Vote Determinants of the 16th Presidential Election in Korea[‡].

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Abstract

–Using a multi-stage vote decision model by Miller and Shanks (1996), this study analyses the effects of sociological, psychological, and rational variables on the votes of voting patterns in the 16th presidential election in Korea. It finds that the region is the most important variable in individual vote decision, followed by one's ideology and evaluation of government performance. But in the collective election outcome, ideology and issue position have givengave Roh Moo-hHyun decisive advantages for that led to his victory. It suggests that the 16th presidential election is a realigning election₂ and both regional and ideological cleavages will continue to be electoral eleavagesso in the near future.

Key words:

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Introduction

Probably no election was as dramatic as the sixteenth presidential election in December of 2002 was in Korea's electoral history. One can hardly forget Roh Moo-hHyun's Cinderella story, in which the son of a poor farmer without college a college education succeeded to become in becoming the country's most powerful man. In addition, there were many other unexpected –events and developments during the election which proved critical in deciding the –outcome.

—When—While the-opposition Grand National Party's Lee Hoi-cChang was considered a certain successor to Kim Dae-jJung as the next president in May, 2002, Roh was only one of the distant challengers to front-running RhJ-ee In-Je in the ruling Millenium Democratic Party's presidential primary. After a surprising victory in the party primary with the help of his ardent followers called Nosamo, Roh's popularity among the general public soared to above 50 percent.0% of the public supportamong the general public.—Inexplicably however, Roh began to lose his popularity and soon many MDP leaders left the party to join campaign of a third party candidate, Chung Mong-jJoon, who was considered more winnable-viable against Lee than Roh was at the time. Less than a month before the election, two of the most unprecedented events occurred—the outbreak of anti-Americanism and the formation of a unified candidacy.

Immediately after the U.S. military court found two soldiers not guilty of driving negligence that killed two Korean school girls on November 21, students and civil activists demanded revision of the_Statuse of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and apologies from President George W.. Bush. Candlelight vigils, originally organized for mourning of the tragic deaths, soon turned into anti-American demonstrations where in which tens of thousands of young people cried for the_withdrawal of the U.S. troops and denounced the-U.S. imperialism. Riding a wave of anti-Americanism, Roh Moo-hyun, a progressive nationalist, criticized the existing SOFA as unfair and promised a more equal and reciprocal relation with the U.S. under his administration, which put pro-American conservative Lee on the defensive. Almost at the same time Roh made a successful deal with Chung to unify their candidacy and

came out as a winner by polling 3% more than Chung did in a popularity test. After Chung's withdrawal from the race, Roh's popularity climbed above Lee's but had to withstand Chung's last minute defection on the eve of the election day.

Just as the election was full of surprises, so was did its voting behavior raise with many unanswered —questions: namely, Wwhy do regional cleavages remain so strong? Wwhat are the causes for sudden ideological and generational conflicts and which side do they favor? Wwhat are is the impacts of issues such as North Korea policy and economic mismanagement on the election? such as North Korea policy and economic mismanagement. In order to answer these questions and others with regard to electoral behavior, we I will first compare partisan support of the sixteenth election with that of the fifteenth election, exploring the look into effects of sociological, psychological and rational variables on the vote and I will also measure the importance of the variables in individual voting decision and in the aggregate election outcome. We I will also try to answer whether the sixteenth election will become a rule or an exception in the future.

Continuities and Changes in the Presidential Vote

-The presidential vote since democratization had been rather easy to explain because regionalism had been the only dominant predictor of the vote. No other social,—and economic, demographic, or attitudinal variables had shown any consistent effects on the votingvoting patterns with to any degree of statistical significance. But in the sixteenth election, noticeable generational and ideological cleavages appeared, although—with-regional cleavages remaineding strong.

As we can see from Table 1, which that summarizes vote differentials of major social and political groups, regional cleavages of the sixteenth election are no less strong than those of the fifteenth election were.²³ Strength, if not the existence, of

² We should note that postelection survey data by Korean Social Science Data Center have large measurement errors with regard to turnout (17%) and presidential vote (7-8%). The errors do not represent any systematic measurement biases however, and their statistical analyses yield almost the same results as those of other data such as *Joong Ang Ilbo* data.

regionalistic voting of the sixteenth election was a surprise to many who expected its weakening after retirement of the two principals, Kim Young-Sam_sam_and Kim Dae-Jungjung. Lee_(1998) and Cho_(1997) attribute regionalistic voting to the political mobilization by_of_regional leaders like the two Kims, who differed little in ideologies or policy alternatives; but this _ which was not the case in the sixteenth election. Lee and Roh are differed widely different in their ideologiesy as well as backgrounds, and neither comes came from their respective party's respective home region. Roh in fact comes from Yeoungnam, an arch-rival region of MDP's Honam region. It follows that regionalism is now unaffected by the changes of the party leadership who which created it...

During the authoritarian days, age was one of the most important basis for electoral cleavages, where in which the old and less well-educated tended to support the authoritarian government, while the young and well-educated opted for the democratic opposition. Since democratization, however, age had affected the partisan vote little because parties and candidates could not be distinguished from one another according to their itheir ideological or issue-related positions. latforms.y or issue positions.

Unlike in—what could be found in the—previous elections, the two—main presidential candidates in the sixteenth election, Lee and Roh, presented two ideologically distinct alternatives, differing probably in all policy—areas from domestic economic policy to foreign security policy. With regard to the most controversial North Korea—policy, that having to do with North Korea, Roh insisted that economic aid to the North iswas—the only policy alternative that can—could avoid war; but—however, candidate—Lee demanded a complete review of Kim Dae-jJung's conciliatory North Korea policy.

As has been the case for the last fifty years, no evidence of class voting/class votingvoting patterns taking place along class lines exists in the sixteenth election. Income and occupation are not related to the presidential vote except for the highest income bracket, that which tends to support Lee. In this sense, ideological conflicts in Korea are not caused by objective economic interests, but rather by subjective political attitudes. Vote differentials of a group (here I don't quite get your meaning do you

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mean differences WITHIN a group, or that the difference BETWEEN different groups is greater?) by types of ideology increased was twice as much high in the sixteenth election as those in the previous electionones. Among those who called themselves conservative, Lee's supporters outweighed Roh's by the 28 percent; but among the progressives Roh's supporters outweighed Lee's by the 50%.

Those who have pro-government party attachments tend to support Roh, while those with pro-opposition attachments tended to support Lee in the 16th election. But in the previous election, the pattern was exactly completely the opposite, and as those with pro-government attachments tended to support Lee. This shows that one's pro-government or pro-opposition party attachment has not measured much more than/did not count as has not measured (did not count?) much more thans-much as one's support for the government party or the opposition party; and certainly not the one's long-term psychological attachment to a party that cannot can be transmitted through across generations, as some have hypothesized (Cho, 1992). We should therefore be careful not to interpret effects of party attachment as those of the a long term psychological attachment such defined as party identification.

Table 1. Presidential Vote Differentials of Selective Groups (%)

Groups		HLee Hoi-chang-D. Kim	Lee Hoi-chang- Roh Moo-hyun
		<u>Dae-jung</u> (1997)	(2002) H. Lee-M. Roh(2002)
Age 20-29		-9.4	-43
	30-39	-5.8	-28.5
	40-49	2.8	-3.7
	50 or more	-2.3	0
Region	Seoul,	0	-20.1
	Kyunggi Gyeonggi		
	Chungcheong	-5.6	-20.1
	Honam	-84.5	-87.5
	Y <u>e</u> o <u>nun</u> gnam	47.7	22.2
Income	Lowest	-3.5	-19.2
	Lower middle	-17.8	-14.7
	Middle	-2.4	-14.3

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	Upper middle	-0.4	-25.8
	Highest	2.2	4.2
Ideology	Conservative	13	28.3
	Middle	-4.1	-12.8
	Progressive	-22.9	-49.8
Party	Pro-government	75.1	-52.5
Attachmen	Neutral	10.3	-22.7
ŧ <u>attachmen</u>			
<u>t</u>			
	Pro-opposition	-61.1	19.7

Source: Korean Social Science Data Center (1997, 2002)

A Multi-stage Vote Decision Model

-Variables affecting the vote have customarily been grouped into three categories according to their theoretical background: sociological, psychological and rational variables. Voting studies usually focus on one group of variables, showing emphasizing its their explanatory power and parsimony simplicity over the others. A multi-stage model by Miller and Shanks (1996) is one a of rare attempts to combine three groups of variables into a single model. Their This model sequentially measures the variables' effects according to the logical and temporal order of influence: first measured are the effects of socio-economic and demographic variables are measured, followed by those of the long- and mid-term psychological and attitudinal variables, and then by those of bring short—term attitudinal variables into the equation. By measuring variables' effects at each stage, the model can not only provide their unbiased total effects but also show the paths of –indirect effects which that are mediated by other variables included in the equation at the later stages.

-We can find from the regression estimates in Table 2 that, two regional

⁴ Their original multi-decision model consists of six stages, which are summarized into three stages here for the sake of simplicity without loss of theoretical rigor. See Miller and Shanks (1996, 192)

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dummy variables, those of Honam and Yeoungnam, have the greatest total effects, and half of their effects are mediated by party attachment, ideology, issue position and evaluation of government performance. The remaining half that is the unique effects of regional effects are rather perplexing considering the fact most effects of group variables on the vote, such as region, on the vote are usually mediated by psychological and attitudinal variables. One possible, though not very persuasive, candidate for explaining explanation accounting for the unique effects of region may be lie in regional consciousness, the conception of "we" and "they" in which one feels a sense of unity within his a region and competition without from those without.

The total effects of one's age upon the voting are not smallinsignificant, and most of their effects are mediated by one's ideology and security issue position. Regression coefficients and statistical significance of age variable noticeably decrease when the effects of the two mediating variables are controlled, which shows that generational conflicts in the sixteenth election are closely related to ideological and issue conflicts.

—At the second stage of voting decision-making, selfselt-identification of progressive-conservative ideology shows stronger effects upon the vote than pro-government and pro-opposition party attachment does. Most of ideological effects remain, after the effects of security issue position and evaluation of government performance are controlled. This is probably both because one's ideology is related not only to foreign policy issues but to domestic policy issue-ones as well, and in addition to the fact —that because—issue positions and evaluation of government performance are—affected by one's region and party attachment in addition to ideology.

—<u>The e</u>Effects of party attachment on the presidential vote may be considered small<u>insignificant</u>, <u>if itas long as it</u> represents one's partisan preference. We may infer from this that party voting was not as salient as candidate voting in the sixteenth election, and that ideological and issue differences between Roh and Lee were perceived by the public to be more of individual differences than of party differences.

Between the two short-term attitudinal variables, the evaluation of government performance had greater effects than security issue position had upon the vote. Roh's promise of a new kind of politics may not have been as effective as has been believed, because those who gave negative ratings to the Kim Dae-jung

government were more likely to vote for Lee.

-Among the various issues, the only issues that show statistically significant effects upon the vote are security issues those having to do with security. Social and economic issues such as women's rights and big business reforms do not show any statistically significant effects on the presidential vote. The two security issue positions of North Korea policy and relation with the U_S_ are strongly related to each other, which allows for a composite index of security issue position combining the two_ which is used here. A pro-American who are satisfied with the existing relationship with the U_S_ tended to oppose economic aid to North Korea, while a nationalist who wants wanting to alter the relationship changes in the relation with the U_S_ tended to support the such aid.

Table 2. Regression Coefficients of the Vote Determinants

	Variables in	Honam	Y <u>e</u> o u ngna	Age	Party	Ideology	Security	Government	
ı	the equation		m		Attachment		Issue	Performance	
							Position		
	Honam,	.723**	<u>416**</u>	228**					.200
	Y <u>e</u> o u ngnam								
ı	Age								
	Party	.614**	381**	219**	.242**				.235
	<u>a</u> Attachmen								
J	t added,								
	Ideology	.556**	349**	106**	<u>237**</u>	<u>331**</u>			.306
	added,								
	Security	.532**	343**	076*	.240**	.304**	.223**		.328
	Issue issue								
	<u>p</u> Position								
l	added,								
	Government	.417**	283**	.082*	.187**	.282**	.194**	<u>285**</u>	.373
	Performance								
	performance								

added,

Note: a. * = p < .05, ** = p < .01

-b. Total effects of a variable are underlined.

Source-: Korean Social Science Data Center (2002)

Importance of Attitudinal variables Variables in Individual Decision and Aggregate Outcome.

Miller and Shanks_(1996, p452) distinguish between_the importance of psychological and attitudinal variables in individual decision-making and their importance in the aggregate election outcome, that is which descides who wins and loses, winning of losing. The former represents the effects of a variable upon one's decision-making at the individual level, while the latter measures the size of its contribution to the aggregate decision of a winner. It is therefore possible that a variable is critical in one but irrelevant in the other. Suppose that one's ideological position is crucial in deciding which candidate to vote for. But if progressive voters and conservative voters are relatively equal in number, ideology would then have little effects upon the election outcome. Since the value ranges of attitudinal variables in the analysis are standardized between -1 and 1, the importance of a variable in individual decision can be measured by its standardized regression coefficients; and—its importance in the aggregate outcome can be measured by the unstandardized coefficients multiplied by the average value.⁵

As we can see from Table 3, the most important attitudinal variable in one's an individual's choice of candidate is that of ideology, followed by the evaluation/theevaluation-voter's estimation of government performance and party attachment. The least important of the four variables in individual decision-making is one's security issue position, whose importance is about half of ideology's importance that of ideology. Although their effects may not be greater than regional

⁵ Group variables such as region and age are excluded from the analysis here because they are nominal variables of which range of the value cannot be standardized like

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effects, ideology and issue position together certainly play a critical role in deciding one's an individual's presidential vote.

In deciding the aggregate election outcome, the three variables of ideology, government performance, and <u>national</u> security issue—are roughly equal in their importance. Evaluation—An evaluation of government performance and party attachments gave Lee 6% and 1% vote advantages respectively, but ideology and <u>national</u> security issue <u>positionstances</u>—gave Roh 5% and 6% advantages respectively. The illncreased importance of the security issue <u>position</u>—in the election outcome, compared with its individual importance, is <u>because—explained by of</u>—the size imbalance. 40% of the public side with the progressive nationalistic position, but only 15% side with the conservative pro-American position.

Table 3. Importance of the Attitudinal Variables

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Variables	Individual Decision	Aggregate Outcome_(%)
Ideology	334**	5.65
Party	277**	-1.04
Attachment attachment		
Security <u>Issue issue</u>	.172**	6.37
<u>p</u> Position		
Government pPerformance	.297**	-6.32

Note: ** = p < .01

Source: Korean Social Science Data Center (2002)

-During the election, <u>many</u> Korean people were surprised to find out that serious ideological and generational conflicts exist in their society. After the election, they were

other ordinal or quantitative variables.

<u>even</u> more surprised by the fact that a progressive candidate had just won the presidential election. The most surprising finding of this study is the fact that Roh won the election <u>because</u>, not in spite of, but thanks to his progressive ideology and issue position. This shows how much Korea has really changed in recent years, where a label of progressive and anti-American had been considered a curse to a presidential hopeful.

- The nNegative evaluation of the Kim Dae-jung government cost Roh about half of the gains he got-had gained from his ideology and issue position. Lee was not mistaken when he emphasized —political corruption and mismanagement of the economy by the Kim government during the campaign. The aAdvantages of a party attachment for Lee were very limited because pro-opposition identifiers were—only slightly greater in number than those who identified themselves as pro-government identifiers in number.
- The <u>I</u>ideological and issue variables can be said to have decided the outcome of the sixteenth presidential election. Although region and age may be more important in individual decision<u>-making</u>, their aggregate effects are relatively small. The greater <u>size numbers</u> of Y<u>eooungnam</u> people is canceled out by the <u>higher percentage rate (do you mean higher rate of voting? Sounds like you're comparing the personality of <u>Honam people</u>, <u>which I don't think you are, so I assume you mean higher voter turnout</u>) of _—Honam voters, and the more populous younger generation's advantages are nullified by their low electoral turnout. The positive gains by Roh from ideology and issue position outweighed his <u>negative gains losses</u> from party attachment and <u>low</u> evaluation of government performance, which provided <u>the for his margin</u> of his narrow victory.</u>

New Ideological Cleavages and Electoral Realignment

–Unlike the previous elections, the sixteenth presidential election was much more than an election of with the outcome determined by regionalism. It was also an election of rife with generational and ideological cleavages. Such anan —election is likely to follow in the near future, as ideological conflicts will be as will remain—electoral cleavages

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along with regional cleavages. along with regional cleavages The sixteenth presidential election will then then be remembered as a realigning election for bringing about about ideological cleavages to the fore, like the 13th presidential election that brought sharp regional cleavages.

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Ideological conflicts between the—generations was—were difficult to believe imagine until quite recently, as at first because Koreans people-had been known for their ideological homogeneity and conservatism. Until a few years ago the an election surveys had not even included a questionnaire measuring one's ideological position. Scholars noticed ideological and issue cleavages in recent elections,— but found them to be minor and the evidence spurious. Kang (2002) does not find enough evidence to suggest the existence of ideological cleavages, and Lee (2002) finds that one's issue position is more determined by one's partisan support than vice versa. Typically, Honam people tended to identify with the progressive side because they supported the

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Table 4. Ideological Composition of the Electorate (%)

Kim Dae-ifung government, while Yeoungnam people tended to take the conservative

Table 4. Ideological Composition of the Electorate (%)						
Туре	1997	2000	2002			
Conservatives	41.5	23.8	26.7			
Middle	22.3	46.6	32.3			
Progressives	36.2	29.6	41.1			

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Source: Korean Social Science Data Center (1997, 2000, 2002)

position because they disapprove<u>d of</u> the Kim government.

-Ideological cleavages have become became genuine for the first time in the sixteenth presidential election thanks to the growth of progressive voters and partisan conflicts over President Kim's conciliatory policy to the North, called the "sunshine policy." Table 4 shows that the ideological composition of the Korean people is has been changing in recent years and is becoming more progressive, in particular especially after 2000, influenced by the historic North-South summit in that year and the following rising popular expectation of reunification. An increase of progressive

voters made possible the appearance of a progressive candidate from a major political party in a presidential election.

- -____Issues of North Korea policy and relation with the U₂S₂ had not been reallynever been completely dormant. Korean progressive and socialist parties, which who have yet to succeed as a major party, have always concentrated more on issues of nationalism and anti-imperialism than on class issues such as rights of labor labor rights and or welfare policy. -Anti-imperialism and peaceful reunification, not the class struggle or socialist revolution, have been the dominant slogan of the radical student movement as well.
- Both dDe-radicalized nationalism and anti-imperialism—became popular among the—young people recently, aided by events that helped enhance national self-respect, such as recovery from the economic crisis, rapprochement between the two Koreas and the success of World Cup soccer match. The young Young Koreans in their twenties and thirties, without—who have no memory of war and poverty, do-no longer perceive a security threats from—North Korea as a security threat, nor appreciates the alliance with the U_S, in contrast to the old who still do both. In fact, many young people believe that President Bush's "axis of evil" approach is more responsible for the current security crisis than the—is_North Korea's nuclear program—is. Since the—relations with the North and the U_S, has been the fundamental basis of fundamental basis fundament of the—South Korea's foreign—policy, generational and ideological conflicts were bound to occur_along, with changes in the—generational formation—makeup of the society.
- The sSpread of nationalism and the emergence of generational and ideological cleavages are not entirely spontaneous. President Kim and his advisors consciously cultivated the nationalistic mood of the public so as to mobilize enough support for his favorite-cherished "sunshine policy." The sunshine This policy became a hot political issues when North Korea did not keep its promises, including the failure of Kim Jong-Il to make a promised's return visit to Seoul. The Grand National Party (GNP) has strongly criticized the policy as a failure while the MDP—has defended it as the one that will eventually lead to the country's peaceful reunification. country's peaceful reunification.

-We should not expect, however, that ideological conflicts will continue to intensify.

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Partisan conflicts over the issues of North Korea policy and relations with U.S. are likely to weaken, once the current security crisis is over in one way or anothercomes to its inevitable, albeit short-term resolution. President Roh, even thoughalthough he is an ideologue, will have to compromise and bargain with the GNP in-for control of the legislature, something that which will contribute to the weakening of ideological conflicts between the two sides.

–It may be imprudent to discuss the future of regionalism without successfully explaining its causes. But it seems very likely that regional cleavages will continue to exist, although they may change in form and strength. Competitive feelings and animosities between Yeoungnam and Honam people do not seem to have abated since the election. –Roh has gained some new support from his home provinces, BPusan and KyungnamGyeongnam, thanks to regionalism. Regional cleavages can be said to have frozen (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967), in that they have become the basis of electoral alignment without any specific policy contents.

-If anyone is to blame for regional cleavages, it is the elite class (do you mean socially, politically, or financially elite? All or some of the above?), not the general public. Political leaders like the two Kim's, as well as Roh and Lee, have always relied on the regionalist strategy, which was both effective and—efficient, when they needed popular support. Leaders have denounced regionalism only when they needed support from the hostile regions. Incumbent Dietmen have also played an important role in maintaining and reproducing regional cleavages. More than half of the congressional districts, including most of the Honam and Yeoungnam districts, are safe districts—ones because a candidate with a certain regional party's region's endorsement is expected to win in the election without much difficulty. It has been commonplace that for incumbent candidates in these districts to competitively aggressively appeal to regional loyaltiesy during the election in order to increase their chances for reelection at winning.

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⁶ <u>Lipset and Rokkan (1967) use the term "freezing" to describe a later stage of cleavage development where cleavages like religious cleavages in contemporary Europe which have been affecting the vote after they lost policy implications.</u>

Conclusion

-During the MDP primary, supporters for Roh had argued that for a candidate from Yeoungnam to be chosen because he would be better able than a candidate from another region to win a race against Lee by penetrating the Yeoungnam region than a candidate from another region would be. The strategy of the Yeoungnam candidacy, which was persuasive at the time, would not have delivered the victory because Honam votes and some Yeoungnam votes for Roh were not sufficient enough. It was the young people outside the Honam region that made the difference.

-A winning electoral coalition of Honam and the-young people may turn out to be a weak government evalition one however. Roh will probably face a very strong opposition in office because, in addition to a power struggle, Roh will also have to deal with ideological and policy struggles which his conservative predecessors had not. More importantly, his conservative opposition will consists of the old and powerful who already have de facto control the of society. Without their acquiesence acquiescence, Roh's government effectiveness will be seriously compromised. Recent confrontation between Roh and three best-selling conservative newspapers, called dubbed the "war with the press", may be only a just the beginning.

Roh may also find it difficult to maintain unity in his supporting coalition of the youth and Honam people. The young generation supports Roh for his progressive policy, while Honam people support him for his loyalty to Honam and Kim Dae-iJung, of which Roh repeatedly assured them of during the campaign. The young generation wants Roh to sever his ties with the previous administration, which turned out to be very corrupt and regionalistic; while Honam people find his progressive policy position naive and irresponsible. Satisfying one side will therefore inevitably lead to alienating the other. In his own MDP camp, a serious power struggle has already broken out between the progressive faction and the Honam faction, threatening jeopardizing the party unity.

In Korea, a democratically elected president wields a tremendous amount of power when he has popular support. But he is powerless when he loses his popularity it. Since democratization, all three presidents had been unable to carry out important policy decisions in the latter part of presidency when they lost popular

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support. A—<u>The</u> honeymoon period for Roh may end sooner than expected, for his opposition is strong and his support is—divided. It is—critical to the success of his presidency how wellthat Roh will be able to demonstrate the ability to handle the current crisis caused by North Korea's nuclear program, as well as manage political friction with the Bush administration, with aplomb and overcome—solid leadership skills. with leadership skills the current crisis caused by North Korea's nuclear program and friction with Bush administration.

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4) Lipset and Rokkan(1967) use the term "freezing" to describe a later stage of cleavage

development where cleavages like religious cleavages in contemporary

Europe which have been affecting the vote after they lost policy implications.