

**The Forced Mobilization/Forcible Drafting of Koreans during the Final Phase of Final Phase of Colonial Rule Rule and the Formation of the Korean Community Residing in Japan**

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**Abstract**

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In this paper, I examine the influence of the forcible drafting of Koreans on the formation of the Korean community in Japan dating from the late Japanese colonial period.

Until Korea was liberated from Japanese colonial rule on 15 August 1945, approximately 2 million Koreans remained in Japan, or 10% of the total Korean population at that time. Some migrated to Japan in search of work, while others were forcibly mobilized for the Japanese government's policy of increasing and supporting the labor force during the Japanese war of aggression. Ninety thousand people were taken to Japan by force.

After Japan's surrender, most Koreans were able to return to their homeland in accordance with the repatriation policies of the GHQ that controlled Japan indirectly after the war. 1.5 million Koreans returned to Korea between August, 1945 and August 1948.

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The reason the entire population of Koreans in Japan could not return was because the GHQ had acquiesced to the Japanese government's demand to postpone repatriation in favor of restoring the domestic economy. Accordingly, the GHQ strictly limited the amount of material possessions and property that Koreans could take back with them. Thus, for those Koreans with sizeable holdings, Koreans married to Japanese, or those who had settled down in Japan with their Korean family, the decision to leave Japan was not an easy one. Their descendants, the so-called second, third and fourth generation Korean-Japanese, have continued to shape the Korean community in Japan.

1. Introduction

2. The situation of those Koreans who were forcibly relocated to Japan during the final phase of the colonial era

3. Formation of the Korean community in Japan after World War II

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#### 4. Conclusion

##### 1. Introduction

By the time the Korean peninsula was finally liberated from the yoke of Japanese imperialism on 15 August 15, 1945, over 2 million Koreans were residing in Japan. Given the fact that the overall population of the Korean peninsula at that time was approximately 25 million people, this means that nearly 10% percent of the Korean people were by this point residing in Japan. The majority of these Koreans living in Japan fell into one of two categories: those who had immigrated in search of work, or and those who were forced to relocate who went to Japan as part of the Japanese forced mobilization forcible drafting policy implemented under during the wartime structure which came into effect from 1938 onwards. As a result of the passage of the National General Mobilization Law passed in April 1938, 900,000 Koreans were forcibly relocated taken by force to Japan under the latter's general mobilization of labor policy. (이 부분에 있던 주석은 영어로 번역했을 때 큰 차이가 없으므로 뺐는데 선생님 생각은 어떠신지요?): 삭제

해도 무방합니다.

A great majority of these people were returned to liberated Korea in the immediate aftermath of the Japanese defeat either on their own or as part of through the repatriation plan drafted by the General Headquarters of the United States' (hereafter referred to as GHQ) of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (hereafter referred to as GHQ), which indirectly ruled Japan after World War II, repatriation plan. All in all, 1.5 million Koreans returned to Korea from between August 1945 and to August 1948. The complicated nature of this repatriation plan became the overarching reason why a significant number of Koreans did not return to Korea. More to the point, because as the GHQ accepted the Japanese government's fears of the economic impact such a mass exodus of resources could have, the GHQ limited the amount of money and the size of the belongings that Koreans could take back with them, thus assuaging the Japanese government's fears of the effect such a mass exodus of resources could have on the Japanese economy. Therefore, many Koreans, Hanin who were unwilling to abandon their fortunes and who no longer had any roots in Korea, as their entire families had immigrated-relocated to Japan, decided to put off returning to Korea repatriating. Their descendants have continued to live in Japan, becoming the second, third, and fourth generations of this Korean community in Japan.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The Association of Korean-Japanese National Studies (2003, 71-72). Koreans Residing in

Koreans, ~~currently residing in Japan, the majority of whose ancestors settled~~who ~~remained~~ in Japan under ~~the above-mentioned~~these circumstances ~~and maintained~~, who ~~possess~~a strong attachment to their ~~homeland~~homeland, have seen their legal status altered again and again ~~as a result of~~according to the policies implemented by the GHQ, the Japanese government, and the governments of the two Koreas. Their national identity, which they have struggled to maintain, has also been altered as a result of these changes.<sup>2</sup>

This paper ~~examines the factors that have influenced the formation of the Korean community in Japan, based on~~analyzes the results of Japan's ~~forced mobilization~~forcible ~~drafting~~ policy ~~in the late Japanese colonial period, and delves into the situation that Koreans to whom this policy was applied found themselves in, so as to conduct a larger analysis of the factors which have influenced the formation of the Korean community in Japan.~~

—This paper uses the term *Jaeil Chosunin*—Koreans residing in Japan—, rather than *Jaeil Hankukin* or *Jaeil Korean*—Japanese Korean, to refer to those Koreans residing in Japan. The term *Jjaeil joseoninaeil Chosunin* (Korean residents in Japan) used in this paper is taken to mean all Koreans living in Japan. It is also a historical term which encompasses those Koreans—who possess *Chosun-Joseon citizenship*nationality, *Korean citizenship*Republic of Korea nationality, and Japanese *citizenship*nationality. All Koreans who ~~have~~relocated to Japan since the opening of the ~~three~~ports in 1882 have ~~disparagingly~~been referred to ~~disparagingly~~ as *senjin* or *cChosenjing-hosenjin* by the Japanese. ~~The Hanin Koreans, however, expressed~~asserted their *ethnic identity*resistance to ~~being assimilated within Japanese society~~by referring to themselves as *jaeil joseonin**Jaeil Chosunin*. The first generation of Korean *residents*residing in Japan ~~were~~mostly ~~came~~ from the southern part of the Korean peninsula and had moved to Japan in order to overcome the rampant poverty ~~which that~~struck their region during the colonial era. As they no longer had any roots in Korea, ~~these they~~people—did not return after liberation in August 1945. Despite their long period of

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*Japan, Who Are They?*, Samin, 2003, pp.71-72

<sup>2</sup> Among the ethnic Korean groups residing in other countries, Japanese-Koreans are arguably those who exhibit the strongest attachment to~~wards~~ their homeland. As Koreans who moved to China during this period did not face any severe discrimination, and were even able to enjoy autonomy within the *natural-positive* law of China, they do not exhibit such a strong attachment to~~wards~~ Korea. The same is true of Koreans who reside in other countries. However, in the case of Japanese-Koreans, who found themselves the victims of discriminatory policies imposed on them by ~~their adopted homeland~~the Japanese government, they have maintained a strong attachment to~~wards~~ Korea, ~~and this~~despite the lukewarm reaction of ~~their homelands~~successive Korean governments to their plight.

residence in Japan, ~~these people~~ they were never granted Japanese citizenship, but rather have been classified as “~~special~~ ~~exceptional~~ permanent residents.” They are registered as ~~either being~~ nationals of the Republic of Korea, or of ~~Chosun~~ ~~Joseon~~. Those ~~people~~ registered as citizens of the Republic of Korea ~~are those who~~ belong to the ~~Association of~~ Korean Residents ~~Union~~ in Japan (hereafter referred to as the ~~mindan~~ ~~Mindan~~). The term ~~Chosun~~ ~~Joseon~~ nationality is not used to indicate citizens of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (~~DPRK~~, ~~North Korea~~) established in the northern part of the Korean peninsula after World War II, but rather refers to the absolute monarchy known as the ~~Taehan~~ ~~Great Han~~ Empire, which existed before the Japanese annexation of Korea. As such, ‘~~Chosun~~’ ~~Joseon~~ is just a nominal nationality as the country it refers to no longer exists.<sup>3</sup>

2. ~~The situation~~ **Situation of those Koreans who were forcibly relocated Mobilized to Japan during the Late Japanese Colonial Period** ~~final phase of the colonial era~~

—At the time of ~~the liberation of~~ Korea’s ~~liberation~~ in August 1945, there were some 2 million Koreans residing in Japan. As we can see from ~~t~~ <Table 1>, the number of Koreans who went to Japan ~~began to rise~~ ~~started to increase~~ after 1922, ~~and~~ ~~and~~ rapidly ~~increased~~ ~~so~~ after 1939.<sup>4</sup>

<Table 1> Korean ~~Residentss~~ ~~residing~~ in Japan: ~~1882-1938~~ ~~1882-1938~~ (표에는 1945년까지 나와 있습니다)

(Unit: ~~people~~ ~~one person~~)

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<sup>3</sup> ~~The term Jaeil Chosunin has been replaced by terms which transcend nationality such as Jaeil Hankuk Chosunin – Chosun people residing in Japan, Jaeil Chosun Korea Japanese Chosun Korean, or other terms containing the suggestive phrase ‘Jaeil’ – residing in Japan. The most common term used to indicate Korean residentss residing in Japan by South Koreans is jaeil dongpo (overseas Koreans in Japan, literally “brethren” or “compatriots” in Japan) Jaeil Dongpo which loosely translates as compatriots in Japan. However, in this paper I use the term jaeil joseonin (Korean residents in Japan) in that this term emphasizes the historicity and the strong resistance of overseas Koreans in Japan.~~

<sup>4</sup> For more information about Koreans’ immigration to Japan and their status within Japan during the period spanning from 1882-1938, please refer to Chung Hye-kyung (2002), *The Jaeil Chosunin National Movement during the Colonial Era*, Kookhak Community Corp, 2002 ch.2

Year	Number of Koreans <del>residing</del> Residing in Japan			Year	Number of Koreans <del>residing</del> Residing in Japan		
	(1)	(2)	(3)		(1)	(2)	(3)
1882	4			1925	129,870	187,102	214,657
1895	12	12		1926	143,798	207,853	247,358
1896	19			1927	165,286	246,515	308,685
1898	71			1928	238,102	341,737	358,121
1900	196			1929	275,206	387,901	398,920
1905	303	303		1930	298,091	419,009	419,009
1907	459	459		1931	311,247	437,519	427,275
1909	790	790		1932	390,543	504,176	433,692
1911	2,527		5,728	1933	456,217	573,896	500,637
1912	3,171		7,796	1934	537,695	689,651	559,080
1913	3,635	3,952	10,394	1935	625,678	720,818	615,869
1914	3,542	4,176	12,961	1936	690,501	780,528	657,497
1915	3,917	5,064	15,106	1937	735,689	822,214	693,138
1916	5,624	7,225	17,972	1938	799,878	881,347	796,927
1917	14,502	17,463	22,218	1939	961,591	1,030,394	980,700
1918	22,411	27,340	34,082	1940	1,190,444	1,241,315	1,241,315
1919	26,605	35,995	37,732	1941	1,469,230	1,469,230	1,484,025
1920	30,189	40,755	40,755	1942	1,625,054	1,625,054	1,778,480
1921	38,651	48,774	62,404	1943	1,882,456	1,768,180	1,946,047
1922	59,722	82,693	90,741	1944	1,936,843	1,911,307	2,139,143
1923	80,415	112,051	136,557	1945	-----	2,100,000	2,206,541
1924	118,152	168,002	172,130				

(1) *Statistical Yearbook of the Empire of Japan*

(2) ~~Park Bak~~ Jae-il (~~-, Comprehensive Investigation of Koreans Residing in Japan, Shinkiwon, 1957, p. 23-29~~)

(3) Tamura Noriyuki (~~-, The Ministry of the Interior's Investigation of the Size of the Chosun Population in Japan (1), Economy and Economics, Vol. 46, 1981, p. 58~~)

~~Due-Owing~~ to domestic necessity, the Japanese government allowed Koreans to ~~immigrate~~ to Japan during the 1910s. However, ~~from-since~~ the 1920s ~~onwards~~, ~~immigration~~ was ~~expanded temporarily permitted~~ or restricted ~~according to based on~~ the

~~prevailing~~ economic situation ~~that prevailed at the time in question~~. In April 1919, the Japanese government, through the Government-General ~~of Chosun~~ in Korea, announced ~~the a report on the Administrative Measures Governing the People~~ Travel Regulation of Koreans of Chosun: Any ~~person Korean who~~ wish ~~ing~~ ed to ~~immigrate~~ go to Japan had to submit a travel certificate, ~~which was to be issued by the local police station~~ by the police station in their district in Korea and submitted to the local police station upon arrival in Japan. Although ~~in April 1922~~ Japan allowed the free ~~movement~~ passage of ~~people Korean~~ sto take place in April 1922, this right was curtailed ~~for Koreans~~ in September 1923 following the Kanto earthquake. Furthermore, in 1924, Japan announced the report on the Travel Certificate for Koreans ~~in~~ order to resolve the chaos in the Japanese labor market ~~which follow~~ ing ~~ed~~ the large-scale introduction of cheap Korean labor, ~~Japan passed regulations in 1924 limiting the number of Koreans which could immigrate to Japan. These regulations~~ This certificate was issued ~~called for immigration certificates to be granted~~ solely to those Koreans who possessed at least 30 won and ~~who~~ had been guaranteed a job in Japan. These restrictions were further strengthened in 1928 when the ~~Government-General of Chosun's~~ Police Administration Bureau of the Government-General ~~issued~~ announced new guidelines ~~which stated~~ stating that any Korean who desired to ~~immigrate~~ to Japan had to possess at least 60 won and a ~~letter vouching for his/her good character~~ permit issued by the ~~local~~ police station in their district.<sup>5</sup>

In the 1930's Japan's ~~immigration~~ policy ~~became one~~ was based on ~~the provision of providing~~ temporary return certificates ~~to a limited number of Koreans who wished to return to Japan after having visited their homeland, and on the use of job specific visas~~ travel permits (도항소개장의 번역으로 맞는지요? 맞습니다). In August 1929 the ~~Director of the Security Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of the Interior~~ informed local ~~Japanese offices~~ of the report on the Certification of Korean Laborers, ~~about the need for Korean laborers wishing to immigrate to Korea to receive the so-called 'certificate for Chosun laborers.'~~ This certificate system was based on Japan's ~~desire~~ intention to prevent Korean laborers from moving from job to job once they entered Japan, and was used a means ~~of getting rid of of returning to Korea those those laborers who were not needed by~~ which the Japanese economy ~~did not need~~. ~~As such,~~ Japan used ~~these temporary return~~ these certificates to ~~make~~ keep ~~sure that~~ Korean laborers working in strategic areas such as factories and mines ~~continued to do so,~~ and to stop prevent

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<sup>5</sup> Police Administration Bureau of the Government-General (~~of Chosun, Security Situation~~, 1927, p.519, p.522); Police Administration Bureau of the Government-General (~~of Chosun, Summary of the Reports filed by the Chosun Police~~, 1925, p.167).

those employed in other fields from returning to Japan after having visited Korea. Moreover, ~~These temporary return certificates~~ made it possible for Japan to control Koreans' immigration to Japan. However, by dissuading many from taking the risk of going back to Korea, ~~this the~~ system also resulted in increasing the number of Koreans who decided to remain in Japan. ~~To counter this trend~~ Therefore, Japan began ~~from the middle of the 1930s onwards~~ to concentrate on "Japanizing" ~~assimilating~~ those Koreans who resided in Japan ~~from the mid-1930s~~. ~~As such, despite~~ After a small modification in July 1930, ~~these temporary return certificates~~ this certificate system became one of the key elements ~~of the system~~ used to control Korean immigration to Japan during the 1930s.

Nevertheless, the most comprehensive version of Japan's immigration policy towards Koreans in the 1930s ~~came in the form of the ordinance~~ was outlined in a memorandum (규례통첩이 무엇인지 설명을 부탁드립니다. 규례통첩은 법령의 형식을 나타내는 명칭(고유명사)이므로 내용에 따라 의미가 다른 것이 아닙니다.) announced by the Police Administration Bureau of the Government-General of Chosun in May 1936. This ~~ordinance~~ memorandum, which ~~was designed~~ addressed to ~~resolve all of~~ the problems associated with previous immigration-related regulations, ~~was characterized by the~~ stated that any following: Any Korean who desired to immigrate ~~go~~ to Japan ~~was now forced~~ had to obtain an immigration travel certificate permit issued by ~~from~~ the police station in the district of their local police station permanent or current residence. Moreover, this ~~ordinance~~ memorandum also ~~dealt with~~ stated that the dependents of those Koreans who had already immigrated settled into Japan. ~~In order to be able to immigrate to Japan, these dependents~~ had to ~~possess~~ not only obtain an immigration travel certificate permit ~~from issued by~~ the local police station ~~in their district after, but to submit themselves to a full police completing a background check investigation upon arrival~~ in Japan. As mentioned above, such regulations were put into place to allow Japan to control Korean immigration, ~~with this ordinance and became~~ becoming the basis of Japan's immigration policy until it was replaced with the National General Mobilization Law in 1938.<sup>6</sup>

The massive influx of Koreans to Japan had its origins in the latter's human resources mobilization policy initiated in 1938. As a result of this mobilization of labor policy, ~~which was known alternatively as the Kangje Yeonhaeng, Kangje Dongwon, or Jeonshi Nomoo Dongwon,~~ around approximately 7,94 million Koreans were

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<sup>6</sup> Chung Hye-kyung (*The Jaecil Chosunin National Movement during the Colonial Era—With a special focus on the Osaka area*, PhD dissertation, The Graduate School of Korean Studies, The Academy of Korean Studies, 1999), Chapter 2



~~mobilized~~ moved (not including with those women forced into sexual slavery not included in this total).

Studies on Japan's ~~forced mobilization~~ forcible drafting of Koreans during the colonial era have revealed the existence of various viewpoints on the topic, as This is evidenced by the use of different terms-- *Kgangje Yyeonhaeng*, *Kgangje Ddongwon*, and *Jjeonshi Nnomuoo Ddongwon*—to refer to the same phenomenon. The term, *Kgangje Yyeonhaeng*— (forcible drafting) was most frequently used until the early 1990s. It ~~forced mobilization~~, was first used coined by Bak Gyeong-sik, a the Korean historian residing in Japan, Park Kyeong-shik in his 1965 book *Joseonin gangje yeonhaeng-eui girok* (Record of the Forcible Drafting «~~Forced Mobilization~~ of Koreans»). ~~Park decided to publish this book which came a~~ At a time when the Japanese ~~—~~ government and people refused to even acknowledge that a wartime mobilization system or a ~~forced mobilization~~ forcible drafting had ever taken place, ~~Bak decided to publish this book~~ in order to bring to light Japan's ~~the abduction~~ forced mobilization of Koreans by Japan. To do so, ~~Park he~~ traveled throughout Japan for a few years and ~~proceeded to and~~ collected oral testimony from Koreans who had been forcibly ~~mobilized~~ taken away by the Japanese. As a result of his efforts, Japan's forced ~~mobilization~~ drafting of Koreans became recognized as a historical fact and as a new field of study. Since then, in academic circles, the term *Kgangje Yyeonhaeng* (~~forced mobilization~~) has been used to refer to the ~~mobilization~~ mobilization of the labor ~~force~~, military, ~~civilian~~ civilian employees of the military, and women (Kang Chang-il, Kim In-deok, No Yeong-jong, Jeong In-seop, and Chung Hye-kyung) (Kang Chang-il, Kim In-deok, Roh Yeong-jong, Chung In-seop, Chung Hye-kyeong). Another commonly used term ~~which has commonly been used~~ is that of *Jjeonshi Nnomuoo Ddongwon*, or— wartime labor ~~mobilization~~ mobilization. Kim Min-youngyeong, who has advocated the usage of the term, *Jeonshi Nomoo Dongwon*, has argued that ~~the term~~ *Kangjegangje Yyeonhaeng* is only applicable to ~~mobilization~~ drafting at the individual level.<sup>7</sup> The third term used ~~to refer to such mobilizations~~ is that of *Kangjegangje Ddongwon* (~~forced mobilization~~), which ~~—~~. While this term is similar to *Jeonshi Nomoo Dongwon*, it ~~emphasizes~~ is also understood to refer to the “relocation of the forced ~~relocations of the~~ labor” (Kang Man-gil, Kwak Geon-hong, and Anjako Yuka) ~~force~~.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Kim Min-youngyeong (*Japanese Imperialists' Exploitation of Chosun Laborers*, Hanwoolsa, 1995, pp.27-31).

<sup>8</sup> The term, *Kangjegangje Ddongwon* is widely used among scholars (Kim Yeong-dal, Tobita Hida Yuichi, Takayanagi Toshio, Hitomi Masaru Tonomura) working within Japanese academia. These scholars prefer this term ~~over to~~ *Jjeonshi Nnomuoo Ddongwon*, because it emphasizes the forced nature of the mobilization of ~~Chosun~~ Korean labor during the final phase of colonialism,



Japan's human resources mobilization drive can be ~~broken down~~classified into ~~the mobilization of labor~~ mobilization, military mobilization, and sexual mobilization. While ~~the mobilization of labor first~~ refers to ~~those laborers mobilized~~ enlisted through ~~volunteer recruitments~~ drives, government-led ~~arrangements~~ drives, and ~~forced labor drafts~~ forced mobilization, as well as to those laborers mobilized by government-controlled organizations such as the Women Laborers<sup>2</sup> Volunteer Corps (Yeoja ~~Geullo Jeongsindae~~ ~~Kunro Jungshin Dae~~), Patriotic Laborers Associations Corps (~~Geullo Bogukdae~~ ~~Kunro Bokuk Dae~~), Patriotic Students Associations Corps (~~Hakdo Bogukdae~~ ~~Hakdo Bokuk Dae~~), or Chosun-Korean Farmers Patriotic Youth Patriotic Youth Corps (~~Joseon Nonggeop Boguk Cheongnyeondae~~ ~~Chosun Nonggeup Bokuk Chungnyeondae~~), ~~M~~ military mobilization refers to ~~both the voluntary recruitment of volunteers~~, and ~~the~~ forced recruitment of soldiers, ~~including civilian military s~~, and ~~labor employees for the military~~ (~~gunsok~~) and military personnel (군요원은 무엇입니까? military laborers의 의미입니까?, 위에 밑줄 친 부분은 삭제해주시요. 군속으로도 설명이 충분할 것 같네요.). Meanwhile, sexual mobilization refers to those women ~~who were~~ forced to serve as sex slaves for the Japanese military. These mobilizations unfolded in the following chronological fashion<sup>9</sup>:

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<Labor Mobilization of labor<sup>10</sup>> (이 부분부터 주석으로 법 내지는 법령을 설명하셨는데 외국인 독자에게는 별로 도움이 될 것 같지 않습니다. 그리고 대부분의 중요한 법령은 본문에 있기도 합니다. 따라서 혹시 빼도 될지 여쭙어 보고 싶습니다.) ~~삭제해도 됩니다.~~

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- ~~Volunteer~~ recruitment ~~drives~~ (October, 1939- February, 1942)<sup>11</sup>
- ~~Government government-led~~ mobilization ~~arrangements~~ ~~drives~~ (February, 1942~)<sup>12</sup>
- ~~forced labor~~ ~~Forced mobilization~~ ~~draft~~ (August, 1944- August, 1945)<sup>13</sup>

and the Japanese government's ~~active~~leading role in this mobilization.

<sup>9</sup> The Academy of Korean Studies (~~, Status of the Survivors of Forced Mobilization during the Japanese Colonial Era~~, 2003, p.3).

<sup>10</sup> The National Mobilization Law was passed in April 1938; ~~and~~ the National Conscription Decree, in July 1939.

<sup>11</sup> The guidelines governing Korean laborers' ~~immigration~~ to Japan and the recruitment of ~~Chosun-Korean~~ laborers were published in July 1939

<sup>12</sup> Measures governing the usage of ~~Chosun-Korean~~ laborers (enacted by the Japanese Cabinet) and guidelines governing ~~Chosun-Korean~~ laborers' ~~immigration~~ to Japan (Government-General of ~~Chosun in Korea~~) were passed in February 1942.

<sup>13</sup> The National Conscription Decree was announced in 1939; in accordance with this, ~~National Conscription Decree~~ military conscription was launched in 1941. ~~T~~the National Conscription Decree was ~~later~~ modified on July 20<sup>th</sup>, 1943; in September 1944, this ~~National Conscription~~ ~~D~~decree was made applicable to all males in their 20s and 30s, who were to be conscripted for a period of one year.

- Women Laborers' Volunteer Corps (1944~)<sup>14</sup>
- Patriotic Laborers Corps:<sup>15</sup> mobilization formed in every region at the provincial level (1938-1945)
- Patriotic Students Corps<sup>16</sup>

<Military mobilization>

- ~~Mobilization of civilian labor force into civilian military employees~~ the military (kansok) (1939-1945)
- ~~Mobilization of special~~ volunteer soldier troops for the army (February 1938- 1945)
- special ~~v~~ Mobilization of volunteer soldier troops for the navy ~~navy~~ (October 1943-1945)
- ~~Mobilization of~~ student soldiers ~~volunteer troops~~ (1943-1945)
- Conscription ~~conscription~~ (1944-1945)
- military personnel ~~Mobilization of labor for the military~~ (1939-1945)

< Sexual mobilization >

- ~~Mobilization of~~ comfort women (1938-1945)

— Let us now look ~~more~~ in-depth at Japan's human resources mobilization policy<sup>17</sup>:

~~1) Labor 1) Mobilization of labor~~  
1) —

서식 있음: 글머리 기호 및 번호 매기기

Japan's mobilization of labor ~~drive~~ was not limited to the Korean peninsula. As the Sino-Japanese War initiated by the Japanese in July 1937 began to drag on, the Japanese government ~~came to recognize~~ realized that it was necessary to establish total control over its country and colonies and ensure their full mobilization in order to assure itself

<sup>14</sup> Announcement of the Decree for the Mobilization of Women Labor in August 1944, this decree applied to simple laborers aged 12-40.

<sup>15</sup> ~~The~~ A decree authorizing the formation of the Patriotic Labor Corps was passed in 1941. ~~This~~ decree called for all men between the ages of 14-40 and women between the ages of 14-25 to join such associations; in November 1943 measures were passed which strengthened the enforcement of this decree; in 1944 an ordinance was passed which forced students to join the labor force.

<sup>16</sup> Guidelines governing the training of the members of these Patriotic Student Corps were passed in June 1938.

<sup>17</sup> Kim Min-yeongung (—"Investigation, and Estimation of the Victims of Forced Mobilization", *Status of the Survivors of Forced Mobilization during the Japanese Colonial Era*, 2003, pp.23-27).

of ~~the adequate~~ military resources and labor ~~force needed to sustain such a long drawn-out conflict, it would have to establish total control over its country and colonies, as well as their full mobilization.~~ To attain this, Japan enacted the National General Mobilization Law on 1 April 1<sup>st</sup>, 1938. ~~This law was also applied to the Korean peninsula from 5 May 1938 (- a law which was, following the Government General of Chosun's announcement of Decree-imperial edict No. 316) on May 5<sup>th</sup>, 1938, made applicable to the Korean peninsula as well.~~ However, ~~b~~Before actually commencing this drive to mobilize ~~the Chosun labor force,~~ Japan launched a comprehensive investigation of Koreans' vocational skills ~~in order, which was designed to ascertain help them develop a better understanding of the amount~~quantity, quality, and state of labor available, ~~the quality of this labor, and the present status of this Chosun labor force.~~ As part of this effort, a decree forcing all individuals to register their vocational skills was announced by Japan on 7 January 7<sup>th</sup>, 1939, and implemented in Korea from 1 June 1<sup>st</sup>, 1939 onwards. The next steps taken by Japan included the enactment of certain regulations facilitating the investigation of the present state of the labor force, and of others designed to further cement Japan's control over ~~the labor force,~~ financial resources, businesses, and culture. Based on the above-mentioned laws and regulations, Japan proceeded with the mobilization of the Chosun-Korean labor force.

Under the Japanese government's systematic measures and preparations for the direct mobilization of labor, ~~One of the most salient effects of these measures to mobilize the labor force was the fact that~~ a great number of Koreans were forced to leave their hometowns. On 28 July 1939, ~~t~~The forced mobilization-relocation of Chosun-Korean laborers ~~theoretically~~ began with the Ministries of the Interior and of Health and Welfare's announcement on July 28<sup>th</sup> 1939 of the guidelines-communication (통첩의 번역을 아시면 알려주시기 바랍니다) concerning governing Korean laborers' immigration to Japan. Forced mobilization began in earnest ~~However, it was~~ when the Government-General distributed guidelines concerning the recruitment of Korean laborers and regulation of their migration to provincial governors on 1 September 1939 ~~with the Government-General of Chosun's distribution from September 1<sup>st</sup>, 1939 onwards of guidelines governing the recruitment of Chosun laborers to provincial governors that the forced mobilization of Chosun labor began in earnest.~~ As a result, Koreans were collectively relocated ~~The collective mobilization of Chosun labor undertaken~~ as part of this labor mobilization plan, which differed considerably ~~was a marked departure f~~from Japan's previous policies.

Japan's mobilization of labor was carried out in three stages: volunteer-recruitment (September 1939-January 1942), government-led mobilization-arrangements (February,

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~~1942-August, 1944~~), and ~~finally~~, forced ~~mobilization-labor drafts~~ (~~September, 1944-August, 1945~~). ~~However, t~~These three stages all shared the commonality of oppressive force being used to mobilize and exploit labor. 이 단계는 시기적으로 변천한 것이 아니라 1939년부터 1945년 시기 동안 혼용되었다. The ~~se three~~ stages can be described as follows:

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위 밑줄친 내용은 삭제해주시요.

서식 있음: 글꼴: 굵게, 밑줄, 글꼴 색: 빨강

아울러 한글로 입력한 문장을 넣어 주십시오.

① ~~Voluntary-R~~recruitment stage: Entrepreneurs in the mining, coal, and construction industries assigned to recruit ~~Chosun-Korean~~ laborers, had to ~~get-get~~ permission from the Japanese government before they could employ ~~Chosun-Korean~~ laborers. Once they had obtained permission, ~~these entrepreneurs these-entrepreneurs~~ were free to recruit laborers in the areas designated ~~to them~~ by the Government-General ~~of Chosun~~. Entrepreneurs were responsible for ~~making a list of prospective employees~~, conducting ~~their~~ physical examinations ~~of prospective employees~~, and verifying their identities, ~~and for registering those selected with the government~~. Moreover, ~~the-employers or their representatives were was~~ also responsible for assuring the safe passage of the ~~collected Korean~~ laborers to Japan.

② Government-led ~~mobilization-arrangement~~ stage: During this stage, the Government-General ~~of Chosun~~ was responsible for passing on the demands for labor submitted by entrepreneurs to provincial government offices. The provincial governors would then ~~proceed to~~ round up the required laborers by taking a certain number of individuals from each *eup* and *myeon* unit. ~~In other words, during this stage~~ the Government-General ~~of Chosun~~ assumed responsibility for the collection of laborers. In addition, in order to facilitate their ~~mobilization-relocation~~ and ~~reduce the number of runawayseut down the chances of their running away~~, these laborers were separated into ~~small~~ groups ~~of five~~ before being shipped out to Japan. These government-led drives were introduced as a means of assuring a larger number of ~~Chosun-Korean~~ laborers for the Japanese market.

③ Forced ~~mobilization-labor draft~~ stage: The forced relocation of Koreans to Japan began in 1939, and by the end of 1943, approximately 400,000 people ~~were had already been forcibly relocated~~~~moved~~. However, even this number was not great enough to ~~assuage-fulfill~~ the demand for labor during the final stages of the war. To solve this problem, in September 1944 the Government-General ~~of Chosun~~ began ~~from September~~

~~1944 onwards~~ to enforce the ~~National Conscription Decree~~ National Requisition Ordinance, which cleared the way for the forced mobilization of Koreans. This ~~ordinance~~ ordinance allowed all Korean youths to be conscripted without their consent. Indeed, during and this period ~~saw the violent enforcement of this ordinance as~~ young people were abducted off the streets, and local villages were attacked ~~by the Japanese~~ in search of able-bodied workers. Under the National General Mobilization Law, any person who refused to be ~~conscripted as labor~~ drafted was thrown in jail for a period of at least one year or forced to pay a fine of at least 1,000 won. Although the conscription period was officially set at one year, it was not uncommon for this period to be unilaterally extended without the agreement of the laborer.

While a large number of Korean laborers were also forcibly relocated within Korea ~~as well~~, the majority of the studies on the subject of forced mobilization of Korean labor have focused on those ~~laborers~~ dispatched overseas. In his study on the domestic labor force during colonial rule, ~~Hur Soo-ryeol~~ Heo Su-yeol argues that, based on available materials, the number of Koreans ~~forcibly relocated~~ moved against their will within Korea by the Government-General ~~of Chosun~~ can be estimated at 422,399 while provincial offices were responsible for the forced relocation of 4,146,118 people.<sup>18</sup> ~~However, those regular laborers and mine and munitions factory workers who were relocated should also be included in this calculation.~~ (일반징용과 현원징용의 차이점이 무엇인지 설명을 부탁드립니다). 현원징용은 이미 모집이나 관알선 등 기타 방법으로 인력이 통제되거나 동원이 된 상황에서 다시 이동하게 된 경우를 의미합니다. 예를 들면, 모집노동자로 동원된 조선인을 군부대에서 ‘군속’으로 다시 동원하거나, 공장에 동원된 여성을 ‘군위안부’로 동원하는 방식입니다. 이에 비해 일반징용은 ‘모집’ ‘관알선’과 동일한 인력동원의 방식인데, 앞의 두 예에 비해 관의 개입이 더욱 적극적이고 통제가 강화된 형태를 의미합니다.

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서식 있음: 글꼴: 굵게, 밑줄

Many means, including the formation of the Women Laborers' Volunteer Corps and the mobilization of military nurses, were used to assure the ~~mobilization provision~~ of ~~women-female~~ laborers. While the legal basis for the Women Laborers' Volunteer Corps can be found in the Women Labor Ordinance ~~passed in August 1944~~, which ~~was~~ while being adopted in Japan in August 1944 and ~~was also made to applied~~ to Korea, the actual mobilization of ~~women-female~~ labor began well before this. ~~In other words, the legal basis for this mobilization of women laborers was introduced ex post facto.~~ Although the exact date on which the Women Laborers' Volunteer Corps was launched remains a subject of debate, there is general agreement ~~on the fact~~ that it was already in

<sup>18</sup> ~~Hur Soo-ryeol~~ Heo Su-yeol (*The Real Face of the Forced Mobilization of the Chosun Labor Force*; Cha Ki-byeeok, Japanese Colonial Rule in Korea, Jeongeumsa, 1985).

existence before August 1944. Several methods, such as government-led mobilizations, ~~voluntary~~ recruitments, as well as forced mobilizations –undertaken by schools and organizations, were used to collect ~~women members~~ ~~laborers for this Women Laborers' Volunteer Corps~~, with government-led mobilizations being the first ~~such method~~ employed. ~~As such, the Japanese colonial government played an active role in the mobilization of the Women Laborers' Volunteer Corps.~~

The mobilization of student labor and the formation of the ~~Chosun-Korean~~ Farmers' Patriotic Youth Corps were ~~other means also which were~~ used to organize Korean labor. As the war dragged on, the Japanese government began to strengthen its control over the ~~Chosun-Korean~~ labor force. For ~~instance~~ ~~example~~, it set up the Patriotic Labor Corps as a means of ~~mobilizing~~ ~~marshalling~~ ~~much needed~~ short-term labor ~~and~~, ~~which also allowed it to~~ ~~mobilize~~ ~~provided~~ the long-term labor required for its strategic industries. In addition, as the war worsened for the Japanese, more and more students ~~began to were~~ ~~being mobilized~~ ~~pulled into the labor force~~. As men of working age became harder and harder to come by, Japan, under the guise of the Patriotic Labor Corps, increasingly began to mobilize women, students, and even children.

The ~~Korean~~ Farmers' Patriotic Youth Corps ~~was formed under~~ ~~was formed as part of~~ the policy of exploiting ~~youth~~ ~~youth~~ labor from ~~agricultural~~ ~~rural~~ areas; ~~according to the Government-General's rural control policy~~ ~~which was established based on the Government-General of Chosun's agricultural control policy~~.<sup>19</sup> Moreover, ~~in 1932~~ the Government-General of Chosun began to implement a wartime ~~agricultural~~ ~~agricultural~~ policy ~~from 1932 onwards~~ by strengthening the ~~Agricultural Promotion~~ ~~Rural Revival~~ Movement. This ~~wartime~~ ~~agricultural~~ policy was not only designed to ~~use rural labor~~ ~~develop rural areas~~ to overcome the ~~rampant~~ problems facing the agricultural sector, but ~~also~~ to incorporate ~~these~~ human resources ~~from these areas~~ ~~within~~ ~~into~~ the wartime system. To achieve this, farmers' training centers were established and youth groups were organized. In order to assure ~~the success of~~ long-term ~~agricultural plans and the presence of an~~ ~~and~~ effective ~~agricultural~~ labor forces ~~in rural areas~~, Japan had to establish policies ~~which were~~ specific to ~~individual labor groups~~ ~~individual agricultural areas~~. Japan educated the members of the ~~Chosun-Korean~~ Farmers' Patriotic Youth Corps ~~in order and then dispatched them to Japan as secondary farmers~~ to replace ~~those~~ Japanese ~~farmers and operate the wartime mobilization system in rural areas~~. ~~who had gone to war.~~

<sup>19</sup> Higuchi Yuichi (*The Situation of Chosun Farmers Under the Wartime Structure*, Shakai Hyoron, 1998); Chung Hye-kyung (*“The Forced mobilization of labor during the final phase of the Japanese colonial era –The Chosun Farmers' Patriotic Youth Corps”*, *Korean Independence Movements* Vol.18, 2002).

~~These members of the Chosun Farmers' Patriotic Youth Corps~~ were gathered from around the country and dispatched to Japan after ~~having received a brief short-term training period in the above mentioned farmers' training centers~~. While the ~~Agriculture and Forestry~~ Bureau of the Government-General of Chosun was responsible for the general administrative affairs of the ~~Korean Farmers Patriotic Chosun Farmers' Patriotic Youth Corps~~, the ~~military county offices~~ ~~was played the central role in the local~~ areas. The number of Korean people drafted as agricultural laborers has been estimated at 7.40 million (6.5 million within Korea and 900,000 overseas).

## 2) Military Mobilization

~~Japan's~~ ~~The~~ expansion of ~~the Japan's war of aggression~~ and its growing lack of military forces ~~raised led it to begin entertaining~~ the possibility of ~~mobilizing incorporating~~ Koreans into its military. ~~The~~ However, the Japanese ~~brass government~~ remained uneasy about ~~allowing training and arming~~ Koreans, the majority of who harbored hostile feelings towards Japan ~~despite the long-term goal of assimilation, to join their military~~. In June 1937, ~~however~~, the Japanese Ministry of the Army asked ~~Chosun Korean~~ Military Headquarters to submit its opinion about the possibility of ~~mobilizing inducting~~ Koreans into the Japanese military. The ~~Chosun Korean Military Troop's~~ Headquarters ~~responded with response came in the form of~~ a report entitled <<"An Opinion on ~~Korean the Korean~~ Enlistment">. This report ~~argued proposed~~ that ~~allowing an experimental system be set up to allow Korean Chosun~~ youth to ~~voluntarily~~ join the military ~~on an experimental on a voluntary basis~~. ~~This, the report argued~~, would lead Koreans to increasingly see themselves as imperial subjects (*Hwangkuk*), and help the Japanese military resolve its expected shortage of human resources.

Moreover, the longer than expected duration of the Sino-Japanese War and ~~the expansion of~~ Japan's ~~war of aggression other conflagrations~~ presented the Japanese government with an opportunity to further ~~study the possibility of consider mobilizing recruiting~~ Koreans into the military. ~~On February 22, 1938, the~~ Japanese government ~~authorized made~~ the ~~military enlistment mobilization~~ of Koreans ~~into the military possible~~ by ~~enacting announcing~~ the ~~Army Army~~ Ordinance for Special Enlistment System (Ordinance-imperial edict No. 95) on 22 February and implementing it on ~~which was implemented from~~ 3 April 1938-3<sup>rd</sup>-onwards). In addition, ~~other~~ regulations ~~related to the implementation of enlistment~~ were also announced. These regulations stated that provincial governors and police chiefs would be responsible for gathering



volunteers after receiving the green light from the Japanese military headquarters, while the Government-General would operate training centers. After Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the Japanese Navy also considered recruiting Koreans. ~~To counter this,~~ In response to this, the Japanese government announced the Navy Ordinance for Navy Special Enlistment System (imperial edict No. 608) as well as a decree concerning training centers for naval volunteers.

The extension of battle lines meant that even students could not escape forced conscription. In accordance with the regulations governing the temporary employment of special volunteer soldiers for the army, passed in October 1943, Koreans of college age or older were sent to the battlefield as student soldiers.

Japanese military authorities, ~~who originally initially~~ only planned to introduce a military conscription system for Koreans 50 years down the road, ~~were forced~~ began considering to begin considering the adoption of such a system as a last gap measure as early as 1942. By 1944 the Japanese military had begun ~~its~~ preparations to implement this plan. The Military Service Law, which was to be the legal basis used to implement ~~the conscription ordinance~~, was amended on 1 March 1<sup>st</sup>, 1943 ~~and took (with the actual amendments taking effect on 1 August 1<sup>st</sup>, 1943).~~ Physical exams were began to be given to prospective Korean soldiers new recruits starting in from April 1944. ~~All in all,~~ a total of 206,000 people, or 94.2% of ~~those who were selected~~ the recruits, successfully completed this physical examination.

By this point, the Japanese military was not only short of soldiers but also short of the labor needed to sustain the military. To remedy this situation, the Japanese military ~~began to mobilize enlisted~~ Koreans as *kunsok* ~~civilian labor force employees for of~~ the military (*gunsok*). During ~~the early stages of~~ the Sino-Japanese War, these civilian so-called kunsok employees were recruited ~~and made~~ to build ~~military related~~ factories under military jurisdiction and to participate in civilian-public construction projects. However, as the war ~~began to dragged~~ on, Japan increasingly fell back on special conscription or direct government intervention to mobilize round up the necessary labor for the military. ~~With the modification of The modification of the National Conseription Decree Requisition Ordinance on 20 July 20<sup>th</sup>, 1943, Japan, paved the way for Japan to mobilize enlisted Koreans into the military based on a policy of "controlled requisition".~~ Many of ~~them were later those who were mobilized under this policy had their status changed to kunsok and~~ were sent out into the field to build munitions military factories or ~~were~~ dispatched to the frontline as civilian employees of the military. On the surface, their mobilization took the form of supporting ~~In essence, these kunsok were used to support~~ the Japanese military's war effort. Moreover, after 1944, ~~special-separate~~

classifications were no longer issued and ~~these kunsok~~they were simply mobilized ~~enlisted alongside along with~~ the regular labor force. ~~The kunsok~~Civilian employees ~~were sent were assigned as drivers, prison camp guards, and laborers out to work on~~ airport and railroad construction sites, ~~and~~ in military factories ~~in Southeast Asia, or~~ used as drivers, or prison camp guards ~~in Southeast Asia~~. Following the defeat of Japan, a great number of ~~these kunsok~~ were treated as B or C-level war criminals.

### 3) Sexual Mobilization

—Previous studies have tended to classify the Women Laborers' Volunteer Corps and comfort women (~~women used as sexual slaves by the Japanese military~~military sexual slaves) ~~within the same category: that of of~~ mobilized ~~women laborers~~female labor. However, a distinction should be made in that while the ~~Women Laborers' Volunteer Corps~~former was mobilized for labor purposes, the ~~comfort women~~latter were ~~were~~ used for sexual exploitation. Moreover, different recruitment methods were used to secure these two groups. As such, the term sexual mobilization is only applied ~~in this paper~~ to ~~the~~ comfort women ~~in this paper~~.

—Comfort women were among the very first to be forcibly mobilized. Japan ~~felt the~~ needed ~~to make sure that to send~~ comfort women ~~were present in areas wherever~~ the ~~Japanese~~ Japanese military had been dispatched, such as China and Southeast Asia. ~~More to the point, t~~The first comfort station was opened in Shanghai in 1932, one year after the Manchurian Incident of 1931. The mobilization of comfort women was carried out ~~with cooperation as a cooperative venture~~ between ~~those involved in~~ the Japanese prostitution industry and the Japanese military and government, which in great part explains why, to this day, the Japanese government has refused to accept responsibility. During the 1930's ~~these~~ comfort women were lured into sexual slavery with promises of jobs. However, ~~by from~~ the 1940's ~~this veil was lifted and~~ women ~~were forcibly taken~~ away ~~began to be forcibly mobilized~~. ~~Those who~~ Several actors actively participated in this sexual mobilization drive including: soldiers, ~~kunsok~~civilian personnel, ~~the High~~ Police ~~police~~, and ~~as well as~~ those engaged in the prostitution industry. To date, the exact number of comfort women or victims of such sexual mobilization has not been clearly established.

<Table 2> Estimate of the ~~N~~ number of Koreans ~~who were~~ forcibly mobilized ~~Mobilized~~ within Korea and ~~a~~Abroad ————— (Unit: ~~people~~person)

<u>Labor Mobilization of labor</u>	Total	Military mobilization ( <del>soldiers,</del> <del>kunsok</del> )(soldiers, civilian military employees)	Total
Provincial-level mobilizations within Korea	5,782,581	<u>Special volunteer</u> <u>Special enlisted</u> soldiers <u>of the army</u>	20,723
Government-led <u>arrangements</u> mobilization drives within Korea	382,537	Army	186,980
Mine and munitions factory workers relocated within Korea ( <u>현원징용</u> ) <u>한국에 국한하지 않습니다. 미크로네시아나 다른 지역에서도 시행.</u>	260,145	Navy	22,299
<u>Forced labor drafts</u> <u>Korean laborers</u> relocated within Korea	43,679	<del>kunsok</del> -Civilian military employees (Army)	70,724
Subtotal	6,468,942	<u>Civilian military employees</u> <del>kunsok</del> (-Navy)	<b>84,483</b>
		Military personnel <del>used</del> -within Korea	55,404
<u>Forced labor drafts</u> <u>abroad</u> <u>Korean laborers</u> relocated overseas	<b>724,727</b>	<u>Military personnel</u> ( <u>군요원?</u> ) <del>dispatched</del> -to Southeast Asia <u>군요원은 여러 성격이 혼재되어 있으므로 Military personnel 로 하는 것이 적당할 것 같습니다.</u>	36,535
<u>Forced labor drafts</u> <u>Korean laborers</u> relocated to Japan	132,781	Military personnel <del>dispatched</del> to Japan	<b>132,781</b>
<u>Forced labor drafts</u> <u>Korean laborers</u> relocated to Southeast Asia	135	Military personnel <del>dispatched</del> to China	4,587
Subtotal	867,643		
Total	7,326,585	Total	614,516

서식 있음: 글꼴: 굵게, 밑줄

- People mobilized for sexual purposes, i.e. the comfort women, are excluded from this tally.
- Bold-style figures indicate the number of people forcibly mobilized to Japan
- Source: Kim Min-yeong (2003, 48).

3. —

4. —

5.—

6.—	7.— Number of people 8.— registre d—as foreigner s	9.— Nationality	
		10.— C h e s u n	11.— R.O.K /%
12.—		46.4	63.77,43
		6	3/14.
		7	2
		7	64.95,15
13.—		4	7/17.
		7	0
	29.544,903	0	65.121,9
	30.560,700	47.4	43/2
14.—	31.535,065	6	2.8
	32.556,084	5	66.131,4
	33.556,239	7	27/2
	34.577,682	5	3.6
15.—	35.575,287	4	67.135,1
	36.601,769	3	61/2
	37.611,085	48.4	4.3
	38.619,096	1	68.143,8
16.—	39.581,257	3	89/2
	40.567,452	7	4.9
	41.569,360	1	69.146,3
	42.573,284	2	31/2
17.—	43.578,545	2	5.4
	44.583,537	49.4	70.158,9
	45.585,278	2	91/2
		4	6.4
18.—		7	71.170,6
		6	66/2
		5	7.9
		7	72.174,1

<del>19.</del>	<del>50.4</del>	<del>51/2</del>
	2	8.1
	1	73.187,1
	7	12/3
<del>20.</del>	0	0.1
	7	74.194,0
	8	54/3
	51.4	3.0
<del>21.</del>	3	75.215,5
	3	82/3
	7	5.0
	7	76.228,3
<del>22.</del>	9	72/3
	3	7.6
	52.4	77.244,4
	2	21/3
<del>23.</del>	8	9.5
	7	78.253,6
	9	11/4
	5	1.0
<del>24.</del>	6	79.253,6
	53.4	11/4
	4	3.3
	2	
<del>25.</del>	7	
	7	
	8	
<del>26.</del>	54.4	
	4	
	0	
	7	
<del>27.</del>	4	
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	55.4	

<del>28.</del>	4
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**Formation of the Korean Community in Japan after World War II**

서식 있음

*The GHQ and Japanese Government's Policies toward Koreans after World War II*

From 1945-1948 approximately 1.5 million of the 2 million Koreans residing in Japan were repatriated to Korea. In 1950, some 544,903 remaining people registered as Korean residents in Japan in response to the Alien Registration Law. They consisted of those who had left hometowns in search of work in Japan and those who went to Japan as part of the labor mobilization policy implemented after 1938. Unfortunately, returning to Korea after World War II proved more difficult than anticipated; this is why 544,903 Koreans were still in Japan by 1950.

Let us now look at some of the policies the GHQ and Japanese government adopted for Koreans who hoped to return to their liberated fatherland. For the most part, the GHQ's policy towards Koreans was influenced by the United States' perception of Korean residents in Japan. In its policy for dealing with non-Japanese residents in Japan (16 June 1944), the United States, as one of the members of the Allied Forces during World War II, classified them as "enemy citizens." The United States regarded Koreans,



who continued to resist Japan because of their historical background, as an “obstacle” in rebuilding a positive relationship with Japan. As a result, Koreans were treated as even more “useless” than the Japanese, and became the targets of a “removal” policy. This perception can be discerned through the actions of the GHQ during the occupation of Japan. The GHQ intended to investigate Koreans whom the GHQ regarded as enemy citizens and bring them under their control.<sup>20</sup>

The removal policy for Koreans was the result of a collaborative effort between the GHQ and the Japanese government. The GHQ announced two memorandums: the General Headquarters Memorandum on the Registration of Korean, Chinese, Ryukyuan, and Taiwanese in Japan (February 1946) and the Repatriation Memorandum (March 1946). These memorandums provided Koreans with but one choice: accept or refuse repatriation to Korea. Moreover, should they accept repatriation, they had no other option but to comply with the plan established by the authorities. Under this plan, each individual was allowed to take with them no more than 1,000 yen (equivalent to the value of approximately 16kgs of rice) and basic commodities such as clothes (less than 113 kg). As a result, many Koreans put off returning to Korea, and the removal policy came to naught.<sup>21</sup>

Another policy employed by the Japanese government and the GHQ against the Koreans was the ethnic education policy. Even before the liberation of Korea, ethnic Korean education was actively practiced in Japan. However, when the repatriation policy was completed in 1947, the Korean community in Japan began conducting their own brand of ethnic education, a move vehemently opposed by both the Japanese government and the GHQ. In January 1948, Korean schools were entirely denied formal recognition, in accordance with the notification stating that no private schools in which Korean children of school age were enrolled would be recognized. In addition, the Japanese government severely limited the ability of teachers working in these schools to receive the necessary qualification, thus making it difficult for the schools to remain in operation. In October 1949, the Japanese government ordered the closure of 90 schools managed by the League of Koreans (Joseonin Yeonmaeng). Moreover, 275 schools were ordered to restructure, with the majority of these schools being ordered again to shut down on 4 November 1949.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Hong In-suk (2001, 141-145).

<sup>21</sup> For a more detailed account of the returning process, please refer to Choi Yeong-ho ([-*Korean Residents in Japan and the Liberation of the Fatherland*, Geulmoin, 1995].)

<sup>22</sup> With regard to the ethnic education movement, please refer to Kim Yeong-hae (1988), [-*Materials Relating to the Jaecil Chosunin's Struggle to Maintain their Ethnic Education*, Tokyo, Akashi, 1988; Ojawa Yusaku ([-translated by Lee Chung-ho, *History of the Jaecil Chosunin's*

Korean residents in Japan were essentially sacrificed by the GHQ in the name of stability and the rebuilding of Japan. Rather than regarding them as an ethnic minority with their own culture and lifestyle, the GHQ and Japanese government attempted to forcibly assimilate them while continuing to discriminate them. Nevertheless, Koreans proved to be very resilient.

As mentioned above, the Japanese government and the GHQ's policy regarding ethnic education provoked the strongest response from Korean residents in Japan. For Koreans, who were strongly attached to their homeland, ethnic education was seen as the most important means of maintaining their Korean identity. Even when the Japanese colonial government strongly pursued a policy of assimilation through such organizations as the Hyeophwahoe, they vehemently clung to their right to ethnic education. The movement to establish schools for Korean children began to spread within Korean communities in Japan. The first school for Koreans in Japan, the Naniwa Night School, which opened in 1928, came about as a result of the efforts of Koreans residing in Naniwa-ku, Osaka, who organized a committee supporting the operation of the school. The largest Korean community, which was situated in Higashinari-ku, Osaka, decided to establish the Kansai Kyomei School in April 1931, raising 1,700 won in contributions to cover the funds needed to open the school. A ceremony marking the completion of the building was held on 1 December of that same year, and the school was officially opened in January of the following year. The Korean community in NakakawachiNaka-Kawachi-gun, Osaka, opened its own school geared towards the education of preschool children on 16 October 1930. In addition, Koreans also established a night school in Minato-ku, Osaka, with many students in attendance.<sup>23</sup>(이 부분에 나오는 일본어 발음을 확인해주시기 바랍니다).맞습니다

서식 있음: 글꼴: 굵게

As such, Koreans throughout Japan were active in movements defending the right to Korean ethnic education. Beginning with a rally held in Osaka in February 1948, demonstrations were continuously carried out that year. On 14 April, the city of Kobe accepted Koreans' demands. However, the GHQ reversed this decision and declared a state of emergency, which resulted in widespread protests with 1,732 people arrested in Kobe alone. 136 people were taken to court and sentenced to 15 years of hard labor. Moreover, a 16-year-old boy named Kim Tae-il died after being shot in the back of the head during the protests in which a great number of people were injured. Despite the fact that in 1952 the number of Korean schools had been reduced from 600 to 44, with

Ethnic Education, Hyeon, 1999).

<sup>23</sup> Chosun Ilbo, 29 July 29, 1930; 28 November 28, 1931; 23 December 23, 1931; Joseon jungang ilbo/Chosun Joongang Ilbo, 6 January 6, 1932; 2 December 2, 1934; Minjung sibo/Shinbo, Vol.6, 15 September 15, 1935.

the assets seized by the Japanese government, Koreans' passion for ethnic education could not be quelled. Their continued push earned them permission to reestablish ethnic schools in 1965, albeit under limited conditions. In addition, the establishment of the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (hereafter referred to as Chongryun) in May 1955 further cemented this drive for ethnic education. Chongryun passed its own "school regulations" in 1956 and established Joseon University in Tokyo that same year, which became the first Korean tertiary education institute established in Japan.

#### 1) Legal Status of Korean Residents in Japan Following Liberation in 1945

서식 있음: 글머리 기호 및 번호 매기기

Let us now turn to the issue of the legal status of Koreans in Japan after Japan's defeat. The Japanese government used 70 million Japanese and 30 million Koreans more or less as cannon fodder but took voting rights away from Koreans following its surrender in World War II. As a result of the modification of the election law in October 1945, Korean residents, along with Taiwanese residents, were defined as non-Japanese citizens without voting rights and ineligible for public office, meaning they could not be included in the electoral rolls.

The Alien Registration Law was drafted in cooperation between the Japanese government and the GHQ. This law, along with the "removal" policy, was used to control Korean residents in Japan. By the time the GHQ's repatriation plan came to an end, some 600,000 Koreans remained in Japan. The focus of the Japanese government's policy accordingly was changed from removing to controlling those Koreans. In November 1946 the Japanese government began to implement a system of certification of residence in Osaka, with the results of this reflected in the Alien Registration Law (2 May 1947). In this law, Korean residents in Japan were obliged to register as foreigners and carry an alien registration card. Moreover, it stipulated that individuals could be forcibly relocated if they were in violation of any of the provisions. At that time, 529,589 Koreans, or 98% of the estimated 540,113 Koreans residing in Japan, registered under this Alien Registration Law.<sup>24</sup> Following the outbreak of the Korean War, the Japanese government, at the behest of the GHQ, announced the Immigration Control Act (4 October 1951), which was aimed directly at Korean residents in Japan.

However, it was the San Francisco Peace Treaty that most influenced the legal status of Korean residents in Japan. This treaty, signed on 8 September 1951 and enacted on 28 April 1952, saw Japan officially abandon its rights to the Korean

<sup>24</sup> Hong In-sueok (2001, The GHQ's policy towards Korean residents in Japan in the immediate aftermath of World War II, pp.170-175).

peninsula. This resulted in the transformation of the legal status of Koreans, who became officially recognized as foreigners. The notification, dated on 28 April 1952, stated that Korean residents in Japan had, as a result of this treaty, officially lost their Japanese citizenship. At the same time, however, Japan recognized the right of temporary residence for Koreans as stipulated in the Potsdam Agreement. This was not a favorable measure for them. While the Japanese government recognized their status as temporary residents, they also applied the same regulations to them as they did to other foreigners residing in Japan. These regulations governed their qualifications for remaining in Japan, the duration of their stay, and their forced relocation if they did not obey the laws of the land. It can be inferred that Japan intended to use the issue of Koreans' status as a negotiation card in future talks on the normalization of relations between Korea and Japan.<sup>25</sup> After the San Francisco Peace Treaty, they fell under the jurisdiction of the Alien Registration Law. As such, they had to carry a registration card on them at all times and be fingerprinted at regular intervals: in other words, they were treated as potential criminals.

The 1965 Korea-Japan Basic Relations Treaty further weakened the legal status of Korean residents in Japan. Because the treaty only permitted Republic of Korea (ROK) nationals to obtain permanent resident status in Japan, 350,000 Joseon nationals, which made up 59% of the Koreans in Japan at the time of the Korea-Japan Treaty, officially found themselves stateless. This accord did not contain any guarantees that the first, second, and third generations of Koreans in Japan would automatically receive permanent resident status in Japan. Moreover, by leaving open the possibility of renegotiating measures related to the granting of permanent residence after a duration of 25 years, even those who had obtained permanent residence found themselves on shaky legal ground.<sup>26</sup> As such, Koreans who were registered as Joseon nationals lived in legal limbo until they obtained the status of special permanent resident following Japan's ratification of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees in 1982.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>25</sup> Kang Je-eon and Kim Dong-huon (*Korean Residents in Japan—History and Future Prospects*, 1989, pp.178-179).

<sup>26</sup> This problem was finally resolved with the signing of a memorandum based on the “Agreement on the Legal Status and the Treatment of Nationals of the Republic of Korea Residing in Japan”, which guaranteed the status of permanent resident to the third generation of the Koreans in Japan and the establishment of the Immigration Control Special Law in May 1991 (*Jaeil Chosunin*). This memorandum was signed during then Prime Minister of Japan Kaifu Toshiki's visit to Korea in January 1991. This was followed by the establishment of the Immigration Control Special Law in May 1991.

<sup>27</sup> Kim KwangGwang-ryeol (*“Present Status of Korean Residents in Japan and Future Tasks”*, *Peace and Human Rights on the Korean Peninsula*, 2001, p.222).

## 2) The Two Koreas' Policies towards Korean Residents in Japan

서식 있음: 글머리 기호 및 번호 매기기

Significant differences arose between the North and South Korean governments' approaches to Korean residents in Japan. While the South Korean government basically adopted an "abandonment" policy, the North Korean government, as the DPRK Foreign Minister Nam Il stated in 1954, recognized Koreans in Japan as "DPRK citizens." These differences in the two governments' adopted policies considerably influenced the political orientations of Koreans in Japan. Let us first analyze the South Korean government's policy.

Before the establishment of an independent government in Korea, South Korean leaders, who were involved in an anti-UN trusteeship movement, were concerned about the leftist, pro-Communist League of Koreans. They paid little attention to the Korean Residents Union in Japan (Mindan), which formed in October 1948 and consisted of pro-Japanese figures. As anti-communist nationalism became the backbone of South Korean society, the existence of the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chongryun), the pro-North Korean organization, came to influence the South Korean government's perception of Koreans residing in Japan. While Rhee Syngman's administration recognized the importance of resolving this issue during talks with its Japanese counterparts, the issue became little more than a diplomatic tool to be used during Korea-Japan talks due to the general lack of awareness regarding the plight of overseas Koreans.

While Rhee Syngman's government adopted a hard-line policy towards Japan, Park Chung-hee's government shattered the dreams of Koreans in Japan by ratifying the Korea-Japan Agreement. The Park government, which came to power through a military coup, set out to achieve two urgent tasks: the establishment of an anti-communist military structure in Korea, and the reconstruction of the domestic economy and stabilization of national living standards. The normalization of relations between the ROK and Japan emerged as a necessary step towards attaining these objectives: the solidification of the anti-communist camp in East Asia, the stabilization of the anti-communist military government in Korea, and the resolution of Korea's economic problems. The normalization of relations between the two countries, which was undertaken for these reasons, left an undeniable scar on the psyche of Korean residents in Japan.

In the "Agreement on the Legal Status and the Treatment of Nationals of the Republic of Korea Residing in Japan" (Paragraph 1 of Article 1, Paragraph 1 of Article 2, Article 3, and Article 4), which was added to the Treaty on the Basic Relations

between Japan and the Republic of Korea, only those people who obtained ROK citizenship were granted the right of permanent residence in Japan. As a result, the division and confrontation between North and South Koreans within the Korean community in Japan reached serious proportions. The Japanese government used this agreement to control Koreans with Joseon nationality. As a result of the normalization of relations with Japan, South Korea received 300 million dollars in reparations and an additional 200 million dollars in loans. However, this agreement did not include any Japanese apology or settlement of the past, which has left many issues unresolved between Korea and Japan: Japan's provision of compensation for the forced mobilization of Koreans looms as one of the largest.

<Table 3> Changes in the nationality of Korean residents in Japan<sup>28</sup>

Year	Number of People Registered as Foreigners	Nationality	
		Joseon	R.O.K/ %
1950	544,903	467,470	77.433/14.2
1951	560,700	465,543	95.157/17.0
1952	535,065	413,122	121.943/22.8
1953	556,084	424,657	131.427/23.6
1954	556,239	421,078	135.161/24.3
1955	577,682	433,793	143.889/24.9
1956	575,287	428,956	146.331/25.4
1957	601,769	442,778	158.991/26.4
1958	611,085	440,419	170.666/27.9
1959	619,096	444,945	174.151/28.1
1960	581,257	401,959	187.112/30.1
1961	567,452	380,340	194.054/33.0
1962	569,360	375,124	215.582/35.0
1963	573,284	357,702	228.372/37.6
1964	578,545	350,173	244.421/39.5
1965	583,537	339,116	253.611/41.9
1966	585,278	331,664	253.611/43.3

<sup>28</sup> In 1994, 67% of the Korean residents in Japan (*Jaeil-Chosumin*) were registered as nationals of the R.O.K. Kwon Jun-hui/on-hee, ("Divided nationalism and the *Jaeil-Chosumin* registered as nationals of Chosun", *Korean-Japanese National Studies*, Vol. 2, 2002, p.1197), <Table1>

North Korea's policy towards Korean residents in Japan has been exemplified by Nam Il's announcement over Pyongyang airwaves in April 1954. In this statement, Nam Il, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, asserted that the Japanese government should recognize Koreans in Japan as citizens of the DPRK and, as such, provide them with the freedoms and rights bestowed by this status. This was further cemented by North Korea's support for ethnic education and the right of repatriation to North Korea. From April 1957, North Korea, through Chongryun, provided educational support and scholarships to Korean residents. Support for ethnic education was first promised by Kim Il-sung in August 1955. However, due to interference by the Japanese government, no aid was possible until 1957. In December 1972, the North gave Koreans 12.9 billion yen in educational funds. This economic support allowed the Korean community to strengthen the financial basis of their ethnic education and further solidified ties with North Korea.<sup>29</sup>

The repatriation of Koreans in Japan to North Korea gained momentum in 1959, with a letter to Kim Il-sung from a Korean resident of Kawasaki in August 1958. In response to this letter, in which he lamented that he could no longer live in Japan and wished to return to North Korea, Kim Il-sung recognized repatriation as one of the natural rights of all citizens of the DPRK. From December 1959 to November 1961, 88,000 people returned to North Korea. On the basis of the Japanese government's removal policy, this repatriation could be carried out despite the objections of the South Korean government.

North Korea's policy contrasted with the deceitful policy adopted by the South Korean government through the Korea-Japan Agreement, which influenced Korean residents' view of their homeland and their political orientation. As a result of the conclusion of the Korea-Japan Agreement, Koreans in Japan lost all faith in the South Korean government. Meanwhile, the North Korean government enacted the nationality law in 1963, recognizing non-naturalized Koreans as citizens of the DPRK. While this did not actually result in Koreans in Japan being granted North Korean citizenship, the tolerant approach displayed by the North Korea government deeply influenced the Korean community in Japan.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> As these educational institutes offering ethnic Korean education did not receive any financial support from the Japanese government, and had many of their assets were seized, the financial burden placed on *Jaeil Chosunin* the parents of the Koreans in Japan wishing to send their children to such schools was prohibitively huge.

<sup>30</sup> As North Korea had not established diplomatic relations with Japan at that time, the passage of North Korea's nationality law did not result in the *Jaeil Chosunin* obtaining North Korean



### 3. Conclusion

서식 있음: 글머리 기호 및 번호 매기기

As evidenced above, the Korean community in Japan is a product of Japan's colonial economic policy and of its forced mobilization policy. Although Korea itself was eventually liberated, the liberation of these people has yet to truly take place. Koreans who remained in Japan as a result of the policies of the Japanese government and the GHQ have been marginalized and discriminated against by the government and society of Japan and mostly ignored by the governments of the two Koreas.

When the Japanese Ministry of the Interior conducted a census of Koreans in September 1947, approximately 530,000 Koreans were found to be residing in Japan. Unable to return to their homeland, they eventually became "Korean residents in Japan." Rather than sit idly by and hope that Korea would unify and become prosperous, they provided their children with an ethnic Korean education in order to prepare them for an eventual return to Korea and were active in nationalist organizations. Despite the Japanese government and the GHQ's repeated interference and oppression, they taught their children the history and language of their homeland with their own efforts. When the Korean community, which had played such an important role in preserving Korean national identity, was dismantled after liberation, they found their ability to maintain Korean national identity severely tested. Though they suffered from limited social mobility and were unable to enter official circles of power, Koreans were able to achieve economic stability by creating a niche for themselves in industries such as the Pachinko business and the handicraft manufacturing industry. However, economic hardships have hardly been the worst they endured: their marginalized status within both Japan and Korea has posed a much larger problem.

Whether they tried to conceal their identity and pass as Japanese or live openly as Korean residents in Japan, they could not avoid discrimination. In order to assure that their children would not suffer as they had, the first generation took all necessary steps to help their offspring adjust to Japanese society. However, for these second and third generations, Japanese society has proven to be a hard wall to knock down. The most difficult thing has been their relationship to their Korean homeland. Given their strong feelings, Korean residents in Japan can neither assimilate into Japanese culture nor remain unaffected by the cold gaze of the Korean government that seems hell-bent on interfering with their efforts to protect their rights.

As time has gone by, Koreans have come to realize that the best option for them is citizenship.

to live openly as Koreans within close-minded Japanese society. Stories of people who obtained Japanese citizenship restoring their Korean names and nationality are common amongst Koreans residing in Japan. In other words, they want to live as Koreans, regardless of the political orientation or ideology of their homeland. If this is the case, will they continue to play the role of “outsiders”?

At the beginning of 2003, a Korean school in Osaka invited a singer named Kim Yeon-ja to perform at the 55<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the school’s founding, and designated Kim as a bridge between North and South Korea. Kim’s song “Imjingang River” has become the symbol of the unification of the two Koreas within the Korean community in Japan. The song states, “Although birds are free to fly across the Imjingang river that runs between North and South Korea, the people of North and South Korea cannot move freely across the river.” Koreans in Japan, like Kim Yeon-ja, have identified themselves as actors who can help bridge ideological differences and bring about unification. In the future, as full members of Japanese society, they may play a role of bridging the divide between North and South Korea.

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—North Korea's policy towards the *Jaeil Chosunin* has been exemplified by Nam Il's proclamation announced over Pyeongyang airwaves in April 1954. In this proclamation Nam, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, asserted that the Japanese government should recognize the *Jaeil Chosunin* as overseas nationals of the D.P.R.K. and as such, provide them with the expected freedoms and rights bestowed by this status. This perception of the *Jaeil Chosunin* as overseas nationals of the D.P.R.K. was further cemented by North Korea's support for the ethnic education policy, and their granting of the right to return to North Korea to the *Jaeil Chosunin*. From April 1957 onwards, North Korea, through the Chongryeon, provided educational support and scholarships to the *Jaeil Chosunin*. The provision of support for ethnic education was first promised by Kim Il-sung in August 1955. However, due to the interference of the Japanese government, no aid was possible until 1957. In December 1972, the North provided the *Jaeil Chosunin* with 12.90 billion yen in educational funds. This economic support allowed the *Jaeil Chosunin* community to strengthen the financial basis of their ethnic education, and further cemented ties with North Korea.<sup>34</sup>

80.—The repatriation of *Jaeil Chosunin* to North Korea began in 1959, with the letter of a *Jaeil Chosunin* who resided in Kawasaki to Kim Il-sung in August 1958 serving as the momentum for this development. In response to this letter, in which the *Jaeil Chosunin* lamented about how he could no longer live in Japan and wished to go back to North Korea, Kim Il-sung recognized the right of return to be one of the natural rights of all people of the D.P.R.K. From December 1959 to November 1961, 88,000 people returned to North Korea. This repatriation was carried out over the vehement objections of the South Korean government who claimed that all this did was play into the hands of the

<sup>34</sup>—As these education institutes offering ethnic Korean education did not receive any financial support from the Japanese government, and many of their assets were seized, the financial burden placed on *Jaeil Chosunin* parents wishing to send their children to school was huge.

Japanese government and their policy of 'removing' the *Jaeil Chosunin*.

81.— North Korea's *Jaeil Chosunin* policy, given form by Nam Il's proclamation, influenced the *Jaeil Chosunin*'s, who were disappointed with the deceitful policy adopted by the South Korean government exemplified by the 1965 Korea-Japan Accord, view of their fatherland and their political orientation. As a result of the conclusion of the Korea-Japan Accord, the *Jaeil Chosunin* lost all faith in the South Korean government. Meanwhile, the North Korean government, in its nationality law enacted in 1963, recognized all Chosun nationals as overseas nationals of the D.P.R.K. While this did not result in the *Jaeil Chosunin* being granted North Korean citizenship, the tolerant approach displayed by the North Korea government deeply influenced the *Jaeil Chosunin* community.<sup>32</sup>

82.—

83. Conclusion

84.—

85.— As can be seen from the above, the *Jaeil Chosunin* community is a product of Japan's colonial economic policy and of forced mobilization. Although Korea itself was eventually liberated, the liberation of these people has yet to truly take place. The *Jaeil Chosunin*, who as a result of the policies of the Japanese government and GHQ, were given little option but to stay in Japan, have lived as a marginalized group that has been discriminated against by the government and society of Japan, and that has also had to suffer further indignation in the form of the indifference toward their plight displayed by the governments of the two Koreas.

86.— When the Ministry of the Interior conducted a census of the Hanin in September 1947, about 530,000 Koreans were found to be residing in Japan. These people, unable to return to their homeland, eventually became the *Jaeil Chosunin*. Rather than standing idly by and hoping that the unification of Korea would occur and that their homeland would become prosperous, they actively pursued the right to provide their children with an ethnic Korean education and formed nationalist organizations in order to prepare for their return to Korea. Despite the Japanese government and GHQ's repeated interference and oppression, the *Jaeil Chosunin* clung to their right to teach their children the history and language of their homeland. When the Chosunin community, which

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서식 있음: 글머리 기호 및 번호 매기기

<sup>32</sup>—As North Korea had not established diplomatic relations with Japan at that time, the passage of North Korea's nationality law did not result in the *Jaeil Chosunin* obtaining North Korean citizenship.

had played such an important role in preserving Korea's national identity, was dismantled after liberation, they found their ability to maintain their national characteristics as Koreans severely tested. The *Jaeil Chosunin*, although they suffered from limited social mobility and were unable to enter the official circles of power, were able to achieve economic stability by creating a niche for themselves in industries such as the Pachinko parlor business and the handicraft manufacturing industry. However, economic hardships have hardly been the worst thing these people have had to endure; their marginalized status within both Japan and Korea has proven to be an even more serious cause of heartache for the *Jaeil Chosunin*.

87. The *Jaeil Chosunin* could not avoid being discriminated against by Japanese society even when they tried to hide their identity and pass themselves off as Japanese. In order to assure that their children would not suffer like they had the first generation of the *Jaeil Chosunin* took all necessary steps to help their offspring adjust to Japanese society. However, for these second and third generations, the Japanese society has proven to be a hard wall to knock down. The most difficult thing for the *Jaeil Chosunin* has been their relationship with their homeland. These *Jaeil Chosunin* who are residents of Japan but, given their strong feelings for their homeland, cannot assimilate into Japanese culture, cannot remain detached from the cold gaze of their fellow countrymen or from the attitude displayed by a Korean government that seems hell bent on scuffling their efforts to protect their rights.

88. As time has gone by, these *Jaeil Chosunin* have come to realize that the best option for them is to live in this narrow minded Japanese society as Korean residents. Stories of people who obtained Japanese citizenship restoring their Korean name and nationality are common amongst the *Jaeil Chosunin*. In other words, these people desire to live as Korean residents in Japan, and this regardless of the political orientation or ideology of their homeland. If this is the case, then what kind of role can we expect these 'outsiders' to play?

89. At the beginning of 2003, a Korean school in Osaka invited a singer named Kim Yeon-ja to perform at the 55<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the school's founding, and designated Kim as the bridge between North and South Korea. Kim has been actively engaged in the unification movement, and has sung her song "Imjin River" in both North and South Korea. Kim's song has become the symbol of the unification of the two Koreas within the *Jaeil Chosunin* community. This song contains lyrics which claim that although birds are free to fly across the Imjin

~~River that runs between North and South Korea, the people of North and South Korea cannot move freely across the river. As such, the *Jaeil Chosunin*, like Kim Yeon-ja, have identified themselves as an actor which can help bridge differences and bring about unification. In the future, the *Jaeil Chosunin*, in their capacity as full members of the Japanese society, will play the role of bridging the divide between North and South Korea.~~

~~90.~~

KCS