

## Change of Ideological Terrain and Political Consciousness in South Korea

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### Abstract

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This paper aims to examine the ideological terrain and the change in political ideology and consciousness since the economic crisis of 1997~~late 1990s~~ in South Korea. The ideological terrain in South Korea changed from the Conservative-led one to that of a competition of among the Conservative, the Moderate~~middle~~, and the Progressive, and while the impact of globalization each of these three patterns is divided into two categories by the impact of globalization. Region and generation have played a more critical role than class in the formation of political consciousness in South Korea. Regionalism or regionalistic sentiment has emerged as the most significant criterion since the June Democratization Movement of 1987 while generation factor has gained more influence with globalization and the coming of information society since the late 1990s. Recent changes in the ideological terrain of South Korea can be interpreted not as “the end of ideology” or “the renaissance of ideology”, but as the coexistence of the politicization and depoliticization of civil and political societies.

Key words: 10개정도 뽑아주시기 바랍니다. political ideology, political consciousness, the Conservative, the Moderate, the Progressive, regionalism, generational difference, globalization, the information society

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## 1. Introduction

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This paper aims to examine the changes in ideological terrain and political consciousness in South Korea since the economic crisis of 1997 late 1990s. In general, political consciousness ~~means~~ can be defined as the way people understand their society, and is usually expressed in the form of political ideologies such as "the Conservative", "the Moderate-Middle" ~~how about "moderate?"~~, and "the Progressive". Political ideology is the complex plex [confluence?] of various ideas, including which includes beliefs and hopes, as well as the understandings ways in which individuals, parties, classes, and states understand ~~and prospects about~~ domestic and foreign affairs, ~~which individuals, parties, classes, and states have~~. From the perspective of political sociology, ~~political ideology,~~ which is usually acquired in the process of political socialization, not only exerts great influence on the political consciousness of social actors in civil society, ~~but also provides political parties with an overall and fundamental~~ direction for policies. In this paper, political ideologies and their closely ~~linked~~ linked political consciousness in South Korea since the economic crisis of 1997 late 1990s will be sociologically analyzed given a sociological analysis.

\_\_\_\_\_ This paper is comprised of three parts. In the second section, the ideological terrain in South Korea, using understood in terms of the tripartite model of the Conservative, the MiddleModerate, and the Progressive, ~~are~~ briefly explained. The modern history of South Korea since 1945 worked as favorable conditions for the development of ~~the a~~ Conservative faction; ~~however,~~ the ideological terrain in South Korea, led by the Conservative faction, began to change after the June Democratization Movement of 1987, and began to take on the trichotomy ~~which that~~ stands for the competition between the Conservative, the Moderateiddle, and the Progressive. ~~[huh?]~~ In the third section, political ideologies related to the ideological terrain in South Korea since the late 1990s ~~is~~ are discussed. The characteristics of the ideological terrain in South Korea ~~is~~ are analyzed based on empirical data, generational factors ~~influencing that~~ influence political ideologies, and the problematic concepts of "the end of ideology" and "the renaissance of ideology". In the final section, a brief

summary and discussion ~~on~~of the future of political ideologies in South Korea are provided.

## 2. The Ideological Terrain in South Korea

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### (A) Overview of the Ideological Terrain in South Korea

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In general, the paradigm of political ideology is classified into a bipartite model of the Conservative versus the Progressive, or into a tripartite model of the Conservative, the MiddleModerate, and the Progressive. The bipartite model had been ~~more influential~~influential than the tripartite model ~~the as the more~~-dominant framework for interpreting the ideological terrain of Korea than the tripartite model until the 1980s. However, the tripartite model started to gain comparative advantage as a consequence of the decline in ideological and political opposition and the gradual growth of the MiddleModerate. The classic way to classify political ideology is by choosing whether to impose more importance on the state or the market, or on growth or distribution, but this has been recently challenged by the impact of globalization. Each of these three features of ideology (the Conservative, the MiddleModerate, and the Progressive) is again divided into two categories, according to the political attitudes toward globalization. The choices between nationalism and globalism now play a critical role in classifying ideologies.

<Figure Table 1>. The Ideological Terrain of South Korea

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	<del>the</del> -Conservative	<del>the</del> <u>MiddleModerate</u>	<del>the</del> -Progressive
Nationalism	<del>the</del> -National -Conservative (Theory of <u>the</u> Developmental State)	<del>the</del> -National <u>MiddleModerate</u> (Theory of the Coalition of the Left -and the Right)	<del>the</del> -National Progressive (National Liberation Faction)
Globalism	<del>the</del> -Global Conservative (Neo-liberalism)	<del>the</del> -Global <u>MiddleModerate</u> (South Korean Version - -of the _____ Third Way)	<del>The</del> <u>GG</u> lobal Progressive (global Left)

<FigureTable 1> shows the ideological terrain in South Korea, reflecting the ~~the~~ ~~changechanges~~ brought about by globalization. First, the Progressive is arranged into two groups, “the National Left” and “the Global Left”. The former focuses on national liberation while the latter focuses on global solidarity. Second, the ~~MiddleModerate~~ is classified into “the National ~~MiddleModerate~~” and “the Global ~~MiddleModerate~~”. The coalition of the Left and the Right after Korea’s liberation from Japanese colonial rule in 1945 represents the National ~~MiddleModerate~~, and ~~the~~ Korean version of “the Third Way” is regarded as the Global ~~MiddleModerate~~. Third, the Conservative is divided into “the National Right” and “the Global Right”. The theory of ~~the~~ developmental state under the Park ~~Chung-Chung-hHee~~ ~~Regimeregime~~ -in the 1960s is ~~the-an~~ example of the former, while recent neo-liberal policies represent the latter.

## ~~(2) The Conservative~~

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The Conservative ~~group~~ in South Korea had exerted great influence on ~~the-both~~ intellectual society and ~~the-~~ society as a whole ~~since-from~~ the Korean War. The development of conservatism in South Korea is attributed not only to the political strategy of the ruling class, but also to ~~the~~ support from ~~the~~ grassroots. As a result, the Conservatives continued to gain considerable support from ~~the~~ citizens until quite recently.<sup>2</sup> The dominance of conservatism in South Korea can be explained by two reasons.

First, ~~the~~ establishment of separate regimes ~~in-on~~ the Korean peninsula after the liberation of 1945, ~~and-along-with~~ the experience of the Korean War (1950~1953), ~~both~~ reorganized South Korean society into ~~an-~~“anti-communist regimented society” led by the Right-Wings, as Cho ~~HiHee Yeon-yön~~ pointed

<sup>2</sup> The conservative characteristic of ~~the~~-civil society in South Korea began to decline after the June Democratization Movement of 1987, and a series of social changes in 2002 including “candle-light demonstrations” and the presidential election contributed to weakening ~~the~~ conservative civil society. For ~~the-a~~ discussion about the change of civil society in South Korea, see Kim Ho-ki-gi (1999), ~~Kim~~ (2001), Koo (2002).

out (Cho ~~Hi-yŏn Cho~~, 1997: 70).<sup>3</sup> Anti-communism had been one of the most dominant ideologies in South Korea, and not even a hint of discussion of the potentials of socialism or social democracy, the main political ideologies of the Left-Wings ~~is-was~~ tolerated. This situation enabled conservatism to take precedence over any other ideologies and greatly influenced the public sphere, which ~~is-was~~ closely tied to both civil and political societies. Second, the system of traditional Confucian ethics served as ~~one-of-the~~ firm bases for the development of conservatism. While traditional thoughts ~~are-were~~ generally denied and rejected in the process of modernization, Confucian ethics were often evaluated as beneficial to the development of South Korea. “Confucian capitalism” and “the Korean version of democracy” (the political ideology which-that emphasized Korean traditions of democracy under the ~~Park Chung Hee~~Park Chung-hee Regime) are representative discourses ~~which-that~~ show-demonstrate the influence of Confucianism on the Conservative. The main idea of those discourses is that Confucianism, marked by favoritism and hierarchism, contributed to rapid industrialization and ~~played-the-role-of~~ offered a theoretical and political framework in-within which to adapting Western democratic systems and institutions into a South Korean style. Traditionalism and ~~communitarianism-communalism~~, which Confucian ethics emphasized, had a selective affinity with [aspects of?] Western conservatism.

It is interesting that some scholars raised the question of whether conservatism really exists in South Korea, even though many politicians and intellectuals publicly advocate ~~the-Conservative~~ ideas. For example, Kang ~~Ch]ŏeong-in~~ classifies conservatism into the categories of “dispositional conservatism”, “conditional conservatism”, and “political-philosophical conservatism”, ~~and-argues~~ while arguing that there is only a “conditional conservatism” ~~[no-quotation-marks? Is this your phrase? Or his?]~~ in South Korea, led by the mainstream, which wants to protect its vested interests, or “the conservatives without philosophy” (Kang ~~Ch]ong in~~, 1997: 9-62). He claims that liberal democracy has never been fully realized in South Korea and

<sup>3</sup> According to ~~Cho Hee-Yyeon~~ ~~Cho (Cho Hi-yŏn)~~ and ~~Kim Eun-Mme~~ ~~Kim~~ (1998: 133), “the anticommunist ideology was thus voluntarily accepted by the populace as well as the state, and provided a social condition in which labor discipline and political repression were possible in the name of “the fight against Communism.””

that there are no traditions and practices of liberal democracy in South Korea, even though the mainstream ~~appoints~~ has appointed itself as ~~the~~ its safeguard/guardian of liberal democracy. Kim Yong-min also points out that conservatism in South Korea has no philosophical or ethical foundation and that it serves only as a politically dominant ideology for the ruling class (Kim ~~Yong-min~~, 1999: 11-52). He ~~analyzes~~ argues that conservatism in South Korea had somewhat vague meaning and just ~~worked~~ functioned for the integration of the mainstream, the die-hards, and the conservative ~~middle~~ middle-class. In short, he argues that ~~there exist~~ conservative forces or conservative parties exist in South Korea, but ~~no~~ without a philosophy of conservatism ~~in South Korea~~.

To explain the Conservative in South Korea clearly, it is necessary to distinguish ~~the~~ conservative forces from conservatism. If ~~the~~ conservative forces indicates are made up of a group of people who want to conserve traditions and to sustain communities, conservatism is not the only choice left to them. They could choose the die-hards or the reactionaries as the source of their ~~own~~ ideology, ~~and~~ and even sometimes ~~they prefer~~ show a preference for dictatorship to democracy, as the cases of other countries ~~show~~ demonstrates. In this context, it ~~can~~ might be true that conservatism has never existed in South Korea. Although ~~the~~ conservative forces adopted conservatism as its main political ideology under the Yushin ~~Regime~~ regime in the 1970s and the Chun Doo-Hwan ~~Regime~~ regime in the 1980s, when liberal democracy was suppressed, conservatism in South Korea is far from the ideal conservatism of Western societies [this is an ideal? Just because the ruling classes happen to possess a particular ideological agenda? What makes this necessarily better than a conservatism out of pure self interest, which is a prime motivation still shared by so-called "Western" conservatism. What "West" are we talking about? France? Germany? The US? Turkey? Peru? Brazil?]. This is because the ideology of either regimes cannot be defined as conservatism, considering if we assume that conservatism is also one of the modern democracies.

The Conservative in South Korea is the ideology of dominant political forces and the intellectuals of the ~~Park Chung-Hee~~ Park Chung-hee ~~r~~Regime in the 1960s, the ~~Roh Tae-Woo~~ Roh Tae-woo and the Kim ~~Young-Young~~ sSam ~~r~~Regimes of the late 1980s and ~~the~~ 1990s. As mentioned above, conservatism in South Korea is classified into "the National Conservative" and "the Global

Conservative", and with the theory of the developmentaldevelopment state under the Park Chung-HeePark Chung-hee Regime-regime in the 1960s standing as is a typical ideology of the former, while neo-liberal policies under the Kim Young-sam Young Sam Rregime since the mid-1990s come to represent the latter. In a strict sense, the conservatives in South Korea tend to be regarded as being identical to both the die-hards and the reactionaries, and without their who exist without a own philosophical background. Furthermore, the Progressive has taken the initiative in setting the agenda of social reform in the democratization process since 1987, and while the Conservative consequently began to lose its intellectual and political hegemony over society.

### (3) The Moderateiddle

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It is difficult to clearly define the political Moderateiddle in South Korea. While the literal meaning of the Moderateiddle is the-that of an ideology which is lying between the Conservative and the Progressive, the word "moderateiddle" does not simply mean the denote a theoretical center of an ideological spectrum. In a positive sense, the Moderateiddle can be considered as an attempt to combine the advantages of both the Conservative and the Progressive, but it is hard to assert that it this position is a productive reconstruction because it also can be seen as a simple rearrangement of various policies.

In South Korea, there are have been ups and downs in the history of the Moderateiddle. Even if there were middleModerate-oriented leaders including Y~~eo~~ Un-hHyöeong and Kim Kyu-Gyu-sSik, who tried to establish a coalition of the left and the right after the 1945 liberation, and Jo Bong-amCho Pong Am, who tried to promote social democratic policies against the Rhee-Syngmng Man Rhee Regime-regime in the late 1950s, it was difficult for the Moderateiddle to attract wide attention from the public in during the Cold War era. The Moderateiddle began to gain critical momentum after the June Democratization Movement of 1987, which changed the ideological terrain in South Korea from that of an oppositional relationship between democracy and anti-democracy to a multiplicitous relationship among the Conservative, the Moderateiddle, and the Progressive. Lively discussions and heated debates among intellectuals since the 1990s over the nature of Western social democracy, including democratic corporatism and the "Third Way", among the intellectuals since

the 1990s reflect ~~the~~ this increased attention given to the Moderate ~~middle~~.

The Moderate ~~middle~~ in South Korea seems to cover a wide range of ideologies, ~~from spanning from the position of the~~ liberals all the way to the Keynesian right. The Moderate ~~middle~~ actively emphasizes the introduction of competition mechanisms rooted in the market system and at the same time asks the government to effectively intervene in solving the problems of social inequality that the market system brings about. As shown in Table 1, the Moderate ~~middle~~ in South Korea is divided into “the National Moderate ~~middle~~ ” and “the Global Moderate ~~middle~~ ”, while the latter, represented by the Korean version of the Third Way, influenced the policies that the Kim Dae-jung regime promoted. As shown in <Figure 1>, the Middle in South Korea is divided into ‘the National Middle’ and ‘the Global Middle’, and while the latter represented by the Korean version of the Third Way influenced the policies that the Kim Dae-Jung Regime promoted. [can’t understand the last part ofn this sentence— maybe I just need a second look later] From a sociological perspective, the Kim Dae-j Jung Regime ~~regime~~ is a typical example of ~~the a~~ middle Moderate-oriented government ~~which that~~ pursued both economic neo-liberal policies and social democratic welfare policies (Choe Chang-jip, 1998; Im Hyök-paek, 2000). The emergence of ~~the a~~ moderate ~~middle~~-led regime such as the Kim Dae-j Jung government has politically important implications in South Korea in the sense that it marks the fact that the hegemony of the Conservative has ended and that the Moderate ~~middle~~ ’s emergence allowed for competition between among the Conservative, the Moderate ~~middle~~ and the Progressive began with its emergence to begin.

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The Moderate ~~middle~~ in South Korea ~~now~~ must now face tasks in the both theoretical ~~context~~ and ~~in the~~ political contexts. The Moderate ~~middle~~ in South Korea does not seem to go beyond ~~than simply arranging the mere~~ rearrangement of the strategies of the Progressive and the Conservative, even though it tries to suggest various economic and social policies. From the view of the Progressive, the Moderate ~~middle~~ failed to provide both programs for the socially weak ~~and in addition to~~ strategies to address the social inequalities ~~sy which that~~ the market system causes in capitalist society. In addition, there has not been a tradition of liberalism in South Korea ~~that~~



usually provides from which to provide an epistemological base for the this Moderateiddle (Kim Dong-ch'un, 1999). From the view of the Conservative, the Moderateiddle applied-imported and applied theories from the West without considering the given-existing conditions of-within the-Korean society. [but simplistically setting up "Western conservatism" as the "ideal" without any explanation is any different?] Even though the Moderateiddle does not necessarily have to accept criticism from the Conservative and the Progressive, it is undeniable that limitations for there exist limitations of the Middle.undeniable that there are some limitations for the Moderateiddle.

In spite of these limitations, it is hard to assert that there is no optimistic outlook for the Moderateiddle has no optimistic prospects. The primary advantage of the Moderateiddle is that it seeks for sustainable and feasible alternatives, and has-possesses great potential to draw broad attention from civil society, where both progressive-Progressive and eConservative trends interests are mingled. The-This increase in flexibility and autonomy - t- the main principle of social changes triggered by the globalization and the coming advent of the information society - - makes the boundary between the Conservative and the Progressive more unclear, and consequently prompts a forecast of "the end of ideology". The future of the Moderateiddle in South Korea depends on how to respond to the impact of globalization and the coming of the information society. -these changes - in a global dimension. [I'm still not really sure what that means. Too vague]

#### (4) The Progressive

The history of the Progressive in South Korea is dramatic. The Progressive erupted in both the political and civil societies after the liberation from Japanese colonial rule in 1945, but it rapidly shrank under the American military occupation (1945~1948). Although there were some progressive studies in academic circles, they were mostly conducted by minority groups and were nationalist-oriented. The Progressive rapidly declined after the Korean War, but came-grew to a turning pointcritical mass in the mid-1980s as a consequence of the growth of student and labor movements in the late 1970s and early 1980s. "The debate on social formation" within the progressives deeply influenced both the - intellectual and civil societies and is regarded as having opened the

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“age of social science”. Even though the debate seems to have been overheated from ~~the a~~ present-day perspective, its significance lies in the Progressive having attained academic civil rights. This debate contributed to resurrecting the Marxist political economy ~~which that~~ was severed after the Korean War.

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The ~~heated heat of the~~ debate suddenly cooled down in the 1990s, ~~for -~~ ~~There are both~~ external and internal reasons. The collapse of Eastern European socialism and the introduction of a procedural democracy after the June Democratization Movement of 1987 eroded the meaning of revolutionary movements in South Korea ~~which that~~ the debate aimed to encourage. Instead of ~~the a~~ debate on social formation, the Progressive ~~went entered~~ into new debates on post-Marxism, civil society, and the ~~making construction~~ of a working-class party. Compared to the 1980s, the influence of the progressives on the intellectuals declined in the 1990s, while their influence on civil society and social movements increased. This ~~changed altered~~ atmosphere resulted in the establishment of various social groups, such as Korean Federation of Environmental Movement (KFEM) in 1993, People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD) in 1994, ~~the~~ Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) in 1995, and ~~the~~ Democratic Labor Party (DLP) in 2000.

In ~~a~~ theoretical perspective, the Progressive in South Korea ~~covers spans~~ ~~from the~~ Keynesian Left to orthodox Marxism. According to Yun ~~KG~~öeön-ch'a, fractions of progressive intellectuals in South Korea are composed of “old-left Marxism”, “new-left Marxism”, “Althusserian Marxism”, ~~the~~ “radical theory of civil society”, “theory of radical democracy”, and ~~the~~ “theory of progressive nationalism” (Yoon ~~Kön~~-ch'a, 2000, 18). Concerning ~~the its~~ relation with political society, the Progressive can be classified ~~into as~~ a group ~~supporting that supports~~ the Democratic Labor Party (DLP), a group ~~focusing that focuses~~ on radical civil movements, ~~and as an independent group supporting that supports the left [do you mean “remaining” or the “Left?”] alternatives.~~

Although the radical social theories of Western Europe were not introduced until the late 1970s, those theories took firm root in South Korea

only in the past 20 years, while it took 200 years for Western Europe to ~~build up the theories~~ develop them. Cynical criticism regarding ~~it~~ them as being academically dependent ~~of on~~ European radical thoughts is aired ~~by nationalist intellectuals~~ by whom? and this criticism is somewhat reasonable. ~~[this whole sentence would benefit indicating who is doing the airing.]~~ However, the Progressive of South Korea considered Western theories as a “reference book”, not as a “text book”, and tried to construct theoretical frameworks as well as to carry out political practices ~~which that can~~ could be applied well to the South Korean case. ~~The advantage of the progressive alternatives in South Korea is that they actively set the agenda of social reform during the democratization process after the June Democratization Movement of 1987. The advantage of the progressive alternatives in South Korea is actively setting agenda of social reform during the democratization process after the June Democratization Movement of 1987. [I also don't understand this sentence.]~~ This endeavor of the Progressive contributed to gaining support from the working class and the younger generation.

The Progressive of South Korea consists of “the National Progressive” and “the Global Progressive” as can be seen in ~~<Figure Table 1>~~. The National Progressive has been theoretically influenced by the “national liberation faction”, Marxism, and the social democratic left; it also shows the several tendencies ~~as that~~ Yun ~~KG~~ Gëon-ch'a examines. Compared to the Conservative and the Moderate ~~middle~~, the global version of the Progressive, ~~which can be called “the Global Left”,~~ is still underdeveloped, ~~which can be called ‘the Global Left’, to actively tackle contemporary issues such as globalization and the coming of the information society. [where does this clause belong? To where is it connected?]~~ The underdevelopment of the Global Left resulted from the strong orientation of the South Korean progressive towards ~~the a~~ nationalism ~~which is~~ deeply influenced by anti-imperialist struggles. However, the role of the Global Left is becoming more and more important in the course of globalization.<sup>4</sup> The most important task for the Progressive lies in

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4 In this respect, anti-war ~~movements regarding protest in response to~~ the Iraqi War became the turning point to gain a global dimension beyond ~~the~~ national boundaries in the social movements of South Korea. For a discussion about the response of social movements to globalization, see Castells (1998), Kingsnorth (2003).

strengthening not only the capacity of the Democratic Labor Party, but also the global solidarity of the Progressive in the realm of social movements.

### 3. Changes in Political Ideology and Political Consciousness

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#### (4) The Coexistence of the Conservative, the ~~Moderate~~ Middle, and the Progressive

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While the Conservative highly values growth, the market, and the community, the Progressive values distribution, the state, and the individual. The ~~Middle~~ Moderate emphasizes the balance between growth and distribution, market and state, and as well as community and the individual. In many societies, political ideologies influence political consciousness and provide criteria for political choices including that include voting. What is important is It is important that South Korean people choose political ideology based on different criteria than from those in the West. In Western societies, political ideology is divided according to the way people understand the relationship between state and market, and growth and distribution. However, the main criteria for ideological choice in South Korea are the viewpoints about related to South Korea's relationship with America the United States and North Korea. The difference in criteria is attributed to the distinctive historical and geopolitical conditions of South Korea, that is, the establishment of separate regimes since 1945 and the experience of the Korean War since 1945. While the Conservative generally holds a favorable attitude toward America and anti-communism, the Progressive supports socialism (or socialist democracy) and anti-Americanism, and while the ~~Middle~~ Moderate tries to reconcile these two opposing ideological positions.

However, this ideological terrain has started to change recently. The Western criteria regarding the choice between state and market, and growth and distribution, began to gain influential power as well as the existing criteria of South Korea; [huh?] that is, South Korea's relationship with America and North Korea. This change is due to two causes. First, the external political environment changed the way South Korean people see-viewed North Korea. Since the early 1990s, the reconciliatory atmosphere between South Korea and North Korea and the rise of anti-American movements have weakened the

influential power of the Conservative within civil society. The successful promotion of the “Sunshine Policy” introduced by the ~~Kim Dae Jung~~ ~~Kim Dae-jung~~ regime (the government’s conciliatory policy toward North Korea), owes much to the changes in political consciousness in South Korea. At the same time, the Sunshine Policy directly contributed to ~~the~~ civil society’s alleviating shrinking hostility toward North Korea. Second, the financial crisis of South Korea in the late 1990s raised the question of how the relationship between state and market. ~~The~~ That the crisis changed the economic model of South Korea from that of a developmental state model to a neo-liberal ~~model one~~ should be understood. In addition, the deepening of social polarization, which included ed the deterioration of income distribution, contributed to the growth of the Progressive and the MiddleModerate.

<Table 24>. Ideological Terrain of South Korea  
(Unit: %)

	<u>Feb.</u> 2002 <del>Feb</del>	<u>Feb.</u> 2003 <del>Feb</del>	<u>Sep.</u> 2004 <del>Sep</del>	<u>Jan.</u> 2005 <del>Jan</del>
The Progressive	21.4	34.0	31.6	26.8
The <u>MiddleModerate</u> <u>e</u>	49.5	34.8	32.2	46.2
The Conservative	28.5	31.3	28.4	25.4
Others	0.6	-	7.8	1.6

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Sources: Feb. 2002 ~~Feb.~~ Feb. 2003 ~~Feb.~~ JoongAng Ilbo, 2-1- February 2003. (2월 1일? 1월 2일?)  
Sep. ——— 2004 Sep., Jan. 2005 Jan. Dong-a Ilbo, 1-1- January 2005.

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<Table 1> 2 —shows the recent change in ideological terrain of South Korea. Even though the numbers are slightly different, the Conservative, the Moderateiddle, and the Progressive are in overall equilibrium. What is remarkable in <Table 1> 2 —is that the Moderateiddle is winning more support from the public than the rest. The emergence of the Moderateiddle can be explained by the impact of globalization. By emphasizing globalism against nationalism, globalization prompts the end of an ideology that means the convergence of and transcendence over existing oppositional relationship of between the Conservative and the Progressive. Even though the growth of the

Moderate middle cannot be regarded as ~~the meaning the same as the~~ end of ideology itself, a number of issues is increasing, ~~which that cannot can no longer~~ be ~~handled dealt with any more with through the~~ existing ideological confrontation. For example, how to respond to the call for opening the domestic market to foreign investors, whether to ~~develop utilize~~ nuclear energy or not, ~~or~~ how to keep the balance of centralization and decentralization nationwide ~~–~~ these are ~~the~~ typical issues ~~which that~~ cannot be easily addressed by the ideological dichotomy of ~~the~~ Conservative versus the Progressive. The rise of the Middle Moderate, as shown in ~~<Table 21>~~, however, can be interpreted as marking an the increase in people's passive and even indifferent attitudes toward political issues. It also reflects the disappointment and helplessness of ~~the~~ people who are exhausted with overheated confrontation between the Conservative and the Progressive.

## ~~(2)~~ Region and Generation

Class, region, and generation are three major factors that influence the choice of political ideologies in South Korea. In Western societies, class plays the most critical role in political choices, ~~[REALLY? How about race in the US?]~~, but region and age range have been more influential factors than class in South Korea. ~~[and even the most recent election wasn't split along class lines? Most of the rich and established voted for Lee Hoi Chang Lee Hoi chang while the more disenfranchised went for Noh. Yes, that occurred along age and regional lines, but isn't money and establishment correlated with age and region? In the same way, money and power is correlated with race in the US, one might argue. This argument is paper thin.]~~ The reason class has not been taken into account can be explained by two facts. First, anti-communism has been so dominant in the modern history of South Korea that deep cleavages between the classes and their closely tied ideological differences have been concealed. The prevalence of anti-communism in South Korea resulted in paving the way for the development of the Conservative. Concerning the present situation of politics in South Korea, the middle-oriented Uri Party and the conservative-oriented Grand National Party are taking the lead in the National Assembly, while the progressive-oriented Democratic Labor Party is relatively lower in status.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> What is remarkable is that Democratic Labor Party won 13.1% of votes in the National Assembly election of 2004 while 20-30% of people identified themselves as supporters of the

Second, regionalism or regionalist sentiment prevented and replaced the role of the class factor in South Korea. The influence of regionalism in political choices cannot be emphasized enough. Because of its great influence upon political and civil society, regionalism has also been one of the most important factors in reproducing the system of party politics in South Korea.

This form of regionalism, which began to appear under the ~~Park Chung-Hee~~ Park Chung-hee regime, was characterized by the phenomenon of the power base of a given party being focused on a particular geographical region (Kim, 2001, 234). Even though there are various forms of regionalism in many countries, there is probably no country in which regionalism has had as crucial an influence upon politics as in South Korea. For example, in the presidential election of 1997, Kim ~~Dae-Dae~~ Jung, the candidate of the New Millennium Democratic Party, received 40.3% of the vote nationwide but received over 90% in the Chŏlla-do Province, while Lee ~~Hoi-Hoi~~ cChang, the candidate of Grand National Party, gained 38.7% of the vote nationwide, but gained over 50% in the Kyŏngsang-do Province, and over 60% in Taegu-Daegu and Kyŏngsangbuk-do province in particular. This tendency did not change in the presidential election of 2002. Roh ~~Moo-Moo~~ hHyun, the then presidential candidate of the New Millennium Democratic Party, won the overwhelming support in of Chŏlla-do Province, as opposed to Lee ~~Hoi-Hoi~~ cChang, who gained the majority of support in of Kyŏngsang-do Province.

The negative effect of regionalism is that it misleads and distorts the political consciousness and choice of people. From an economic perspective, voting based on regionalism can be considered rational. From a social perspective, however, regionalism appeals to regional exclusivism and antagonism, and therefore distorts the political judgment of people. It has interrupted active competition among the Conservative, the MiddleModerate, and the Progressive, as well as in addition to disrupting the processes of positive interaction between political society and civil society. In addition, this regionalism is closely connected to both school ~~ties~~ and family ties, ~~and~~

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Progressive. There exists an asymmetrical correspondence between political and civil societies in South Korea.

these which have been connections that have exercised a decisive influence upon presidential and National Assembly elections. One of the main causes of political underdevelopment in South Korea has been that the fact that the regional cleavages combined with class cleavages has promoted to promote political splits. Political parties exacerbated this political situation by continually attempting to capitalize on regional biases.

Recently, age range has emerged as one of the most important factors affecting political ideology and consciousness. The generational difference in political consciousness is reflected in voting and has influenced result of voting voting results. In the 1997 presidential election, this difference could be seen is readily apparent. As shown in <Table 2>3, Kim Dae Jung Kim Dae-jung attracted more support from those in their 20s and 30s, while Lee Hoi Chang Lee Hoi-chang gained support from the relatively older generations over 40. This tendency continued in the 2002 presidential election, as <Table 3>4 illustrates. Roh Moo Hyun Roh Moo-hyun won nearly 60 percent of the support from the voters in their 20s and 30s, while Lee Hoi Chang Lee Hoi-chang drew almost the same amount of support from those over 50.

<Table 2>3. Voting by Age Range in the Presidential Election of 1997

(Unit: %)

	Lee Hoi- cChang	Kim Dae- jung Kim Dae- jung	Rhee In-je Lee In Je	Others
The 20s	27.9	43.2	24.6	4.3
The 30s	34.8	43.7	20.7	0.9
The 40s	44.1	37.2	17.8	1.0
Over the 50s	51.0	34.2	14.8	-

Resource: ChJoeng Tae hwa, (1998: 65).

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<Table 3>4. Voting by Age Range in the Presidential Election of 2002

(Unit: %)

	Roh Moo- Hyun Roh Moo-hyun	Lee Choi- Choi-cChang
	MBC-KRC*   KBS-Gallup	MBC-KRC   KBS-Gallup



20s	59.0	62	34.9	31
30s	59.3	59	34.2	34
40s	48.1	47	47.9	49
50s	40.1	40	57.9	58
over 60s	34.9		63.5	

\* KRC: Korea Research Center

Resource: Kang (~~Wŏn-t'aek~~, 2003: 290).

What is remarkable ~~[is this so remarkable? Is not the younger generation often more progressive than the older, established generation in many other similar societies? Perhaps the Korean case is more pronounced, but it isn't actually very surprising.]~~ is the consistent general characteristics of the younger generation. In general, the younger generation is more inclined to ~~the~~ Middle Moderate and ~~the~~ Progressive reform than to the Conservative, and therefore, holds favorable attitude toward ~~the~~ candidate who pursues social reforms. In the case of Western societies ~~[again, are they really all the same? I guess then we should compare the US to "Eastern societies" and treat the cases of China, Japan, and Korea as all the same.]~~, the young in their 20s are said to be more conservative by ~~[due to]~~ the introduction of neo-liberalism but actually became more individualized and depoliticized, not conservatized.<sup>6</sup> The situation in South Korea is not that different from the West ~~[ugh—this is the argument's most problematic hole. Is such a fundamental logical error acceptable in an academic paper?]~~. While those in their 30s, represented by ~~"the 386 generation,"~~<sup>7</sup> (referring to those who were born in the 1960s and actively participated in the pro-democracy movements while attending universities in the 1980s), are still reform-oriented, those in their 20s are relatively depoliticized. One difference from the West is that conservatism has not appealed to those in their 20s, ~~because due to the fact that~~ conservatism in South Korea has no philosophical foundation. In addition, ~~the~~ 18 years of ~~"historical learning process"~~ of democratization since the June Democratization Movement has helped to maintain the attention of the younger generation toward democratic reform.

<sup>6</sup> Ulrich Beck (1998) calls ~~the~~ younger generations as "Freedom's Children" and emphasizes ~~the~~ individualization as a distinctive trend of reflexive modernization.

<sup>7</sup> ~~The 386 generation refers to those in their 30s who were born in the 1960s and actively participated in the pro-democracy movements while attending universities in the 1980s.~~

One more important issue is the gap between the generations. Globalization and the ~~coming-advent~~ of ~~an~~ information society accelerate social change and consequently widen the gap in worldview between the generations because younger generations adapt themselves to those changes more easily than older generations.<sup>8</sup> It should be noted that this generational difference is demonstrated in political choices. Individualism, open-mindedness, and favorable attitudes toward change are ~~main-central~~ values inherent ~~in-to~~ globalization and the coming of ~~an~~ information society. Therefore, the political force ~~which-that~~ pursues those values receives more support from ~~the~~ younger generations. ~~[No mention of the speed of industrialization, urbanization, and modernization in general as factors?]~~ Although there is variation within each generation and each country, it is undeniable that the generation gap in political orientation will become wider. ~~[this line of argument is completely unconvincing.]~~

### ~~(3) The End of Ideology or an Ideological Renaissance of Ideology~~

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It is difficult to predict the future of the ideological terrain of South Korea. However, two possibilities can be suggested based on past experiences. First, globalization will serve as a double-edged sword. It offers favorable conditions to the Conservative in that it strengthens the market mechanism against the state, but it also helps the Progressive to receive wide support from the public because ~~of the~~ deepening of ~~the~~ social polarization caused by globalization. ~~This is one of the primary issues of the Progressive. [where does this go?]~~ However, this confused and complicated situation which globalization has generated will also give the ~~MiddleModerate~~ a chance to expand its influence. Taking all these conditions into account, there is a possibility that the ideological terrain in South Korea will remain as is, and the end of ideology may not ~~appear easily~~ ~~be so readily apparent~~.

<sup>8</sup> For ~~the a~~ discussion about the ~~gap of generations~~ ~~generation gap~~ in South Korea, see Song ~~Ho-kün~~ (2003).

Second, differences in political ideology ~~from due to the~~ generation gap will be ~~considered~~ more important than ever. If globalization and the coming of ~~an~~ information society are irresistible trends in contemporary ~~history~~society, the emergence of ~~“generation politics”~~ is an inevitable by-product of those two changes. However, the generation factor does not necessarily make generation politics the most leading political paradigm in the ~~21th-21st~~ century because ~~generational~~ interests are less tangible than ~~those of regional-region~~ interests or class ~~interests~~. In addition, the contradictory characteristics of the younger generations should be taken into account when discussing generation politics. Younger people actively express their ~~political~~ opinions ~~on politics~~ especially through the ~~internet~~Internet, but at the same time, are more indifferent to politics than older people. Given this situation, ~~a~~ renaissance of ideology will not happen in the near future, and ideological debates and the tendency ~~of~~ ~~towards~~ depoliticization will ~~continue to~~ confusingly coexist for the time being.

#### ~~4-~~Conclusion

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~~In this~~This paper ~~examined~~ the ideological terrain of South Korea and ~~the~~ changes in political ideology and consciousness since the late 1990s ~~have been~~ ~~examined~~. First, the ideological terrain in South Korea changed from the Conservative-led to competition of the Conservative, the ~~Middle~~Moderate, and the Progressive, and each of these three patterns is split into two fractions by the impact of globalization. Second, empirical data show that the Conservative, the ~~Middle~~Moderate, and the Progressive are kept in balance in South Korea. Third, region and generation have played a more critical role than class in the formation of political consciousness. Regionalism has emerged as the most significant criterion ~~in politics~~ since the June Democratization Movement of 1987, and ~~the~~ ~~generational~~ factor is gaining more influence with globalization and the ~~coming-advent~~ of ~~an~~ information society. Fourth, recent changes in the ideological terrain of South Korea cannot be interpreted as the end of ideology or ~~the-a~~ renaissance of ideology. Continuation of ideological debates and the trend of depoliticization will coexist for the time being.

~~The debates~~Debates ~~on-over~~ political ideologies exist in every society. Political ideology provides a basic framework for political consciousness, and political consciousness has much to do with the growth of democracy. If democracy

matures through productive competition among various political forces, ideological debate serves as the starting point for policy competition. However, recent ideological debates in South Korea seem to be somewhat excessive and overheated. Considering the relatively short history of democracy in South Korea, this phenomenon is quite understandable. However, excessive debates are not desirable because they increase the social cost in solving ideological conflicts. One of the essences of democracy lies in the coexistence of differences and similarities. Considering that political ideology is a kind of framework for expressing difference and similarity among competing social groups, the political society in South Korea should also ~~has to~~ focus on similarities instead of differences.

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