

Korean Citizens' Movement Organizations: Their Ideologies, Resources, and Action Repertoires

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Abstract

This paper aims to examine the characteristics of Korean citizens' movement organizations. While the 1989 inauguration of the Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice heralded a completely new start for the social movement of the 1990s, citizens' movement organizations' activities displayed a continuity with the democratization movement by continuously demanding political reform.

Differing from the 1980s social movement and led by radical ideologies, the major citizens' movement organizations, despite some ideological differences, displayed a new trend that could have been categorized as liberalism. They also encompassed a wide range of policy issues; in particular, the resource mobilization methods of citizens' movement organizations, such as the collection of membership fees and contributions, were considerably different from those of past movement organizations, which centered on human resources.

It is also to be noted that they continuously pushed ahead with the unfinished tasks of the democratization movement through the mainstreaming of democratic reform issues. That they grew into such massive institutions that they begged being called "pseudo-political parties" by dealing with comprehensive issues might have been the result of their having organized themselves with a view to coping with a centralized authoritarian power structure.

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Expansion of Citizens' Movement Organization

One of the most noticeable social phenomena in Korea since the 1990s has been the expansion of citizens' movement organizations. In 1999, Korea had about 4,023 citizens' movement organizations with some 20,000 branches. In 2003, the figures soared to approximately 7,400 and 25,000, respectively (NGO Times 2003). Although some of these organizations were launched much earlier, they did not play significant roles during the period of prolonged suppression of civil society under authoritarian regimes. Citizens' movement organizations based on autonomous civil society emerged in earnest following the June Uprising of 1987. They have thus clearly made great strides in a short period of time.¹

The epoch-making successive establishment of the Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ) in 1989, the Korean Federation for Environmental Movement (KFEM) in 1993, and the People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD) in 1994 heralded a new era of social movement. In the course of the 1980s democratization movement, the social movement was perceived to be a radical resistance movement based on the *minjung* ideology that pursued liberation of the oppressed and the deprived, workers, the urban poor, and peasants. The successive launch of major citizens' organizations, however, saw Korea's social movement move from the "*minjung*'s sphere" to the "citizens' sphere." In other words, the citizens' movement organizations, having established themselves as institutional elements of civil society, opened the era of the "citizens' movement."

The shift from radical social movements centered on the nation and the *minjung* to a citizens' movement represented a kind of discontinuation of the democratization movement, marking a great change in Korea's social movement landscape. A violent resistance campaign to challenge state power became a moderate institutional campaign focused on policy issues: this clearly signaled the transfor-

1. A survey of 730 citizens' movement organizations revealed that 74.2 percent of them came into being since 1987 (Kim H. 2000).

mation of Korea's social movement from a radical *minjung* movement into a citizens' movement. The change was prompted by the collapse of Eastern European socialism, the material affluence of the middle and labor classes, and more directly by the advent of political democratization from the late 1980s.

If attention is paid to these, one can emphasize a discontinuity between the democratization movement since the 1980s and the citizens' movement since the 1990s. But a certain degree of continuity can be still found between the two. In fact, since the 1990s citizens' movement organizations' campaigns have focused mainly on political reforms for the democratization of the administration, legislature, and political parties. This gives rise to the interpretation that citizens' organizations continued to pursue the unfinished tasks of the 1980s democratization movement. The political forces leading the June Uprising of 1987, a turning point in Korea's democratization, diversified into three different arenas: institutional politics, the labor union movement, and the citizens' movement. However, they shared the task of achieving political democratization by replacing authoritarian political power. In particular, citizens' movement organizations pursued an "influence strategy" to change the authoritarian political structure that had been maintained by the old political power; the substantial context of this strategy was a continuation of a "resistance strategy."

This continuity of the democratization movement functioned as an important element in defining the issues, the structural features and the action repertoires of citizens' movement organizations since the 1990s. This paper aims to examine the characteristics of citizens' movement organizations that made rapid strides from the 1990s, with attention given to these points. Since the 1990s, Korea's civil society has been led by several major citizens' movement organizations. Accordingly, their ideologies, resources, and action repertoires will be analyzed, centering on the major citizens' organizations:² the Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice, the People's Solidarity

2. The 1990s witnessed Korean civil society being dominantly led by aforementioned

for Participatory Democracy, and the Korean Federation for Environmental Movement.

Ideological Standardization and Mainstreaming of Reform Issues

Ideological Standardization and Adaptive Divergence

Although the democratization movement of the 1980s was led by a national democratic movement group that centered around the radical *minjung* movement, those who actually took part in the democratization movement covered a wide spectrum of ideologies ranging from extreme leftist ideology to moderate liberalism. There was an effort to classify the ideological tendencies of the citizens' movement organizations emerging from the 1990s into "progressive" and "conservative" (Cho H. 1999, 328). But they were the outcome of a breakaway from the radical *minjung* movement, influenced by upheavals in Eastern Europe, the expansion of the middle class, and the development of procedural democracy. Accordingly, the ideologies of citizens' movement organizations, rather than being classified into progressive and conservative, began to converge around state ideologies and market-friendly liberalism.³ During their initial peri-

gigantic national NGOs such as the CCEJ, PSPD, and KFEM. Various citizens' organizations and many other local level associations were created, modeled after these major players. This article limits its scope to focusing primarily on the major large citizens' movement organizations and does not comprehensively explore the entire range of Korean civil organizations. Yet, it is still crucial to develop a discussion of those relatively small local civil associations and citizens' movement organizations.

3. The radical *minjung* movements of the 1980s, as the major impetus for early democratization efforts, were based on socialist ideologies and aimed to help exploited workers and peasants. In contrast, the citizens' movements in the 1990s can be characterized as social reform efforts with principles of liberal democracy as their basis, and as a result do not reflect the interests of a particular social class. If one asserts that the interests of any class were aggressively pursued, it can be argued that the citizens' movement was oriented towards the needs of the middle class.

ods, there were some ideological differences according to their constituents' propensities; this was reflected in their coalition activities after the year 2000. Passing through the Kim Young-sam, Kim Dae-jung, and Roh Moo-hyun administrations, however, these ideologies tended to display signs of greater adaptation to the system. In this respect, the ideologies of Korean citizens' movement organizations until recently were inclined in general towards a liberalism adapted to the system on the one hand, and showed a trend of "adaptive divergence" to the system with some strategic variance within a liberal orientation on the other.

From the outset, the Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ) distinguished itself from the mass-oriented radical democratization movement of the 1980s. The CCEJ defined its main subjects as citizens irrespective of socio-economic class in its mission statement: "The forces we intend to rally are not confined to the alienated and suppressed people. . . . Citizens, be they businessmen or the middle class, are important constituents of our movement" (CCEJ 1989b). In its foundation, the CCEJ described the objective of its movement as the attainment of a "democratic welfare society in which the defects of the market economy are corrected. . . through an appropriate intervention of a clean and competent government, while fostering the efficiency and dynamics of the market economy (CCEJ 1989a). Its 2002 revised rules redefined the objective as "contributing toward building the framework of democratic welfare society by waging a peaceful citizens' movement aimed at the realization of economic and social justice" (CCEJ 2006). It can be found from these objectives that the CCEJ affirmatively embraced the market economy, and demanded only market ethics and democratization of government without raising class-based issues. Such an ideological orientation, which explicitly regarded businessmen and the middle class as major constituencies displayed a distinct affinity with capitalist ideologies and a trend of moderate liberalism. In particular, during the 2000 General Election, the CCEJ did not join a "blacklisting campaign" to prevent political parties from nominating unqualified candidates only to defeat them, which had been characteristic of an

extremely aggressive voters' struggle. Therefore, it explicitly demonstrated its tactical conservativeness and moderate liberalism by restricting itself to ensuring fair elections.

The People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD) was also not based on any particular, but rather a variety of social strata and classes. Its articles stated, "Our objective is to monitor state power through voluntary participation of citizens of a variety of social strata and social classes, present specific policies and alternatives, and construct a participatory democracy in which liberty, justice, human rights, and welfare can be realized through practical citizens' actions." With its inaugural address stressing that the proposed construction of participatory democracy was "aimed at overcoming civic indifference," the PSPD stopped short of presenting an ideological alternative to the dominant state ideologies (PSPD 1994). However, based on its demands for opening the closed political order through citizens' participation by stressing state power and policies that prioritized public interests, we find that the PSPD asserted democratization and civic intervention more positively than other citizens' movement organizations. In addition to strongly rejecting "the division of Korea into north and south and oppressive politics used as an excuse," the PSPD clarified: "Owing to the sacrifices that many of our seniors have made for democracy and human rights. . . we will overcome domination and alienation and stretch wider the arms of our solidarity." These statements indicated that it followed strongly the spirit of the democratization movement and expressed a particular interest in the alienated masses differently from the other major citizens' movement organizations. Accordingly, the PSPD's ideology, short of transcending liberal democracy as it was, may be classified as having been a "reformative liberalism" in that it was strongly oriented toward political reform, which was the unfinished task of the democratization movement.

The Korean Federation for Environmental Movement (KFEM), the biggest environmental movement organization in the country, is inclined toward ecologism, but differs little from other citizens' movement organizations in terms of political ideology. The Korean Anti-

Pollution Movement Association (KAPMA), the predecessor to the KFEM which was established in 1993, displayed a strong leftist environmentalism. Attributing the environmental crisis to “monopolistic *jaebeol* desperate to make money, the military dictatorship protecting them, and the domineering United States, which has turned the Korean peninsula into a colonial dumping yard,” KAPMA presented as an alternative a “genuine democratic society in which social inequality and alienation from nature can be overcome,” as well as a “democratic society in which the *minjung* is the masters” (Ku 1996, 218-219). But the KFEM attributed the environmental crisis mainly to businesses, government, and individual citizens, while advocating an “environmentally sound and sustainable society.” It regarded residents or citizens as the main body of its movement and envisioned a moderate form of environmental advocacy that stressed environment-friendly industrial structures, technological development preserving the environment, and ecological modes of living. The federation, nonetheless, displayed its reformative nature by leading coalition campaigns of citizens’ movement organizations against authoritarian political power.

Table 1. Ideological Orientations of Major Citizens’ Movement Organizations

Organization	Main Subjects	Social Model	Ideological Orientation
CCEJ	citizens from every strata and classes	democratic welfare society	moderate liberalism
PSPD	citizens from every strata and classes	participatory democracy	reformist liberalism
KFEM	residents, citizens	sustainable society	reformist liberalism (ecology and environmental advocacy through technological development)

The standardization and adaptive divergence of ideologies, which were evident in the major citizens’ movement organizations’ discourses, became much more pronounced as the inter-relationship between citizens’ movement organizations and the government and between citizens’ movement organizations and the market changed in line with repeated shifts in administration and progress in democracy after the 1990s. The major citizens’ movement organizations generally maintained a relationship of critical or discordant cooperation with businesses and the government, while sharing ideologies with them. In relationship with the government, the CCEJ, in particular, displayed the characteristics of a “polity member type” organization from the beginning, maintaining a mutually cooperative relationship. On the other end, the PSPD displayed the characteristics of a “challenger type” against the Kim Young-sam administration (Cho D. 1999, 269-273), but later shifted itself into a polity member type under the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations by participating in various councils.⁴ With citizens’ movement organizations taking part as major partners in the recently expanded government-initiated governance programs, their ideological leanings tended towards further standardization in the direction of accommodation to the system.

4. We may be able to identify two different types of social movement organizations if we consider the relations between the government (or polity) and civil society. The democratization movement organizations in the 1980s can be defined as “challenger type” organizations in that the majority of them offered tenacious resistance to the government and maintained fundamental conflict relations with the polity. On the other hand, citizens’ movement organizations in the 1990s became more cooperative with the government in certain policy issues and can be called “polity member type” organizations that maintained limited conflict relations with the polity. The differences between the “challenger type” and “polity member type” movement organizations were quite distinct in many ways, including relations with the government, memberships, organization structures, major resources, and modes of participation, to name a few (Cho 1999).

Diversity of Campaign Issues and the Mainstreaming of Reform Issues

The major citizens' movement organizations handled such a wide a variety of issues that they were dubbed "comprehensive" or "department store-like" entities. With emphasis placed on the elimination of real estate speculation in the initial period, the CCEJ proposed the introduction of a public concept of land, tax reform, and other policy issues aimed at resolving the housing problem. The CCEJ succeeded in bringing about a real-name system in real estate and financial transactions in the economic sector (CCEJ 2000). In the political and social sectors, the CCEJ advocated a range of issues for institutional reforms, including a campaign for fair electioneering, policy campaign by reform subjects, delay of early admission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), enactment of a special law addressing the consequences of the Gwangju Democratization Movement, and introduction of a special prosecutor system. It also campaigned for the reform of legal and institutional provisions with the purpose of energizing local autonomy, and the reform of elections, political parties, political fundraising, as well as National Assembly acts. With a view to guaranteeing citizens' right to know and democratizing the administration of government, the CCEJ advocated the enactment of acts on information disclosure and administrative procedures (CCEJ 2000).

Between 1989 and 2001, economic issues handled by the CCEJ accounted for 32.5 percent of its projects, while political issues took up 24.6 percent (see Table 2). At the outset, the CCEJ stressed its dis-

Table 2. CCEJ's Activities by Area (1989-2001)

Area	Politics	Corruption	Economy	Environment	Urban Affairs	Diplomacy	Society	Unification	Total
No. of Project (%)	492 (24.6)	99 (4.9)	651 (32.5)	219 (10.9)	120 (6.0)	103 (5.1)	314 (15.7)	106 (5.3)	2004

Source: Kim Tae-ryong et. al. (2002)

inction from the democratization movement. Most of these economic and political issues, however, were addressed as reform measures calling for political and economic democratization, and accordingly the CCEJ can be interpreted as having functioned as the extension of the democratization movement.

The Peoples Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD) was much more active than others in pushing ahead with reform issues. The PSPD, centered on eight action bodies, developed a variety of legal and institutional reform programs. Among them were a judicial reform campaign aimed at guaranteeing prosecutorial neutrality and eliminating judicial corruption, a campaign that filed suits against corrupt jurists, the evaluation and monitoring of lawmakers' legislative activities, a civic complaint campaign against corrupt and incompetent politicians, a campaign to enact political reform laws, research into policies for reforming the legislative system, and a campaign to pass an anti-corruption law.

The PSPD's priority projects by year reveal broad reform activities. It conducted, with some success, a judicial reform campaign in 1995, a transparent society campaign centered around the enactment of an anti-corruption act in 1996, a minority shareholders campaign in 1998, a budget monitoring and information disclosure campaign in 1999, a blacklisting campaign to block the political party nomination of unqualified candidates in the 2000 General Election, as well as a campaign to monitor presidential campaign fundraising in 2002 (PSPD 2005). Such PSPD campaigns can be understood not only as drives to check political power, but more comprehensively, as reform measures for political and economic democratization. The PSPD's power monitoring campaigns in broad areas, in particular, were conducted in alliance with other activist groups. The issues of the *minjung*, labor, and citizens occupied greater weight in coalition projects, as shown in Table 3.⁵ This indicates that the citizens' movement (PSPD), the progressive party (Democratic Labor Party), and the

5. *Minjung* issues include the right-to-survive and the welfare of peasants, fishermen, the disabled, and the urban poor.

labor circle (Korea Confederation of Trade Unions) all began to produce a certain degree of accord in terms of actual political reform and the reform of family-centered business conglomerates, as well as the creation of social welfare programs and guaranteeing the masses' right to survival. In this respect, the PSPD, it can be said, has continually pushed ahead with the unfinished tasks of the democratization movement in a far more positive way than other groups.

Table 3. PSPD's Coalition Project Issues (1994-2002)

Year	Minjung	Labor	Human right	Educa- tion	Peace	Press	Environ- ment	Women	Citizens	Region	Total
1994	3		1						2		6
1995	10	6	1		2				9		28
1996	4	5	1	3		1	1	1	4	3	23
1997	4		3		1				1	4	13
1998	1	1		3		2			15	2	24
1999	4	7		2	1	1	1		14		30
2000	9	16	2	5			4	4	23	2	65
2001	10	33	7	8	14	3	2	2	22	18	109
2002	4	13	3		11			2	9	3	45
Total	49	81	18	21	29	7	9	9	99	33	343

Source: PSPD (2002).

The Korean Federation for Environmental Movement (KFEM), as specialized as it seems in environmental issues, is actually characterized by its positive involvement in a wide range of issues. Since its foundation in 1993, the KFEM has dealt with almost all major environmental issues, both domestic and international, plus those involving the public interest. They included a campaign against drinking water pollution, a green zone preservation campaign, opposition to the construction of nuclear waste disposal facilities, opposition to the construction of golf courses, and campaigns for nullifying both the projected Dong-gang river dam and the Saemangeum reclamation project (KFEM 2006).

The most noticeable aspect of the KFEM's activity was that it, in solidarity with other groups, actively engaged itself in non-environmental, political issues. It participated in campaigns to introduce a special prosecutor system and enact an anti-corruption act. It also played an active part in supporting solidarity activities with other civil organizations for democratic reform, which took up the task of bringing about political institutional reforms including the revision of politics-related laws such as the publication of presidential election campaign fund. The KFEM, in particular, participated in the Citizens' Alliance for the 2000 General Election more actively than others.

Korea's major citizens' movement organizations, by handling comprehensive campaign issues, were better able to deal with the various concerns of citizens. These organizations have steadily pursued policy issues related to political reform, such as a campaign to block the party nomination of blacklisted candidates and ensure their failure in the 2000 General Election, a campaign for bringing transparency to campaign fundraising during the 2002 presidential election, and large-scale coalition drives such as the candlelight vigils that followed the 2004 presidential impeachment and general election. In this respect, the residual issues of the democratization movement can be said to have been mainstreamed amid a strong tendency towards diversification of citizens' movement issues since the 1990s.

Emergence of Large-scale Organizations and Market Mobilization

Emergence of Large-scale Organizations and Limited Specialization

According to the *Hanguk min-gan danche chongnam* (Directory of Korean NGOs), published in 2000, organizations in the civil and social sector had an average of 8,130 members, 7.17 full-time staff members and 5.91 executive board members (NGO Times 2000). Taking the number of citizens' movement organizations formed voluntarily since the 1990s into consideration, the figures are much

higher because religious civil organizations like the YMCA, whose membership exceeds 100,000, are included. Nonetheless, the major citizens' movement organizations that grew since the 1990s and led the citizens' movement expanded far greater than other groups in terms of membership, number of full-time staff members, and budget.

To begin with, the membership of the Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ), inaugurated in 1989 with 500 promoters, surged to about 10,000 in 1995. The CCEJ grew into a massive group with its membership swelling to about 20,000 in 1999 and some 35,000 in 2003 (see Table 4). As of 2005, the CCEJ had 34 local branches across the country, and the number of full-time staff members, an indicator of the real size of an organization, rose to 56, and the annual budget leaped to approximately 1.4 billion won (NGO Times 2000, 2003). The People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD), too, saw the combined number of executives and gener-

al members grow from about 490 in 1995, in the wake of its inauguration, to some 10,000 in 1999 and then to about 12,700 in 2003. The number of full-time PSPD staff members also rose from 48 in 1999 to 54 in 2003 and its annual budget exceeded approximately 1.7 billion won in as early as 2001 (NGO Times 2003).

In scale, the Korean Federation for Environmental Movement (KFEM) was bigger than the CCEJ and the PSPD. Established in 1993 with the merger of eight environmental movement organizations, the KFEM, as shown in Table 4, grew into a gigantic body in 1999, with 53,000 memberships, 50 full-time staff members, and an annual budget of 3.5 billion won. In 2003, the membership grew to 85,000 and the number of full-time staff members to 73. As of 2005, the KFEM had grown into the most powerful environmental movement organization in the country, with 49 branches across the nation (NGO Times 2000, 2003; KFEM 2005).

Major citizens' movement organizations, commensurate with their expanding size and scale of operations, tended to gradually increase the number of areas of specialized activities. The PSPD, for instance, saw its specialized action bodies increase from five at the time of inauguration, which included the Center for National Assembly Watch and Center for Judiciary, to nine action bodies and three auxiliaries including the Institute for Participatory Democracy by 2005. The structure of these specialized action bodies, however, was not indicative of a high degree of specialization in the production of issues and policies. The Citizens' Institute for Environmental Studies for the KFEM, the Institute for Participatory Society for the PSPD, and the Korea Economic Justice Institute for the CCEJ played the role of central policy-making bodies. A dual structure including both full-time activists and part-time policy consultants constituted most of these bodies. The policy-making bodies functioned not as complete policy-making units, but as a network of outside policy specialists. Most citizens' movement organizations possessed policy-making committees, but they effectively acted as consulting bodies of outside specialists (Cho H. 2004). Such limitations indicated that they, despite their huge scale, were still "limited in specialization."

Table 4. Major Citizens' Movement Organizations' Membership, Full-time Staff Members, and Budget

(Unit: person and won)⁶

Classification	CCEJ		PSPD		KFEM	
	1999	2003	1999	2003	1999	2003
Membership	20,000	35,000	10,000	12,700	53,000	85,000
Full-time staff members	56	40	48	54	50	73
Budget (billion won)	1	1.4	0.8	1.68 (2001)	3.5	2.2

Sources: *Hanguk min-gan danche chongnam* (2000, 2003)

6. Membership, the number of full-time staff members, and budget size were mostly obtained from the *Hanguk min-gan danche chongnam 2000* and *Hanguk min-gan danche chongnam 2003*, and supplemented by interviews with those involved and the organizations' internal data.

The large scale aggrandizement and restricted specialization of these organizations indicate that they played the role of representing citizens' demands and making them political agenda, rather than "expressing" these demands themselves. In this respect, they functioned as "representative agencies" for the citizens (Cho H. 1999). This shows that they were "pseudo-political parties," even when institutional political parties were unable to fulfill their democratic functions under authoritarian regimes from the late 1980s. Most of them, dubbed "comprehensive citizens' movement organizations," displayed such characteristics. They dealt with a comprehensive range of political, economic, social, and cultural policy issues, which were produced by specialized action bodies, and they—limited as they were—were reminded of the policies of political parties.

That they were massively organized and became pseudo-political parties centered on headquarters in Seoul indicates that the activities of these organizations were largely defined by the democratization movements. In the course of resisting, at the institutional level, against the centralized political power and administrative structures that persisted even after the 1990s, citizens' movement organizations also tended to undergo expansion around their headquarters. The limited degree of specialization on the part of citizens' movement organizations resulted in a pattern of dealing with political, social, and public opinion-oriented reform issues rather than specializing in and resolving routinely emerging issues.

Market Mobilization

Citizens' movements from the 1990s were characterized by a distinct difference from the 1980s democratization movement in their methods of mobilizing resources, in which human resources were the most important factor. Campaigns were only able to succeed if large numbers of people participated directly in protests under the constant threat of violent suppression. The most important mobilization factor in the democratization movement, accordingly, was the will and devotion that enabled individuals' participation. Mobilized in the

movement were organizations formed basically through groups sharing such common relationships as found amongst workers, farmers, and students (Cho D. 1996).

In contrast, the major citizens' movement organizations mobilized individuals who did not share a particular common base as they campaigned around a specific issue or channeling their participation through a particular organization. This type of mobilization involved not direct activity in itself, but rather indirect participation, namely through the collection of membership dues. Campaigns by specialized full-time activists could be programmed and executed through the mobilization of such funds (McCarthy and Zald 1977). Membership fees and contributions thus constituted the most important mobilization factor, with which organizations had to advertise and publicize themselves. In this respect, the citizens' movement organizations' resource mobilization type can be described as one of "market mobilization." Their resource mobilization can be generally classified into three categories: the recruitment of full-time activists, the recruitment of general members, and the mobilization of material resources. The degree of market mobilization differs among the three categories. Differences in the degree of market mobilization appear between the time when citizens' movement organizations were established and the present, which demonstrates that their activities were an extension of the democratization movement.

The way the major citizens' movement organizations recruited their full-time activists indicated the continuity of the democratization movement, rather than the existence of a market feature. In a survey exploring the motivations that prompted such activists to join their respective organizations, 84.1 percent of the respondents cited recommendations by their former comrades. An overwhelming majority of such activists were mobilized through close relationships with those who had conducted social struggles together in the past. When asked about their past careers, 66 percent of respondents to listed activism in other campaign bodies (Song 1998).

The experience of campaign comrades and groups could be said to be typical of citizens' movements from the 1990s. Given that peo-

ple in their 30s accounted for an overwhelming majority of the respondents and that the so-called “386 generation”—people in their 30s who attended college in the 1980s and were born in the 1960s—who led the 1980s student movement, effectively became the main pillar of the citizens’ movement in the 1990s, their experience of campaign comrades and groups can be interpreted as being related to the democratization movement. Activists in the main citizens’ movement organizations—the CCEJ, PSPD, and KFEM—which were inaugurated in the late 1980s and early 1990s in particular, have much more of a direct connection with the democratization movement. Personal links gradually changed as the age of activists became younger in the 2000s.

General members of major citizens’ movement organizations do not take part in their groups’ activities, but mostly exist only on a mailing list. Such members do not have a common base, but participate as individuals. According to a survey of the routes through which members joined organizations, 43.3 percent of the respondents did so based on recommendations by existing members with whom they were acquainted, with 39.4 percent having joined upon the recommendation of founding members, 9.6 percent through the media, and 6.7 percent by taking part in programs conducted by the organization (Lim and Kong 1997). That the recommendation of members constituted the largest motivation to join can be regarded as the most common pattern, given that most participation in a movement is related to people being involved in a small group with which one was already linked.⁷ But such participation tends to be replaced by

7. Regarding the dominant member-recommendation type as a Korean characteristic, some interpret it as personalized network mobilization, in contrast to the cognitive mobilization found in the Western new social movement. They stress that such a joining pattern differs from a market mechanization pattern based on a spontaneous volunteerism (Song 1998). But mobilization in all social movements including market mobilization, from the perspective of micro mobilization context, is made through connections with the various small groups that individuals belong to. Furthermore, market mobilization, a concept that can be contrasted with community mobilization, can be seen as market-oriented in the respect that it is not a direct participation based on a region or community, but mobilizes individuals’

voluntary participation due to the wide publicity of the major citizens’ movement organizations through the media, the heightened visibility of such institutions through statements and public hearings, and the recent boost in advertisement and the use of Internet homepages.

The major citizens’ movement organizations, unlike those of the democratization movement, featured market-oriented organizations because they placed priority on the mobilization of financial resources, which consisted mainly of membership fees and contributions, apart from the mobilization of human resources. Most of their revenues, as shown in Table 5, come from membership fees, contributions, and project proceeds. The CCEJ, for example, saw the share of its total amount of membership fees and contributions fall from 41

Table 5. CCEJ’s Financial Structure (1993-2003)

(Unit: million won and %)

Year	Total Budget	Membership Fees	Contributions	Project Proceeds	Other Revenues
1993	990	41	—	59	—
1994	993	41	—	59	—
1995	1,899	18	—	82	—
1996	1,666	17	—	83	—
1997	1,036	77	—	23	—
2000	1,100	25.8	46.9	19.6	7.7
2001	1,000	41.8	45.6	9.1	3.5
2002	1,000	25	62	10	3.3
2003	1,400	26.6	64.9	5.1	3.4

Sources: Park (1999); CCEJ (2005).

financial resources in the form of membership fees and contributions. Therefore, the “personalized mobilization” duplicates, rather than contrasts with, cognitive mobilization, and is a generalized mobilization that cannot be contrasted with market mobilization.

percent in 1993 to 17 percent in 1996, while the percentage of project proceeds rose from 59 percent to 83 percent. Until the mid-1990s, the CCEJ tended to rely largely on proceeds from research projects commissioned by government agencies and businesses. From 1997 to 2002, the CCEJ heavily relied on membership fees and contributions, with the portion of project proceeds declining to as low as 5.1 percent in 2003. But with reliance on membership fees remaining low, its financial status can hardly be said to have been stable. In membership fees, contributions, and project proceeds, the major citizens' movement organizations showed a similar picture, albeit with some variation. Operated mainly on membership fees and contributions, they had been gradually reinforcing their market-oriented characteristics.

The trend of market-oriented mobilization on the part of citizens' movement organizations can be attributed to the open-resource mobilization that had begun to become more apparent in an open civil society, prompted by progress in democratization. At the outset, the major citizens' movement organizations could not expand into big market-oriented ones due to financial restraints. But they enhanced their visibility by attracting media attention consistently through the emergence of their new action bodies and the introduction of new issues. Thanks to a substantial rise in membership fees and contributions in the 2000s, they expanded a variety of publicity activities. On account of expanded electronic information space, in particular, the "electronic masses" online accessibility to citizens' movement organizations greatly increased. Such trends contributed toward expanding the marketability of citizens' movement organizations.

Strategies and Action Repertoires of Korean Citizens' Movements

Strategy of Influence and Action Repertoires at the Institutional Level

Citizens' movement organizations have conducted a variety of activi-

ties since the 1990s, including internal ones such as raising financial resources through member recruitment, running various agencies, offering educational programs for activists and citizens, introducing new issues, and evaluating the results of activities; their activities also included external ones such as legislative petition and legal litigation, campaigns, mass rallies, public discussion meetings, statement issuances, and press activities.

These modes of activities, in the context of campaign strategies, may be broadly classified as part of a "power-oriented strategy." In contrast to an "identity-oriented strategy," the power-oriented strategy, which is interested mainly in the results of political decision-making and the distribution of political power, is significant in that it is used as a means of gaining or sharing power (Rucht 1990). The radical democratization movement of the 1980s clearly adopted a power-oriented strategy, but the varied campaigns of major citizens' movement organizations conducted since the 1990s cannot be said to have adopted that strategy explicitly because they did not pursue the goal of gaining or sharing political power. But their activities can be included in the category of the power-oriented strategy in the sense that they continuously demanded political and social reform in an open civil society and were determined to change the political community on a priority basis. Nevertheless, in that they pursued changes through the pressures of public opinion and citizens' participation within the framework of a representative democracy, theirs can still be classified as a "strategy of influence," distinct from power-oriented strategy (Cohen and Arato 1992).

According to a survey of 52 citizens' movement organizations, they utilized the mass media 77.4 times a month on average (Lim and Kong 1997). Utilization of press constitutes the most important mode of activities in terms of politics of influence. Citizens' movement organizations also stressed open discussion meetings, protest rallies and demonstrations, statement issuances, and signature campaigns. In addition, they published their own newspapers and magazines for publicity purposes and ran educational programs for active members. Of these, discussion meetings, statement issuances, and

rallies and demonstrations, along with the utilization of the mass media, constituted a strategy of influence that called for the attention of the public sphere (Kim Ho-Ki, 2000). Newspapers and magazines published by citizens' movement organizations can be understood in the same context, as they are used as a means of broadening public consensus on issues they deal with.

Such action repertoires, in general, were employed by citizens' movement organizations at both the legal and institutional levels. The most common activities of the major citizens' movement organizations, which were equipped with abundant resources, were legislative petitions and legal confrontation. With the PSPD, which mostly resorted to legal activities, for example, institutional reform through legislative petition accounted for the biggest portion, at 41.5 percent, and suits filed against corruption and irregularities through civic and criminal litigation accounted for 23.3 percent and 18.7 percent, respectively (see Table 6).

Such legal activities within the system were indicative of the strategy of influence routinely employed along with campaigns for enacting or amending regulations, National Assembly monitoring,

Table 6. PSPD's Legislative Petitions and Legal Responses
(1994-2001)

Year	Legislative Petition	Criminal Litigation	Civil Litigation	Administrative Litigation	Constitutional Petition
1994	1	3	1	-	-
1995	5	2	1	1	-
1996	8	1	1	-	2
1997	13	4	9	-	-
1998	20	7	5	1	2
1999	5	4	15	5	1
2000	18	1	10	10	3
2001	10	14	3	5	2
Total	80 (41.5%)	36 (18.7%)	45 (23.3%)	22 (11.3%)	10 (5.2%)

Source: PSPD (2002).

public auditing, disclosing information to the public, and the budget monitoring carried out at the level of central and local governments. These campaigns represented the process of transforming the legal and institutional factors that monopolized political power under the authoritarian political order. In that they were endeavors to transform the authoritarian power structure sustained even from the 1990s, they were seen as the pursuit of continuing tasks of the democratization movement. Accordingly, such action repertoires can now be interpreted as a part of a "strategy of resistance" deployed on a routine and institutional basis.

Strategy of Influence and Positive Coalition Activities

A method employing an influence strategy the most positively amongst the citizens' movement organizations' activities could well be defined as the coalition campaigns in which a large number of groups participated. The joint issuance of statements, operation of educational programs, campaigns, petitions for revisions of laws, and signature drives are often conducted in solidarity with many groups (Kwon and Yee 1998). But a more aggressive and challenging influence strategy may include mounting coalition activities piggybacked atop national issues. Cases in point were the Nakdonggang river phenol incident and campaigns against the construction of the Donggang river dam and nuclear waste disposal site. Initiated by environmental organizations, these campaigns were conducted in solidarity with various citizens' movement organizations, including consumer and anti-nuclear groups.

The positive coalition activities related to political democratization, as led by major citizens' movement organizations, should be given special note. A broad coalition among citizens' movement organizations during election times came in the form of voters drive aimed at substantially replacing authoritarian political forces. One part of a coalition movement on a large scale, led by the PSPD and KFEM among others during the 2000 General Election, was a drive intervening in elections in earnest and which exercised considerable

influence. The Citizens' Alliance for the 2000 General Election (CAGE) can be said to have achieved the unfinished tasks of the democratization movement of June 1987.

The CAGE, participated in by 981 civil organizations throughout the country, conducted a campaign to prevent political parties from nominating unqualified candidates and also to defeat them in the election. It represented the most powerful nationwide struggle since the June 1987 democratization movement. Dubbed "the drama of the voters' revolution," this campaign demonstrated itself as an effective resistance against corrupt, authoritarian political forces by applying seven criteria for blacklisting unqualified candidates. The seven criteria were: acts of corruption, election law violations, acts against the constitutional government and human rights, acts instigating regional sentiments, unfaithfulness to legislative activities, negative attitude toward reform bills and policies, and the truthfulness or falsehood of documentation registered at the National Election Commission. Such documentation included registered properties, military services, tax payments, and criminal records (Mun 2000; Cho H. 2001).

As shown in Table 7, this campaign was a powerful voters' resistance drive against the established political community. It started as a campaign to block the political party nomination of incompetent and corrupt politician and developed into a struggle to force already nominated blacklisted candidates to withdraw their candidacies, as well as defeat those who were nonetheless nominated to run in the elections. To be stressed most in the process is the widespread public support of the campaign. First, this support could be confirmed from observing the number of groups that supported the campaign. Launched by the major citizens' movement organizations, the campaign gradually expanded to the regions and a number of social sectors. The number of participating groups nearly doubled from 500, when the first blacklist of corrupt and incompetent politicians was announced, to 981 near the elections. Over 10 broad regional coalitions emerged, including one in Busan; religious, health and medical and academic sectors also joined the campaign. Second, with a total of 350 million won in contributions collected, participating groups

Table 7. Major Activities of the Citizens' Alliance for the 2000 General Election

Period	Contents
Dec. 1, 2000	Inauguration of the Citizens' Coalition for the General Election
Jan. 24 – Feb. 2, 2000	Announcement of the first blacklist of unqualified candidates for party nomination
Jan. 30 – Feb. 19, 2000	Staging of the first and second simultaneous national rallies for blocking the party nomination of blacklisted candidates
Jan. – Feb., 2000	Launch of an election law revision campaign.
Feb. – Mar., 2000	A nomination withdrawal campaign is held and applications for a group of litigation plaintiffs advertised
Mar. 1, 2000	Issuance of a Declaration of Voter Independence on the anniversary of the March 1 Independence Movement
Mar. 2 – 6, 2000	The National plaza for political reform event held at Myeong Dong Catholic Cathedral in Seoul
Mar. 20 – 26, 2000	Launch of a national bus tour to collect 2.27 million voter signatures
Mar. – Apr., 2000	2.27 million voter signature collection campaign is held, with a total of 336,226 persons participating
Mar. 23, 2000	Issuance of guidelines for the nomination of candidates for proportional representation
Apr. 3, 2000	Announcement of a blacklist of nominated candidates to be defeated and a support rally held.
Apr. 8, 2000	The Red 2000 Festival held with a slogan reading, "Let's go to the polls, play, cast ballots, and change"
Apr. 3 – 12, 2000	A "defeat campaign" held by area and region
Apr. 12, 2000	The "Performance of Hope" event held as a candlelight vigil at Myeong Dong Catholic Cathedral in Seoul

Source: Cho H. (2001).

managed to conclude the campaign in the black, a phenomenon unseen in such drives, thanks to the help of unprecedented public support (Cho H. 2001). Third, the most visible support was revealed in the outcome of the campaign, as 95 percent of blacklisted candidates lost in elections in the capital and its surrounding areas and 68.6 percent nationwide.

The wide support of the campaign represented the formation of public consensus on a citizens' movement seeking political reform on a priority basis. That consensus, in turn, showed that varied citizens' organization activities since 1987 gained public legitimacy. The political reform drive during the 2000 general election led to a policy evaluation during the 2002 presidential election. And then the 2004 general election saw civil campaigns diversified into a campaign to have blacklisted candidates fail, a campaign to have qualified candidates elected, and a campaign to publicize information about candidates. Groups leading such campaigns included the Citizens' Alliance for the General Election, the Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice, the Citizens' Action for the Right Choice, the Voters Association for Clean Election. Before such campaigns went into full swing, however, the National Assembly passed an impeachment bill against the president, which was perceived as an unreasonable and desperate attempt to maintain the established political order. On the streets, candles replaced the Molotov cocktails students had thrown in 1987. Hundreds of thousands of candles filled the Seoul streets, where the protests of the year 1987 had left off. In other words, the adoption of an impeachment bill for the purpose of maintaining the old order offered citizens' movement organizations and citizens, interconnected through the Internet, an opportunity to conclude the 1987 democratization movement.

Such coalition campaigns, led by major citizens' movement organizations, had a certain degree of continuity with the coalition struggles the *minjung* and democratic forces waged during the 1987 democratization movement. As evinced in the wide and successful citizens' coalition campaign during the 2000 General Election, coalition campaigns were still regarded as the most important engine

enabling political reform in all of the citizens' movements since the 1990s. The reason this campaign style continuously emerged in the Korean citizens' movements was that centralized authoritarian power order still remained and citizens' movement organizations had pushed ahead with the task of political reform aimed at changing such order. Citizens' movement organizations were able to exercise positive influence in elections because most of their core members shared the experience of the democratization movement since 1990s and because such activists formed networks.

New Challenges for the Korean Citizens' Movement Organizations

Fifteen years have passed since citizens' movement organizations started their activities in the space of the open civil society created as a result of the 1980s democratization movement. In that period, citizens' movement organizations have led the reform of the political community, earning the assessment of being the most credible organizational entity among the constituents of our society. While the 1989 inauguration of the Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice heralded a completely new start for the social movement of the 1990s, citizens' movement organizations' activities displayed continuity with the democratization movement by continuously demanding political reform.

Differing from the 1980s social movement and led by radical ideologies, the major citizens' movement organizations, despite some ideological differences, displayed a new trend that could have been categorized as liberalism. It was also new for them to have offered a wide range of policy issues. In particular, the resource mobilization methods of citizens' movement organizations, which bore market characteristics such as the collection of membership fees and contributions, were considerably different from those of the past movement organizations, which centered on human resources. It is also to be noted that they continuously pushed ahead with the unfinished

tasks of the democratization movement through the mainstreaming of issues that demanded the reform of the authoritarian power structure and the political community. That they grew into such massive institutions that they begged being called “pseudo-political parties” by dealing with comprehensive issues might have been an effect of their having organized themselves with a view to coping with a centralized authoritarian power structure. The most important indicator that demonstrated continuity with the democratization movement lay in the fact that most of their activists had shared the experience of the democratization movement. Broad coalition campaigns, based on such continuity and links, can be seen as a similarity between the democratization movement and citizens’ movement. The coalition activities concentrated in Citizens’ Alliance for the 2000 General Election, in particular, can be described as the reemergence of the voters’ struggle of the 1980s democratization movement. The citizens’ movement organizations’ activities since the 1990s, from the perspective of the “institutionalization of social movements,” could be considered to be the result of the institutionalization of the 1980s democratization movement within the realm of civil society. The democratization movement’s leading forces had diverged along three routes: the institutional political community, labor unions, and citizens’ organizations, all of which pursued the sustained democratization task of replacing the authoritarian political power. That task, it can be said, was accomplished when the 1987 political forces emerged as a majority party in the National Assembly in 2004. In this respect, 2004 may represent the completion of goals begun in 1987.

The unfinished task of democratization, left over from 1987, in this respect led citizens’ movement organizations’ strategy of influence to focus on resistance against old political power. And such strategic orientations functioned as a factor defining their organizational features, issues and the characters of activists. Korea’s citizens’ movement organizations, with a strategy of resistance against the old political power groups, had to shift to a new strategic orientation. The monitoring and criticizing state and market power is a task inherent to citizens’ movement organizations. But such monitoring

and criticism need now be focused on expanding “communication” within civil society. The pursuit of a communication strategy requires an epoch-making transformation in their framing of issues, political organization and action repertoires, all of which were formed under a resistance strategy. Above all, with the development of new issues related to daily life, ways of enhancing the rationalization and specialization of organizations capable of coping with these issues are in need of further research.

The major citizens’ movement organizations—the CCEJ, PSPD and KFEM—have led Korean civil society since the 1990s. In this process, their influence increased and their size expanded. Of course, it is inherent to the very historical nature of Korean society that big major citizens’ movement organizations have led civil society to counter giant state power. With the expansion of decentralization and the promotion of a balanced regional development, however, citizens’ movement organizations need to free themselves of centralization in Seoul. Decentralization amid localization demands a multifaceted development of citizens’ movement organizations that reflect the needs of civil society.

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