

**Political Significance of the 2002 Presidential Election Outcome and
Political Prospects for the Roh Administration Post-Election Period**

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1. Introduction: Main Purpose of This Paper

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This paper attempts to analyze the political significance of the 2002 presidential election outcome and casts prospects on how the major political agendas which emerged during the election campaign will unfold in the future. Comparing the 2002 presidential election with the three previous ones held in 1987, 1992 and 1997 after democratization, we find there are more differences than commonalities. The election system itself did not change, but notable differences from the past were observed in the nomination of presidential candidates, the competition structure and the election campaign. In the three presidential elections prior to 2002, competition was among multiple candidates. But the 2002 election had was a binary competition, which was achieved by forming a unified candidacy between two candidates, Roh Moo-hyun and Chung Mong-joon, before the official launch of the election campaign. The process that by which through which Roh Moo-hyun, presidential candidate of the New Millenium Democratic Party (NMDP), defeated his rival Lee Hoi-chang of the Grand National Party (GNP) who entered the race for the second time after the 1997 election running his second presidential race, and came out as the winner in the end was so dramatic that it was truly like a piece of drama spectacular and dramatic. In the Korean-style primary election,¹ newly adopted by the New Millenium Democratic Party (Democratic Party NMDP) to select its presidential candidate, Roh Moo-hyun beat Yi

1) In a rigorous sense, the NMDP's presidential candidate selection method is a combination of the existing caucus system in which the party representatives participate in selecting a candidate and the U.S. primary election system in which ordinary voters participate. I call it "Korean-style primary election" to emphasize that it was the first time in the history of Korean parties that ordinary voters participated in the selection of a presidential candidate.

Rhee In-je, ~~reverting confounding~~ most people's expectations, and got the ticket to the race. ~~Raising Riding~~ the unstoppable "Roh wind," he garnered an over 60% ~~percent~~ support rate among the public, ~~but it (which later~~ fell to around 20% ~~percent~~ by October with the graft scandals involving two sons of the then President Kim Dae-jung). Meanwhile, as Representative Chung Mong-joon announced his candidacy, ~~around 10 or so~~ NMDP ~~Representatives representatives~~ left the party, ~~pushing for a unified cooperation claiming for unification of candidacy between~~ Roh ~~and~~ Chung ~~candidacy~~. The two struck a dramatic agreement to unify candidacy, turning the election competition structure from one strong candidate (Lee ~~hoi-chang of the Grand National Party~~) vs. two less strong candidates (Roh and Chung) into a race between two strong candidates. In the three presidential elections prior to 2002, competition was among multiple candidates, while the 2002 election was a binary competition.

The process through which Roh Moo-hyun, defeated his rival Lee Hoi-chang running his second presidential race, and came out as the winner in the end was spectacular and dramatic. Roh's victory was facilitated by (The unprecedented voluntary citizens' involvement and the Internet-based campaign ~~made great impacts as well~~. Roh's fan club "~~Roh same~~Nosamo ("People who love Roh Moo-hyun)") introduced new election campaign tactics, including ~~(e-campaigning.) the Internet campaign~~. There were a number of turns and twists along the campaign— to name a few, the North Korea nuclear issue, candlelight rallies for two South Korean schoolgirls killed by a U.S. armored vehicle, Roh's election promise to move the nation's administrative capital outside of Seoul, and Chung's eleventh-hour withdrawal of his support for Roh. ~~After~~ Despite or perhaps because of all this, the election ended in Roh's victory.

The many interesting features of the 2002 presidential election— such as its enormous volatility that denied any prediction of the outcome, use of new campaign methods and the dramatic election outcome— yielded ~~varying many~~ analyses and assessments. Some argue that region-based voting weakened² ~~and signs of change began to show,~~ while others claim ~~that concentration of votes divided by regions~~

2) Gang Won-taek, "2002nyeon daetongnyeong seon-geo-wa jiyekjuui" (The 2002 Presidential Election and Regionalism) (paper presented at a seminar held by the Korean Political Science Association, Press Center, Seoul, 6 February 2003), p. 65.

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~~[division of support along region]~~regionally delineated support remained solid though it was less pronounced compared to the previous elections.³ With regard to generational cleavages, an opinion poll specialist notes differences of voting behavior between the ages of those under ~~and over 45 and 45 and~~~~those over 45~~⁴ while another expert claims that the post-Cold War generation (~~in the age bracket of~~ those in their mid twenties to early thirties) had different interests and policy preferences from the older generation regarding national unification and security and foreign relations.⁵ Meanwhile, some maintain that the progressive camp has replaced the conservative camp as the mainstream of Korean society with the unprecedented ~~[unparalleled]~~ advance of leftist forces.⁶

_____ The diverse interpretations of the presidential election result generates contrasting outlooks on the political future of the Roh ~~Administration~~administration. Some cast an optimistic view that, with Roh in power, Korean politics will break away from the old-fashioned 3-Kim style politics and establish a new political framework-~~of~~ politics.⁷ In contrast, others express concerns that President Roh ~~has to~~must induce the cooperation of the Assembly and the political parties for smooth state management, but ~~he~~ may fail to do so due to his weak political base, ~~and in this~~ which case he ~~will~~ would have to take a detour and resort to populism by mobilizing civic organizations. This paper critically analyzes these contradicting assessments of the 2002 presidential election outcome and claims made on the future of the Roh ~~Administration~~administration and attempts to provide an alternative explanation which is more systematic, comprehensive and balanced.

2. Political Significance of the 2002 Presidential Election Outcome

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³ Kim, Man-heum, "16dae daeseon-gwa jiyekjuui" (The 16th Presidential Election and Regionalism) (paper presented at a seminar held by the Institute of Korean Political Studies, Seoul National University, 28 January 2003).

⁴ An, Bu-geun, "Jijido byeonhwa-wa tupyo gyeolgwa" (Change in Support Rates and the Election Outcome) (paper presented at a seminar held by the Institute of Korean Political Studies, Seoul National University, 28 January 2003).

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Examining the views and opinions expressed on the political significance of the 2002 presidential election outcome, we find that scholars and the press hold ~~different~~ varying views and focus on ~~variant things~~ different areas. ~~Sohn Ho-cheon~~ interprets ~~argues~~ that it was a victory of Roh's ~~campaign for~~ "Let's get rid of ~~remove~~ old-style politics" campaign over Lee's ~~campaign for~~ "Let's remove ~~remove~~ the corrupt ruling forces;" campaign.⁸ Seo Ji-m~~u~~on ~~views~~ claims that the Korean people ~~chose~~ preferred Roh's proposal for new political experiments ~~that might seem uncertain~~ over Lee's ~~to make a just country through the reform~~ project of reforming ~~of~~ the existing national system.⁹ ~~Meanwhile~~ Among the others, Jeong Jin-~~young~~ yeong characterizes it as ~~putting behind a~~ "putting behind of the 3-Kim era";¹⁰ Kim Ho-gi calls it an election revolution led by people in their twenties and thirties;¹¹ and Jo Jae-~~yeou~~p calls it a shift from party politics to citizen politics.¹² In the news media, the Hankyoreh newspaper reported that "the mainstream of Korean society is changing";¹³ Chosun Ilbo wrote found a "diffusion of progressive forces" ¹⁴ and Donga Ilbo noted the "emergence of a new election culture."¹⁵ Although these assessments are valid in part, they are vague conceptually and overemphasize or exaggerate certain aspects while ignoring the others. For example, in regards to the expression of "putting behind the 3-Kim era," different people characterize 3-Kim politics differently¹⁶ and it is disputable whether ~~the 3 Kim politics~~ it will disappear with the exit of the three ~~3~~ Kims. It is rather hasty to conclude that the political practices of the three-Kim politics will go away all of a sudden as the three kims move out of the scene. ~~It is rather hasty to conclude that the political practices of the 3-Kim era will go away all of a sudden as the 3 Kims move out of the scene.~~ Despite the broad consensus that 3-Kim style politics ~~should disappear with the exit of the 3 Kims~~ should become extinct, the political circle has not yet agreed on a new framework of party politics with which to replace it. ~~This tells us that it will~~

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be a long process and take a considerable amount of time. Clearly, much more time is needed to resolve its aftermath.

~~Rise of a New-Style political leader Leadership to power Through the Increase of Civil society's Society's Political role — Role~~

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While the political parties revealed serious various limitations in the 2002 presidential election, civil society demonstrated its political capability and assisted strength in assisting a new-style political leader to ascend to power. The 2002 election outcome can be regarded as the victory of an 'open "open-minded"-minded" candidate and 'newly "newly emerging"-emerging" civil society. I deployeined these words to strike a contrast ~~them~~ with a 'narrow "narrow-minded"-minded" candidate and the 'old "old-style"-style" political circle. Albeit At the risk of oversimplification, Roh is open-minded and Lee is narrow-minded, taking into consideration considering their images, personal style and political orientations. Taking advantage Making the most of his relatively 'young' "young" age and open-minded personality, the fiftyish-Roh, in the 50s, appealed to affective young people in twenties and thirties of age (the so-called "Generation 2030") and attracted volunteer supporters like Nosamo Roh same. Unable to rely on the old-style campaign based on the party organizations due to his weak support base within the Democratic Party NMDP — and the opportunistic attitude of the party members, he made new took bold political experiments—steps such as adopting conducting the Internet campaign, allying with the People's Party for Reform (PPR), forming a unified candidacy based on the opinion polls result and distributing plastic piggy banks named "Hope" for fundraising [to get political contributions] from ordinary citizens. Meanwhile In contrast, Lee tried to appeal to young voters but it was not that successful as youngsters did not find him approachable for his came up short, largely as a result of the 'disciplinarian"-disciplinarian" image created by his austere looks and serious manners. Also, he ran the Lee also ran an Internet campaign but only in a defensive manner, regarding it only as a new technology rather than as an instrument to change the framework and practice of politics.

_____ In contrast to Roh, Lee employed a thoroughly party-based campaign strategy.

The GNP's party structure, ~~a remnant of deriving from~~ the authoritarian era, was too old and the "individual incentive-oriented" party members lacked ~~a~~ self-starting and proactive spirit, ~~compared in comparison~~ to Roh's camp. Turning the party into something like a political machine, Lee ran the campaign ~~in with~~ a tight grip ~~under his command, compared to~~ ~~whereas~~ the NMDP ~~which~~ was internally ~~very~~ divisive, ~~like "bean powder."~~ However, he failed to attract many new supporters because of the inflexible party structure and his own narrow-mindedness. This is why he never had more than 35% of ~~the~~ voters' support ~~according to opinion poll results although despite the fact that~~ he had many chances to boost his popularity ~~taking advantage on the occasions~~ of his rival's blunders and ~~the~~ corruption of people in power. ~~Lee's supporters were fixed at less than half of the electorate while anti Lee voters were divided between Roh and Chung. Roh then secured their support by unifying Chung and thereby garnered a dramatic victory in election. Then, Roh secured their support by unifying candidacy with Chung and finally garnered a dramatic victory in the election.~~

~~_____~~ The competition between the old-fashioned machine-type party and the newly emerging civil society ended in the latter's victory. ~~This is proved by the fact that Lee, who received full support from the well-ordered GNP, lost to Roh who relied on Roh-samo, the Internet and People's Action for Participation amid weak support from the NMDP. The origin of civil organizations in Korea is can be traced to student activism during the authoritarian era and the democratization movement led by religious and labor organizations, but it was after democratization in 1987 that they exercised political influence in a normal [an official] way such conventional ways such as elections.~~ Compared to ~~the~~ political parties, civil organizations have a flexible, less bureaucratic structure and ~~are comprised of~~ young, ~~passionate~~ members ~~full of passion~~ largely due to its short history. They have grown considerably after democratization and their ~~membership is increasing members are increasing in numbers~~. Evolving through competition and cooperation ~~among them~~, they have accumulated political ~~capability skill~~ through ~~such activities as~~ leading campaigns for fair and clean elections, acting as watchdogs of Representatives' legislative activities and participating in the ~~rejection and defeat~~ campaign in the 2000 general elections to ~~reject and defeat unqualified candidat~~ prevent the parties from nominating "unfit" candidates and then ~~to defeat those who were nonetheless nominated to run in the elections.~~ ~~clean up~~

nomination structures.

_____ The following factors seem to have been working ~~for-in~~ civic organizations' favor ~~to outperform the political parties~~ in the 2002 presidential election. First, civic organizations could participate in the election campaign at low costs with the widespread and wide use of the Internet, ~~which was~~ made possible by the rapid ~~progress of~~ informatization in Korean society. Second, the younger generation electorate that played a leading role in the civic organizations' election campaign gained confidence and interest in collective action after their wildly enthusiastic support seemed to engender the miraculous success of their team in the 2002 World Cup. ~~massive enthusiastic cheering made happen the miracle of the Korea team entering the quarterfinals in the 2002 World Cup Soccer event held in Korea and Japan.~~ The candlelight rallies held in memory of two middle-middle-school girls killed by a U.S. military vehicle during the election campaign period would not have been possible without ~~the-that~~ collective cheering experience ~~they had in the World Cup.~~ Third, the Korean-style primary election introduced by the NMDP raised the interests and participation of civil society. In contrast to his own party's lukewarm response, ~~Roh same's~~ Nosamo's role was critical in pulling out to Roh's victory by in its giving whole-hearted support throughout the campaign, ~~which was quite contrasting with his own party;~~ on-It was by grace of this sustenance that he ~~this basis~~ could ~~he~~ enter and finish the race despite the extreme divisiveness in the party. When Roh ran quickly out of favor with the public in the middle stage of the campaign, many NMDP politicians withdrew their support or simply left the party opportunistically, but ~~Roh same~~ Nosamo members and volunteer supporters defended ~~[stuck to]~~ him persistently.¹⁷ If the NMDP's new conventional candidate selection system stayed, ~~which required only party members and representatives' participation,~~ instead of adopting the new primary election system, had not brought new volunteer supporters to defending Roh's candidacy remained in place, the NMDP presidential candidate, he could not have survived ~~would have had to suffered even more.~~

_____ Yet civil society revealed its own limits by pulling out mobilizing the participation of only a small number of avid supporters instead of a broad-based of ordinary voters. These se limitations were reflected in the low turnout on the election day among youth

the younger electorate despite ~~young volunteers' Internet campaign to vote~~ Internet voting campaigns. Although voluntary participants ~~had a strong preference and passion~~ were firm and passionate, they were relatively very small in number ~~compared to the whole electorate~~, so that a large part of the civil society showed skepticism and concern with their activities. However, the past election result shows that when a small minority with ~~a~~ strong political preferences competes with a majority with ~~a~~ weak political preferences, the former has advantage over the latter.

2) ~~Persistence of region~~ Region-based Based Voting Behavior along with the Emergence of Generational Cleavage

In the last election, region-based voting behavior persisted and significant generational differences in voting ~~occurred~~ came to light. Gross differences in voters' support for the presidential candidates between Kyungsang-Yeongnam region (Gyeongsangbuk-do and Gyeongsangnam-do provinces) and Honam region (Chollabuk-do and Chollanam-do provinces) ~~Jolla Provinces~~ were repeated again, ~~which was a~~ dominant tendency ~~that continued~~ since democratization. Clear generational differences were also observed in that most people in their twenties and thirties picked Roh whereas a great majority of people ~~of~~ 50 and older voted for Lee.

Let us first analyze region-based voting behavior. Roh gained a predominant majority of votes in Gwangju City and Chollabuk-do and Chollanam-do provinces ~~Jeonnam and Jeonbuk Provinces~~ (95.2%, 93.64% and 93.46%, respectively), while Lee got a majority of ~~the~~ votes in Busan City, Gyeongsangbuk-do, Kyungnam Province, Daegu City, and Gyeongsangnam-do and Kyungbuk Province (66.7%, 67.5%, 77.8% and 67.5%, respectively). In other words, regional competition between Kyungsang and Jolla provinces Yeongnam and Honam regions haunted the last election with big margins ~~out an exception~~. ~~In the 1997 presidential election, Kim Dae-jung gained~~ garnered 92.0% of the votes in the Jolla Honam region and Lee Hoi-chang did captured 58.0% of the votes in the Kyungsang-Yeongnam region. This time again, Roh had a landslide victory in Jolla with 91.6% of vote counts, while Lee got 67.9% of votes in Kyungsang. ~~In Daejeon City and Choongnam and Choongbuk~~

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~~Provinces~~ ~~Chungcheongnam-do~~ and ~~Chungcheongbuk-do~~ provinces, Roh secured 55.1%, 52.2% and 50.4%, respectively, beating Lee, in all the three areas who got 39.8%, 41.2% and 42.9%, respectively. Despite Lee's emphasis of his ~~the fact that Lee emphasized his ties to the~~ ~~Choongchung~~ ~~Chungcheong~~ region as (his hometown is Yesan, ~~Chungcheongnam-do~~ ~~oongnam p~~ Province), Roh got 250,000 more votes than his rival by making an election promise to transfer the nation's administrative capital to the ~~Choongchung~~ ~~Chungcheong~~ region. In the end, the votes were divided between the East and the West — which was dubbed "Lee got the East and Roh got the West" — ~~by such that Lee winning won in Gangwon and~~ ~~Kyungsang~~ ~~Provinces~~ ~~Yeongnam~~ region, and Roh in Seoul, Incheon, ~~Gyeonggi-do~~, ~~Choongchung~~ ~~Chungcheong~~, ~~Honam~~ ~~Jolla~~ and ~~Jeju-do~~ Provinces. —

— Before the election, some predicted that region-based voting might abate because the GNP and the NMDP representing ~~Yeongnam~~ ~~Kyungsang~~ and ~~Honam~~ ~~Jolla~~ ~~Provinces~~ regions, respectively, nominated an outsider (one who is not from the region) — as their presidential candidates. But that prediction was ~~disproved~~ ~~overshadowed~~ ~~contradicted~~ by the election outcome. ~~[But the election outcome put them to shame.]~~ ~~How come~~ Why did voters in each region ~~gave award~~ a landslide victory to an outsider? If the regionalism of the 3-Kim era was an affective sort ~~that in which~~ voters supported their region's representatives ~~gave avid support to an insider~~, that of the 2002 election was a 'strategic' — "strategic" one. ~~Yeongnam and Honam~~ ~~Kyungsang and Jolla~~ voters cast their votes strategically for their own region-based parties ~~although the presidential candidates were not from their regions~~ in order to prevent ~~their rival~~ ~~the rival regional~~ party from grabbing power, ~~despite the fact that the presidential candidates were not from their regions.~~

— ~~Scholars have made diverse analyses of political orientations of voters~~ ~~those who cast vote~~ region-based votes. Region-based political orientations may occur for ~~as a result of many factors:~~ (i) attachment to one's hometown; (ii) inclination to support a politician from one's own region [a politician of the same origin]; (iii) inclination to support a party which represents one's origin; (iv) psychological inclination to ~~hate~~ ~~resent~~ a certain region; and (v) tendency to give more emphasis to regional issues than

national issues.¹⁸ Which of the five political orientations guide region-based voting? Jo Gi-sook₂ endorses (iii),₂ identifying saying it is party-oriented voting, whereas Yi Jeong bok chooses (ii),₂ arguing that most voters do not have party identification affiliations but cast votes according to personality.¹⁹ and cast vote personality-oriented. Looking back to the 2002 election results,₂ voters did not cast vote to a candidate of the same origin as they did in the 3 Kim era out of affective regionalism, or stuck to personality oriented voting as Yi Jeong bok said it appears that neither of these readings is accurate. Contrary to Jo Gi-sook's suk's claim, the region-based voting in the 2002 election did not appear to be was not solely party-oriented; in fact, for a wide spectrum of regionalist sentiments were was present. In Busan and Kyungnam Gyeongsangnam-do pProvince, a significant number of voters had (iii) amid a strong tendency of (iii). In HonamJolla Provinces region and Daegu and Kyungbuk PGyeongsangbuk-do province, many were of (iii) and (iv). Meanwhile, (v) seemed to be strong in Choongchung ProvincesChungcheong region. Future investigation of the nature of region-based voting behavior must examine how the above five political orientations are distributedoperate in Korean society. Such an analysis will generate findings that are essential to more accurately predicting possible change of region-based voting behavior. If regional voting is based mainly on (iii), a nationwide increase in the of representativeness of the NMDP and the GNP will contribute to reducing regionalism. But if it is based on (iv), there is little possibility for it. [it is very unlikely.] (this whole system of roman numerals is extremely confusing and distracting... no clear solution but to re-write everything.)

_____ A distinct feature in the 2002 election concerning choice of support was generational variance. In the post-election Aexit polls, clear differences in voting behavior were observed along the dimension lines of age; a predominant majority of people in their twenties and thirties (Generation 2030) voted for Roh,₂ whereas a great majority of people of 50 and older chose Lee. Generation 2030,₂ who accounted for 48% of all voters,₂ is believed to have played a critical role in Roh's victory. The exit poll results demonstrated clear generational gaps in choice of support: the support rate for

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Roh and Lee was 62.1% and 31.7%, respectively, in the 20-29 age bracket; 59.3% vs. 33.9%, ~~in the ages of among those~~ 30-39; and 39.8% vs. 58.3% among people of 50 and older.²⁰ It was very close in ~~the~~ 40-49 ~~range~~ with 47.4% vs. 48.7%. Generation 2030 seemed to express their aspiration for new politics in political action. With the advent of ~~the~~ information society and ~~the~~ spread of globalization, they refuse authoritarianism and collectivism and prefer liberalism and individualism, being discontented with the existing political order and the mainstream society. Their sympathy with abolishing old-style politics, which was Roh's catch phrase during his campaign, ~~resulted in polarizing results along generations~~~~ending~~~~ended with results polarized along generational lines~~. These~~y~~ are the people who led street cheering ~~in during~~ the World Cup ~~event~~, rallied in mourning for ~~the~~ two schoolgirls ~~killed by a U.S. military vehicle~~ and participated in candlelight demonstrations calling for ~~the~~ revision of the SOFA. One thing to note in relation to generational variance is that there were no generational differences among ~~Jolla-Honam region~~ voters.²¹ ~~This means that region~~~~Regional biases, it seems, were~~ ~~was~~ a stronger factor than generational ~~differences~~ in choosing the candidate in that region ~~alone~~.

~~3) Significant increase~~~~Increase of the voters'~~~~the Voters'~~ ~~progressive~~~~Progressive political~~
~~Political attitudes~~~~Attitudes~~

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The 2002 presidential election expanded ~~to some degrees~~ the ideological spectrum of predominantly conservative Korean politics and ~~made~~~~saw~~ the progressive camp of the civil society gain a stronger voice than ever before. The presidential candidate of the Democratic Labor Party (DLP), ~~Gwon-Kwon~~ Young-g~~hil~~, a long-time leader of the progressive party movement, participated in the television debate with two other candidates from major parties for the first time since its foundation. His appearance in the debates was ~~made possible~~ ~~as by the fact that~~ his party received government support funds ~~by obtaining~~~~when it garnered~~ over ~~the minimum~~ 5% of votes in the 2002 local government elections. In Korea, workers and farmers are not represented in high-ranking public office ~~despite their high account for the electorate~~~~even though~~

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~~they make up a significant part of the electorate~~, so they have been ~~isolated-ignored~~ ~~in~~ party politics and elections. The political circle was criticized ~~as it remained for remaining~~ very ~~—conservative~~ ~~although—while~~ Korean society diversified with industrialization and informatization. The DLP candidate was expected to get at least 7-8% of all cast votes, but he did not. Some believed that as Chung announced ~~to withdraw his~~ ~~the withdrawal of his~~ support for Roh the night before the election day, progressive voters chose Roh instead of ~~Gwon-Kwon~~ in order to prevent the conservative Lee from winning the election.²² Although the base of the progressive party ~~has~~ increased a great deal ~~from the past~~, ~~voters cast~~ votes are ~~—cast~~ strategically ~~than based on ideology rather than ideologically~~, implying that the party has a long way to go.

~~—(this paragraph starts with a premise—that progressive forces have gained strength—that is totally undermined with the final claim that people do not vote ideologically)~~

~~This kind of~~ ~~Such~~ limitations existed in progressive voters' political orientations as well. Progressive voters displayed a progressive orientation on such issues as ~~relations with North Korea, national defense, unification, foreign relations and national issues (specifically, aid to North Korea, revision of the National Security Law, and diplomatic relations with the United States, etc.)~~, but they were conservative as far as social and economic issues were concerned.²³ ~~Things—Topics~~ that were once regarded as ~~politically~~ dangerous, or ~~tabooed~~— such as anti-U.S. sentiments, withdrawal of the U.S. military from the peninsula and revision of the National Security Law— were ~~shattered~~ ~~broached~~ in the 2002 presidential election. Emphasis on national security was attacked as a "remnant of Cold-War mentality," and claim for mutual cooperation between Korea and the U.S. ~~was-were~~ criticized as being "subservient to a powerful nation." ~~[toadyism]~~ Anti-U.S. sentiments ran high among ordinary citizens as candlelight rallies were held in memory of ~~the~~ two schoolgirls killed by a U.S. armored vehicle and the SOFA issue surfaced during the election campaign period. Even Lee Hoi-chang, who represented the conservative forces, kept pace with the anti-U.S. sentiments by demanding U.S. President Bush to "apologize in person" and ~~calling for~~ the revision of

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the SOFA. ~~Meanwhile~~ ~~However, while,~~ a great majority of young voters held progressive foreign policy attitudes ~~as to foreign relations~~ (such as ~~whether to continue aid~~ support for continued aid to North Korea despite the nuclear issue and ~~to abolish~~ the abolishment of the National Security Law), ~~but~~ they were lukewarm with ~~chaebol-jaebol~~ reform and an increase of economic equality. The high popularity of ~~Chung among youngsters, who is a son of the founder of Hyundai Group,~~ who is a son of the founder of Hyundai Group, among the young, ~~was an~~ gave evidence to this tendency.

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Two factors that ~~helped~~ boosted progressive attitudes ~~increase~~ in the past election were the increased role played by the young generation in the informatization era and the intense conflicts ~~in the society that arose in~~ Korean society over the North Korea issue under the Kim Dae-jung ~~Administration~~ administration. Compared to the older generation, Generation 2030 ~~tends to be~~ is affective, individualistic, liberalistic and post-materialistic in its political orientations. Unlike the older generation accustomed to decile scale thinking, Generation 2030 is familiar with the binary scale of the digital era and tends to see things in black and white. ~~(the comparison is both too highly metaphorical and overly generalized)~~ This seemed to have made them see things in an oversimplified way and affected their political decisions and actions. As this group, which represented nearly half of the electorate, gave almost unilateral support to a progressive candidate, conservative attitudes weakened naturally. When conservative and progressive civic organizations collided over the Kim Dae-jung ~~Administration's~~ administration's North Korea policy during the election period, progressive organizations garnered stronger public support, partly aided by the ~~incident of two schoolgirls killed by a U.S. army vehicle~~ death of the two schoolgirls.

~~4) Emergence of a new~~ New election ~~Election campaign~~ Campaign style ~~Style~~

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One last thing to note is the rise of a new election campaign style in the 2002 presidential election. The use of mass media ~~for~~ in elections began in the 1997 presidential election in Korea. In the 2002 election, not only traditional mass media (television and newspapers) but also on-line tools (the Internet and mobile phones) were used ~~for election campaign~~ campaigning. Netizens ~~had~~ conducted active

discussions ~~on election~~ anonymously on the Internet, had two-way electronic conversations, making two-way communications and gathered with like-minded people for off-line meetings. On-line discussion and debate was actually more active than that conducted by the parties themselves and activities were going on more actively than those of political parties. Digital media competed against the conventional media, displaying its enormous political influence on the younger generation. While newspapers and broadcasters ~~were skimpy about representing the voice of youth and tended not to represent the voices of the young or the~~ disadvantaged, the new media gave them opportunities to share opinions and ~~deploy~~ organize collective actions. ~~Thereby~~ Consequently, the long-standing practices of buying votes ~~with money, tours and entertainment~~ through various means and mobilizing paid supporters for large-scale public stumps reduced noticeably while media and on-line communications increased in importance. This change in ~~the~~ election campaign methods reflects changes occurring in Korean society: As voters' awareness [consciousness] is upgraded enriched with the progress of informatization, democratization and globalization, the use of media becomes more effective than that of party ~~organizations~~ organized activities.

Recognizing this importancereality, all ~~the~~ three candidates who appeared in the joint TV debates prepared themselves thoroughly for the events and competed fiercely to ~~put broadcast~~ their PR materials on television and in newspapers. The two major parties made enormous efforts ~~for in the~~ media campaign and the figures show this: 40 30 runs of TV commercials, 70 prints on newspapers ads and 3 TV debate sessions.²⁴ According to ~~the documents~~ statements on the use of election funds submitted by ~~the~~ each party's election headquarters to Voter's Solidarity for the 2002 Presidential Election, over half of the election funds were spent on media, including production of television commercials and homepage maintenance.²⁵ In contrast, stumping expenses took up only one-tenth of ~~the entire cost~~ total expenses. ~~Naturally~~ Presumably, illegal campaign practices such as ~~paying money~~ buying and ~~entertainingment~~ for votes reduced while the likelihood of creating a transparent, clean election culture increased.

The media and Internet-based election campaign produced some negative as well

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as positive effects. It reinforced the tendency of choosing candidates based on image rather than policy, ~~lines~~—as the candidates were not effective ~~in in~~ ~~getting communicating~~ their messages ~~across for because they~~ ~~lacked of strong~~ debate skills. ~~Besides~~ ~~Further~~, party ~~organizations activities~~ weakened as the media and volunteer supporters' organizations dominated the election. ~~Particularly~~ ~~On another level~~, ~~the amount of anonymous verbal abuse in~~ ~~spewed forth in chat rooms and on-line boards presented serious barriers to Internet space becoming a truly public sphere.~~ ~~on-line communications revealed some serious barriers to become a true public sphere because of indiscriminate verbal abuse made on anonymity in the Internet space.~~

~~3. Political Prospects of for the Post-Election Period: The Future of the Roh Administration's Major Political Agendas~~

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Now I would like to discuss how the major political agendas that emerged in the 2002 presidential election will play out in the coming years and, particularly, how the Roh ~~Administration administration~~ is likely to handle them. ~~and Two months have passed since President Roh Moo-hyun took office and but even before that,~~ ~~the Presidential Transition Committee [Presidency Takeover Committee]~~ ~~named the new administration 'Participatory "Participatory Government" Government'~~ and announced ~~12 a major 12 point~~ national agendas based on election promises. ~~26 Two months have passed since President Roh Moo-hyun took office, y~~ Yet it is still not easy to ~~figure out the directions of the Roh Administration~~ ~~cast an outlook on~~ ~~forecast what will happen in the future.~~ In Korea party politics is not institutionalized but formless and fluid. ~~Because it is common that for major existing parties to disband all of a sudden~~ ~~suddenly and for new parties are formed to form,~~ ~~casting a political outlook futures requires a lot of imagination.~~ For an example, ~~while there were words~~ ~~was talk~~ of establishing a new party in the ruling NMDP, to which Roh belongs, ~~but it submerged~~ ~~the impetus seems to have weekend.~~ ~~The unconsolidated party structure makes it really difficult to expect what will happen.~~ Despite the difficulties, however, I would like to attempt to foresee how the several impending political issues will play

out in the future.

~~1) The issue-Issue of how-How to effectively-Effectively deal-Deal with the current-Current divided-Divided government-Government~~

서식 있음

Of the various political conditions that plague President Roh, the divided government is the most cumbersome ~~one~~. The NMDP, ~~to-to~~ which Roh ~~belongs-belongs~~, is the second largest party in the Assembly. ~~and-However~~, the largest party, the GNP, has ~~the~~ majority ~~of~~ seats, so he cannot govern smoothly without ~~the-GNP's~~ cooperation. The divided government is a new political phenomenon in Korea that appeared after democratization and all Presidents inaugurated after democratization ~~experienced~~ ~~have had to deal with it.~~²⁷ ~~N- But it has taken various forms and past Presidents have handled it in different ways. But some divergences existed in the form of divided government and the Presidents reacted differently.~~

~~In During the Roh Tae-woo Administration, the ruling Democratic Justice Party (DJP) became the largest party in the 1988 parliamentary elections, but the DJP failed to secure more than half of the Assembly seats, creating a divided government for the first time in the history of Korean Korea's history of constitutional government. Under the divided government structure, three opposition parties allied and put the President and the ruling party into political quagmires by holding Assembly hearings to investigate, for instance, the Gwangju Democratization Movement and the corruption and irregularities of the preceding Chon Doo-hwan Administration. Although the President changed transformed the divided government into a unified one by merging three parties in 1990, he had difficulties running it as a result of for constant conflicts in the newly newly formed ruling party and the defiance of the opposition parties and anti-government forces outside the Assembly. Succeeding President Kim Young-sam started with a unified government when he took office, but later had a divided government, failing to secure half of the Assembly seats in the 1996 general elections. Right after the general elections, Kim created a unified government by bringing in several independent Assemblymen and some affiliated with the opposition parties, but~~

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~~this invited severe resistance from the opposition parties, causing troubles to the President and brought upon the President a series of difficulties.~~

~~— In the 1997 presidential election, Kim Dae-jung allied with Kim Jong-pil's United Liberal Democrats (ULD) and won the election, but his party, National Congress for New Politics (NCNP), held less than half of the Assembly seats even including with the ULD seats. In the Roh Tae-woo and Kim Young-sam Administrations, the ruling party was the largest party, though not securing half of the though they failed to secure a majority of Assembly seats. In the Kim Dae-joong-jung Government, the ruling his party was only the second largest and was riddled with political conflicts, particularly, in the initial stage of his governance leadership as it was the first time in Korean history that an opposition party took had taken power. Unable to get the Assembly's approval on the nomination of his first Prime Minister, President Kim had to be satisfied with an acting Prime Minister for three months. In the end, he took away expelled some Representatives from the main opposition party to in order to have create a unified government. Angered by this, the opposition parties left the Assembly and struggled outside its halls, causing engendering political impasses. As seen in these examples, every no President taking that has taken office after democratization could not has been able to govern effectively in a divided government and or created an effective unified government through artificial reshuffle of the political circle through reshuffling, but it did not help much as they were faced with the fierce resistance of the opposition parties, of course, did nothing to help them.~~

~~— When President Roh Moo-hyun won the election, many predicted that he would face difficulties in running the divided government as given that the opposition GNP is makes up a majority bloc in the Assembly. Reminded of previous political standoffs created as the Presidents tried to take control of the Assembly and the opposition parties mounted struggle outside the Assembly, people thought President Roh would take a similar path have a similar fate. Such negative predictions were further supported with the GNP's criticism of Roh as a "leftist." As the conservative opposition GNP, a majority party in Parliament, criticizes Roh as a 'leftist,' they believed that the President would have a rough relationship with Parliament. Despite those pessimistic predictions, however, Roh has managed the divided government relatively effectively for the past 2 months as President-elect and as President by~~

~~regarding treating~~ the Assembly and the opposition parties as political partners and ~~exerting working~~ to obtain their collaboration. Examples of this are the passage of the ~~Presidency Presidential Takeover Transition~~ Committee Law Act, ~~the~~ appointment of a Special Prosecutor to investigate secret money transmissions to North Korea and ~~gaining acquisition of~~ the Assembly's agreement to the proposal to send troops to Iraq. Before inauguration, the President-elect visited the GNP headquarters and met with the GNP Chairman Seo Cheong-won to seek the majority party's support ~~with gettingfor passing~~ the ~~Presidential Transition Committee Act~~ ~~Presidency Takeover Committee Act~~ through the Assembly and ~~cleared-clearing~~ the way to appoint a Prime Minister with the Assembly's approval before his inauguration. Upon taking office, the President did not veto the proposal to appoint a Special Prosecutor to investigate secret remissions of money to North Korea, ~~an issue that which~~ brought out intense confrontations between the ruling and opposition parties, ~~and made it into effectbut rather helped to actualize it~~. This ~~action~~ invited severe opposition from his own party, but it prevented expected ~~extreme struggle from disastrous conflict with~~ the GNP. Regarding the movement to send troops to Iraq, Representatives crossed party lines to give support or express opposition. ~~This~~ While this cross-voting is ~~desirable supposed to be a common phenomenon~~ in a ~~presidency-presidential~~ system, ~~though it may not be it is not so~~ in a cabinet system. In a ~~presidency-presidential~~ system, Representatives vote ~~not by the dictates of their party line but~~ according to ~~his-their~~ beliefs and let their electorates judge their actions ~~instead of being dictated by the party's decision~~. In other words, the Assembly in the ~~presidency-presidential~~ system should not be a space of struggle between the ruling and opposition parties but operate as a transformative legislature by translating the public's ~~political demands needs~~ into ~~government~~ policies. However, in Korea the Assembly has been mired in the former and does not very actively perform the latter role. ²⁸

____ In Roh's presidency so far, the relations between the President and the Assembly have taken a different shape from the past, which can be explained by several factors. First, because the NMDP already introduced a few new ~~measuresystems~~ to ~~control the abuse of pprevent the vices of an 'imperial' p~~ ~~residential powery~~ (including separation between the party and the government), ~~President Roh can not easily~~

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~~control the Assembly through his party.~~ Roh is not ~~President head of the ruling party~~ but only a party member and thus, ~~he cannot easily control the Assembly through his party.~~ After President Kim Dae-jung withdrew as ~~President leader~~ of the NMDP toward the end of his term, the NMDP made it official that President of the nation cannot ~~hold the post be President leader~~ of the party ~~presidency, in order to eliminate the evils of imperial presidency and save the party out of the President's grip.~~ Therefore, President Roh ~~did did~~ not try to ~~take over control~~ his party ~~presidency in order to control and~~ the Assembly ~~by becoming party President leader;~~ instead, he made ~~several occasions personal visits~~ to ~~consult with~~ Representatives and members of the ruling and opposition parties or invited them to Cheong Wa Dae (the Blue House) to solicit collaboration. Second, President Roh is younger than the 3 Kims, has a shorter political career (serving only ~~one-and-half 2~~ terms in the Assembly), and lacks charisma, political disciples and political funds. All these contribute to the changing Assembly-President relations. His apparent respect for the Assembly may come from his relatively short stint with it; since he joined a political party in the 1988 general elections, he was elected twice and has seen many senior Representatives with an extended career in politics. Finally, President Roh thinks that he should not create ~~an~~ ~~image~~ ~~the impression~~ that he is in fight with the Assembly because of the ~~overriding atmosphere at~~ ~~consensus during~~ the presidential election that old-fashioned 3-Kim style politics must be replaced with new style politics. In spite of these factors, however, ~~the~~ tradition dies hard ~~that and~~ both the political community and the public ~~continue to~~ want to delegate important political decisions to the President, ~~so such that~~ the President ~~must bear political burden to meet the people's demands~~ ~~has retains immense~~ ~~political power.~~ This makes us ~~shy to say~~ ~~wary about claiming~~ that the institutional arrangements are in place ~~that which~~ ~~make ensure that~~ the President and the Assembly cooperate for state management in the divided government. Because President Roh has a stronger support base in civil society than in the political community composed of the Assembly and the parties, he may detour ~~around~~ the political circle if it does not cooperate.

~~-2) The issue~~ ~~Issue of how~~ ~~How to carry~~ ~~Carry out~~ ~~political~~ ~~Political reform~~ ~~Reform~~

서식 있음

Discussion of specific mechanisms of political reform requires a lot of space, so here I would like to examine ~~the dilemmas of~~ President Roh's dilemma in pushing ahead with the reform.²⁹ In the ~~presidential~~ election voters sent a strong message to do away with old style politics and install a new framework of party politics~~establish new style politics~~a new idiom, so he cannot afford to neglect this mission. Not only ~~the voters'~~ demands but also the political reality pressures him to go ahead with political reforms. As the 3-Kim style political cartel—based on regionalism, political charisma and a ~~political~~ machine-like political party—is going to disappear~~was crushed in the last presidential~~voted out of the election, Roh has a practical agenda to create a new framework of politics to fill the political vacuum. He needs to strive enact institutional reforms to achieve political pluralism by breaking the institutions and practices that helped maintain an oligarchical political market and altering change it into a free-competition political market.

____ Roh faces three major difficulties in pushing the political reform. First, it is not easy to form a national consensus on the a new political framework which replace to replace —3-Kim style politics. Few citizens and politicians oppose eliminating the "old-style oligarchical politics maintained by the so-called 3 Kims," but they hold different ideas on about what would constitute such a new politics. For example, there are many views on how to resolve the problems of the current presidential system, ~~there are many views~~ such as creating a power-shared presidential system, revising the constitution to allow two terms of 4-year terms for Ppresidency, and adopting a cabinet system. Second, even if President Roh prepares reform plans to introduce new style politics, he is expected to encounter difficulties working it out. ~~The P~~political groups benefitting benefiting from the existing political system will defy vehemently certainly militiate against the reform. To cite an example, the current local electoral-district party system, which permits political monopoly of the headchief of local electoral-districts, is a remnant of the authoritarian era. But any move to abolish it has been met with fierce opposition from the headchiefs in both Kyungsang Yeongnam and Jolla-Honam regions, baffling stiffling party reform efforts. With regionalism prevailing regional biases in effect, local electoral-district headchiefs of the KyungsangYeongnam-based GNP and the JollaHonam-based NMDP can get a

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~~ticket~~ easily get tickets to the National Assembly ~~easily~~, so they desperately oppose any attempt to revamp the current local electoral district ~~chief~~ system.

____ One last thing to point out is how the President should overcome the difficulties of progressive political reform. He cannot accomplish political reform by resorting to power through force, for he is not a dictator nor is Korea an authoritarian regime; for he is not an authoritarian leader who took power through a coup and thus he must do it gradually by seeking national consensus and agreement ~~of the~~ in political circles. But the effects of political reform are not felt unless it is made comprehensively. If gradual reform is attempted, it will be difficult to obtain the public's ~~support~~ support, as it will generate little visible given that such reform does not generate easily palpable effects. Let me give you an example. Political fund reform furnishes a clear illustration. Political fund reform While political fund reform ~~it~~ is essential for party reform but it is not easy to reform ~~the two~~ both areas at the same time. So if party reform is attempted without reforming the political fund system, the effects of reform cannot be anticipated. To cite a specific case, in 1994, there was a time when ~~government subsidy national treasury~~ funds to parties were raised considerably to a considerable degree, on the excuse of eliminating ~~ostensibly to eliminate~~ illegal political funds without democratizing party structure first. Then, the chairman of a party used the government funds ~~like private money~~ privately and turned the party into something like a political machine. Political reform must be made in a comprehensive manner to generate synergy effects among various political institutions ~~systems~~. However, as the new administration will have a difficult time trying to reform ~~even in an~~ one area, let alone seeking a comprehensive reform, ~~I am afraid~~ it unfortunately appears as though the reform efforts may not produce any visible effects.

~~3. The issue~~ Issue of how ~~How to forge~~ Forge national ~~National integration~~ Integration through resolving ~~Resolving the old and new social~~ Social conflicts ~~Conflicts~~

서식 있음

In addition to political reform, the Roh ~~Administration~~ administration has a political agenda to overcome social conflicts— including regional conflicts and labor-management conflicts) which have been the ~~biggest~~ greatest barrier to the development of Korean society and politics since democratization— and to forge

national integration by resolving ideological and generational conflicts which emerged newly in the 2002 election. Let us look at regional conflicts first. In the 2002 election, ~~region based voting behavior was pronounced that~~ a predominant majority of voters in the Kyungsang-Yeongnam region cast votes for the presidential candidate of the KyungsangYeongnam-based GNP while voters in the Jolla-Honam region gave unilateral support to the candidate of the JollaHonam-based NMDP. ~~Regionalism has gripped Korean politics for the past 15 years since democratization propelling intense political conflicts.~~ The previous three administrations of Roh Tae-woo, Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung made various efforts to overcome regional conflicts but ~~had made~~ no visible ~~outcomes in roads.~~ Expectations for Roh Moo-hyun in this area ~~is are~~ particularly high ~~because of his consistent actions to given his track record for efforts to~~ abolish regionalism during his political career. He entered the 2000 general elections as an NMDP candidate in Busan, a GNP stronghold, advocating ~~"drive out regionalism"~~ an end to regionalism and lost. After this, his fan club Roh same Nosamo was created on the Internet space. ~~It was his the fourth race for public office in which he ran shouting anti-regionalism and lost. When President Roh Tae-woo merged three parties in 1990, he Roh Moo-hyun left the Unification Democratic Party and established a new Democratic Party advocating post-regionalism. In the 1992 general elections, he made his bid in Busan and lost. In 1995 he entered the race for Busan Mayor and lost again. At that time, Busan was a stronghold of the then President Kim Young-sam's forces which initiated in the merging of three parties, so his efforts to destroy regionalism turned out vain. In the 1996 general elections he made his bid as a Democratic Party candidate in Jongno, Seoul and was rebuffed with another failure. In 1997 he joined the NCNP created by Kim Dae-jung and became a non-Jolla-Honam member in the Jolla based party. But finally, these political setbacks helped him gain a landslide victory in the Jolla-Honam region in the 2002 presidential election.~~

____ President Roh faces three dilemmas with regard to regionalism. First, he won the race ~~with predominant [almost unanimous]~~ with the near unanimous support of Jolla Honam voters; ~~but however,~~ if he becomes a hostage of that region during his presidency, he ~~cannot will not be able to~~ overcome regional conflicts insofar as people in other regions who are anti-Jolla-Honam will not back him. Meanwhile, Jolla-Honam

voters and politicians are ~~asking him strongly~~ making strong petitions to him to represent their ~~interests~~ interests, as their votes were critical in his victory.³⁰ As Roh has no stable political support base other than the Jolla-Honam region, he is pressured under pressure to respond to their demands. But the more receptive he is to the demands, the more difficult it will prove for him to secure support in other regions. Therefore, the question of whether he can overcome regional conflicts ~~or not~~ depends on how he resolves this ~~dilemma~~ particular problem. Second, in order for his NMDP to become more than a regional party, he ~~should~~ needs to weaken the power of ~~strong-voiced~~ powerful Jolla-Honam politicians in the party and bolster those from other regions. But as Honam Jolla politicians are strongly ~~against it~~ opposed to any such action, he cannot change the NMDP into a national party or expand his power base beyond Jolla-Honam. GNP politicians from the Kyungsang-Yeongnam region and NMDP politicians from the Jolla-Honam region who benefit from the current regionalism want to ~~stick to~~ preserve the current political system, making it even more difficult to ~~attempt a~~ enact political reform. ~~One more thing to think about~~ An additional point of consideration is that new forms of regional conflicts may arise in the process of putting into action his election promise to ~~relocate~~ transfer the nation's administrative capital in to the Choongchung-Chungcheong region. Politicians and voters outside of Choongchung Chungcheong, especially, those in Seoul and Gyeonggi-do pprovince, are ~~against it as~~ opposed, given the fact they are more likely to suffer than benefit from ~~it~~ the move. Many experts claim that the election promise must be reconsidered because it would requires a phenomenal amount of money ~~which will that would~~ overshadow its positive effects and that it would be undesirable to move the capital south of Seoul for the post-unification era. If Roh puts his promise into action, he will lose support in Seoul and some other regions. But if he fails to deliver ~~it~~, he will be faced with enormous opposition from the -Choongchung Chungcheong region.

Another social conflict President Roh ~~should~~ must overcome is labor-management ~~conflict~~. A ~~fundamental reason that~~ What makes labor-management conflict ~~difficult to deal with is that it is very cumbersome to so~~ difficult is the problem of achieving negotiating ~~focus only one of the two (highly~~

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likely) contradicting goals— i.e., to advance the rights and welfare of the economically weak laborers on the one hand and to increase the competitiveness of companies and the national economy on the other hand. In order to make the nation into an economic hub of Northeast Asia, ~~which is~~ one of the national goals of the Roh Administration, foreign investment is critical; ~~but however, this~~ requires a flexible labor market. Workers want job security more than anything else ~~and~~. Roh has promised to help workers ~~have gain~~ "equal relations" with employers ~~and maintained in return for~~ their support for him. But if the economy becomes sluggish and companies ~~start laying off workers for~~ execute layoffs for structural adjustment, workers will ~~strongly demand~~ for stable employment. ~~The fact proves this dilemma that~~ This dilemma has led the Roh Administration to employ a very careful approach in dealing with pressing issues of labor-management relations such as non-regular workers and ~~alien-foreign~~ workers. Recently, the ~~Labor~~ Minister was directly involved in resolving the strikes at Doosan Heavy Industries and Construction and the railroad union strikes. ~~As the government plays a bigger role in handling labor management conflicts, workers and employers will rely on the government instead of resolving them on their own, putting a higher burden on the government.~~ The government may ~~continue to~~ want to directly intervene in labor-management conflicts for prompt resolution ~~in order~~ to minimize negative impacts on the economy. But there are concerns that if this occurs repeatedly and the government turns an open ear to the laborers' demands, its political burden will increase and businesses may lose competitiveness. Thus, what the government should do first is to take a long-term perspective, cultivate a new culture ~~that wherein~~ employers and employees resolve conflicts autonomously, and obtain cooperation from labor and management to prevent in advance labor strikes which bog down the economy. Because Roh was a member of the Labor Committee of the Assembly and has taken the position of speaking for the laborers in strikes, workers have high expectations of him whereas employers are ~~concerned with~~ worried by the new administration's labor policy. Meanwhile, as workers are divided between the Democratic Labor Party (based on Korean Confederation of Trade Unions, KCTU) and the Korea Social Democratic Party (based on Federation of Korean Trade Unions, FKTU) ~~and are in a competitive as well as cooperative relationship among themselves,~~

they ~~lack a solidarity of representation~~ ~~cannot speak in one voice in labor-management conflict~~. Amid the workers' ~~high~~ Given their high expectations of the President, workers' economic and political demands to the government may escalate due to the competition between KCTU and FKTU, while entrepreneurs are skeptical of Roh's policy. As Korea's economy faces many challenges due to China's rise as an economic rival, the war in Iraq and the spread of SARS (severe acute respiratory ~~symptoms~~ syndrome), there is a strong possibility that labor-management conflicts ~~will grow worse~~ intensify.

 In the last presidential election, unprecedented ideological conflicts emerged in Korean society ~~on the issues of the~~ over North Korea policy and Korea-U.S. relations. ~~The ideological~~ Those conflicts became more visible, ~~expressed as being translated into~~ generational conflicts. President Roh inherited the Kim Dae-jung ~~Administration's~~ administration's sunshine policy and set "peace and prosperity" as the main principle of its North Korea policy. Ideological conflicts revolving around the North Korea policy derived from ~~different~~ divergent views on the relative importance of nation vs. state and varying assessments of the North Korea's system and its leadership's nature and direction of change. Besides these fundamental differences, conflicts were amplified by the problems found in the formation and implementation of the government's North Korea policy and the involvement of partisan and personal interests in its approach to North Korea policy. In order to resolve the conflicts, the Roh ~~Administration~~ administration should have clear, consistent objectives ~~for its North Korea policy,~~ and put in place a transparent process ~~in~~ of policy formulation and implementation and make ~~incessant~~ steady efforts to build national consensus. The Kim Dae-jung ~~Administration~~ administration proclaimed the establishment of a ~~peaceful~~ regime replacing the armistice regime on the peninsula as the goal of its North Korea policy, but created serious skepticisms ~~invited misunderstanding~~ by making little progress in building such regime after ~~inserting a clause on national unification in the agreement adopted at~~ the South-North Summit meeting in 2000. As seen in the secret transmissions of money to North Korea, the North Korea policy was formed ~~secretively~~ behind closed doors according to partisan interests and this intensified domestic conflicts, pitting South Koreans against each other. ~~My personal~~ Hope is ~~that~~ the Roh aAdministration should learn from the mistakes of the past

administration.

_____ It appears that Korea-U.S. relations have improved since the launch of the Roh ~~Administration~~ administration. The U.S. expressed ill feelings about Korea during the election campaign period as Roh's supporters burned the U.S. national flag ~~and holdin~~ violent demonstrations, ~~held in~~ candlelight vigils in memory of two South Korean schoolgirls ~~killed in an accident involving American soldiers,~~ and ~~demanding~~ ~~demande~~d the revision of the SOFA. Korea-U.S. relations soured because of Roh's assertion for 'equal' "equal" relations with the U.S. and for his outspoken position that he did not oppose the withdrawal of the U.S. military from Korea. Even his envoy to the U.S. ~~said-said that~~ "South Koreans will choose nuclear-armed North Korea over attack on our northern brethren." But the Bush ~~Administration's~~ ~~administration's~~ skepticism dissipated as Roh decided to send troops to Iraq when ~~the war in Iraq~~ broke out ~~there~~. This shows that Roh is learning diplomacy from a pragmatic standpoint and appears to ~~admit-be admitting~~ that foreign ~~relations~~ policy requires cool-headed judgment and strategic thinking ~~as well as just cause and passion~~.

_____ The generational conflicts in the presidential election seemed to reflect ~~generational~~ differences in ~~the~~ political experiences ~~between generations~~ and socioeconomic change in Korean society. The new generation, ~~coined called~~ Generation 2030, did not experience the Korean War; ~~they are-is~~ more interested in individual pursuits than ~~it is concerned for~~ ~~worry about absolute poverty poverty;~~ and ~~they are-is~~ familiar with on-line communications via the Internet or mobile phones ~~with the progress of informatization~~. In contrast, the older generation abhors communism, is sensitive to ~~the~~ fears of war, tends to emphasize individual responsibility for economic inequality rather than social structural causes, and ~~they are-is~~ not accustomed to new media. These differences produce divergences in ways of thinking, modes of behavior and political choices and actions.

_____ There are contrasting views on the generational conflicts. Some say that generational conflicts ~~is~~ ~~are not a serious political phenomenon insofar as they~~ typically occur in periods of rapid social change ~~and that the younger generation will adapt themselves just to the existing new social system through the conflicts,~~³¹ ~~though the actual contents may differ and that the new generation will adjust to the new~~

society through the conflicting process and so, it is not a serious political phenomenon. ~~Contrary to this~~ On the contrary, some argue that the new generation is too affective and they approach complex political phenomena in an oversimplified manner and cannot make the right choice as they are accustomed to black and white thinking that is related to the binary scale of the digital era. They also believe that the lack of firm national values ~~on nation~~ among ~~youngsters~~ the young will become a serious national problem. These differences lead to variant views on how to ~~cure~~ ~~resolve~~ resolve the generational conflicts. Though the Roh ~~Administration~~ administration may take the former position, it needs to build a system that ~~helps~~ boosts the younger generation's political participation and involvement in sound activities. It also needs to put in place mechanisms to ~~help~~ the acceptance and absorption of the political activities of young voters ~~be accepted and absorbed~~ by the established political community instead of allowing them to be ~~being~~ played out abnormally in the form of excessive student activism. It should strengthen informatization education and improve ~~the~~ on-line communication systems so that ~~Netizens~~ netizens cannot vilify certain individuals by exploiting the anonymous and instant nature of the Internet, or engage in collective political action indiscreetly by making affective judgments. More specifically, Internet discussion and participation must be brought into a truly public sphere and public organizations' homepages must ~~be run on real names~~ be based on transparency and, not on anonymity.

4. Conclusion

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The 2002 presidential election will be recorded as a critical event in Korean election history in many aspects. It marked a ~~new~~ turning point in Korea's democratization ~~since 1987~~. The 1987 presidential election put an end to the monopolistic power system of authoritarian military rule, but ~~impregnating~~ regionalism and ~~political machine like parties of 3 Kims, oligarchical power system~~ the oligarchic power system ~~of the 3 Kims who headed political machine-type parties y system~~ thrived for the next 15 years ~~was maintained for the past 15 years after it~~. Providing ~~a~~ momentum to abolish ~~this the oligarchical power~~ system, the 2002 presidential election opened the way to

~~proceed to~~instantiating a pluralist political pluralist system both in name and reality. Many factors operated to make this happen. ~~the~~ The NMDP newly adopted the Korean-style primary election to select a candidate and pragmatic, open-minded Roh Moo-hyun, pragmatic and open-minded, emerged as the party's presidential nominee. Civil society had made steady efforts to reform build political institution capabilities ~~the~~ the progress of informatization created a new environment in which political participation was not very costly much more accessible, in turn introducing ~~the advance of information and communication technology introduced~~ new campaign methods. Progressive political orientations emerged in foreign relations and South-North-South relations. A unified presidential candidacy was formed between Roh Moo-hyun and Chung Mong-joon. And, finally, many youngsters young people participated in the election campaigns voluntarily and proactively. Although many political changes and dynamics were observed But although there were many changes in political dynamics in the past election, many things remained unchanged. The negative election Negative campaigns focusing on the disclosures of rivals' misdemeanors and irregularities, and mud-slinging, party politicians' opportunistic banding and disbanding, and region-based voting behavior continued as in the past. The changes and continuities in the election process and outcome imply that the future of Korean politics will not change overnight. In other words, the election provided a momentum to abolish old-style politics, but the newly launched Roh Administration administration may not be able to complete the framework of new-style politics in its term and it will only play the role to initiate the change and build in initiating the change and building a successful foundation.

The reason that people reserve to cast bright outlooks on the future path of observers are reluctant to express optimism for President Roh's future path is that the political reality is very unfavorable to him. As his party is the second largest in the Assembly, he needs the largest party's cooperation to run the divided government effectively. But this is not easy because Representatives are bound to their parties and lack autonomy for nomination for to candidacy and supply of political funds. The President is likely to put will have experience trials and errors in paving new relations with the Assembly. In order to avoid the continuation of the divided government, President Roh will likely do something so that his party will secure a majority of seats

in the 2004 general elections. He has already proposed to adopt a power-shared presidential system in which the majority party has ~~would have~~ the rights to nominate the Prime Minister after the 2004 general elections and ~~and for this, he also has made advanced~~ a proposition to revamp the general election system. However, both the GNP and the NMDP are lukewarm to this proposal because GNP Representatives from Kyungsang Provinces Yeongnam region and NMDP Representatives from Honam Jolla Provinces Jeolla region who compose the core forces in each party are sure of their electoral victory in under the current election system and ~~have no interest in changing it.~~

_____ Because the political future of the President depends on the 2004 general elections, he must not only revamp the general election system but also achieve visible outcomes in state management before the elections. It seems very difficult to resolve ~~the~~ existing conflicts such as regional ~~conflicts~~ regionalism and labor-management ~~conflicts~~ disputes in addition to ~~and~~ new conflicts that emerged in the past election such as ideological and generational conflicts. The political groups that support Roh expect that he will speak for their political interests and so, they may withdraw support for him if he does not meet their expectation ~~honors the interests of the opposition groups.~~ But if he ignores the political preferences of ~~the~~ opposition groups out of fear that his support base may shrink, he ~~cannot~~ will not be able to expand his support base and ~~so, his party cannot~~ will consequently be unable to secure a majority of seats in next year's election. If he changes his position and allies with ~~the~~ opposition groups to broaden his support base for next year's election, he is existing support base will likely to lose some of his existing support base ~~weaken, so this cannot be an option for him, either.~~ _____ In this case, his support base in the Assembly and the nation will be very limited and fluid as it is now. Unless he comes up with something which satisfies both his supporting and opposition groups, he may have to chose one, or go back and forth between the two with while both remain unsatisfied.

Notes

1) In a rigorous sense, the NMDP's presidential candidate selection [nomination] method of the NMDP is a combination of the existing caucus system in which the party representatives participate in selecting a candidate and the U.S. primary election system in which ordinary voters participate. I call it Korean style primary election to emphasize that it was the first time in the history of Korean parties that ordinary citizens participated in the selection of a presidential candidate.

2)

Gang Won-taek, "The 2002 Presidential Election and Regionalism," Paper presented at a seminar held by the Korean Political Science Association at the Press Center, 6 February 2003, p. 65.

3) Gim Man-heum, "The 16th Presidential Election and Regionalism," Paper presented at a seminar held by the Institute of Korean Political Studies at Munhwagwan (Culture Hall), Seoul National University, 28 January 2003.

4) Ahn Boo-geun, "Change in Support Rates and the Election Outcome," Paper presented at a seminar held by the Institute of Korean Political Studies at Munhwagwan (Culture Hall), Seoul National University, 28 January 2003.

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6) *The Hankyoreh*, issue of 23 December 2002.

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7) This word is coined by taking the last [family] name of three aged powerful politicians, Kim Dae-jung, Kim Young-sam and Kim Jong-pil.

8) *Joongang JoongAng Ilbo*, issue of 20 December 2002.

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9) *Chosun Ilbo*, 23 December 2002.

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10) *Dong-a Ilbo*, 21 December 2002.

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11) *Donga Ilbo*[bid.], 20 December 2002.

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12) *Donga Ilbo*[bid.], 20 December 2002.

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13) *The Hankyoreh*, 23 December 2002.

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14) *Chosun Ilbo*, 23 December 2002.

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15) *Dong-a Ilbo*, 20 December 2002.

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16) The Political Reform [Study Analysis](#) Team of the Presidency [Takeover Transition](#) [[Presidential Transition](#)] Committee cites as the ill practices of 3-Kim politics,

regionalism, turning the party to a political machine, and abuse of power and corruption. (~~The 16th Presidency Transition Committee, *Daehwa: je 16dae daetongnyeong insu wiwonhoe baekseo* (Dialogue: White Paper of the 16th Presidency Transition Committee) (Seoul: Government Information Agency, 2003), p. 248. The 16th Presidency Takeover Committee, *Dialogue: White Paper of the 16th Presidency Takeover Committee*, Government Information Agency, 2003, p. 248.)~~)

17) For example, Roh shed tears at the foundation convention of the People's Party for Reform held in October 2002, moved by ~~Roh-samo~~Nosamo member ~~Moön-Mun~~ Seong-geun's speech titled "Cheers to Roh Moo-hyun!" and this scene was included in his television commercial.

18) Yi Nam-young, "Hanguk seon-geo yeongu-ui hyeonhwang-gwa gwaje" (The Current Status and Agendas of Research on Elections in Korea), in Hanguk-ui jeongchihak: hyeonhwang-gwa jeonmang (Political Science in Korea: The Current and Future Outlook), ed. by Korean Political Science Association (Seoul: Bobmun Sa, 1997), "The Current Status and Agendas of Research on Elections in Korea," in Korean Political Science Association, Political Sciences in Korea: The Current Status and Future Outlook, Beopmunsa, 1997, p. 323.

19) Jo Gi-søksuk, Hamnijeok seontaek: Hanguk-ui seon-geo-wa yugwonja (Rational Choice: Elections and Voters in Korea) (Seoul: Hanul, 1996)~~Rational Choice: Elections and Voters in Korea, Hanwool, 1996;~~ and Yi Jeong-bok, "Hangugin-ui tupyo haengtae: je 14dae chongseon-eul jungsim-euro" (Voting Behavior of Koreans: The 14th General Elections), Hanguk jeongchi hakhoebo 26.3 (1993). "Voting Behavior of Koreans: The 14th General Elections," Bulletin of the Korean Political Science Association 26 (3), 1993.

20) The Hankyoreh, issue of 23 December 2002, from an article citing the exit poll results of Korea Broadcasting Service.

21) ~~Ahn Boo-geun, "Change in Support Rates and the Election Outcome," Paper presented at a seminar held by the Institute of Korean Political Studies at Munhwagwan (Culture Hall), Seoul National University, 28 January 2003~~An Bu-geun, op. cit.

22) In the local government elections held in June 2002, the DLP candidates obtained 8.1% of all cast votes. But in the 16th presidential elections the party's nominee Gwon got only 3.9% of all electoral votes. Many presumed that this was because after Chung

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withdrew his support for Roh, the DLP supporters did not vote for Gwon and chose a much stronger contender Roh to make him beat the conservative Lee.

23) ~~Gang Won-taek, "The 16th Presidential Election and the Generations," Paper presented at a seminar held by the Institute of Korean Political Studies at Munhwagwan (Culture Hall), Seoul National University, 28 January 2003~~ Kang Won-taek, op. cit.

24) ~~Joong Ang Ilbo, issue of 12~~ December 12, 2002.

25) ~~Dong-a Ilbo, issue of 20~~ -December 20, 2002.

26) The 12 major national agendas in four areas are as follows: 1) Area of foreign relations, national unification and security:— consolidation of the peace regime on the peninsula; 2) Area of politics and administration:— corruption-free society, service-oriented administration, decentralization of power and balanced development of the nation, and political reform for participation and integration; 3) Economic area:— establishment of a free and fair market order, increased focus on science and technology at the societal level and working for a brighter future for rural areas; and 4) Area of society, culture and women:— participatory welfare and advance of quality of living, national integration and gender equality, educational reform and focus on knowledge and culture for a stronger nation and cultivating labor-management relations for social integration.

27) ~~Kim Yong-ho (Kim, Yong-Ho), "Minjuhwa ihu bunjeom jeongbu-e daehan pyeongga" (An Assessment of the Divided Government after Democratization), in Hanguk jeongdang jeongchi-ui ihae (Understanding Party Politics in Korea) (Seoul: Nanam, 2001), pp. 475-498; and Jang Hun, "Hanguk daetongnyeongje-ui bulanjeongseong-ui giwon: bunjeom jeongbu-ui jedojeok, sahoejeok, jeongchijeok giwon" (Origins of Instability of the Presidential System in Korea: The Institutional, Social and Political Origins of the Divided Government), Hanguk jeongchi hakhoebo (Bulletin of the Korean Political Science Association) 35.4 (2001): pp. 107-207. Gim Yong-ho, "An Assessment of the Divided Government after Democratization," in Understanding Party Politics in Korea, Nanam, 2001, pp. 475-498; and Jang Hoon, "Origins of Instability of the Presidential System in Korea: The Institutional, Social and Political Origins of the Divided Government," Bulletin of the Korean Political Science Association 35(4): 107-207, 2001.~~

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- 28) [Kim Min-jeon, "Minjujuui gonggohwa-reul wihan gukhoe gaehyeok" \(Reforming the National Assembly for Consolidation of Democracy\), "Gyegan sasang 41 \(summer 1999\): pp. 113-135.](#) [Gim Min-jeon, "Reforming the National Assembly for Consolidation of Democracy," 『계간 사상』, Vol. No?? \(summer\): 113-135, 1999.](#)
- 29) For a detailed analysis of the content of political reform, see [Bak Gi-deok, "Political Reform Agendas and Prospects of the Roh Administration: With Focus on the Form of Government, Election System and Party Organization and Operation" \(in Korean\) \(paper presented at the seminar of the Korean Political Science Association, Press Center, Seoul, 6 February 2003\).](#) [Bak Gi-deok, "Political Reform Agendas and Prospects of the Roh Administration: With Focus on the Form of Government, Election System and Party Organization and Operation," Paper presented at the Spring 2003 Meetings of the Korean Political Science Association on the theme of "Assessment of the 2002 Presidential Election and the Agendas of the Incoming Administration," the Press Center, 6 February 2003.](#)
- 30) The recent expressions of dissatisfaction with the personnel policy of the Roh Administration in the [Jolla-Honam](#) region attest to this.
- 31) Many experts hold this view, who have studied or worked on adolescents' issues in academy or in the field for an extended period of time.

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Abstract

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In the 2002 presidential election, Roh Moo-hyun ~~who ecampaigned~~ in a new style ~~that conferred~~ ~~aided by an increased political role of on civil society~~ ~~and~~ defeated Lee Hoi-chang, ~~whose power who was thoroughly based on his party organization~~. The election outcome signified ~~a break from the~~ ~~breaking the framework of old-fashioned party politics based on~~ oligarchical ~~party politics of the three~~ ~~control by three~~ Kims (Kim Dae-jung, Kim Young-sam and Kim Jong-pil) that ~~dominated the democratized Korea at the last~~ ~~had lasted for~~ 15 years ~~after democratization on the one hand and the inauguration of~~ ~~a starting a new form of party politics on the other hand~~. In spite of the national consensus for the abolishment of ~~the~~ 3-Kims style politics, however, it will take a considerable amount of time to establish a new framework of party politics to replace ~~the old one~~ ~~it~~. This is because President Roh has to manage a divided government ~~in which~~ ~~with~~ his party ~~is only~~ ~~being~~ the second largest in the Assembly.

and ~~will therefore face difficulties in mobilizing~~ ~~it will not be easy to mobilize~~ support ~~from the Assembly~~ for his political reform agenda. Moreover, his party will encounter difficulties in securing a majority of seats in next year's parliamentary general elections unless he resolves ~~the existing~~ conflicts that have already existed, which have already existed, such as regional cleavages and confrontations between labor and management, and new conflicts that emerged in the ~~past~~ election such as ideological and generational conflicts. With issues such as the nuclear issue in North Korea and a sluggish domestic economy hanging in the balance, it will not likely be easy for the Roh Administration to take clearly visible strides within the year. He must also and makes visible achievements in state management. With many issues hanging over such as the war in Iraq, the nuclear issue in North Korea and a sluggish domestic economy hanging in the balance, it will not likely be easy ~~seems very difficult for the Roh Administration to take clearly visible strides within the year~~ make some visible outcomes in state management in a year's time. Thus, the new Administration is expected to have mark a transitional period ~~shifting~~ from the 3-Kims' oligarchical party system to a pluralist party system.

Keyword: divided government, political cartel, political oligarchy, political pluralism, political reform

Glossary:

~~Divided government: Refers to the situation that in a presidency system a party or a political group produces President but fails to secure majority seats in the Assembly, so another party or political group takes control of the administrative and legislative branches.~~

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~~Political cartel: Control of the political circle by more than one leader or political group.~~

~~Political oligarchy: Government by a few leaders or a small minority of political forces.~~

~~Political pluralism: Government by multiple leaders or political groups engaged in fair~~

~~political competition.~~

~~Strategic regionalist voting: Voters cast votes for their own regional [region-based] party to prevent other regional [region-based] parties from taking power.~~

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