An Analysis of the Discourse on
the Citizens' Movement in Korea:
A Comparison to the Japanese Case

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Abstract

This paper explores the discourse on the citizens' movement in Korea in comparison to Japan. Although Korea and Japan use the same term of "citizens' movement," the discourses on it were totally different from each other due to the different historical context of these respective citizens' movement. While the discourse on citizens' movement focused on class issues with respect to the minjung *movement in Korea, the discourse in Japan concerned itself with with new subjects of the social movement associated with Japanese modernization. While there was almost no discourse on a theory of a organization in Korea, a discourse on the organization of citizens' movement, related to the characteristics of Japanese modernization, was also elaborated from the beginning in Japan. However, discourse on the citizens' movement in Korea focused on the issues of the citizens' movement that were scarcely found in Japan. A comparative analysis of the discourse on the citizens' movement reveals particular features of the citizens' movement itself and raises theoretical questions that have been previously ignored in thinking about the citizens' movement in Korea.*

Keywords: citizens' movement, discourse, subjects of citizens' movement, theory of organization, *minjung* movement, radical democracy

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Introduction

Korea's citizens' movement history began with the foundation of the Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ) in 1989. Since then, many citizens' organizations were formed and their social influence has increased; nowadays, the citizens' movement forms the mainstream of Korea's social movements (Han J. 2004; Kim H. 2000; Hong I. 2000). In spite of the solid existence and status of the citizens' movement, the meaning of the movement itself seems to have become rather obscured. In carrying out empirical research, it is sometimes unclear how the citizens' movement should be categorized, and through which meaning even citizens' movement activists (whether individuals or groups) might define their activities as part of the citizens' movement. Cho Dae-Yop argued that social movements nowadays have diversified, yet the "citizens' movement" has been more narrowly defined and cannot portray the full extent of its reality. Also, he pointed out that "citizens' movement" and "citizens' movement organizations" are often conflated (Cho D. 2000, 142-143). However, he did not expand his argument to clarify in what context the confusion arose nor did he explain what caused it; even after he made note of the problem, no further research had been done on this topic.

The purpose of this paper is to uncover the definition of citizens' movement that was confused and obscured in the early stage of citizens' movement discourse. The focus of my argument is that the main cause for the ambiguity and confusion of the term "citizens' movement" lies in its practical applications, not academic discourse. In other words, the "citizens' movement" is not an analytical concept for explaining the current social movements of the time, but rather a normative or practical concept used by the originators of the discourse to express the direction they wanted the movement to take. This early citizens' movement discourse resulted in a new social movement identity, and the concept of the citizens' movement born out of this discourse became the prototype of the Korean citizens' movement.

The Japanese citizens' movement provides a useful point of comparison for understanding the Korean citizens' movement. Though the term "citizens' movement" (   ) is commonly used in Korea and Japan, the citizens' movement in Japan, an advanced capitalist society, is considered to possess the characteristics of a new social movement (Cho Hyo-Je 2003). There is a tendency to believe that the definition of citizens' movement must be the same in both countries because Japan and Korea use the same term. In addition, the words "civil society" (*simin sahoe*) or "citizen" (*simin*) were adopted from the West, so it is easy to think that "citizens' movement" is also a translated word. Accordingly, it is easy to misunderstand the common term "citizens' movement" used in Japan and Korea as having the same origin. However, the term "citizens' movement" is not imported, but was actually born out of the distinct political and social context of Korea and Japan. Like in Korea, the notion of the citizens' movement in Japan also formed within a field of discourse on the social movement (Han Y. 2001).[1]

The notion of the citizens' movement appeared for the first time in Japan in 1960, which was much earlier than the emergence of the new social movements in Europe. This was ten years after the political conversion to a democratic system from an imperial fascist one took place after Japan's defeat in World War II and eight years after the Japanese sovereignty was restored according to the terms of the Treaty of San Francisco. During this time, Japan experienced the formation of a "55-year system" in which "conservative vs. reformist" parties became entangled in intense ideological conflicts coupled with the Cold War. According to the democratization policy of the postwar period, labor unions, democratic organizations, and other voluntary associations formed, which led to the vitalization of civil society. Particularly labor unions, in collaboration with the reformist party, were the forefront of a resistant social movement including the strug-

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1. From this perspective, I have examined the background of the formation of citizens' movement discourse in Japan and its significance at the time. The parts related to Japan in this article are mostly based on that research (Han Y. 2001) and partly on recent studies published in Japan.

gle against the Security Treaty between the United States and Japan (hereafter referred to as "anti-Security Treaty movement").[2] Economically, Japan was in the beginning phase of rapid growth, when industrialization was underway on ever-growing scale, but the negative effects of industrialization and growth-oriented policies had not yet fully emerged or become issues of contestation.

On the other hand, in Korea, since a limited level of democratization was achieved due to the breakdown of the militaristic fascist system after the June Uprising of 1987, the notion of the citizens' movement emerged as democratization movement activists were dissolving and reorganizing in the late 1980s to early 1990s. During this

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2. Japan and the United States signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty and Security Treaty between the United States and Japan ("Security Treaty"), which stipulated the stationing of the United States Army in Japan, at the San Francisco Conference in 1951 (and went into effect on April 28, 1952). As the Constitution stated that Japan could not possess military forces, the Security Treaty could not be a bilateral one but an unequal one where, though Japan acknowledged the stationing rights of the United States Army, the latter was not responsible for protecting Japan. Prime Minister Gishi Nobuske sought to revise this treaty in order to equalize the two sides immediately after he came into power in 1957. This was based on the United States's reorganization of the Far East strategy and the renaissance of Japan's economic and military power. However, the new Security Treaty was met by a large-scale opposition movement arguing that a) the new treaty contradicted Article 9 of the Constitution, which stipulates the abandonment of Japan's military force, b) it showed hostility toward other countries including China, and c) the possibility for Japan to involve itself in military actions taken by the US would rise. This was the "anti-Security Treaty movement," which remains the biggest and the last national struggle in Japan's history of social movements. When the Cold War system was established in the 1950s, resistant powers in Japan also established an extensive unified front against the system reorganization by the governing authority. In other words, there was a demand that the "organizational sphere" constituted by the reformative party and the labor union and the "non-organizational sphere" consisting of small non-party groups should unite and proceed with a resistant movement; this united front was represented by the term "national movement." The representative of this movement was the peace movement, and the anti-Security Treaty movement that reached its peak in 1960 was the resistant movement that continued the line of the national movement, thus having a significant position in the modern political and social movement history in Japan.

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period, the loosening binds of state oppression allowed for the expansion of civil society's autonomous space and a number of voluntary associations were formed. However, due to the internal and external environment, the influential power of the *minjung* movement, which used to be a pillar of the democratization movement, dwindled and the labor movement was suppressed. At the time, rapid changes in the post-Cold War era, such as the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe and diplomatic ties of Korea with Russia, greatly influenced Korean society as well, but apart from the international context, the Korean peninsula continued to exist in a state of division. Economically, Korea was well past its peak era of rapid economic growth after the 1988 Olympic Games and was experiencing problems arising from a growth-oriented economic structure. These problems were not only related to political and production areas but also to everyday life, thus bringing various issues into the forefront of popular attention.[3]

The backgrounds for the emergence of the citizens' movement discourse in Korea and Japan clearly show differences on many levels. The concept of a citizens' movement in Japan emerged in the 1960s, thirty years earlier than in Korea. Comparing the time in which the concept emerged in each country, Japan was not yet in the developed, capitalist stage, while Korea displayed post-industrial, post-modern traits. Seen from a linear development perspective, Japan was in a less developed stage than Korea when the term "citizens' movement" appeared. If this was the case, why did Korean and Japanese intellectuals discuss the citizens' movement in politically, economically, and socially different contexts and what kind of meaning did they attribute to it? This paper will discuss how the citizens' movement was defined in early discourse, which formed the identity of Japanese and Korean citizens' movements. This paper will also reveal what the distinctive characteristics of the concept are in each case, why these characteristics emerged, and why the same term was

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3. Regarding the background of the concept of citizens' movement in Japan, see Han Young-Hae (2001, 377-390) and see Cho Dae-Yop (1999, 139-147) regarding Korea.

used despite the different contexts. In addition, how these discursive characteristics are reflected in both countries' movements will be considered.

The object of investigation in this paper is, in the case of Japan, the citizens' movement discourse that developed during the process of evaluating the success and limitations of the "anti-Security Treaty movement" in 1960. In Korea's case, the object was the discourse that appeared after the Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ) declared the beginning of a "citizens' movement" in 1989, until the concept of a "progressive citizens' movement" developed through discussions of civil society as well as the citizens' movement in the early 1990s. In Japan, the concept of the citizens' movement engendered at that time became the prototype for the current citizens' movement; however, in Korea, the "citizens' movement" concept declared by the CCEJ and the ensuing "progressive citizens' movement" concept both combined to engender the Korean citizens' movement prototype.

Korea achieved an institutional democracy that included an election system through the June Uprising in 1987. But even with the increase in the autonomy of civil society, the labor and unification movements were suppressed, and radical forces could not secure political representation. Conflicts arose between the moderate reformists and radical *minjung* movement forces over how to evaluate such a limited democracy and develop a reformist line that would create a more mature democracy. The citizens' movement discourse in Korea appeared in relation to these democracy and social reform projects. On the other hand, in Japan, a massive protest against the revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty[4] broke out in 1960. In 1959, reformist organizations, such as Japan Socialist Party and Labor

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4. A large-scale opposition movement took place arguing that the new security treaty contradicted Article 9 of the Constitution, which states the abandonment of Japan's military force, adding that it showed hostility toward other countries including China and that the possibility for Japan to involve itself in military actions taken by the United States would rise.

Union, and other democratic organizations formed a coalition and were expanding its movement. When the US-Japan Security Treaty was signed on January 19, 1960 and was submitted to the Diet for ratification, the Japan Socialist Party and the Communist Party struggled inside the Diet and massive demonstrations outside the Diet unfolded. Given these circumstances, the Liberal Democratic Party dispatched police forces around the Diet on May 19, blocked the oppositional parties' affray, and unilaterally passed the treaty ratification. From these incidents, the "anti-security" or "opposition to the revision of the security treaty" movements were expanded into the "cabinet resignation" and "protection of democracy" movements. As a result, the entire cabinet took responsibility for the affair and resigned, even though the treaty ratification was approved after a month. After the end of the anti-Security Treaty movement, the notion of a citizens' movement was suggested in the process of evaluating their success and limitations, and was actively discussed.

Subjects of the "Citizens' Movement"

In the previous section, Korea's June Uprising of 1987 and Japan's anti-Security Treaty movement of 1960 were introduced as important background for the appearance of citizens' movement discourse. Korean and Japanese citizens' movement discourses found new movement subjects here.

In its mission statement, the Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice asserted that "citizens" must be the new subjects of the social movement, and particularly referred to "the citizens who poured out onto the streets during the democratization demonstration in June 1987." The CCEJ expected that these citizens, who achieved a "political miracle" in 1987 but afterwards drifted away from reforms to become onlookers, would "return to the progressive line" and participate in the movement to create "a miracle of distribution." On the other hand, the Japanese philosopher Kuno Osamu paid more attention to "the large group of citizens who [were] at home, at work, at

the Diet, the Prime Minister's house, and those who occupied the streets" during the 1960 demonstrations against the security treaty and had raised the issue of their "ideological significance" (Kuno 1960).

As such, both Japan and Korea found participants who differed from the previous activists engaged in oppositional political movements, and groped for a new logic with which to conceptualize themselves as citizens. However, the method of identifying citizens as the subjects of a citizens' movement differed significantly in Korea and Japan.

The CCEJ defined the subject of the new social movement as "citizens," not "a mass of people" (*minjung*), in its mission statement, and gave the reason that it was not only the "marginalized and suppressed *minjung*" but also "whosoever believes that our society should not be the way it is and that we must achieve a democratic welfare society, whether he be a businessman or from the middle class, can become an important part of this movement" (CCEJ 1989b). Here "citizens" were identified as "social constituents," apart from considerations of class, but what the CCEJ really focused on was the "middle class." Soh Kyung Suk, the former executive director of CCEJ, said, "If the regime can be changed by election rather than coup d'etat, . . . then the currents of society will be determined by the attitude of the middle class, which make up seventy percent of our society." He also argued, "If a social movement theory that pays attention to their reformist characteristics and acknowledges them as subjects of historical development does not appear, our social reform cannot be achieved" (Soh 1993, 198). In short, the citizens' movement discourse redefined the subjects of social reform from the *minjung* to the citizens.

However, although the CCEJ and Soh Kyung Suk defined citizens as the new subjects, they did not specify their distinct characteristics. The term citizen was used in contrast to the *minjung*, but they did not clarify what caused citizens to pour into the streets during the June Uprising of 1987 to accomplish a "political miracle." Soh Kyung Suk claimed that if the definition of *minjung* were expanded, it

would not differ from that of citizens which refer to common people; therefore, it was unnecessary to use the word *minjung* which triggered a feeling of resistance. If so, then conversely there was no need to use the term citizens either. Here, citizens became a mere concept to refer to "common people." In this way, the CCEJ passively defined citizens in contrast with the combative *minjung* as a group striving for stable reform instead of defining them in a more active sense as subjects of social movements based on the concept of citizenship. In the end, the subjects from whom the citizens' movement earned its power to reform became obscured, and naturally, the citizens' movement proposed by the CCEJ formed the identity of moderate reform.

Then, how did the proponents of the progressive citizens' movement, who criticized the reform lines of the CCEJ, define the subjects of the movement? Paik Wook Inn defined the citizens' movement as a movement based on the 'demands of life' that erupt from the base of civil society and voluntary associations of the members of a society. According to him, the difference between a progressive citizens' movement and a reformative citizens' movement depended on whether that movement takes the middle class as its basis while excluding labor movements in areas of production, or whether it works closely with labor movements. Alternatively, it also depended on whether the movement strived for the "democratic hegemony" of a certain class while specifying the class origins of the movement subjects, or whether it took the perspective of "dismantling class" (1993, 230-231). However, Paik did not clarify the subjects' class characteristics in the progressive citizens' movement discourse. He argued that in relation to the movement subjects, the issues of citizens' movements were related to the concrete interests of daily life; therefore, the various relevant social classes and strata could participate comprehensively in the movement. Here, the definition of the subject was significant in terms of the complex interplay of classes and strata (Paik 1993). In opposition to the CCEJ's position, which excluded the *minjung* as an agency of social reform, the author conceptualized "the common people" or "the complexity of the multi-class and multi-strata" as the subjects of social reform, rejecting the

middle class as the exclusive agency of social refom, In a nutshell, this discourse did not look for progressive momentum from the characteristics of subjects, but rather the connection with the labor movement became the determining factor for progressiveness. Likewise, a leading scholar of the progressive citizens' movement, Cho Hee-Yeon, defined the citizens' movement as a "citizens and *minjung*'s voluntary organizing movements that emerged as a response to the problems due to administration and the organization of public pressure based on those movements" (1993, 267). Here, the reason for defining the subjects for the (progressive) citizens' movement as "citizens and *minjung*" was because it was inevitable that "under a changed situation, social progress is not monopolized only by the previous *minjung* movement forces" (Cho Hee-Yeon 1993b, 267). Even in Cho's article, in which he critically analyzed the centralization of citizens' movement and suggested a progressive citizens' movement as a practical alternative, the subjects of the progressive citizens' movement were not discussed. In addition, as for the concept of *minjung*, Cho provided an extensive, two-page explanation for its conceptual changes in the political and social contexts in Korea by differentiating between the two dimensions of the "definition as subjects" and the "definition as orientations." In contrast, he simply described the concept of citizens in the footnote explaining the concept of *minjung*, under the premise that it was "proposed within the context of the formation of modern Western societies." The fact that the discourse of the citizens' movement, which signified progressive, reformist perspectives, neither defined the unique characteristics of the movement subjects more actively, nor discussed the central notion of citizen, reflected the dilemma that stemmed from the greater importance of the citizens' movement relative to the *minjung* movement. This ambiguity towards defining the subjects resulted in significant limitations for Korean citizens' movement theory and even for the theoretical development of social movements.

Apart from Korea's citizens' movement discourse, Japan's citizens' movement discourse that appeared in 1960 attributed significant meaning to the idea of citizens. It was an inquiry into the ideological meaning behind a large group of citizens that had filled the streets during the anti-Security Treaty movement. As Matsushita Kei-ichi stated, "the class that was able to participate in the resistance of citizens was the new middle class who enjoyed individual freedom" (Matsushita 1960, 120); the specific mode of existence of this group of citizens may not be too different from the citizens who had poured onto the streets during the June Uprising of 1987, an event that captured the attention of the CCEJ. However, in Japan's citizens' movement discourse at that time, citizens did not indicate the existence of a new middle class, but rather a concept that was ideologically formed by selectively choosing certain characteristics of citizens that were displayed during the movement. These characteristics were the internal driving force that enabled citizens to participate in the resistance movement, and discourse producers attempted to form the subjects of the movement through revealing and expanding them. In this context, "citizen" was not so much a concrete idea, but rather an ideological concept that the proponents of the citizens' movement tried to create.

Kuno paid attention to the fact that among the street demonstrators during the 1960 anti-Security Treaty movement, a good number of them had not belonged to any organization and, in particular, their number increased after May 19. These new participants were "students who normally were engrossed in study and leisure," "common people who were disinterested in politics and were content with their private life that existed between home and work," and "people who had never participated in political activities." They have participated voluntarily rather than as members of labor unions or student organizations, holding cynical attitudes toward professional politicians or revolutionaries. They participated in a resistance movement against political problems; however, it was not always because of their political ideologies. These people were unique because they actively expressed their opinions regarding political issues, and because instead of viewing their daily lives from a political point of view, they viewed politics from the point of view of their daily lives (Kuno 1960). They were further characterized by their autonomous

individual judgment rather than being passively mobilized by an organizational logic, and by their resistance to traditional leadership. What drove citizens to action was not the leadership and ideology of an avant-garde group or mere organizational momentum but rather their individual ethos as professionals and as people making a living, which was marked by "direct opposition to traditional sentiment that comes from allegiance to the community rather than principle" (Hidaka 1960c, 550).

In other words, "citizen" in the Japanese citizens' movement became a concept that implied a conversion of mere "common people making a living through work" to "political entities." This conversion was not based on any political ideology, organizational logic, or group interests but was instead rooted in the experiences of individuals.[5] Matsushita considered the disconnection between organized laborers' union activities and consciousness of everyday life as "the result of a lack of ideological revolution of laborers as individuals, because major Japanese labor unions developed into enterprise unions in the post-war period." On the other hand, pointing out that the labor unions opposed negotiations with residents for fear of causing disadvantages to union members, Hidaka criticized the Minamata pollution issue as an affair "that threw away ideology to save their own interests" and argued that it was due to a lack of the concept of "citizenship" among the laborers (Hidaka 1973, 139-140).

The citizenship that Hidaka talked about meant that individuals formed a consistent consciousness or logic within themselves and behaved according to that; this was also a characteristic of being "modern." Tsurumi Shunsuke argued that since Japan had adopted a system that the West had developed through bourgeois revolution, it had to undergo a "new citizen's revolution" to make the "given democracy" its own, and that these citizen's revolutionary character-

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5. Hidaka Rokuro listed five characteristics of the "citizen," the participants of a "citizens' movement": First, they belong to no party and no faction. Second, they do not have political ambitions. Third, they are part-time participants who have their own jobs. Fourth, they participate voluntarily, not at the order of the organization; and five, they pay for their own participation (Hidaka, 1960).

istics took shape during the security struggle, particularly after May 19, 1960. It was "Japan's public policies that were newly-born out of the private roots of the Japanese people's thoughts," or "radical democracy" (Tsurumi 1960a, 27). In other words, Japanese citizens' movement discourse of 1960 problematized "modernity" as a means to realize modern democracy, which was established in Japan though it was not yet modernized like the West, and in this context, the terms citizens' movement and citizens earned a "revolutionary" identity.

As we have discussed above, in comparison with Japanese citizens' movement discourse, the Korean citizens' movement discourse defined the subjects of the movement as an inclusive category based on class, regardless of perspectives. Within this category, the only differences were found in who the foremost group was, and in other discourses that did not rigorously define the unique characteristics of citizens as the subjects of the citizens' movement. Also, discussion of the subjects of the citizens' movement, or citizens, lacked a rationale that treated them as the internal driving force of reform. Both the reformative citizens' movement and the progressive citizens' movement regarded the perspective of the *minjung* as progressive and transformative, while they considered the perspective of the citizen with reformative, conservative, and moderate political connotations.

Theory of Organization of the Citizens' Movement

One characteristic that stands out when comparing discourses on the citizens' movement in Korea and Japan is that while theory of organization was regarded as very important in Japan, it did not exist in the Korean discourse. On the contrary, while discourse in Korea focused much on the issues of the citizens' movement, they were hardly discussed in Japan. Such differences are important clues that explain the characteristics of the discourses on citizens' movement in Korea and Japan. This part will examine aspects of organizational theory.

Theory of organization, in Japan's citizens' movement discourse,

comprises the two levels that are analytically distinct yet inseparable, i.e. ways to form solidarity between organizations that differ in ideology and political stance and the inner structure of a single group, that is, the organization of the masses. At the same time, theory of organization is closely related to the discussion of subjects mentioned in the previous section.

Hidaka criticized the "bureaucratic and doctrinarian tendencies within progressive movements," pointing out that "there exists institutional rigidity, in other words a type of sclerosis that is spread throughout the progressive forces, particularly among their high-level leaders. This situation appears also in the Communist Party, the Socialist Party, the labor union, and various democratic organizations" (Hidaka 1960c, 560). The organizational theory of the citizens' movement began by acknowledging this problem. This was a widespread "Japanese" issue that appeared not only within progressive movements but also in conservative organizations. The leftists also had this problem while criticizing feudalistic and premodern structure of Japanese society which confirms that the problem was a "Japanese" characteristic that went beyond political ideologies. This is why Hidaka defined citizens' movement as a movement that resisted both the left and the right's centralization of power. However, as members of a resistant people's movement, the proponents of the citizens' movement brought up issues regarding the progressive movement in order to critically overcome problems within the movement. Fundamentally, they were concerned with the labor union. As the labor union led the people's movement up until the anti-Security Treaty movement, it was thought that the organizational problem of the union, the leading power, could reflect directly on the overall organization of the people's movement and thus impede the dissemination of the movement.

The labor union and the reformist party had the leading organization at the center supported by unit organizations, which were organized vertically as the organizations of the masses. Directions of movement and specific plans for action were discussed and decided by the core, high-level leaders before being passed down to the

lower-level organizations as directives. These lower-level organizations, organized hierarchically under a central leading group, followed these directives, with the people belonging to them being mobilized accordingly. Ishida called this policy-making method "bureaucratic directivism." The relationship between an allied organization and its units can be depicted as one of "total subsumption," that is, a uniform pattern of deference to all directives coming from the top. This relationship inevitably turns the organization into a simple "gathering of powers." Also, in the event of political conflict or division at the upper level of the organization, the lower organizations under the vertical hierarchy of "total subsumption" will follow the leading organization and become divided. This problem was again evident in the anti-Security Treaty movement led by the people's movement.

Furthermore, Ishida pointed out a "concentric idea" as a characteristic of Japanese organization, arguing that the idea judges everything according to its distance from the center based on linear developmental stage theory and a uniform symbolic ranking, and does not acknowledge the autonomy of any organization that inclines toward another center. This idea naturally assumes that subjects who participate in the same movement share the same ideology, and those who claim themselves to be an orthodox leader within this line have a strong belief in their infallibility. They also tend to think of those without a strong belief in their shared ideology to be "backward" and thus take the position of "total negation" toward those organizations that are not completely subsumed into their line of organization, creating a "doctrine of conscience that monopolizes justice."

As examined in the previous section, citizens' movement theory in Japan conceptualized the "citizen" as the new subject of the movement as opposed to "organizational men," that is, the masses of people who were caught within the above-mentioned organizational structure and possessed no autonomy. The movement with the citizen, an autonomous individual, as its subject should differ from the previous mainstream progressive movements in its method of organizing these subjects. The "citizen" seeks solidarity rather than

being isolated from other people and absorbed with his own life. However, these citizens aim to join together as autonomous individuals, in a kind of solidarity that does not bring about the loss of individuality due to group activities. Shinohara Hajime regarded "the discovery of the citizen" as the most distinctive characteristic of the anti-Security Treaty movement and remarked that "the interplay between group activity and individuality brought about the expanded reproduction of the citizen" (Shinohara 1960, 65-66). The new trend Kuno found among the participants of the anti-Security Treaty movement, such as non-organizational and voluntary participation by those who were previously indifferent to politics and their sarcastic views on the elite consciousnesses or behaviors of professional politicians and revolutionaries as leaders, reflected the fact that Japan's social reality demanded a new organizational principle. The important aspect of the mass society that developed in Japan at the time was the "transforming the people into the masses," i.e. the way people came to be absorbed in their personal lives and thus became passive and fragmented individuals who were indifferent to social and political issues. These masses had to be organized into political subjects in order to expand the people's movement, and the citizen became the politically organized subjects of the masses.

The first organizational principle of the citizens' movement that is drawn from the above issue is "no party, no faction" and "no headquarter, no branch." The "no party, no faction" acts from the perspective of the common emotions or interests of the participants rather than being swayed by political interests, and the "no headquarter, no branch" principle opposes the vertical hierarchy of "movement leaders vs. the masses" and "central vs. subsidiary control." All members form horizontal connections with equal rights and what is needed in this case is not a group of leaders but a manager who can adjust and unify the diversity among members.

The second organizational principle is "respect for diversity and spontaneous volunteerism." Hidaka saw that the diversity of the group that joined an anti-authority and anti-system camp during the anti-Security Treaty movement showed a larger proportion of those in the anti-authority than authority among participants, and remarked that "the maintaining of this distribution is the biggest guarantee that kept the perfect form of fascist government from developing in Japan" (Hidaka 1960c, 542). He argued that since it was against the character of the people's movement to impose a single opinion upon all members within it, there was a need to find an objective through a consensus that could unify individual subjects into solidarity toward that objective, while respecting diverse viewpoints and acknowledging the pluralism of the organized center. The participating subjects will only cooperate as equals without the existence of an organizational "orthodoxy" or "legitimacy" and these subjects should be organized so that they can divide and adjust their roles to form a unity, in order to realize their limited common goal. In light of the problems with the previous "method of national meeting" that occurred in the 1960 anti-Security Treaty movement, Ishida argued that it was necessary to "follow the regulation that seemed to be very loose (regulations that do not unify actions or those that least interfere with others' actions)" and "specialize roles according to the goal so that each organization acts within a limited role, that is, within its own area," in order to increase the capacity of the movement while maintaining diversity (Ishida 1960c, 121-123). He commented that the process of voluntary establishment of regulations by the participants shows the most fundamental organizational process, saying that when the people who met for the first time at the anti-Security Treaty movement were organizing demonstrations (for example "The Voiceless Voice"), disciplines were established to achieve the same goal, and an organic division of roles was settled.

Unlike in Japanese citizens' movement discourse, theory of organization barely exists in the Korean citizens' movement discourse. Neither the citizens' movement discourse first developed by the Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ) nor the progressive citizens' movement discourse provided the unique organizational principle or organizational characteristic of the citizens' movement. Progressive citizens' movement discourse focused on distinguishing its identity more from a reformative citizens' movement than from a

minjung movement and emphasized its solidarity with *minjung* movements. However, it hardly discussed the form of such solidarity or the organizational method of the solidarity movement. The criticism that it was "a citizens' movement without citizens" was related to the characteristic of citizens' movement discourse in Korea, namely the absence of a theory of organization. Though some (Ha 2003) oppose this criticism based on the fact that there are a number of members who pay fees, it is debatable whether the members are really the subjects of the movement. Whether the securing of members accompanies the organization and participation of the grassroots masses or whether it simply remains at expanding the size of the organization or external influence needs to be considered.

The Issues of Citizens' Movement and Campaign Styles

The citizens' movement in Korea is considered as dealing with various issues in everyday life in the field of civil society such as the environment, women, education, consumer, and human rights. This was viewed as the character and "newness" of the citizens' movement that was different from the *minjung* movement, which dealt with the unequal distribution of resources and power (Lee 1992; Song 1998; Jeong et al. 1993). However, it is not that the citizens' movement began with this identity. When the Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice raised the flag of the citizens' movement, its goal was "economic justice" and "distribution justice," which, in regards to the issues, had rather the characteristic of an "old social movement" (Jeong et al. 1993; Kim J. 2004). Though it later expanded its issues to include areas such as corruption, environment, education, unification, labor, attitudinal reform, cooperative living, local autonomy, electoral campaign reform, and dispute mediation (e.g. mediation of the Oriental medicine dispute),[6] it did not define citizens'

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6. Consequently, it was criticized as the "shopping mall style movement" or "new

movement as a movement that dealt with various everyday issues from the beginning. Rather, after the concept of citizens' movement was suggested by the CCEJ, when a number of citizens' organizations[7] that appeared in the 1990s as a response to various new problems that were related to everyday life such as the environmental issue were categorized as citizens' movement organizations, the idea that citizens' movement bears this attribute seems to have been formed.

On the other hand, by raising an objection to the fact that such issues in everyday life were considered as belonging only to the citizens' movement, the progressive citizens' movement contributed in a different way to establish this idea. Paik Wook Inn claimed that "social issues such as housing, pollution, transportation, medical service, and education are the manifestations of contradictions of capital and labor in the sphere of everyday life, derived from the structure of capitalist society," and understood that such issues in everyday life could be characterized as tasks of the *minjung* movement. Therefore, he pointed out, "when social movement emphasizes only the economic struggle that takes place at the production site, as it cannot directly control the producer's overall life—production, consumption, and leisure activities—it decreases the sphere of class struggle and is unable to raise various issues regarding democracy in general at a political level." Cho Hee-Yeon also criticized the closedness of "*minjung* discourse" in the 1980s as one of the causes behind the marginalization of "*minjung* discourse" and "*minjung* movement" and the rise of "citizens' discourse" and citizens' movement in the

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movement supremacy." According to Park Hyung-Jun, CCEJ intended to deal with all issues in politics, economy, and society from a "moderate and reform" perspective that was distinct from the previous *minjung* movement (1995, 90).

7. In the 1990s, real-estate speculation and phenol pollution of the Nakdonggang river gave rise to economic and environmental issues and interest in various other issues related to everyday life such as education, transportation, and security increased rapidly. At the same time, action bodies were established to respond to the new issues in problem areas, promoting a social movement to solve the issues at hand (Cho D. 1999, 141-143).

1990s in Korean society.[8] He suggested that the progressive camp needed to respond effectively to the expansion of CCEJ and argued for a "reformist citizens' movement, progressive citizens' movement" that would propose a "progressive counterproposal" regarding the everyday life issues of the masses that were not limited to a particular class.

His argument for a "progressive citizens' movement" suggests that as the everyday life sphere where various issues are raised is becoming monopolized by the citizens' movement despite its original status as multi-class and multi-strata, the *minjung* movement camp should also actively engage in this sphere; then, the progressive citizens' movement will take on meaning as a movement that plans to make the intervention of *minjung* in civil society." As shown plainly in Cho's words, "when the progressive intervention strategy into civil society is successfully carried out, it is possible to overcome the ideological implication embedded in the concept of citizens' movement and the term citizens' movement itself" (2001, 32), the progressive citizens' movement views a citizens' movement as the "expansion of the reformist *minjung* movement" that aims for the deconstruction of the identity of the citizens' movement rather than the establishment of it.

According to the theory of the progressive citizens' movement, there is no issue particular to the citizens' movement. However, while their discourse and specific activities were generally limited to the issues related to the understanding of classes, irrelevant to the intention of those who pursued the progressive citizens' movement, the citizens' movement fixed its image as the movement that dealt with diverse issues of the social sphere. This greatly contributed to establishing its position as the leading power of social reform. In order to counter the expansion of the "moderate and conservative"

CCEJ's sphere of activity and the strengthening of its position, the progressive citizens' movement forces formed the People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD) in 1994. After its foundation, as with the CCEJ, the PSPD dealt comprehensively with various issues and emerged as one of the foremost citizens' organizations in Korea with CCEJ. Based on the "*minjung* identity" of the expansion of reformist *minjung* movement, the progressive citizens' movement tried to respond to the "conservative citizens' movement" led by the CCEJ but ended up advocating its identity not as a *minjung* movement but as a citizens' movement. As a result, the CCEJ and PSPD forced the *minjung* movement to yield its position as the mainstream social movement to that of a citizens' movement, and the term citizens' movement only came to strengthen its existence rather than being overcome.

In general, CCEJ and PSPD are considered as having the same characteristic as "comprehensive citizens' movement" organizations.[9] The concepts of "comprehensive citizens' movement" and "professional citizens' movement" are not found in Japan and the existence of comprehensive citizens' movement that deals with any issue is a unique phenomenon in Korea. Under the political circumstances in Korea where political parties cannot function properly, comprehensive citizens' movement organizations were viewed as replacing the role of these parties (Kim H. 2000). However, this is the assessment of their function or result. This model came to exist because the organizations that had a different ideological basis tried to intervene in all spheres of society based on their ideology. In this regard, a comprehensive citizens' movement is not simply activities that comprise various issues of the movement but rather a focal point that gives meaning to diverse specific activities and provides an ideological basis with the securing of the ideological frontier as its ultimate aim. On

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8. Cho stated "In particular, interpreting the heightening of control in modern capitalist societies, the diversification and expansion of cultural domination in the areas of consumption and everyday life, and environmental issues solely through the lens of class contributed to greatly reducing the scope of both the Marxist and *minjung* movements after the 1980s" (1993).

9. Cho Hee-Yeon divides the citizens' movement into a "comprehensive citizens' movement" and a "special professional citizens' movement," and defines the former as "when one organization comprises various issues of the movement with different qualities" and the latter as "when one organization acts on a particular issue" (1999, 320).

the other hand, a "professional citizens' movement" establishes a specific activity goal within a particular area of dispute and focuses on realizing this goal rather than emphasizing a comprehensive ideological inclination.

Unlike Japan, the discourse on citizens' movement in Korea has discussed much on the above-mentioned issues and ways to resolve these issues. Since the CCEJ suggested the pursuit of "reform within the system" rather than "revolution" and the establishment of a legitimate, peaceful, and rational counterproposal for the citizens' movement, rather than the previous illegal, aggressive, and militant struggle, the progressive citizens' movement has also adopted ways to bring about changes in policies and the system through policy proposals as an important method of their movement. Thus in the midst of the absence of discussion on how to organize the masses, by focusing on raising various issues and providing related policy proposals, the citizens' movement came to be led mainly by reputed public figures, professionals, and activists. In this aspect, Jeong Jong-gwon's criticism that the citizens' movement is not a "movement of the grassroots masses" but rather one of organizations made up of professionals and activists "for the grassroots masses" is appropriate (Jeong 2000) .

In the citizens' movement discourse in Japan, it is difficult to find discussions about issues and styles of the movement. These styles are included in the theory of organization and are only mentioned as "respect for spontaneous volunteerism and division of roles," and there are no particular regulations concerning issues.

Conclusion: The Conceptual Characteristics of "Citizens' Movement" and Its Theoretical Task

After comparing early discourses on the "citizens' movement" in Korea and Japan, a few important facts were discovered relating to the concept of citizens' movement.

First, the concept of citizens' movement was introduced in con-nection with the task of realizing democracy in both Korea and Japan. The citizens' movement in Japan is often considered a region-based, depoliticized movement that deals with everyday life issues. However, the citizens' movement discourse that emerged through the anti-Security Treaty movement in 1960 was a highly political state-ment that raised issues at the national and political levels and planned to turn the masses into political subjects. The citizens' movement was conceptualized within a political context that pursued changes in the pre-modern socio-cultural structure and the formation of the subject with aims to establish a democratic system that originated from outside Japan in Japan. In Korea, citizens' movement also emerged within a political context that sought the formation of the subject and reform methods in order to strengthen and intensify the democracy achieved through the June Uprising. The Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice raised economic issues by declaring a citizens' movement, but the concept of citizens' movement was defined not by the issues of the movement but by the nature of the subject. In Japan, the driving force that supported democracy was displayed in the strength of the masses that forced the entire cabinet to resign during the anti-Security Treaty movement, while in Korea, it was found in the power of the masses that brought down military fascism during the June Uprising; they tried to bring this power to a new level after the end of struggle. The Western democratic system was established by bourgeois revolution, but in a country where such a system was introduced without bourgeois revolution, the efforts to overcome the estrangement between the actual system in practice and ideology were conceptualized as "citizens' movement" not "citizens' revolution."

Secondly, the perspective that defined the subject of citizens' movement, or the citizen, differed greatly between Korea and Japan. Whereas Japan's citizens' movement discourse actively defined the independent attribute of the citizen, Korean discourse was very passive in its definition. Also, while discourse developed within the framework of "modern-premodern' in Japan, it grew within the framework of social class and strata in Korea. In Japan's early citi-

zens' movement discourse, a citizen was an autonomous individual that was not absorbed into the group, an ideal that represented the modern attribute against pre-modern Japanese properties such as collectivism and authoritarianism. On the contrary, citizens' movement discourse in Korea defined the subject of the citizens' movement from the perspective of class division and struggle, and the ideological terrain of Marxism and anti-Marxism directly influenced the definition of the subject. The two branches of citizens' movement following different ideological inclinations, i.e. "reformative citizens' movement" and "progressive citizens' movement," are characteristic of citizens' movement discourse in Korea and cannot be found in Japan. As a way to negate the theory of *minjung* as a subject, moderate reformists advocated citizen as a concept that resisted the *minjung*, while the progressive forces restored the *minjung* as the subject of the movement and advocated progressive citizens' movement in order to deny a "center of the middle-class." As a result, the subject of the citizens' movement was classified as a category that comprised all classes so as to resist the monopolistic status of a certain class and thus was not granted its own particular and independent characteristic.

Thirdly, whereas organizational theory takes an essential position within citizens' movement discourse in Japan, it barely exists in Korea. Citizens' movement discourse in Japan treated the grass-root masses as the subjects of the movement and developed the logic to organize individuals and organize solidarity between different movement groups. Regardless of whether they were conservative or progressive, previous organizations show the characteristic of "authoritarianism via concentration of power and vertical hierarchy." As this structure suppresses individual autonomy, an alternative mode of organization must be found for turning the masses into subjects. The alternative organizational method suggested from this point of view possesses the characteristics of a network-type organization in terms of the horizontal and transverse solidarity of the subjects. At the same time, an anti-authority and anti-authoritarian method of organizing went beyond the instrumental meaning of being a simple organizational method appropriate for realizing a goal; instead, it became

the goal itself.

On the contrary, the logic of organizing the grass-root masses was hardly present in Korea and even the progressive citizens' movement discourse that emphasized solidarity between the *minjung* movement and citizens' movement rarely discussed modes of solidarity. The issue of authoritarian organizational structure and culture that was raised by Japanese intellectuals through the concept of citizens' movement was not problematic in Korea. However, discourse issues and different types of movement, which were important for defining the identity of citizens' movement in Korea, were almost non-existent in Japan. The citizens' movement in Japan at the time did not suggest policy alternatives concerning specific issues because the goal of the citizens' movement was not to reform the system or realize the public good but to establish democracy in Japan through reform of Japan's authoritarian, collectivist culture, and consciousness structure, that is, modernization. For the citizens' movement in Korea, mediating conflict between various organizations where autonomy was expanded and including the opinions of alienated organizations whose political representation was not secured in policy-making were important challenges. Therefore, the Korean citizens' movement needed logic and methods that enabled monitoring, making demands, and exercising pressure against state power.

Some recent new trends are increasingly confusing the concept of citizens' movement. Despite such confusion, however, theoretical research to define citizens' movement has not yet been undertaken, and academic discourse and the media discourse that popularizes the citizens' movement rapidly shifted their center to other concepts including governance and NGO. Citizens' organizations that were actual leaders of the citizens' movements are now called NGOs, and the citizens' movement is seen as forming one axis of governance. Despite rising questions as to whether NGO activities are part of the citizens' movement or how being one axis of governance is related to the citizens' movement, only the shift from citizens' movement to NGO is taking place rapidly without any theoretical research. Though the confusion over the concept is pointed out, it is only regarded as a

flaw that needs to be overcome without much effort to explore the meaning behind the confusion. Rather than falling into this ambiguous and confusing concept, empirical studies now discuss the citizens' movement through citizens' organization and use new concepts such as NGO or SCO. Amid such changes, the significance initially given to the citizens' movement is fading. As Hong Il-pyo (2000) pointed out, the intense "citizens' movement, civil society" dispute in the early 1990s passed by like a temporary trend and rather than accumulating or critically succeeding previous theory or ideology, new Western theories and concepts are introduced to replace the former.

In both Korea and Japan, a new conservative citizens' movement has emerged, disturbing its significance. The main target of attack for the new conservative nationalists in Japan as represented by the "New History Textbook Association" can be summarized as individualism, the left wing, and feminists. This is an attempt to deny the "post-war democracy" that aimed to establish "true democracy" based on the modern, autonomous individual and restore statism. Ironically, individualism and the left-wing are placed within the same context in this discourse. Against this, progressive forces are trying to maintain and continue the ideology embedded within the Constitution, the symbol of post-war democracy. Along the same lines, discussion of the new "publicity" also means a competition between national publicity and civil publicity. Meanwhile, new conservatives in Korea, even when advocating liberalism, criticize the progressive camp's ideological inclination and concept of equality rather than drawing out the active meaning of individual or civility embedded in liberalism, and their criticism still remains within the ideological, that is, anti-communist debate. On the other hand, the progressive camp must establish a new meaning of "progressive" for today's circumstances wherein the socialist system has collapsed and the ideological terrain has changed.

The coexistence of elements of both the new and old social movement in the West is often considered characteristic of the citizens' movement in Korea. The general explanation is that Korea came to possess this characteristic due to its condensed development

that overlapped both modern and post-modern challenges. It is also said that though the citizens' movement is basically a type of movement that takes place in a developed capitalist society, the citizens' movement in Korea cannot maintain the same progressiveness that appears in the New Social Movements of the West because of its modern challenges. However, what were the modern challenges for Korean society? From what perspective did we view modernity as the challenge facing our society, and how did we connect it to postmodern challenges? Related to these questions, it is worthwhile to note the recent publication of research that actively examines the "civil" characteristic of the citizens' movement in Korea (Hong Y. 2004). Recently, as a new task for the citizens' movement, the need to overcome external powers and authoritarianism within civil society or in everyday life world and culture has been raised. Related to this, there have also been trends of seeking a new progressiveness (Cho Hee-Yeon 2004; Shin 1999), and it is interesting to see what new theoretical support this task will receive. It would also be interesting to observe how the activists within the citizens' movement will overcome the previous criticisms of the citizens' movement, which included charges that it was a "citizens' movement without citizens," that it had "development-oriented values," and that it sought an "expansion of citizens' organizations and subsequent issues of bureaucracy within them" or a "relationship with political power."

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