

To Survive as a Buddhist Monk in a Confucian State: Gihwa's Response to Jeong Do-jeon's Critique of Buddhism

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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the ideological tensions between Jeong Do-jeon (1342-1398), who launched criticism against Buddhism, and Gihwa (1376-1433) who attempted to defend Buddhism in response to Confucian attacks during the early Joseon dynasty. Jeong and his Confucian colleagues first opened fire on the Buddhist circle where corruption was rampant. Accordingly, on the part of Buddhist practitioners, any answers were to be made in response to this criticism. However, Gihwa's remarks did not deal with the main point of the Neo-Confucian attacks. Rather, he attempted to reconcile with the Confucian counterpart in terms of the accommodation of Buddhism to Confucianism without presenting any explanation as to why Buddhism needed to engage in worldly politics and how they could cope with the problems caused by the secularization of Buddhism. As a result, the Buddhist-Confucian debate in the early Joseon dynasty ended up being a victory for the Neo-Confucian camp, which presented itself as a means to synthetically integrate their principles into the real world. Moreover, through its triumph, Confucian philosophy took an exclusive place as the political creed of the Joseon dynasty.

Keywords: Jeong Do-jeon, Gihwa, Buddhism, Confucianism, secularism, anti-Buddhist polemics, *Hyeonjeong ron*

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Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the Buddhist response to the Neo-Confucian criticism of Buddhism. In Korea, a major thrust of the Neo-Confucian argument came in the form of anti-Buddhist discourse. The Neo-Confucians won the debate against the pro-Buddhist camp by presenting their ideas effectively through a series of memorials and books, in which they tenaciously pointed out the social ills caused by Buddhist monks. In contrast, within the Buddhist camp, nearly no one was able to respond to the Confucian criticism, with the exception of Gihwa (1376-1433), who wrote *Hyeonjeong ron* (Exposition of the Correct) as a defense of Buddhism in terms of apologetics.

Previous literature on the Confucian-Buddhist debate was mainly concerned with two topics: the logical aspects of Confucian criticism and the limitations of Buddhism. John Isaac Goulde dealt with the former, paying attention to how the Neo-Confucians were able to effectively defeat their Buddhist opponents in ideological debate. According to Goulde, Neo-Confucian orthodoxy successfully took over the political, philosophical, religious, and social landscape, so that the Neo-Confucians were able to justify their attacks against Buddhism during the transition period.¹ On the other hand, Charles Muller researched why Buddhism was not able to effectively react against the ethical and political criticisms posed by Neo-Confucianism. He concluded that, because the criticism was focused on indisputable facts such as the rampant corruption of the Buddhist establishment, escapism and nihilism within Buddhist philosophy, and an intellectually devitalized Buddhist *sangha*, the Buddhists could not be trouble-free in defending their worldview.² As Buswell and Shin have depicted, Buddhists tried to reconcile with, rather than refute, Confucian philosophy and doctrine.³

1. Goulde (1985).

2. Muller (1999).

3. For the synthetic attitude of Korean Buddhism under Confucian domination, see Buswell (1999) and Shin (1997).

However, the syncretic reaction of Korean Buddhism under Confucian domination was a passive way to accommodate the Confucian criticism of Buddhism. In this sense, Gihwa's apologetics for Buddhism were totally different from the tendency to synthesize and unify the Buddhist camp under the Buddhism-dominated Silla and Goryeo dynasties. Moreover, as Shim pointed out, the Syncretic Buddhism (*tong bulgyo*) of Wonhyo (617-686) was the invention of Choe Nam-seon (1890-1957), who tried to exalt the cultural self-confidence of the Korean people during the Japanese occupation period. Therefore, to better understand the passive accommodation of Korean Buddhism to Confucianism, one should pay close attention to the assertion that "the term 'syncretism' should not be used to characterize Korean Buddhism in its entirety, much less the Korean mentality in general."⁴

For the balanced approach to the Confucian-Buddhist debate, it seems appropriate to notice Jorgensen's suggestions about overcoming *hoguk bulgyo* (State-Protector Buddhism) and the *tong bulgyo* discourse derived from Japanese Buddhist historiography, which kept Buddhism subservient to authoritarian military regimes in Korea.⁵ If we also consider that Korean Buddhist scholarship was performed mainly in the three major departments of history, religious studies, and philosophy, it is apparent that Korean Buddhist studies needs to broaden its scholarly horizons and incorporate interdisciplinary approaches, including the sociopolitical context of the Confucian-Buddhist debate.⁶ However, preexisting literature in this area often paid less attention to the fact that the Neo-Confucians regarded sociopolitical secularization as the most important criterion to address the question of orthodoxy and heresy. Also, the literature has not shed enough light on how the Buddhist camp justified its secularization in the face of the criticism. Hence, a balanced analysis of this subject should be made based on major issues revealed in the Confu-

4. Shim (1989, 156).

5. Jorgensen (1997, 254-256).

6. Shim (1989, 186-190).

cian-Buddhist debate.

For this purpose, this paper will examine, first, why the early Neo-Confucian scholars of the Goryeo dynasty concentrated on accommodating Buddhism to Confucianism despite the Confucian criticism that highlighted the differences between the Buddhist and Confucian philosophies. The second part of the paper will take up the issue of secularism advanced by Jeong Do-jeon (1342-1398), who criticized Buddhism for being too extensively involved in secular affairs and consequently resulted in corruption.⁷ Lastly, this paper will analyze Gihwa's *Hyeonjeong ron* to see what efforts the Buddhists made to survive in the Confucianism-dominated Joseon dynasty.

Syncretization of Confucianism with Buddhism and Its Limitations

Since the Three Kingdoms period, Korean Buddhism has played a central role not only as a guiding light of spiritual salvation for all people but also as a national protector that regarded itself as having a national calling and took real steps to actualize it. However, because Korean Buddhism was adopted as a state religion under the royal patronage of the Goryeo dynasty, it developed quickly and became a hotbed of corruption and degradation in Goryeo's later years, thus disregarding its essential purpose—the establishment of "Buddha's land." The Buddhist clergy was extensively engaged in politics over a number of sociopolitical issues in both the mundane and transmundane worlds.⁸ They accumulated wealth and land, ruined the state

7. For a comprehensive treatment of Jeong Do-jeon as an architect of Joseon dynasty, see Chung (1985).

8. For example, Buddhist monks Jo Yeong of the King Chungnyeol period (r. 1274-1308) and Jo Ryun of the King Chungsuk period (r. 1314-1330, 1332-1339) dared to arbitrarily sway the national affairs through meddling in the civil service examination, trafficking in government posts, and controlling crucial lawsuits. *Goryeosa* (History of Goryeo), 106:4a; 124:26a. All primary sources are cited according to a

economy, and economically squeezed out the common people in order to maintain their political and economic power.

However, as Choe Seung-ro (927-989) maintained in his writing, the primary focus of Buddhism was a form of religious salvation that fundamentally distinguished itself from the worldly concerns of politics. In this context, he emphasized, "Practicing Buddhism is the basis for moral cultivation; practicing Confucianism is the basis for the governing of the state. Moral cultivation is a resource for the merits of future life; governing the state is the business of the present moment."⁹ Thus, Choe Seung-ro singled out the difference between Buddhism and Confucianism in terms of their functions of moral cultivation and state governance. This abrupt dichotomous distinction became a conventional method and was more generally used by the Neo-Confucian community in the later years of Goryeo. For example, An Hyang (1243-1306), the scholar who first introduced Neo-Confucianism to Goryeo in the thirteenth century, differentiated between Confucianism and Buddhism by characterizing the former as a set of moral and practical tools for life and governance, while criticizing the latter as having an "immoral and barbarous" worldview.¹⁰ Jeong Mong-ju (1337-1392) also emphasized the moral and practical supremacy of Confucianism over Buddhism, focusing on the way of routine, everyday affairs.¹¹ He even asserted the rejection of Buddhism to be a constant concern for Confucianists.¹²

In fact, the Confucian arguments against Buddhism had not reached a philosophical level in the beginning. However, since Choe Seung-ro began making distinctions between Confucianism and Buddhism, many scholars were strongly interested in distinguishing their

combination of chapter and page numbers. The number that appears before a colon refers to the chapter number in the original text and the number that appears after the colon refers to the recto or verso side of the original xylograph page. For example, "Goryeosa, 106:4a" refers to the ninety-three chapter of the original text and the recto side of page nineteen in the xylograph edition.

9. *Goryeosa*, 93:19a.

10. *Hoeheon seonsaeng silgi* (Records of An Hyang), 1:2b.

11. *Goryeosa*, 117:10b.

12. *Goryeosa*, 117:12a.

Confucian creed from the Buddhist worldview, and eventually, a new philosophical discourse was generated within the Neo-Confucian community. In order to exclude Buddhism from this new discourse, the Neo-Confucians criticized Buddhism by emphasizing that Confucianism was primarily concerned with present and normal affairs while Buddhism was only concerned with future life.

However, it was not all the same to those who identified themselves as Neo-Confucian scholars. Despite their critical attitudes, some Neo-Confucians did not totally deny the social function of Buddhism. Rather, they positively assessed the role of Buddhism in order to integrate society as a whole. However, this group of people did not pay much attention to the fundamental differences and contradictions between the secular and religious worlds, nor between ascetic and vulgar moralities. They thought the Buddhism's corruption could be dealt with by eliminating the secularity that had become pervasive within Buddhist circles at that time. For instance, Choe Hae (1278-1340) was critical of such problems as corruption, ritualism, and clerical venality, but he did not recognize Buddhism as a heretic or false religion. That is, he possessed a strong sense of consciousness as a Confucian gentry-scholar, but did not have keen antipathy against Buddhism itself.

The tendency to make a distinction between Buddhism as a religion and Buddhism as form of social abuse was widespread among scholars such as Yi Je-hyeon (1278-1376) and Yi Gok (1298-1351) in the early period of Neo-Confucianism. Even though Yi Je-hyeon criticized Buddhism for "relying on prestige families and the local gentry to exploit the national wealth,"¹³ he interpreted "the way of the Buddha" as "being based on compassion and charity, which both correspond to the two principal virtues of Confucianism—benevolent love and righteousness."¹⁴ Yi Gok also recognized the positive aspects of Buddhism, thus asserting that "as the Confucian gentry devote themselves to self-cultivation, regulation of the family, governance of the

13. *Ikjae jip* (Collected Works of Yi Je-hyeon), 6:19a.

14. *Ikjae jip*, 5:5b.

state, and the creation of the peaceful world, the practice of Buddhism also allows us to raise our living conditions, solidify compassion, and hence develop wholesome mental states for the people and the government.”¹⁵ Thus, they attempted to compromise Confucianism with Buddhism by finding commonalities between the Confucian principle of governance and Buddhist doctrine. In this sense, they were a pro-Buddhist faction that vindicated the social value of Buddhism.

Because Choe Hae, Yi Je-hyeon, and Yi Gok were mainly interested in reforming Buddhism as a response to the widespread corruption in religion, they were not able to be dyed-in-the-wool anti-Buddhists, and consequently did not have a strong desire to create a new sociopolitical order based on a Neo-Confucian philosophy. Accordingly, those who defended the core values of Buddhism were likely to be conservative rather than revolutionary in their political views during the transitional period leading into the Joseon dynasty. In contrast, those who held a fundamentalist perspective of Neo-Confucianism were strongly committed to replacing the old system with a new political order. So they were willing to sweep away all the customs and traditions that Goryeo's Buddhism had generated. That is, the anti-Buddhist argument was not merely an intellectual and philosophical exercise but also a powerful weapon with which to overthrow the Goryeo dynasty. The chief ideological engineer for this process was Jeong Do-jeon, who established the Joseon dynasty based on Neo-Confucian ideology.

Culmination of Anti-Buddhist Polemics by Jeong Do-jeon

The founders of the Joseon dynasty marked an epochal transition by rejecting Buddhist ideology and making Confucianism the basis of their new regime. A memorial submitted by the Office of the Inspector-General confirms the fact that Confucianism became the official

15. *Gajeong jip* (Collected Works of Yi Gok), 3:6b.

creed and ideology of the new government. In July 1392, when Yi Seong-gye seized power, the Office of the Inspector-General proposed an ideological roadmap in which ten items were suggested for consolidating the foundation of the new power.¹⁶ One of them was the “weeding out of unqualified Buddhist clergy,” and in accordance with this suggestion, King Taejo Yi Seong-gye (r. 1392-1398) promulgated the Founding Edict indicating that Confucianism had become the governing ideology.¹⁷

Thus, since the establishment of the Joseon dynasty, the Buddhists were thrust out of their positions of political power. Jeong Do-jeon, who had played a major role in the development of Neo-Confucianism as the official state ideology, wrote a few philosophical essays such as *Simgiri pyeon* (On the Mind, Material Force, and Principle) and *Bulssi japbyeon* (Array of Critiques against Buddhism) to attack Buddhism in a systematic manner. However, despite Jeong's efforts, Buddhism was not eradicated or completely defeated. Rather, its influence still continued to dominate the religious lives of the royal families in the palace.

As shown in the practices of royal families, in spite of strong anti-Buddhist sentiments, the spiritual and religious foundation of the Joseon dynasty was significantly fragmented. Particularly, a fissure appeared between the Confucian aristocrats and monarchs in the early Joseon period. The former emphasized the exclusive vision of Neo-Confucianism while the latter tended to interpret the establishment of the new dynasty in terms of the miraculous efficacy of Buddhism. For example, while Jeong Do-jeon wanted to pour out his fancies and political dreams into the planning of the new capital city, Yi Seong-gye relied more on the intuitive power of the Royal Preceptor Muhak Jacho (1327-1405) in planning Hanyang.

In 1375, when King U (r. 1374-1388) ascended to the throne, Jeong Do-jeon wrote the *Simmun cheondap* (The Mind-Heart Inquires and Heaven Responds) to indirectly criticize Buddhism. But the pri-

16. *Taejo sillok* (Annals of King Taejo), 1:42a.

17. *Taejo sillok*, 1:43a-45a.

mary purpose of the book was not to attack Buddhism itself, but to express his outrage and serious disappointment with the injustice and corruption that had become pervasive throughout the country. In this sense, the fact that Jeong wrote this essay during the first year of his exile is very important because, in his essay, he tried to justify his conviction regarding the ultimate victory of his political vision over the social evils of those days.¹⁸ In *Simmun cheondap*, Jeong Do-jeon wanted to reveal how absurd, unfair, and unreasonable the moral code of Goryeo society was at that time.¹⁹ Despite the commitment to follow the heavenly principle (*cheolli*), his political status was threatened by those who were attempting to purge him. The political circumstances of the late years of Goryeo were well reflected in the funeral oration written by Jeong Do-jeon for Bak Sang-chung (1332-1375), who died in exile on the charge that he had not welcomed a special envoy dispatched from the Northern Yuan dynasty.²⁰ At that time, Jeong Do-jeon and Bak Sang-chung explicitly advocated pro-Ming and anti-Yuan policies because they believed it corresponded with the heavenly mandate (*cheonmyeong*). However, there was no room for them to make their voices heard under the rule of the pro-Yuan faction.

Therefore, Jeong demonstrated his determined attitude as a Neo-Confucianist in the *Simmun cheondap*. In this essay, however, he did not interpret social injustice as a structural problem stemming from Buddhism. Although Kwon Geun (1352-1409) argued in his notes on *Simmun cheondap* in 1394 that the purpose of the essay was to blame Buddhism for undermining moral imperatives and restoring the Confucian learning of the Way, Jeong himself did not use any expression that might have been misunderstood as part of an anti-Buddhist ideology. Rather, he enjoyed great potential and bright prospects in his cultural exchange with prominent Buddhist figures. At least until 1385 (the 11th year of the reign of Goryeo King U),

18. Chung (1985, 76-77).

19. *Sambong jip* (Collected Works of Jeong Do-jeon), 10:11b-20a.

20. *Sambong jip*, 4:24a-25b.

Jeong Do-jeon had not become outspoken against the Buddhist circle.

Yet, when Yi Seong-gye led a military coup by withdrawing expeditionary troops from Wihwa-do island in 1388, Jeong stopped holding meetings with Buddhist leaders because he had been tasked with drawing a new ideological blueprint with which to replace Buddhism, the Goryeo dynasty's ideological basis. In particular, Jeong called for the reform of spiritual civilization in a memorial presented to King Gongyang (r. 1389-1392). In this memorial, he suggested the eradication of corrupt Buddhist circles and settling history by removing anti-revolutionary forces like Yi Saek (1328-1396) and U Hyeon-bo (1333-1400).²¹ Jeong's critical attitude toward Buddhism became more developed in the *Simgiri pyeon* and *Bulssi japbyeon* written later in the early Joseon dynasty years.

In *Simgiri pyeon*, which was composed of the essays "The Buddhist Mind Criticizes Material Force for Taoism," "The Taoist Material Force Criticizes Mind for Buddhism," and "Principle for Confucianism Admonishes the Mind and Material Force," Jeong carried out a comparative study of the natures of Buddhism and Taoism from a Neo-Confucian perspective in order to criticize the former two religions. Because he employed a very unique form of description, the *Simgiri pyeon* appeared to be less critical of Buddhism and Taoism than pointed out by Kwon Geun.²² Moreover, some readers of those days even misunderstood the intention of *Simgiri pyeon*, saying that "Jeong Do-jeon wrote *Simgiri pyeon* to shed light on the unification of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism."²³

However, compared to *Simmun cheondap*, which presented a critique of the Buddhist doctrine in an implicit and indirect manner, his criticism of Buddhism and Taoism in *Simgiri pyeon* came to maturity in many aspects. According to Kwon Geun, because the anti-Buddhist argument did not logically criticize the rotting Buddhist and Taoist monastic systems that were deeply entangled in political and social

21. *Sambong jip*, 3:1a-8b.

22. *Sambong jip*, 10:11a.

23. *Sambong jip*, 10:11b.

issues, Jeong Do-jeon first carefully reviewed the doctrines of Buddhism and Taoism and then underlined their shortcomings in the same vein based on the anti-Buddhist and anti-Taoist polemical dimensions of Neo-Confucianism.²⁴ By citing the *Diamond Sutra* and the *Sutra of Perfect Enlightenment*, Jeong highlighted how “a human mind, at its most basic level, is peaceful, harmonious, and replete, just as a mirror contains everything, thereby following its destiny,”²⁵ while “material force is embodied through provisional combinations of the four elements of earth, water, fire, and wind.”²⁶ These two phrases were deliberately rearranged in his writing to criticize the Taoist worldview with the Buddhist notion of innate buddhahood contained in all sentient beings. Afterwards, Jeong Do-jeon made use of *Daodejing* and *Zhuangzi* to draw readers’ attention to the secularism embedded within Buddhism. He said, “Material force is transformed into diverse forms in an amorphous manner so that it is able to contain the essence of life.”²⁷ And therefore, “Taoism helps its students find the Way.”²⁸ In contrast, “the teachings of Buddha lead people to mistakenly reflect upon what they cannot understand and consequently cause them to concentrate only on gains and losses.”²⁹ Thus, Jeong criticized the secularized Buddhist circles by utilizing the doctrine of Taoism.

It is, of course, hardly fair to criticize Buddhism and Taoism only from Jeong’s point of view, as what needs to be paid attention to here is not how precisely and objectively he understood them, but what perspective he brought in order to portray their predicaments. From the framework of “The Buddhist Criticizes the Material Force for Taoism” and “The Taoist Material Force Criticizes the Mind for Buddhism,” Jeong Do-jeon illustrated that both Buddhism and Taoism failed to ease the tension between the religious and mundane

24. *Sambong jip*, 10:10b-11a.

25. *Sambong jip*, 10:2a.

26. *Sambong jip*, 10:2a.

27. *Sambong jip*, 10:3b.

28. *Sambong jip*, 10:5a.

29. *Sambong jip*, 10:4b.

worlds. That is, Jeong cast doubt on the capabilities of Buddhism and Taoism to reconcile the sacred with the secular. According to Jeong, a “‘mind’ without ‘principle’ would result in a race for worldly gains while ‘material force’ without ‘principle’ would turn out to be nothing more than a body of flesh and blood moving like squirming insects.”³⁰ Jeong Do-jeon thus claimed that, since Buddhism and Taoism were one-sided and incomplete heterodoxies, they should be integrated under Confucian principles. In his essay, Jeong underscored the argument that principle could foster the mind, making it clear and lucid, while also enabling material force to be a strong and influential power.³¹ As Chung has depicted, the gist of Jeong’s argument is that “the Taoist doctrine of the nourishment of the self and the Buddhist view of the enlightenment of the mind are heterodox doctrines that delude people with false teachings.”³²

Despite the ideals Buddhism and Taoism presented to the people, they were supposed to have no means to synthetically materialize their ideals in the real world. As an alternative, Jeong Do-jeon suggested a theoretical framework in which ideology and reality were coherently integrated based on Confucian principles. However, *Simgiri pyeon* still left unanswered the questions of why Buddhism became secularized and how Neo-Confucianism would be able to fill the gap between ideology and reality. In this respect, it is worth examining *Bulssi japbyeon* in detail because it was his final, as well as most sustained, anti-Buddhist polemical work.³³

In essence, Buddhism is a transmudane religion that aims to elaborate upon the termination of worldly desires,³⁴ whereas the goal of Confucianism is, as Fung Yu-Lan pointed out, world-transcending as well as mundane.³⁵ Jeong Do-jeon described the nature of Confu-

30. *Sambong jip*, 10:6a-6b.

31. *Sambong jip*, 10:8b.

32. Chung (1985, 77).

33. The translation of *Bulssi japbyeon* used in this paper is mainly from Muller’s work. <http://www.hm.tyg.jp/~acmuller/jeong-gihwa/bulssijapbyeon.html>.

34. *Sambong jip*, 9:16b.

35. Fung (1967, 2).

cianism as the relationship between life and correct principles in *Bulssi japbyeon*. According to him, “The importance of food for people is great. Indeed, one should not go without food for a day, but one should also not have to seek out food for a day. It is because ‘not having food’ harms life while ‘having to look for food’ harms correct principles.”³⁶ However, “since Śākyamuni regarded cohabitation between men and women as immoral, he abandoned society, and escaped from the work of farming, thereby severing the roots of continuous reproduction.”³⁷ Thus, Jeong Do-jeon criticized Buddhism for denying everyday life, such as sex and labor, and rejecting production and history. Nonetheless, Jeong believed, Buddhism not only regarded the act of begging for food as appropriate, but also further developed the practice of rituals and service, thereby pursuing secular gain. As a result, Buddhism was like a worm, breeding social dysfunction.³⁸

Then, why did Buddhism chase after worldly splendor in spite of its focus on philosophy of purity and selflessness? According to Jeong, this was ironically due to the Buddhist moral code that urged people not to engage in mundane affairs. In reality, the human tendency is to praise good and punish evil because, in human behavior, there is both right and wrong. In other words, the sense of right and wrong is the origin of wisdom. But Buddhists did not discuss human incorrectness and correctness, nor right and wrong. Rather, they underestimated worldly affairs entirely and even claimed that if one could take refuge in the Buddha, misfortune could be avoided.³⁹ This remark was predicated on Cheng Hao’s argument that “in Buddhism, there is a sincere attempt to correct one’s internal life but no sense of duty towards external life.”⁴⁰ In sum, since Buddhism was oriented towards purity, it did not need to sit in judgment over right and

36. *Sambong jip*, 9:15b.

37. *Sambong jip*, 9:16a.

38. *Sambong jip*, 9:16b-17a.

39. *Sambong jip*, 9:7b.

40. Chu and Lü (1967, 281).

wrong, and consequently, it became more disinterested in worldly affairs and more secularized than any other religions. Jeong attributed this problem to the traditional meditation school (Seon philosophy) of Buddhism that emphasized “no establishment of words and letters” and the “cutting off of the path of language.” When Seon Buddhism was introduced by the Bodhidharma, it led people to abandon respect for the norms of society because the Seon school taught that goodness and evil were none other than the mind, and hence, the practice of disciplining oneself against doing evil and endeavoring to cultivate one’s goodness was meaningless.⁴¹ Thus, even if the study of the Buddhists included reverence to correct the internal, it did not include the giving of dues to straighten the external. It contained the means for internal discipline, but lacked the justice needed to straighten out the external. Moreover, even in the matter of correcting the internal, they still missed the essential points.⁴² This was why Jeong Do-jeon devoted himself to criticizing the internal discipline of Buddhism.

To achieve a sense of right and wrong, one must perceive change in the world correctly and respond to the change appropriately. Jeong Do-jeon called it *sujak manbyeon* (“responding to a myriad of changes and transformations”). According to him, “when a myriad of affairs and things take place, this mind responds to them, treating each appropriately without being confused.”⁴³ In Neo-Confucianism, it was supposed to be principles that were able to bring *sujak manbyeon* into function. Jeong also said, “Since the mind is endowed with a multitude of principles, there are none that are not responded to appropriately upon the arrival of all affairs and things. Consequently, the study of Confucianism extends from inside the body and mind to all affairs and things, all of which are penetrated by one.”⁴⁴ On the contrary, because Buddhism shied away from fully investigat-

41. *Sambong jip*, 9:17b.

42. *Sambong jip*, 9:9b.

43. *Sambong jip*, 9:19a.

44. *Sambong jip*, 9:7a.

ing principles and responding to the endless changes of life, it could not create concepts linked with reality.⁴⁵ In this respect, Jeong claimed, “Buddhism is void while Confucianism is substantial. Buddhism has two realities while Confucianism has one, and Buddhism has gaps while Confucianism is consistent.”⁴⁶

The keynote of Jeong’s thought in *Bulssi japbyeon* was to criticize Buddhism as a more dangerous ideology than the philosophies of Yang Zhu and Mo Di, which Mengzi had denounced as heterodox. Hence he took the critique of heterodoxy as his personal responsibility.⁴⁷ The influence of Jeong’s critique of heterodoxy was not, however, restricted to anti-Buddhist arguments. After Jeong juxtaposed “heterodoxy” and “orthodoxy,” the intellectuals of the Joseon dynasty often utilized them to brand Buddhism, Taoism, and unorthodox Confucian ideas that threatened the legitimacy of Neo-Confucianism as heterodoxy.⁴⁸

Gihwa’s Response to Jeong Do-jeon’s Critique

Jeong Do-jeon wrote *Bulssi japbyeon* in May 1398 (the 7th year of King Taejo’s reign) and died in September of the same year, when the first Revolt of the Prince broke out by King Taejo’s fifth son Yi Bang-won. Because he was accused of forming a conspiracy against Yi Bang-won, his books, *Sambong jip* and *Bulssi japbyeon*, were also classified as contraband and so his criticism of Buddhism did not attract people’s attention until a reprint was allowed in 1465 (the 11th year of King Sejo’s reign). During this period, the royal families overtly supported Buddhist rituals and practices. The reform of the Buddhist monks’ extravagance and corruption was, of course, an urgent issue demanded by the Joseon dynasty at that time. Indeed, during the reigns of kings Taejo, Taejong (r. 1400-1418), and Sejong

45. *Sambong jip*, 9:13b.

46. *Sambong jip*, 9:7b.

47. *Sambong jip*, 9:27b; *Mencius*, 3B:9.

48. Chung (1985, 80).

(r. 1418-1450), there were continuous reforms, such as the nationalization of the land and slaves owned by Buddhist temples, the restriction of the construction of new temples, and the enactment of the Docheopje (certification of monkhood) to decrease the sociopolitical power of Buddhism. Nevertheless, it was almost impossible to completely and abruptly ban Buddhism because, as shown in the memorial presented by the Office of the Censor-General, “Buddhist practices were too pervasive in Joseon society for its adherents to be prosecuted.”⁴⁹

Moreover, despite his policies to reduce the external size and secular power of Buddhism, King Sejong was actually fond of Buddhism more than any other monarchs. Indeed, he is well known for allowing the publication of a number of sutras. When *Hunmin jeongeum* (the Korean alphabet *Hangeul*, literally translated as “Correct Sounds to Instruct the People”) was promulgated in 1446, he ordered Prince Suyang to publish *Seokbo sangjeol* (A Detailed Account of the Buddha). Also, he himself even composed *Worin cheongangji gok* (Songs of the Moon’s Imprint on a Thousand Rivers) to praise Buddha’s merit and virtue. In addition, King Sejong constructed a Buddhist shrine in the palace in 1448. When he made the plan to construct the shrine, state bureaucrats objected to the construction based on *Won yukjeon* (Basic Six Codes) and *Sok yukjeon* (Supplemental Six Codes) that banned the construction of new temples or remodeling work. However, King Sejong denied their claim on the justification that “laws apply to the people, not to the monarch.”⁵⁰

Gihwa was a learned priest who played an active role as a Buddhist due to King Sejong’s benevolent policies. According to *The Life of Reverend Hamheo Deuktong*, written by one of his disciples, his given name was Su-i, and he was a student at the National Academy of Confucian Studies (Seonggyungwan). However, at the age of twenty-one, the death of a friend tilted the scales of his belief irreversibly

49. *Sejong sillok*, 12:20b.

50. *Sejong sillok*, 121:10a.

in the direction of Buddhism because he was not able to find an answer to the fundamental questions of life and death in Confucian teachings. Eventually, he entered the priesthood at the Uisang hermitage, Mt. Gwanak, and became a disciple of the Royal Preceptor Muhak Jacho at Hoeamsa temple. When he was 45 years old, he traveled to Mt. Odae and paid his respects to the image of Naong Hyegeun (1320-1376), the teacher of his mentor Muhak. While staying at this hermitage, he received in a dream his Buddhist name of Giwha and his Buddhist penname of Deuktong.⁵¹ Giwha was the inheritor of the Seon (meditation) school, whose practices were derived from his teacher Muhak Jacho who was in turn taught by Naong Hyegeun. Giwha wrote many books, such as *Hyeonjeong ron*, *Geumgang banya baramil gyeong ogahae seorui* (Annotation to the Redaction of the Five Commentaries on the *Diamond Sutra*), *Geumgang banya baramil gyeong yungwan* (The Penetrating Thread of the *Diamond Sutra*), *Daebanggwang won-gak sudara youi gyeong seorui* (Commentary on the *Sutra of Perfect Enlightenment*), *Seonjong yeong-gajip gwaju seorui* (Annotated Redaction of the Text and Commentaries to the Compilation of Yung chia of the Ch'an School), and *Hamheodang Deuktong hwasang eorok* (The Record of the Teachings of the Reverend Hamheo Deuktong). In addition, *Yuseok jirui ron* (An Inquiry into Buddhism and Confucianism) is also presumed to be written by Giwha, but there is no empirical evidence supporting this.⁵² Accordingly, I examine Giwha's pro-Buddhist arguments and their theoretical foundations based on his writings, especially *Hyeonjeong ron*.

As mentioned above, Giwha was educated at a prestigious Confucian academy. In the course of his studies at this institution, Giwha was regarded as having attained a remarkable level of proficiency in Chinese philosophy and literature. He was often compared with Duke Zhou and Duke Shao, who were advisors to King Cheng of the Chi-

51. *Hanguk bulgyo jeonseo* (Complete Works of Korean Buddhism), 7:250c-251a.

52. Refer to Muller (1999, 177) about the controversy over the authorship of *Yuseok jirui ron*.

nese Zhou dynasty.⁵³ However, Confucian teachings did not address the fundamental questions of the meaning and direction of his life. According to *Hyeonjeong ron*, during the period when Giwha still had not yet entered the Buddhist priesthood, he happened to read the *Lunyu* (Analects) with a monk named Haewol. When Haewol reached the passage that states that "there was a ruler who universally extended benevolence to the people and brought succor to the multitudes,"⁵⁴ he put the scroll aside and said, "According to Cheng Hao, the humane man forms a single body with heaven and earth and myriad things. If this statement is to be taken as a true expression of the principle, how are we supposed to see Mengzi as humane? If fowl, pigs, dogs, and swine are to be counted among the 'myriad things,' then how could Mengzi say that people seventy years of age can eat meat?"⁵⁵ Giwha was stymied by this question and could not answer. He pondered over all of the classical transmissions but could not come up with a single text that supported a principle condoning the taking of life. This doubt remained buried within his mind for a long time without being resolved. Then, while traveling around Mt. Samgak at the age of twenty-one, he arrived at Seunggasa temple, where he happened to hear from an old monk about the Buddhist precept of not taking a life. Upon hearing this explanation, he recognized the differences between Confucianism and Buddhism.⁵⁶ And he subsequently composed the following verse:

Until now, knowing only the teachings of the classics and histories,
and the criticisms of Cheng and Zhu
I was unable to recognize whether the Buddha was wrong or right.
But after reflecting deeply in my mind for long years
Knowing the truth for the first time, I reject [Confucianism] and

53. *Hanguk bulgyo jeonseo*, 7:250c.

54. *Analects*, 6:28.

55. *Mencius*, 1A:3.

56. *Hanguk bulgyo jeonseo*, 7:220a. The translation of *Hyeonjeong ron* used in this paper is mainly from Muller's work. <http://www.tyg.jp/~acmuller/jeong-gihwa/Hyeonjeong non.html>.

rely upon [the Buddhist dharma].⁵⁷

In the same year, Gihwa was profoundly affected by the death of his close friend and was determined to walk the Buddhist path. In this respect, Gihwa's priesthood was the result of existential wanderings and encounters with regard to life and death.

As a Seon monk, Gihwa developed the meditation school that emphasized the practice of purity and disinterestedness. However, he did not pursue a life of seclusion. Rather, he wrote many books concerning doctrinal studies. In particular, it is worth noting that he was close to the royal families during King Sejong's reign. According to *The Life of Reverend Hamheo Deuktong*, Gihwa held a number of assemblies for worship on behalf of the royal families and offered the Dharma talk at Daejasa temple for four years from 1421 to 1424.⁵⁸ For example, he held an assembly to pray for the late Queen Wongyeong and presented the Dharma with words to comfort the soul of the late Prince Seongnyeong, the fourth son of King Taejong.⁵⁹ In spite of the tenacious criticism of Buddhism, *Hyeonjeong ron* became an influential pro-Buddhist essay due to the political backdrop provided by the royal families.⁶⁰

The term *hyeonjeong* (Exposition of the Correct) originated from *pasa hyeonjeong* (Breaking the False and Manifesting the Right), which conceptualized the way to establish orthodoxy. In *pasa hyeonjeong*, the key issue was what to define as heresy. For instance, the Mādhyamika-śāstra advocated by Nāgārjuna (c. 150-250) only focused on removing heretical elements within Buddhism. Three Treaties School which emphasized the Mādhyamika-śāstra, Śataśāstra, and Devādaśa-nikāya-śāstra, criticized not only the inherent problems the term "heresy" implied, but also ancient Indian and Chi-

57. *Hanguk bulgyo jeonseo*, 7:220a.

58. *Hanguk bulgyo jeonseo*, 7:251b.

59. *Hanguk bulgyo jeonseo*, 7:227b-228b.

60. It is not clear when *Hyeonjeong ron* was written. Park Hae-Dang (1996, 16-17) argues that it was written when Gihwa remained in Daejasa temple as a royal preceptor (1421-1424).

nese philosophies. By contrast, however, Gihwa's *Hyeonjeong ron* aimed to defend Buddhist philosophy in the face of mounting criticism that secularized Buddhist practices were obsolete, useless, and even harmful. Thus, unlike the Mādhyamika-śāstra and the Three Treaties School, *Hyeonjeong ron* was written as a retort to the theoretical and practical argument against the Neo-Confucian criticism of Buddhism.

As Choe Seung-ro pointed out, the key focus of Confucian criticism was that Buddhist teachings were not appropriate for the governance of the state because they highlighted self-cultivation. To refute this criticism, Gihwa called attention to the fundamental limitations of the so-called governance. According to him, "One should endeavor to cultivate all kinds of virtuous behavior because a single instance of good fortune would arise in each clan throughout the state. . . . However, the way that the Confucian scholars teach people is not through the example of virtuous action, but through laws and punishments. . . . In the case of 'leading by laws and regulating by punishments,' one cannot avoid clarification through reward and punishment. Therefore they say that reward and punishment are the great basis of the state."⁶¹ This was of course the Legalist argument.⁶² However, Gihwa regarded the Confucian method of reward and punishment as ineffective because he believed there would invariably be those who followed the way only superficially. In contrast, the Buddhist method of teaching would lead people to silently accomplish a hearty trust in conjunction with the teaching of cause and effect. Thus, Gihwa believed the Buddhist method was superior to the Confucian approach.⁶³

But this polemic stemmed from his misunderstanding of the *Analects*. The author of the *Analects* certainly suggested the opposite. According to the *Analects*, "if one leads the people with governmental measures and regulates them by laws and punishment, they will

61. *Hanguk bulgyo jeonseo*, 7:217c.

62. *Han Feizi*, ch. 7, "The Two Handles."

63. *Hanguk bulgyo jeonseo*, 7:217c-218a.

avoid wrongdoing but have no sense of honor and shame; but if one leads them with virtue and regulates them through propriety (*li*) and virtue (*de*), they will possess a sense of shame and moreover, set themselves aright.”⁶⁴ That is, the punch line of the *Analects* was indeed to deny the punishment method and to establish a virtue-based political system.

Meanwhile, Gihwa explained the concept of cause and effect and said, “If people want to understand the reasons for their successes and failures in the present life, then teach them to regard the seeds sown in prior lifetimes, and if they want to know what fortune and misfortune will come in the future, then teach them regarding present causes.”⁶⁵ However, to demonstrate the usefulness of the secularized Buddhist concept of cause and effect, Gihwa referred to a Confucian scripture. Citing the *Yijing* (Book of Changes), Gihwa said, “According to the *Yijing*, when you accumulate virtue, you will have abundant good fortune, and when you accumulate evil, you will have abundant calamity. The *Shujing* (Book of Documents) also says that, when the people accord themselves with ultimate principles, heaven rewards them with the five blessings, and when they are in discord, then heaven responds by bringing about the six extremes.”⁶⁶ However, his reasoning was nothing more than a passive defense showing that the Buddhist concept of cause and effect was compatible with Confucian philosophy. The overall tone of the *Hyeonjeong ron* was quite conciliatory in comparison to that found in Confucian criticism. Indeed, he did not directly address the criticism made against Buddhist practices, which were seen as scandalous and corruptive. In responding to this criticism, Gihwa suggested leaving the secular world and cultivating practices of detachment as a solution when one lacked self-control and became polluted by the secular world.⁶⁷

Another charge made against Buddhism by Confucian scholars

64. *Analects*, 2:3.

65. *Hanguk bulgyo jeonseo*, 7:218a.

66. *Hanguk bulgyo jeonseo*, 7:221a.

67. *Hanguk bulgyo jeonseo*, 7:218a.

was that Buddhist practices were antisocial, such as the abandonment of family relationships. Buddhism, according to the Neo-Confucianism, led people to abandon respect for social norms and to forget the all-important task of polishing one's character in the midst of human relationships. In response to this criticism, Gihwa also agreed with the idea of filial piety by saying, “When inside the home, be filial, and when out in society, be loyal. This is certainly the behavior appropriate to citizens and children.”⁶⁸ However, he asserted, “Although one is able to maintain perfect loyalty and perfect filial piety, escaping the fact of cyclical existence is difficult indeed.”⁶⁹ From the secular perspective, it was obviously impious for the Buddha to enter the Himalayas without notifying his parents. But, in another sense, it was a truly filial act because Buddha brought his parents to liberation through his teachings on the essentials of the dharma.⁷⁰ Since all later generations would praise his mother and father as the parents of a great sage, this was the full manifestation of filial piety.⁷¹ Confucius also emphasized in the *Xiaojing* (Classic of Filial Piety) that, “When we have established our character by the practice of the filial course so as to make our name famous in future ages and thereby glorify our parents, this is the end of filial piety.”⁷²

Even so, Gihwa explained filial piety in terms of spiritual salvation rather than relating it to social order and disorder. In contrast, Confucius said, “He who loves his parents will not risk being hated by any man, and he who reveres his parents will not risk being condemned by any man. When love and reverence are thus carried to the utmost in the service of his parents, the lessons of his virtue affect all the people, and he becomes a pattern to the four seas.”⁷³ As illustrated in this passage, Confucianism dealt with filial piety not only at the individual level but also at the societal one, focusing on

68. *Hanguk bulgyo jeonseo*, 7:218b.

69. *Hanguk bulgyo jeonseo*, 7:218b-218c.

70. *Hanguk bulgyo jeonseo*, 7:218c.

71. *Hanguk bulgyo jeonseo*, 7:218c-219a.

72. *Hanguk bulgyo jeonseo*, 7:218c.

73. *Xiaojing* (Classic of Filial Piety), ch. 1, “The Scope and Meaning of the Treatise.”

how to establish secular order in society.

In response to the Confucian criticism that Buddhists were not fully loyal to their state and ruler, Gihwa argued that Buddhism translated loyalty into practice in its own way. First, it was taught that one who would become a ruler must first receive the precepts in order to purify his body and mind. Second, all monks burned incense in the morning and lighted a lantern in the evening, praying for the ruler and the state. Third, Buddhism taught the people that doing good things brings happiness and that doing evil invites disaster.⁷⁴ Gihwa argued that the Buddha's teachings did not encourage the provisional awarding of rank and emolument, nor use authority to enforce penalties, and instead, convinced people and led them toward self-transformation. These three methods, however, were mainly designed to facilitate religious functions rather than cultivate the sense of loyalty demanded by the secular world.

Although the Confucian classics often interpreted the ethical tradition of loyalty as an extension of filial piety,⁷⁵ most Confucian scholars distinguished the familial ethics of filial piety from the political ethics of loyalty. For instance, Quli from the *Liji* (Book of Rites) stated, "According to the rules of propriety for a minister, he should not remonstrate the ruler openly. If he remonstrates him three times and is still not listened to, he should leave his service. In a son's service to his parents, if he remonstrates them three times and is still not listened to, he should obey his parents with weeping and tears."⁷⁶ Highlighting the differences between familial and political ethics, Confucianism suggested the promotion of systemic development through certain political actions like remonstrance, rather than religious activities such as the receiving of precepts or burning incense.

In addition, as seen in Jeong Mong-ju's criticism of Buddhism, Confucians blamed Buddhist monks for roaming idly, avoiding social

74. *Hanguk bulgyo jeonseo*, 7:219a.

75. *Xiaojing*, ch. 2, "Filial Piety in the Son of Heaven."

76. *Liji* (Book of Rites), 1B:3.

responsibilities, depending on others for food and clothing, and therefore making the people suffer from this burden. However, Gihwa's response was quite inadequate. He said, because the responsibility of the monks lay in spreading the dharma and elevating the consciousness of sentient beings, there was no need for them to be embarrassed about receiving alms from the people. It was also clearly spelled out that if a monk proved to be incapable of his responsibilities but received alms from others, it would be an individual fault, but not the fault of the Buddha.⁷⁷ To justify his argument, Gihwa again cited *Mencius*, saying that "Here is a man who is filial at home and respectful to his elders on the one hand and watches over the principles of the ancient kings on the other, while awaiting the rise of future learners. But if you refuse to support him while giving honor to the carpenter and wheelwright, how can you be said to respect a person who practices benevolence and righteousness?"⁷⁸ Based on this observation, Gihwa argued that it was appropriate for those who preserved the Way and worked to elevate people's consciousness to receive food and clothing from those people.⁷⁹

However, there was some degree of misunderstanding. First, when Mengzi distinguished those who labor with their minds and govern others from those who labor with their strength and are governed, he intended to explain the different roles between those who are supported and those who support others.⁸⁰ This distinction was also purported to describe how a ruler and ordinary people were different. Accordingly, to Confucian scholars, who thought that Buddhism had no "governance people" effect, the assertion that Buddhist monks deserved to receive alms without labor seemed like utter nonsense. Second, in the beginning of *Mencius* that Gihwa cited, Mengzi actually started the paragraph with "intercommunication of the productions of labor," indicating that the increase of production is up to

77. *Hanguk bulgyo jeonseo*, 7:224a-224b.

78. *Mencius*, 3B:4.

79. *Hanguk bulgyo jeonseo*, 7:224b.

80. *Mencius*, 3A:5.

the division of labor and societal functions between those who govern others and those who are governed by others. But Gihwa said, "Whether one will be wealthy or poor in this life is based on his karmic predisposition"⁸¹ and "If one ends up hungry, cold, and destitute without offering a single cent for alms, he is responsible for his poverty."⁸² Thus, without presenting an alternative solution, Gihwa just ascribed a variety of social problems to the lack of individual efforts.

As a consequence, Gihwa unintentionally closed his eyes to the corruption of the temples and abuse of the monks. Of course, he acknowledged that there were some monks who defiled their teacher's dharma and did not live up to their appellation. Because these monks did not embody the Five Virtues and Six Kinds of Harmony, they did not deserve to be called monks. Nonetheless, Gihwa attempted to defend the overall Buddhist circle by saying that the problems lay with some individual monks.⁸³ According to him, "In the forest there is wood that is not fit for use as lumber; in the fields there are grains that do not bear fruit. Granted, there are monks who are not capable of acting as repositories and exemplars of the dharma, but one should not be alarmed by these types to an extreme."⁸⁴

Thus, *Hyeonjeong ron* was an accommodation of Buddhism to Confucianism in which Gihwa tried to shed light on the positive aspects of Buddhism and its alleged contributions to society. As if Matteo Ricci had tried to accommodate Christianity to Confucianism in order to facilitate the propagation of Christianity, Gihwa also looked for ways to make a compromise with Confucianism and consequently, in his Buddhist apologetics, he did not provide any provocative arguments against the fundamental Confucian doctrine. However, he was not as successful as might have been expected in justifying how the secularization of Buddhism would be conducive to

81. *Hanguk bulgyo jeonseo*, 7:224b.

82. *Hanguk bulgyo jeonseo*, 7:224b.

83. *Hanguk bulgyo jeonseo*, 7:224b-224c.

84. *Hanguk bulgyo jeonseo*, 7:224c

the development of a society. In this regard, despite his efforts to respond to the Neo-Confucian charges as a leading representative of the Buddhist circle at the time, it was obvious that *Hyeonjeong ron* included fundamental limitations in effectively coping with the criticisms leveled by the Neo-Confucians. But it was because of this accommodative strategy of Gihwa's *Hyeonjeong ron* that "Buddhism could continue as a viable religious force in the Joseon dynasty by supporting the new social program of the Neo-Confucians."⁸⁵

Conclusion

Deeply influenced by Chinese Buddhism of the Northern Dynasty, Korean Buddhism developed from the onset as a strong political ideology with a practical set of ethics, aiming to strengthen the royal prerogative and promote the development of the state. Since the Three Kingdoms era, Korean Buddhism had been taken up as a secular diversion, establishing a close relationship with royal families and aristocrats. Under such patronage, the temples came into possession of vast property and grew as a powerful political force. The secularization of Buddhism went to extremes, especially during the Goryeo dynasty.

As a result, Buddhism and its secular power became a major target of criticism made by the Neo-Confucians at the end of the Goryeo dynasty. In fact, since the early Goryeo dynasty, the separation of religion and politics had been raised as a central issue by those who argued that Buddhism was essentially aimed at bringing about the moral and religious salvation of individuals. This criticism of secularized Buddhism was more progressively developed soon thereafter, when Neo-Confucianism was introduced into Korea. The main charge expressed in Neo-Confucian arguments was that Buddhist practices were antisocial and escapist, and that the Buddhist doctrine was nihilistic. Buddhism, according to the Neo-Confucians, led people to

85. Buswell (1999, 143).

abandon respect for the norms of society and to forget the all-important task of developing one's character in the midst of human relationships. Particularly, Jeong Do-jeon argued that there were correct and incorrect ways to utilize one's mind, and that there was right and wrong in individual behavior; but Buddhism simply ignored these distinctions and consequently misled people while indulging itself in secular pursuits.

However, despite Neo-Confucian scholars' unceasing criticism, Buddhism continued its influence, especially in the religious lives of the royal families during the early Joseon dynasty. But Buddhist circles were not strong enough to fend off Neo-Confucian attacks. Under these adverse circumstances, Gihwa attempted to defend Buddhism against the Neo-Confucians, asserting the intrinsic unity of Buddhism, Confucianism, and Taoism. Because he was a student at the National Academy of Confucian Studies (Seonggyungwan), he was well acquainted with these religions. Citing the Confucian classics, Gihwa argued that there was no fundamental difference between Buddhism and Confucianism, and accordingly the Buddhist teachings were conducive to the development of the world.

In the beginning, Neo-Confucian criticism was focused on the transmundane path of Buddhism as a theoretical polemic, but, due to Buddhism's corruption, this developed into anti-Buddhist sentiment. Accordingly, on the part of Buddhist practitioners, any type of answers should be made in response to this criticism. However, Gihwa's remarks did not deal with the main point of the Neo-Confucian attacks. Rather, he attempted to reconcile with his Confucian counterparts in terms of the accommodation of Buddhism to Confucianism without presenting any explanation as to why Buddhism needed to engage in worldly politics and how Buddhism could cope with the problems caused by its secularization. As a result, the Buddhist-Confucian debate in the early Joseon dynasty ended up being a victory for the Neo-Confucian camp, which presented a means to synthetically integrate their principles into the real world. In addition, with its triumph, Confucian philosophy took an exclusive position as the political creed of the Joseon dynasty.

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GLOSSARY

<i>Bulssi japbyeon</i>	佛氏雜辨	<i>Geumgang banya</i>	金剛般若
Cheng (Ch.)	成(王)	<i>baramilgyeong</i>	波羅蜜經
Cheng Hao (Ch.)	程顥	<i>yun-gwan</i>	綸貫
Choe Hae	崔滄	Gihwa	己和
<i>Daebanggwang wongak</i>	大方廣圓覺	Gongyang	恭讓(王)
<i>sudara youi gyeong</i>	修多羅了義經	<i>Goryeosa</i>	高麗史
<i>seorui</i>	說誼	Haewol	海月
<i>Daodejing</i> (Ch.)	道德經	Hamheo Deuktong	涵虛 得通
De (Ch.)	德	<i>Hamheodang Deuktong</i>	涵虛堂得通
Devādaśa-nikāya-sāstra	十二門論	<i>hwasang eorok</i>	和尚語錄
(Skt.)		<i>Han Feizi</i> (Ch.)	韓非子
Docheopje	度牒制	<i>Hoeheon seonsaeng silgi</i>	晦軒先生實記
<i>Gajeong jip</i>	稼亭集	<i>hoguk bulgyo</i>	護國佛教
<i>Geumgang banya</i>	金剛般若	<i>Hunmin jeongeum</i>	訓民正音
<i>baramilgyeong</i>	波羅蜜經	<i>Hyeonjeong ron</i>	顯正論
<i>ogahae seorui</i>	五家解說誼	<i>Ikjae jip</i>	益齋集

Jo Ryun	祖倫	Shao (Ch.)	召(公)
Jo Yeong	祖英	<i>Shujing</i> (Ch.)	書經
<i>li</i> (Ch.)	禮	<i>Simgiri pyeon</i>	心氣理篇
<i>Liji</i> (Ch.)	禮記	<i>Simmun cheondap</i>	心門天答
Mādhymika-sāstra	中論	<i>Sok yukjeon</i>	續六典
(Skt.)		Su-i	守伊
<i>Mengzi</i> (Ch.)	孟子	<i>sujak manbyeon</i>	酬酌萬變
Mo Di (Ch.)	墨翟	Suyang	首陽(大君)
Muhak Jacho	無學 自超	<i>tong bulgyo</i>	通佛教
Nāgārjuna (Skt.)	龍樹	U	禩(王)
Naong Hyegeun	懶翁 惠勤	Wongyeong	元敬(王后)
<i>pasa hyeonjeong</i>	破邪顯正	<i>Won yukjeon</i>	元六典
Quli (Ch.)	曲禮	<i>Worin cheongangji gok</i>	月印千江之曲
Śākyamuni (Skt.)	釋迦牟尼	<i>Xiaojing</i> (Ch.)	孝經
<i>Sambong jip</i>	三峯集	Yang Zhu (Ch.)	楊朱
Śata-sāstra (Skt.)	百論	<i>Yijing</i> (Ch.)	易經
<i>Seokbo sangjeol</i>	釋譜詳節	Yuan (Ch.)	元
Seon	禪	<i>Yuseok jirui ron</i>	儒釋質疑論
Seonggyungwan	成均館	Zhou (Ch.)	周
Seongnyeong (prince)	誠寧(大君)	Zhou (Ch.)	周(公)
<i>Seonjong yeonggajip</i>	禪宗永嘉集	<i>Zhuangzi</i> (Ch.)	莊子
<i>gwaju seoru</i>	科註說誼		

(Ch.: Chinese, Skt.: Sanskrit)