jiyekjuui-wa minjujeok daepyoseong: Chungcheong yugwonja-ui jeongug daepyoseong nonui-reul jungsim-euro" (Changing Chungcheong Regionalism and Its New Form: Representation of the Whole Electorate). *Bigyo minjujuui yeongu* (Comparative Democracy Studies) 16.1: 159–188.
- KOSIS (Korean Statistical Information Service). [https://kosis.kr/statHtml/statHtml.do?orgId=417&tblId=DT\\_417001\\_0008&vw\\_cd=MT\\_ZTITLE&list\\_id=D2\\_002\\_001&scrId=&seqNo=&lang\\_mode=ko&obj\\_var\\_id=&itm\\_id=&conn\\_](https://kosis.kr/statHtml/statHtml.do?orgId=417&tblId=DT_417001_0008&vw_cd=MT_ZTITLE&list_id=D2_002_001&scrId=&seqNo=&lang_mode=ko&obj_var_id=&itm_id=&conn_)

- path=MT\_ZTITLE&path=%252FstatisticsList%252FstatisticsListIndex.do (accessed August 18, 2024).
- Kramer, Daniel C. 1990. “Those People across the Water Just Don’t Know Our Problems’: An Analysis of Friends and Neighbours Voting in a Geographically-split Legislative District.” *Political Geography Quarterly* 9.2: 189–196. [https://doi.org/10.1016/0260-9827\(90\)90018-6](https://doi.org/10.1016/0260-9827(90)90018-6).
- Lee, Gap-yoon. 1998. *Hanguk-ui seongeo-wa jiyekjuui* (Elections and Regionalism in South Korea). Seoul: Oreum.
- Lee, Hyun-Chool, and Alexandre Repkine. 2020. “Changes in and Continuity of Regionalism in South Korea: A Spatial Analysis of the 2017 Presidential Election.” *Asian Survey* 60.3: 417–440. <https://doi.org/10.1525/AS.2020.60.3.417>.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2022. “A Spatial Analysis of the Voting Patterns in the South Korean General Elections of 2016.” *Social Sciences* 11.9: 389–402. <https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci11090389>.
- Lee, Jae-hyun. 2019. “Jiyek jeongcheseong-gwa jiyek sahoe hwaldong-i jeongchijeok hyoneunggam-e michineun yeonghyang: Daejeon, sejong, chungnam jiyek-eul jungsim-euro” (Influence of Regional Identity and Community Activities on the Political Effectiveness: Focusing on Daejeon, Sejong, and the Chungnam Region of Korea). *NGO yeongu* (NGO Research) 14: 83–104.
- Lee, Jae-mook. 2022. “20-dae daetongnyeong seongeo-wa jiyekjuui-ui byeonhwa-wa jisok” (Twentieth Presidential Election and the Change and Continuity of Regionalism). *EAI Working Paper*. 2022: 1–18.
- McCarty, Harold H. 1954. *McCarty on McCarthy: The Spatial Distribution of the McCarthy Vote, 1952*. Iowa City, IA: Department of Geography, University of Iowa. Unpublished manuscript.
- NEC (National Election Commission of the Republic of Korea). [http://info.nec.go.kr/main/main\\_previous\\_load.xhtml](http://info.nec.go.kr/main/main_previous_load.xhtml) (accessed November 14, 2023).
- Put, Gert-Jan, et al. 2020. “Fighting over Friends and Neighbors: The Effect of Inter-Candidate Geographic Distance on Intra-Party Competition.” *Political Geography* 81: 11–22. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2020.102219>.
- Stockton, Hans, and Uk Heo. 2004. “The Changing Dynamics of Regionalism in South Korea’s Elections.” *Global Economic Review* 33.3: 1–22. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/12265080408449852>.
- Tatalovich, Raymond. 1975. “Friends and Neighbors’ Voting: Mississippi, 1943–73.” *Journal of Politics* 37.3: 807–814. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2129327>.
- Thielemann, Gregory S. 1993. “Local Advantage in Campaign Financing: Friends, Neighbors, and Their Money in Texas Supreme Court Elections.” *Journal of*

*Politics* 55.2: 472–478. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2132276>.

Turovskii, Rostislav F. 2006. "Regional'noe izmerenie elektoral'nogo processa" (Regional Measurement of Electoral Process). *Obshchestvennye nauki i sovremennost'* (Social Sciences and Modernity) 5: 1–20.

Yea, Sallie. 2000. "Maps of Resistance and Geographies of Dissent in the Chölla Region of South Korea." *Korean Studies* 24.1: 69–93. <https://doi.org/10.1353/ks.2000.0020>.