

## Regional Cleavage in Korean Politics and Elections

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### Introduction

Abstract (150 단어 내외) 와 keywords, 필자 기초자료 작성 부탁드립니다.

The most economic way of understanding the politics of a country is to ~~look into the country's~~ understand its political cleavage structure. ~~If you find~~ Once one knows whether the political cleavage of a country is dominated by conservative ~~versus~~ se-progressive ideologies, race or religion, ~~you one~~ can form a general idea about ~~what the~~ the nature of politics in that country's politics is like.

The dominant political cleavage characterizing Korean politics since the country began to implement democratic principles following the June, 1997 Uprising is regionalism, which has played a decisive role in ~~the~~ presidential, general and local elections ~~held~~. Though ~~generation~~ age generational differences emerged as a new variant in the 16th presidential election held in December ~~of 2002~~ last year, the election again revealed that regionalism is still the dominant political cleavage ~~of in~~ Korean politics.

It goes without saying that no country is free from regionalism. But Korea's regionalism is quite serious in its extent. Verifying ~~its seriousness~~ this is the fact that whereas in Western Europe the Netherlands alone exceeds 50 percent in its religious cleavage index, ~~with~~ while the rest of the countries having have an index of between 20 ~~percent~~ and 25 percent, Korea's regional cleavage index exceeds 60 percent.<sup>1</sup> Given that the regionalism of Korea, a country composed of a single ethnicity, is not compounded by racial problems as is the case with many other countries, this phenomenon somewhat defies

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comprehension.

This article attempts to empirically analyze, based mainly on election results, how regionalism ~~has~~ historically emerged and changed in Korean politics, what its ~~reality~~ current state is and ~~in which the~~ direction in which it is moving.

### Some Preliminary Facts and ~~Some~~ Thoughts

#### ~~Some~~ Preliminary Facts

To understand Korea's regionalism, it is necessary to comprehend some preliminary facts. Central are two: one is to understand how Korea's political cleavage structure has changed with a view to comprehending regional cleavage in the context of the development process of ~~Korean~~ politics, and the other is to delve into Korea's regional formation and the political affiliation of its regions.


The cleavage structure of contemporary Korean politics<sup>2</sup> has developed in three phases.<sup>3</sup> The first consists of the eight years from Korea's liberation from Japanese colonial rule in 1945 to the end of the Korean War in 1953. The Dominating political cleavage in the during this period was fierce ideological conflict between the right and the left over the ~~disposition treatment~~ of collaborators with Japan, land reform and the nature of ~~a the~~ state to be newly established ~~anew~~. ~~The~~ second phase extends from the 1953 armistice to ~~the~~ June 1987—U uprising, the political cleavage of which was dominated by a confrontation between democratic and anti-democratic forces. Since progressive forces retreated and anti-Communism prevailed following the Korean War, no Western-style progressive v.s conservative confrontation was

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<sup>2</sup>

possible, while democratization remained the prominent political task under successive authoritarian military regimes. When President Park Chung-hee was assassinated by one of his closest confidants, ~~his security chief~~ the director of the KCIA in 1979, it looked for a while as if the country would adopt democratic principles. This dream was thwarted by a military coup, however, ~~which that~~ saw over 200 citizens massacred. The massacre restored the leftist movement and caused a progressive ~~vs.~~ conservative struggle ~~as to~~ become the secondary political cleavage.

The last phase encompasses ~~a~~ the period from the 1987 implementation of democratic principles to the present. With elections and political competition re-emerging during this period, regionalism emerged as the dominant political cleavage in place of a confrontation between democratic and anti-democratic forces, and a confrontation structure between progressives and conservatives grew to an extent, though it did not become strong enough to dominate the political cleavage. These trends are shown in the following figure:






Figure 1. Historical Changes ~~of in the~~ Political Cleavage Structure in Korea

Let's us now look at the regional formation of Korea ~~next~~. Korea consists of nine provinces, one special city, Seoul, and six expanded cities. KeyCentral to the regionalism are three regions:—Yeongnam, Honamman and Chungcheong. The Hhometowns of As the home of the general-turned dictators, foremost among them Park Chung-hee, and the three Kims, typical Korean politicians in recent decades, the three regions are ~~related with~~ to associated with those politicians.

Yeongnam, located in the southeast of South Korea, refers to KyongGyeongsangbuk-do and Gyeongsangnam-do provinces and the three expanded cities of PBusan, FDaegu and Ulsan. It is necessary to distinguish KyongGyeongsangbuk-do province from KyongGyeongsangnam-do province because they two have trod different political paths. KyongGyeongsangbuk-do province and FDaegu, an expanded city housing the Gyeongsangbuk-do provincial government, are nicknamed TK, the acronym of KyongDaegu and Gyeongsang (according to the a formerly used phoneticization). It is the hometown of three general-turned ~~presidents~~; Park Chung-hee who assumed power through the 1961 coup de'tat, Chun Doo-hwan who grasped power in a series of coups following Park's assassination, and Roh Tae-woo who succeeded Chun. The three military dictators dominated South Korea ~~from from the 1961–1960s~~ to the early 1987/1990s. KyongGyeongsangnam-do province and the expanded cities of PBusan and Ulsan, called the PK region for the acronym of PBusan and KyongGyeongsang, occupies the southeastern part of the Korean

~~Peninsulapeninsula~~. ~~It's~~ This was the political base of former President Kim Young-sam, who spearheaded the democratization struggle since the 1970s along with the ~~just-resigned most recent~~ President Kim Dae-jung, and ~~who~~ assumed presidency in a coalition with the military regime in the 1990s. Being the power base of Kim Young-sam, PK, despite being a part of composing ~~YongnamYeongnam~~, aligned itself with Honam to function as the base of the democratization movement against TK. In the mid-1990s, however, PK fought against Honam in collaboration with TK. The ~~YongnamYeongnam~~ region, comprising both TK and PK, has the largest population in the country and is home to many mammoth plants constructed under the 1960s industrialization drive.

The Honam region, located in the southwestern ~~portion part~~ of the Korea peninsula, consists of North and South ~~ChJeolla~~ provinces and ~~K~~ the expanded city of Gwangju ~~expanded city~~. ~~It's~~ is a region riddled with grudges historically. The granary of the country, Honam was defeated by the ~~Shilla Dynasty~~ dynasty (the current day based in Yeongnam) in the ~~7th~~ seventh century when the latter unified the Korean ~~Peninsulapeninsula~~, and is also the seat of the place where the ~~Donghak Peasant Uprising~~ of the Tonhak or Eastern Learning Peasant Army originated in the late nineteenth century. The hometown of ~~e~~ Ex-p ~~former~~ President Kim Dae-jung who led the democratization movement in the 1970s along with Kim Young-sam, and who ~~sustained~~ endured the greatest hardship in his career in the ~~opposition~~ career, the Honam region, has long been alienated in many aspects. In the spring of 1980, when the country's political situation was turbulent in the wake of Park Chung-hee's assassination, the ~~K~~ Gwangju Uprising erupted in response to another military coup d'etat in which resulted in more than 200 citizens were being massacred.

The Chung~~h~~ongcheong region, located north of Honam, consists of Chung~~h~~ongcheongnam-do and Chungcheongbuk-do provinces and the

expanded city of ~~F~~Daejeon. In Chung~~h~~ongcheong region, regionalism developed in conjunction with the political career of Kim~~a~~ Jong-pil, one of the three Kims, who hails from~~the~~ this region. Unlike the two other Kims who led the democratization movement, Kim Jong-pil was a one of leaders of in the military dictator regimeship and a politician with a Cold War mind~~-~~set. A mastermind of the 1961 coup under the leadership of Park Chung-hee, he was the No. 2 man in the Park administration until Park's assassination in 1979. Banned from politics until the 1980 coup, he resumed~~polities~~ political activity in 1987 thanks to the June Uprising in June of that year. Such regional formation is illustrated in the following fFigure-2:

#### 지도 2

Figure 2. Regional Composition in Korea

#### Some Preliminary Thoughts on Theoretical Thoughts Issues

Before discussing how Korea's regionalism ~~h~~as developed since 1987, it is necessary to briefly touch on how~~the~~ regionalism has become the dominant political cleavage structure of Korean politics since that year.

Some scholars trace the origin of~~the~~ regionalism to the victory or defeat of particular regions that took place in the process of Korea's unification in the 7th-seventh century.<sup>4</sup> ~~This e~~-assertion is ill-grounded, however, because Korea had no political regionalism in the wake of the nation's liberation from Japanese colonial rule in 1945~~and to~~ at least~~until~~ the 1970s. Positions that regarding~~ing the~~ regionalism as an issue of~~the~~ Korean society since the 1960s, without looking for its origins~~s~~ in the premodern era, are broadly classified into several theoretical currents.<sup>5</sup> ~~The first is~~ the economic disparity theory.<sup>6</sup>

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According to this theory, Economic disparity causing regional cleavage emerged, ~~according to this theory~~, when TK regimes, starting with the export-first industrialization policies of the Park Chung-hee administration, ~~under their export-first industrialization policies~~ built huge plants along the coasts of Yeongnam ~~since from~~ the 1960s, ~~to the exclusion and resulting straggling that which led to~~ of the Honam region falling behind ~~and the economic disparities~~. The second theory, not alternative but supplementary to the economic disparity theory, ascribes ~~the~~ regionalism to the TK regimes' discrimination in elite recruitment, favoring Yeongnam people in the appointment of cabinet members and other senior administrators. ~~The third~~ is a psychological theory, ~~which that~~ perceiving ~~the~~ regionalism as a psychological issue emanating from cultural disparity, among other factors. The fourth is ~~a~~ the political mobilization theory, which holds ing ~~that the~~ regionalism has come about from the practice of the military dictators, among them Park Chung-~~H~~ee, and the three Kims mobilizing the people of their respective regions for the purpose of sustaining their political power.

Valid as they are in some respects, these explanations are ~~true~~ only partially true; ~~a~~ and point to the need for a more comprehensive explanation ~~is needed~~. Fundamental and structurally determining factors are undoubtedly ~~fully~~ regional disparity and ~~personnel~~ discrimination in the appointment of personnel. They do not cover the whole picture, however, because ~~K~~Gangweon-do province, ~~which backward as it is as~~ has fallen as behind as much as Honam, does not display regionalism. The existence or non-existence of political alternatives and political mobilization also factor into the regionalism. All in all, Korea's regionalism has dynamically developed with economic disparity functioning as the determining factor ~~in the last instance~~ and the combination of discourse formation ~~of in the relatively autonomous~~ regions ~~with relative autonomy~~, the political socialization process and politicians' mass mobilization for their political ends ~~interacting with one~~

~~another~~. But it is necessary to remember that an important characteristic of Korean politics, other than the ~~ese~~-dynamic ones discussed above, has functioned as a key factor of the regional cleavage. This is what ~~a one~~ scholar ~~has~~ called "the vortex of centralism."<sup>7</sup> ~~This physics of political dynamics "tending to sway all active elements of the society upward toward central power"~~<sup>8</sup> has forced all the political forces including the various regions to fight for this central power and thereby ~~acted~~ functioned as a key fertilizer for regionalism.

### Regional Cleavage in Korean Politics: An Historical and Empirical Analysis

This chapter attempts to analyze historically and empirically ~~analyze~~ the regionalism ~~as represented~~ manifested in Korean politics, especially and elections through the statistical outcomes ~~of elections~~. To better understand the regional cleavage in Korean politics, the historical process of changes ~~in the~~ regionalism is reviewed in several periods.

#### *Dormant Period (1961-1987)*

~~The r~~Regionalism in a political context appeared between 1961 and 1987, but remained dormant, ~~not yet in~~ emerging as an independent cleavage. The Park Chung-hee regime, ~~that which~~ came into being in 1961 through a coup, held a presidential elections in 1963 in an attempt to revert to civilian rule. Park won the election by garnering majority votes in not only Yeongnam (56.7% ~~vsv.~~ 35.7%) but also in Honam (54.3% ~~vsv.~~ 38.1% ). ~~(Ssee T~~Table 1). No regional cleavage was displayed between Yeongnam and Honam. But the rising economic disparity arising from industrialization centered on Yeongnam and

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personnel discrimination in favor of Yeongnam resulted in an ~~accumulated~~ growing sense of alienation in Honam. When Kim Dae-jung, hailing from Honam, ran in the 1971 presidential election, the Park regime agitated regionalism contending that a candidate born in Yeongnam should be elected president. As a result, regionalism became a factor ~~ed in the~~ an election for the first time in the country. Park ~~collected~~ gained an overwhelming 75.8% percent approval in TK, his political base, and 66.9 percent% in PK, which is not TK but still a part of Yeongnam, while Kim Dae-jung won a majority ~~support~~ of 62.3 percent% in his base Honam. (See Table 1). Subsequent elections and political events, however, indicate that ~~the~~ regionalism did not yet establish itself as a principal axis in election patterns. This was ~~B~~because the cleavage structure between the democratic and anti-democratic camps was so prominent that regionalism could not emerge as an independent cleavage structure. In other words, regionalism existed to a certain extent, but as a ~~sign~~ different expression of ~~a the~~ democratic ~~vers~~ use anti-democratic confrontation. ~~The~~ ~~r~~Regionalism existed in the form of confrontation between ~~KyongGyeongsangbuk-do~~ province, the base of military dictatorship, and the alliance of Honam and PK, the bases of the pro-democracy camp led by Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam, respectively. This is evident in the political events that took place during this period.

Park Chung-hee, who ~~employed~~ began his ~~blatant open~~ dictatorship in 1973 by renouncing the constitutional order, was assassinated in 1979 in a ~~ruling block's~~ conflict among the ruling block over how to cope with a large-scale public rebellion taking place in ~~P~~Busan and ~~KyongGyeongsangnam-do~~ province, or PK, the hometown and political base of the opposition leader Kim Young-sam who was expelled from the National Assembly. This evidently verifies that PK and TK, though belonging to the same Yeongnam region, confronted each other in their political stances of pro-

or anti-democracy. During the ensuing political turmoil, when the country

		5th Presidential Election Held in 1963		7th Presidential Election Held in 1971	
		Park Chung-hee	Yun Bo-seon	Park Chung-hee	Kim Dae-jung
Total		46.6%	45.1%	53.2%	45.3%
Seoul		30.2%	65.1%	40.0%	59.4%
Gyeonggi		33.1%	56.9%	48.9%	49.5%
Gangwon		39.6%	49.1%	59.9%	38.8%
Jeju		69.9%	22.3%	56.9%	41.8%
Chungcheong		40.9%	49.2%	54.8%	43.1%
Gyeongsang (Yeongnam)	PK	57.6%	35.3%	66.9%	32.1%
	TK	55.7%	36.1%	75.8%	23.4%
	Total	56.7%	35.7%	71.1%	27.9%
Jeolla (Honam)		54.3%	38.1%	34.8%	62.3%

appeared ~~inclined toward~~ to be leaning toward democratization, the military staged a multi-stage coup d'etat, detaining Kim Dae-jung and banning Kim Young-sam from politics. In that process, the military suppressed an uprising in the KGwangju region, the hometown of Kim Dae-jung, with brutal force that led to the massacre of hundreds of citizens.<sup>9</sup> ~~This time the democracy vsy.~~ anti-democracy confrontation pitched TK against Honam. Chun Doo-hwan, Aanother general hailing from TK, ~~who had~~ staged a successful coup and assumed power through the indirect presidential election system instituted by Park Chung-hee; Honam's alienation was exacerbated by the KGwangju massacre.

Table 1. Polling Ratios in the 1963 and 1971 Presidential Elections

Source: 출처 한국말로 알려주시기 바랍니다. 발행자 및 서지사항.

*Regional Rivalry System (1987-1990)*

A public resistance to win back the direct presidential system ~~deprived~~ taken away in 1971, the 1987 June Uprising restored the people's right to elect their president directly. When the path was paved for democratization, however, the two leaders of the democratization movement, Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam, ~~were~~ split and both ran in the 1987 presidential election. Kim Jong-pil, the No. 2 man in the Park Chung-hee regime, also formed his political party to give rise to a quadrilateral party system with the ruling party included. With the four parties having their respective bases, ~~the~~ regionalism displayed itself fully in the process and outcome ~~of~~ the elections with the result that the regional rivalry system was first born in Korea. (See Table 2). ~~But it~~ should be noted, however, that the regionalism of the four regions was different from each other in nature. ~~The regionalism of in~~ the TK region, ~~in which where the~~ military candidate Roh\* Tae-woo was based, ~~as were~~ his predecessors Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan, was hegemonic in nature, an attempt to preserve the ~~hegemony~~ political dominance the region exercised in the country. The regionalism of HomanHonam, the power base of Kim Dae-jung, and PK, that of Kim Young-sam, on the other hand, resisted TK's hegemony through their anti-dictatorship struggles. The Chungcheong region, the power base of Kim Jong-pil, an original military dictatorial force, was meanwhile mobilized ~~for~~by his political instigation, constituting reflective or imitative regionalism.

The split between Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam thus shifted the nature of the 1989 presidential election from a democracy ~~vs~~v. anti-democracy confrontation into regional rivalry, in which the ruling party candidate Roh

Tae-woo, another general-turned politician, won on account of the split. In this respect, although the Park regime's regionally uneven development policy and elite recruitment discrimination constituted the ~~ultimately~~ determining factors in the emergence of Korea's regionalism, ~~its~~ another direct factor was ~~provided by~~ the split ~~of~~ between Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam.<sup>10</sup> ~~Such~~ regionalism repeated itself in the 1998 general election, institutionalizing regionalism as the central political cleavage in Korean politics.

In the 1987 presidential election, in which four candidates vied, ~~winner~~ Roh Tae-woo garnered ~~88.6~~ 8.1% approval in TK, his power base; runner-up Kim Young-sam 53.7% in his base of PK; third-runner Kim Dae-jung 88.4% in his hometown and power base of Honam; and fourth-runner Kim Jong-pil 34.6% in Chungcheong, his power base. The same pattern repeated itself in the 1998 general election: ~~winner~~ Roh's party won 86% of seats in TK; ~~runner-up~~ Kim Dae-jung's party 97.3% of seats in Honam; ~~third-runner~~ Kim Young-sam's party 62.1% of seats in PK and 93.3% in ~~P~~Busan; and ~~fourth-runner~~ Kim Jong-pil's party 55.5% of seats in Chungcheong and 72.2% of seats in South Chungcheong province.

Table 2. Polling Ratio in 1987 Presidential Election

		14th Presidential Election Held in 1987			
		Roh Tae-woo	Kim Young-sam	Kim Dae-jung	Kim Jong-pil
Total		38.6%	28.0%	27.1%	8.1%
Seoul		29.9%	29.1%	32.6%	8.2%
Gyeonggi		41.0%	28.1%	22.1%	8.7%
Gangwon		59.3%	26.1%	8.8%	5.4%
Jeju		49.8%	26.8%	18.6%	4.5%
Chungcheong		33.1%	20.1%	8.9%	34.6%
Gyeongsang	PK	36.6%	53.7%	6.9%	2.6%

<sup>10</sup>

(Yeongnam)	TK	68.1%	26.6%	2.5%	2.4%
	Total	48.8%	41.6%	5.0%	2.5%
Jeolla (Honam)		9.9%	1.2%	88.4%	0.5%

Source: 역시 출처 정보 알려주세요.

지도 3

Figure 3. Regional Rivalry System

*Regional Hegemony System (1990-1995)*

The ruling party failed to win a majority in the 1988 general election because the four competing parties prevailed in their respective regions. As a result, the Roh Tae-woo administration encountered difficulties in administering the country. In an attempt to overcome the hurdles, the regime, through a secret behind-the-scenes maneuvering, carried out a tripartite merger with two of the opposition parties: Kim Young-sam's party based in PK and Kim Jong-pil's party based in Chungcheong. Kim Jong-pil, a military dictatorial force himself, shared a similar political ideology with as the Roh administration, but Kim Young-sam, unlike the other two others, was liberal; their merger was a sort of kind of grand conservative coalition. Being a coalition of three regions, excepting excluding Honam, the tripartite merger rendered the regional cleavage into a Honam vsy. anti-Honam one. The merger aggravated Honam's alienation, making Honam man a scape-goat for the sake of reinforcing the control of the ruling party. In this respect the merger was akin to Thatcherism's two-nation hegemony project that was designed to renew a control system by dividing a society into a good nation of tax-paying and diligent citizens and a bad one of lazy and poor citizens on the dole, and

sacrificing the latter.<sup>11</sup> –The coalition formed a political majority and administered the country, regarding Honam as a bad ~~nation~~ region to be excluded and gaining support from the remaining three regions. The tripartite merger made the previously diametrically-opposed –TK and PK a single political force called Yeongnam.

Since Kim Young-sam, a minority in the party, triumphed in the internal power struggle ~~of~~ over the huge ruling party formed by the tripartite merger, the 1992 presidential election was basically a ~~dual~~ duel between the two leaders of the democratization movement: Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung. With the nation's top business tycoon and founder and owner of the Hyundai Group, Chung Ju-yung, dubbed Korea's Ross Perot~~s~~, joining the race, the presidential election was tripartite. Fundamentally, however, it was a regional confrontation between Honam and non-Honam, in which Kim Dae-jung of Honam was defeated and consequently retired from politics. (Ssee Table 3-). As shown in the following table, Kim Young-sam, on account of the tripartite party merger, garnered 68.8% approval from Yeongnam by prevailing not only in his political base of PK but also in TK, the base of the military regimes, whereas Kim Dae-jung managed to collect only 10.1% approval in Yeongnam. Going just in the opposite direction, 91% of Honam voters cast votes for –Kim Dae-jung, while merely 4.1% of them ~~approved~~ voted for Kim Young-sam. Such a pattern between Honam and non-Honam regions repeated itself in the 1992 general election: Kim Dae-jung's party won an overwhelming majority of 37 out of 39 parliamentary seats ~~out of a total of 39~~ in Honam, while gaining no seats out of 66 in Yeongnam, and only 4 out of –28 in Chungcheong.

Assuming power, former President Kim Young-sam pushed ahead with a number of reforms and pursued a globalization strategy in line with the Uruguay Rounds. –In that process, Kim Young-sam, in an ostensive effort to reform Korean politics according to global standards, tried to oust from

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politics old and out-moded Kim Jong-pil. Seceding from the ruling party in defiance, Kim Jong-pil formed his own political party, collapsing the regional hegemony system of Honam pitted against non-Honam.

Table 3. Polling Ratio in the 14th Presidential Election Held in 1992

	<u>The</u> 14th Presidential Election Held in 1992		
	Kim Young-sam	Kim Dae-jung	Chung Ju-young
Total	42.0%	33.8%	16.3%
Seoul	36.4%	37.7%	18.0%
Gyeonggi	36.6%	32.0%	22.7%
Gangwon	40.8%	15.2%	33.5%
Jeju	15.2%	32.9%	15.4%
Chungcheo ng	36.2%	27.3%	23.8%
Gyeongsan g (Yeongnam)	68.8%	10.1%	12.2%
Jeolla (Honam)	4.2%	91.0%	2.3%

Source: 출처

지도 4

Figure 4. Regional Hegemony System

*New Regional Rivalry System (1995- present)*

In 1995, as Kim Jong-pil founded his own party, the regional hegemonic system dismantled and a new regional rivalry system emerged. Whereas in the old rivalry system, four regions, i.e., TK, PK, Honam, Chunghongcheong, competed against each other, in this new rivalry system, three regions, namely, Yeongnam (TK + PK), Honam and Chunghongcheong, competed. Kim Dae-jung returned to politics timed with the local elections held that year and

succeeded in forming a new regional coalition [with Kim Jong-pil](#) against Kim Young-sam and Yeongnam [region](#).

The regional coalition between Honam and Chungcheong remained intact in the 1997 presidential election. Yeongnam votes were split between [Lee Hoi-chang](#), the non-Yeongnam candidate put up by the opposition party the region supported, and a young politician, who was defeated in the opposition party's primary but nonetheless stood in the election in defiance. Owing to the Honam-Chungcheong coalition, the split in Yeongnam and an unprecedented economic crisis hitting the country prior to the election, Kim Dae-jung triumphed in the presidential election. While Honam gave Kim Dae-jung a whopping 92.9% approval, Yeongnam extended only a 58.8 aye vote to ~~Lee Hoi-chang~~[Lee Hoi-chang](#) due to a split in votes between him and the defiant young candidate. (See [Table 4](#)).

Contrary to ~~a~~ [the prediction of](#) some scholars ~~made~~, that the election of President Kim Dae-jung, the standard-bearer of the alienated Honam region, would help resolve the country's regionalism, ~~the regionalism did not~~ disappear because the 90-plus percent approval Honam gave Kim Dae-jung resulted in reflective unity in Yeongnam, and ~~because~~ President Kim failed to ~~keep maintain~~ regional balance in his elite recruitment. In the 2000 general election, the ruling party won no ~~seats~~ in Yeongnam, and a third party inaugurated by eminent Yeongnam politicians suffered a defeat in its backyard due to the strategic voting Yeongnam voters employed in fear of [a](#) vote split. In other words, ~~the regionalism did not break up dissolve;~~ neither the ruling party nor the opposition party won a parliamentary seat in regions opposed to them.

The Kim Dae-jung administration was expected to suffer ~~a~~ defeat in the 2002 presidential election because of the public rage over a series of scandals that ~~was~~ [were](#) evinced in a number of preceding parliamentary and gubernatorial by-elections. ~~In an attempt to overcome the political crisis,~~



however, the ruling party began to gather popular support by choosing its presidential candidate in a modified open primary with the public participating. The candidate, Roh Moo-hyun, who had aligned himself with Kim Dae-jung, a rare case among Yeongnam politicians, waged a successful campaign to emerge victorious in the presidential election.

In that it was the first presidential election in the "post-three Kims age," the election drew attention with regard to what shape ~~the~~ regionalism would take. As Kim Jong-pil remained neutral, no regional pattern was repeated in Chungcheong. ~~The R~~regions that mattered were Honam and Yeongnam, whose voting patterns showed little substantial ~~—~~changes. This outcome contradicted the expectation that regional voting would decline particularly because the candidate of the Honam-based party hailed not from Honam but from Yeongnam, and because the candidate of the Yeongnam-based party was not from Yeongnam, but from Chungcheong. ~~—~~Honam cast 90-plus percent support ~~to~~ ~~of~~ ~~for~~ Roh Moo-hyun, the candidate of the ruling party based ~~—~~ ~~in~~ the region, ~~—~~and Yeongnam ~~—~~too extended as high as 69.1% ~~percent~~ support to ~~Lee Hoe-chang~~ Lee Hoi-chang, the candidate of the opposition party based ~~—~~ ~~in~~ that region. (See ~~T~~Table 4). In other words, ~~the~~ regionalism merely shifted from the past "primitive regionalism," in which voters cast votes for candidates hailing from their respective regions, to strategic regionalism, in which they voted for a candidate, who didn't hail from their regions, but who were expected to prevail over the candidate of the opponent party. ~~the~~ ~~R~~Regionalism, ~~then~~, was little weakened. This will be discussed further in connection with the future prospects of Korea's regionalism.

Table 4. Polling Ratio in ~~the~~ 1997 and 2002 Presidential Elections

	<del>The</del> 15th Presidential Election Held in 1997	<del>The</del> 16th Presidential Election Held in 2002

		Kim Dae-jung	Lee- Hoe-changLee Hoi-chang	Roh Moo-hyun	Lee- Hoe-changLee Hoi-chang
Total		39.7%	38.1%	48.9%	46.6%
Seoul		44.3%	40.4%	51.3%	45.0%
Gyeonggi		38.6%	35.2%	50.1%	44.0%
Gangwon		23.3%	42.4%	41.5%	52.5%
Jeju		40.8%	35.9%	56.1%	41.0%
Chungcheong		43.1%	26.9%	51.8%	40.9%
Gyeongsang (Youngnam)	PK	13.4%	52.9%	30.1%	65.7%
	TK	12.9%	65.7%	20.2%	75.1%
	Total	13.2%	58.1%	25.5%	69.1%
Jeolla (Honam)		92.9%	3.3%	92.3%	5.07%

Source: [\(출처의 서지사항 보충해주세요\)](#)

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Figure 5. New Regional Rivalry System

*The Future of Regionalism in Korean Politics*

The One of the issues of greatest interest during the 2002 presidential election drew is if was the question of whether the regionalism had weakened, and, given its outcome, what the future of the regionalism will be like in Korean politics. Some scholars argue that the regionalism has weakened,<sup>12</sup> but this view is too optimistic.<sup>13</sup> In Ssupport ing the of this view, they cite that president elect Roh Moo-hyun's polling ratio of 25.5% in Yeongnam, which is 12 percentage points higher than the 13.2% % Kim Dae-jung collected received in the region in the 1997 presidential election, and particularly that Roh's polling ratio of 30.1% in PK is remarkably higher than the Kim's 13.4%

<sup>12</sup>

<sup>13</sup>

~~Kim earned~~ in the same region ~~in during~~ the previous presidential election. To be noted, however, is the fact that ~~Lee Hoe-chang~~ Lee Hoi-chang's polling ratio in Yeongnam ~~too also~~ increased no less than 11 percentage ~~points~~ from 58.1% in 1997 to 69.1% in 2002. Lee's polling ratio in ~~PB~~ Busan and ~~Kyong~~ Gyeongsangnam-do province, the hometown of Roh, in particular, hiked as much as 12.8 percentage points from 52.9% in 1997 to 65.7% in 2002. This indicates that ~~the fact that~~ Roh garnered greater approval in Yeongnam than Kim Dae-jung did in the region in 1997; ~~was not because of due to~~ weakened regionalism; ~~but Rather, because~~ as the tripartite race of 1997 shifted to a bilateral one in 2002, ballots cast to the third candidate ~~Lee Rhee~~ In-je were split between Roh Moo-hyun and ~~Lee Hoe-chang~~ Lee Hoi-chang. As a result, a Yeongnam man stood as the standard-bearer of the ruling party; based ~~in~~ Honam; in the latest presidential election, and despite the fact that the ruling party candidate's polling ratio in Yeongnam rose more than 10 percentage points from 1997, the difference in ballots gained by the winner and ~~the~~ runner-up in Yeongnam dipped only 1.3 percentage points; from 44.9 percentage points in 1997 to 43.6 percentage points in 2002. (See ~~Table~~ Table 4).

A review of changes in ~~the regional~~ Regional cleavage—Cleavage ~~index~~ Index (RCI), a systematic indication of changes in regional voting patterns, also shows little weakening of ~~the~~ regionalism. ~~The RCI~~ Regional cleavage index means differences between the polling ratio a candidate gains in a ~~supporting~~ region ~~supportive of him or her~~ and that another candidate collects in a region hostile to the latter candidate. The index in the 2002 presidential election, ~~indicating little weakened regionalism~~, showed a decline of ~~a~~ mere 1.8 percentage points; from 67.2% ~~percentage points~~ in 1997 to 65.4% ~~percentage points~~ in 2002, ~~indicating that regionalism had little weakened~~. (See ~~Table~~ Table 5).

Table 5. Regional Cleavage Index (RCI) in Presidential Elections

1992			1997			2002		
Kim DJ (Hona m)	Kim YS (Yeong - nam)	Averag e RCI	Kim DJ (Hona m)	Lee HC (Yeong - nam)	Averag e RCI	Roh MH (Hona m)	Lee HC (Yeong - nam)	Averag e RCI
78.4%	64.9%	71.7%	79.7%	54.8%	67.2%	66.8%	64.0%	65.4%

Remarks: \* Average RCI for Kim Dae-jung and Noh Moo-hyun = their balloting ratio from Homan - balloting ratio from Yeongnam

Average RCI for Lee Hoi-chang = balloting ratio from Yeongnam - balloting ratio from Homan

The overall RCI is the average of the two indices above.

~~Average cleavage indices for Kim Dae-jung and Noh Moo-hyun are calculated by deducting the polling ratios they gained in Yeongnam from their balloting ratios in Honam; average cleavage index for Lee Hoe-chang by deducting the polling ratio he gained in Honam from his polling ratio in Yeongnam; and overall regional cleavage indices by averaging the two indices.~~

~~But~~ ~~†~~ Three factors give rise to an expectation that ~~the~~ regionalism may ~~be~~ weakened under the Roh Moo-hyun administration. First, a ~~sort form~~ of ~~generational~~ revolution based on generation (or age) took place in the 2002 presidential election and generation emerged as a new political cleavage. As shown in the following table, ~~generational~~ Generational cleavage ~~Cleavage index~~ Index (GCI), the conversion of difference in approval ratios by generation, jumped from 9.7% in 1997 to 23.9% in 2002, though still far short of ~~the~~ regional cleavage index (see Table 6). The emergence of such an alternative

cleavage is expected to relatively weaken the importance of the regional cleavage as the determining variant in Korean politics.

Table 6. Generational Cleavage Index (GCI) in Presidential Elections

	1997				2002		
	Lee HC	Kim DJ	Lee IJ	average	Lee HC	Roh MH	average
20-39 years old(a)	32%	39.6%	21.8%		34.6%	59.2%	
over 50 years old(b)	43.2%	45.5%	9.7%		60.7%	37.5%	
GCI(a-b or b-a)	11.2%	5.9%	12.1%	9.7%	26.1%	21.7%	23.9%

Sources: 1997 - Korean Election Study Society

(한국선거연구회가 1997년에 내놓은 책인가요?? 책제목 국문으로 알려주시기 바랍니다.)

#### Outcome of MBC and KRC 2000 exit surveys

Hopeful is the fact that young voters in their 20s and 30s, in particular, cast their ballots free from the biases of ~~the~~-regionalism. A poll conducted in the wake of the presidential election revealed that even in Yeongnam, ~~the~~-a substantial percentage of the young generation-~~of in their~~ 20s and 30s gave-a substantial approval to Roh Moo-hyun. 46.4% of ~~V~~yoters in their 20s in YeongnamTK, in particular, ~~cast a greater approval of 46.4%~~ cast their votes in support~~for~~ of Roh Moo-hyun, a greater number than their 45.2% who supported~~ed~~ ~~for Lee Hae-chang~~Lee Hoi-chang. (See ~~F~~Table 7).

Table 7 Balloting Pattern of Voters in Their 20s and 30s in Yeongnam

		Roh Moo-hyun	<a href="#">Lee Hoe-chang</a> <a href="#">Lee Hoi-chang</a>	Labor Party
20s	TK	45.5%(15)	48.5%(16)	6.1%(2)
	PK	47.1%(24)	43.1%(22)	9.8%(5)
	total	46.4%(39)	45.2%(38)	8.3%(7)
30s	TK	36.1%(13)	58.3%(21)	5.6%(2)
	PK	37.7%(20)	49.1%(26)	13.2%(7)
	total	37.1%(33)	52.8%(47)	10.1%(9)

Source: Korea Social Science Data Center—, [2002 nyeon daeseon seolmun josa](#)  
[책인지? 자료인지??](#) (Questionnaire Survey on [the](#) 2002 Presidential Election) (Outcome released in 2003).

Secondly, despite the facts that Roh Moo-hyun was elected president on account of [the](#) support given him in Honam, and that a majority of Yeongnam voters including those of PK voted ~~in favor of~~ [for](#) his opponent, chances are that under the Roh Moo-hyun administration, many PK voters will shift their allegiance to President Roh ~~Moo-hyun~~ and his party. It is highly likely that [the](#) regional cleavage will shift to a confrontation between ~~the a~~ Honam-PK coalition and TK.

Thirdly, ~~a~~ reform ~~in~~ [of the](#) electoral system is again pushed forward as [a](#) part of political reform. Proposed electoral system reforms envisages the introduction of a regional proportional system or [medium- or large-sized electoral district systems](#) ([중대선거제, 용어확인](#)) with a view to encouraging region-based parties to have their candidates elected in regions controlled by their opponent parties. This electoral reform, if implemented, is likely to contribute toward moderating ~~the~~ regionalism.

## Conclusion

As ~~mentioned~~ demonstrated above, ~~the~~ regionalism ~~again~~ displayed its clout again in the 2002 presidential election, showing ~~little few signs of~~ weakening. It cannot be denied, however, that ~~the~~ regionalism is likely to ~~be~~ weakened in the future on account of several factors. Two things are very important for this possibility to be realized. In the short term, President Roh Moo-hyun should administer the country properly, maintaining regional balance in ~~elite~~ his recruitment of personnel. Only then, can Korea's regionalism ~~may~~ be weakened. In the ~~mid-term interim~~ and ~~in at a~~ more fundamental level, an alternative cleavage that will replace ~~the~~ regionalism should be introduced. Related to this, ideological terrain in Korean politics has been so narrow due to the ~~country's~~ division of the peninsula that it is no exaggeration to say that almost no ideological and policy differences have existed between the ruling and opposition parties. ~~Little~~ The lack of significant differences between the ~~m~~ parties constituted one of the reasons for the predominance of why the regional cleavage ~~is so predominant~~. ~~The r~~Regionalism will ~~be~~ weakened when the ideological ~~distance is expanded~~ gap between ~~the~~ parties is widened and progressive parties emerge so that Korean politics, ~~as the West has,~~ develops a modern conservative vs. progressive ~~ideological cleavage~~ that is similar to that found in the West.

- 1) Yi Gap-yun, *Hanguk-ui seon-geo-wa jiyekjuui* (Korean Elections and Regionalism) (Seoul: Oruem Publishing House, 1997), p. 39. On cleavage indexes of Western Europe, see Bingham Powell and G. Bingham Powell Jr., *Contemporary Democracies* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984).
- 2) A ~~foremost seminal work of~~ research on Korea's political cleavage structure is Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "Cleavage Structure, Party Systems, and Voter Alignment," in Seymour M. Lipset, ed., *Party System and Voter Alignment* (New York: Macmillan, 1967).
- 3) Sonn Hochul, *Sinjayujuui sidae-ui hanguk jeongchi* (Korean Politics in the Age of Neo-Liberalism) (Seoul: Purunsoop Publishing Co., 1999), pp. 265-269.

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- 4) Many historians assert this theory.
- 5) See Korea Sociology Society, ed., *Hanguk-ui jiyeokjuui-wa jiyeok galdeung* (Regionalism and Regional Conflicts in Korea) (Seoul: [성원사](#), 1990); Korean Psychological Association, ed., *Simmihak-eseobon jiyeok galdeung* (Regional Conflicts Seen from Psychology) (Seoul: [성원사](#), 1988); Sonn Hochul, *op. cit.*, [ch. 9](#). Korea's Regionalism: Diagnosis and Prescription.
- 6) See related theses in this special edition.
- 7) Gregory Henderson, *Korea: The Politics of the Vortex* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968).
- 8) *Ibid.*, p. 5.
- 9) Donald Clark, ed., *The Kwangju Uprisings: Shadows over the Regime in South Korea* (Boulder: Westview, 1988).
- 10) [On the difference between ultimately determining factor and decisive factor, see](#) Nicos Poulantzas, *The Crisis of Dictatorship* (London: Verso, 1976), pp. 76, 86.
- 11) Bob Jessop, et al., "Authoritarian Populism, Two Nations, and Thatcherism," *New Left Review* 147 (1984): pp. 32-60.
- 12) [One of the most representative works](#), Jeong Yeon-tae, "Byeonhwa-reul gamjihan seryeokman-i [seonggonghaetdaseonggonghaetta](#)" (Change Perceiving Forces Alone [SucceededSucceeded](#)), *Iron-gwa silcheon* (이론과 실천) (Jan. 2003): pp. 11-13

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