Korea Journal, vol. 57, no. 2 (summer 2017): 102–128.

A Critical Argument against the Thesis of "Individualization without Individualism": *Focusing on a Comparison between Germany's* Sonderweg *and South Korea's Special Path to Modernization**

Chan-Sook HONG

Abstract

The Korean sociologist Chang Kyung-Sup coined the terms "compressed modernity" and "individualization without individualism" to describe the special path to modernisation in South Korea. The word "compressed" here denotes and emphasizes the contradictory coexistence of a collectivistic culture of familism and family formations that are simultaneously individualizing and varying. Because South Korean women have initiated the individualization of family forms, Chang and Song characterize them as "stranded individualizers under compressed modernity," by which they mean that Korean women are culturally still collectivistic but at the same time appear individualistic in their (non-)marriage behaviour. This study argues against the theory of "compressed modernity" in Korea, according to which the individualization of families is nothing but a risk-averse variant of familism. Instead, this study argues that the real dynamic of individualization in Korea is found in the emergence of individualism and its vulnerability to institutions of familism. This study labels such a dynamic "compressed individualization."

Keywords: individualization without individualism, methodological cosmopolitanism, German *Sonderweg*, compressed individualization, (non-)marriage behavior, Ulrich Beck

---

* This work was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea Grant funded by the Korean government (NRF-2013S1A5B5A02029191).

Chan-Sook HONG is a lecturer at the Interdisciplinary Program in Gender Studies, Seoul National University. E-mail: uf341az@snu.ac.kr.

Introduction

The Korean sociologist Chang Kyung-Sup coined the terms "compressed modernity" (2010a, 2010b) and "individualization without individualism" (2014) to describe the special path to modernization in South Korea. The word "compressed" here denotes and emphasizes the contradictory coexistence of a collectivistic culture of familism and family formations that are individualizing and varying.[1] Because South Korean women have initiated the individualization of family forms, Chang and Song (2010) characterize them as "stranded individualizers under compressed modernity," by which they mean that Korean women are culturally still collectivistic (in regards to familism) but at the same time appear individualistic in their (non-)marriage behavior. The word "stranded" here, therefore, refers to a gap between emotion and behavior, which Chang (2014) argues was caused by the 1997 Asian financial crisis. In this view, the seemingly individualistic (non-)marriage behavior of women can be explained as a "risk-averse" reaction to the economic crisis and not at all as a sign of cultural change. Similarly, two other Korean sociologists, Shim and Han (2010), have also developed the concept of "family-oriented individualization."

In my view, however, the (intentional) self-contradiction implied in the terms "individualization without individualism" and "family-oriented individualization" stems from an overemphasis on the Confucian nature of familism as an institution in contemporary Korea. Note that familism comprises multiple facets: it covers institutional, cultural, and internalized values and behavior. Furthermore, the nature and pace of the changes in each facet may differ, even causing internal contradictions. Given this unevenness within familism, I believe that the theses of individualization without indi-

1. On the concept of *familism*, see Goldscheider and Goldscheider (1993, 80). In their approach, Goldscheider and Goldscheider focus on the institutional aspect of the family and family values. Unlike Goldscheider and Goldscheider, Chang (2014) stresses the non-Westernness of Korean family values, even though he uses the term "familialism" in order to highlight the institutionalized nature of familism. In this article, I use the term familism rather than familialism, as the latter is sometimes used to explain western welfare systems, while the former places emphasis on the attributes of family values.

vidualism and family-oriented individualization both fail to properly address the complex "intra-actions" (Barad 2007) within the domain of familism.

For this reason, in this study, I argue against the theory of "compressed modernity" in Korea, according to which the individualization of families is nothing but a risk-averse variant of familism. Instead, I argue that the real dynamic of individualization in Korea is found from the *emergence of individualism* and its vulnerability to institutions of familism. I call this dynamic "compressed individualization."

Individualization in Korea

Since the 1997 economic crisis, academic discussions on individualization in Korea have consistently focused on the dissolution of *normal* families, or the diversification of family structures. Originally proposed by Ulrich Beck in his book *Risk Society* (1992), the "individualization theory" emphasizes the instability of the individual life course (or the "patchwork identity") over statistical aggregates, such as class or stratification, which have been used historically as starting points to explain social inequality in modern society. According to Beck (1992), aggregate categories in contemporary industrial societies, such as family, class, and status, have become unstable and less cohesive as a result of the greater weight given to individuals in the frame of the post-industrial and post-Fordist society.

In Korea, the individualization theory was chosen as a theoretical approach for analyzing the transformation of the family rather than explaining social inequality. The discourse has been implicitly influenced by Beck's idea of "methodological cosmopolitanism." Beck emphasized the need for research into special paths to modernization outside of Europe in contemporary times. In my view, Beck's methodological cosmopolitanism can be regarded as a cultural expression of Germany's "successful Westernization" (van Deth 2001; Schulze 2002; Winkler 2005) after World War II. However, in history, Germany was also once a catch-up industrializing society, whose special path to modernization was called *Sonderweg* (special way). Therefore, I think it is necessary to compare the historical contexts of Germany's

Sonderweg and Korea's special path to modernization as an initial step to utilizing Beck's methodological cosmopolitanism.

In Korean academia, Beck's individualization theory has had little success penetrating the research area of social inequality, the very topic it mainly aimed to comprehend. Mainstream research in that field is either still dominated by the traditional stratification theory or views the widening gap between socioeconomic classes (a statistically defined aggregate) as falsifying the individualization theory (W. Lee 2011; Park et al. 2005).

To summarize, research and discussions on individualization in South Korea, on the whole, are limited to the transformation of the family, emphasize the continuity of Confucian familism in general, and do not question conventional aggregate-focused approaches to social inequality. In this light, I contend that the mainstream research on individualization in Korea does not look past Confucianism—whether it be blaming or crediting—when theorizing about modernization. The point is that even though the Confucian influence is important, it does not necessarily mean that Confucian influence remains consistent across times. Rather, we now witness a gradual attenuation of filial piety (*hyo* 孝) which has undergirded Confucian values, as evidenced by the recent increase in the numbers of senior citizens living in one-person households and those still in the workforce, as well as the rise in their poverty level. These changes, I argue, are not solely caused by the deteriorating *material conditions* resulting from the 1997 financial crisis; they were also driven by the *cultural change* caused by the wealth generated through the successful industrialization of South Korea. Accordingly, in this article, I stress the importance of countering cultural change as well as the effects of the financial crisis when we discuss the issue of individualization in Korean society. In other words, I argue that individualization can be framed as a phenomenon linked to the recent cultural change—the attenuation of Confucian familism—rather than as a mere risk-averse reaction to the economic crisis.

Theoretical Starting Point: Structural Change on the Mezzo-Level or Institutional-Emotional Difference

Discussions on individualization in South Korea since 1997 have centered on the financial crisis, which brought great economic hardship for Koreans. Such crisis-driven perspectives have more in common with Bauman's (1988) gloomy atomized consumer outlook than Beck's more or less optimistic view of individualization as the second wave of modernity. The Western response to Beck's individualization theory has varied, and many scholars have criticized the theory. In particular, those who insist on using class categories in the study of social inequality (Atkinson 2007; Goldthorpe 2002; Mayer and Blossfeld 1990) or on seeing family solidarity as everlasting in family studies (Duncan and Smith 2006; Smart and Shipman 2004) have been deeply critical of Beck's individualization theory. Yet, those critics do not take fully into account the social implication of post-Fordist changes. In their view, it is only the magnitude of the disparity between classes or families that changes; actually, they overlooked how the aggregate categories themselves, including class and family (or gender roles), are subject to change. My point here is that in the West the critique of individualization is really a matter of the category of observation—whether you only observe quantitative changes within the presumably self-same aggregate categories or put individuals in the center of the analysis of social structures as Beck did, since according to Beck the aggregate categories have been rendered unstable and the intragenerational social mobility of individuals has increased in a downward direction.

Compared with Western discussions, Korean scholars' criticism of Beck's theory seems to underscore one dominant factor: Confucianism. Traditional Korean culture is, of course, fundamentally different from that of the West. However, it has traditionally consisted of heterogeneous elements, such as Buddhism, Taoism, and Shamanism as well as Confucianism. In fact, this is its core difference from Western culture, as Beck himself emphasizes (2008b). Traditional Korean culture is already a hybrid, but Korean sociologists tend to reduce the hybridity to a simple monism called Confucianism.

Therefore, in my view, Korean sociologists tend to favor economic reductionism because they believe that individualization in Korea is just an artifact and a distorted variation of traditional familism, brought on by the 1997 Asian financial crisis. I am also concerned that their assessment could be another version of Orientalism. While some Western critics of individualization theory begin with the premise that aggregate categories such as class and family remain important and tangible aspects of contemporary society as ever, Korean critics seem to focus on Korea's institutional and emotional difference from Western societies—that is, the absence of "institutionalized individualism" (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 1994). Chang's "individualization without individualism" (K. Chang 2014; K. Chang and Song 2010),[2] Shim's (2011, 26–27) and Kim's (2013, 131) "family-oriented individualization," and Shin's (2013) "marketized individualization" theses all assert that the sociological implication of apparent individualization in Korea is fundamentally different from that of the West because in Korea there is no tradition of individualism.

There are three problems with this type of argument. First, the Korean scholars ignore the fact that in Western society the *emergence of individualism* was also a historically contingent phenomenon. It is not necessarily impossible that individualism in Korea is emerging in the process of modernization (although it must have different characteristics due to cultural differences from the West).[3] Second, individualization is never a self-evident phenomenon, even in Western societies—there are also debates and controversies on the subject there. Third, Confucianism in Korea has changed drastically both during and after the historical process of industrialization. During industrialization, Confucianism lost its dominance in the economic arena and now must interact with—and sometimes be subordinate to—materialism, which was originally its antithesis.

2. Here I count only Chang, because Song (2011) later implied a cultural change.
3. The Korean Women's Development Institute developed five scenarios for family change in Korea and conducted a survey regarding people's preferences among the scenarios. The majority of respondents favored an individualistic scenario of loose but intimate family relations (Chang et al. 2012).

Methodological Background: Which Empirical Research?

Institutionalized individualism was the basis for what Beck terms "reflexive individualization"[4] in his *Risk Society*. In the initial process of modernization, the emerging bourgeoisie class demanded that political and social institutions support their individual rights—this process represents the start of the "first wave of individualization" (Beck 2008b)—which became over time an established condition of existence in affluent Western society after World War II. So "in a different form . . . [institutionalized individualism] is also characteristic of the 'free wage laborer' in modern capitalism" (Beck 1992, 87). The term refers to the modern right of citizenship given to the individual according to the law. It meant that the individual came to be defined as a unit of mobility and that the supply and demand of rights became mediated through legislation in a labor-centric society.

> What is new is that the individualization process became democratic and that (in close relationship with it) the basic social conditions (labor market, demand for mobility and education, labor and social laws, pension regulations, etc.) . . . accelerate or enforce individualization. (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 1994, 21; my translation)

In light of the different legal status of women and men—especially evident in the welfare system (Ostner 2004; Shin 2012, 12–21)—many feminists have criticized such "institutionalized individualism" as an exaggeration, because women are still defined more often as *spouses* rather than *individuals* even by various institutions in Western welfare states.

However, Beck (1992, 1997) believes that women have also been provided with institutional opportunities to become individuals in the aftermath of World War II, just in a different way from men. This change is also often regarded as a post-Fordist phenomenon, namely the erosion of the full-time housewife system (McDowell 1991). In particular, institutional

4. This concept means the individualization of existing individualism, rather than the individualization of traditional relations. For the relationship between individualization and individualism, see Beck (2008b).

ruptures allowed women to step up and exploit the opportunity to refuse traditional social identities (Beck 1997, 216). By emphasizing the gendered differences in the process of individualization, Beck seems to evade feminist criticism and emphasize the primary importance of individualization in the family.

Beck (1992, 1997) perceives individualization for women as a process that includes both social and individual forms. The social form is represented by the New Women's Movement that arose after World War II, and the individual form is shown in the individualization (staying unmarried, having no children) in the family itself. Beck (and Beck-Gernsheim) also reclassifies the female individualization process into macro-, mezzo-, and micro-dimensions of society. In the micro-dimension, women engage in subpolitics by evading marriage and childbirth and identifying personal problems with social problems; in the mezzo-dimension, family structures change due to women's evasion of marriage and childbirth, and institutions move to normalize such changes and try to mediate the conflicts among the institutions themselves in women's lives; in the macro-dimension, social values shift due to women's individualization and changes occur in the population due to the low fertility resulting from the individualization of the family (Beck 1992; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 1990).

Women actually contributed directly to the individualization of class-based inequality by becoming members of the labor market, indirectly weakening the familial foundation of class relations by spurring changes in family structures. Thus, the individualization of class relations and the family strengthened each other, making the individual an increasingly significant unit of social inequality. I understand this situation in terms of Beck's "subject-oriented sociology" (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 1994) and sociology for the "diagnosis of the present."

Beck (1994) diagnoses the present time as a reflexive period in which a new generation of "freedom's children" appear who radicalize individualism. While important, the independent acts of freedom's children are not the only driving force behind the radicalization of individualism; it is also propelled by the ever further-reaching market and principles of rationality. Under a type of structural governance that restricts agency, the freedom of

freedom's children is mainly a "risky freedom" (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 1994). This reveals the duplicity of individualization: it can be understood both as the outcome of cultural changes brought on by successful industrialization and a coercive social process. What is central to individualization is not only the expansion of individualism or cultural diversification, but also the very metamorphosis of society—in particular, changes in the form of political mobilization. Such a process of social metamorphosis manifests as the *risk society* or the *world risk society*. As a result, political conflict and activities come to be rearranged around the risky byproducts of institutions, while the individualized identity of freedom's children changes into a social identity of "new cosmopolitans" (Beck 2002, 2010).

We can conclude that Beck is interested in both the risks of and the possibilities for cultural change that individualism entails, especially the emancipating force of the cultural changes, which dismantle the category of collective *others*. However, discussions on individualization in South Korea have unilaterally emphasized the risk side of the equation, particularly the classical social risks of the liberal market. Additionally, the discussions are generally policy-oriented and stress the importance of institutional change over the possibility of cultural change. In my view, however, institutional change will never be effective without cultural change. Moreover, many sociological observations report that, especially with young women, we can expect a shift from a collectivism-oriented culture to an individualism-oriented culture (Hong 2015; H. Kim 2001; M. Park 2003; Sohn and Kim 2010; Song 2011).

The unilateral nature of the discussion is, in part, related to the tendency in Korean sociology to understand empirical sociology research from an exclusively positivist perspective. Also, instead of conducting empirical research on individualization with a more macroscopic and analytical perspective, which would lead to a comprehensive diagnosis of contemporary society, Korean sociologists have limited the scope of their research within the boundary of family sociology only to matters, which can be positively confirmed. Thus, they (1) ignore the close theoretic interactions between the individualization of families and the individualization of class conflict, (2) understand the feminist movement, which is a social form of women's

individualization, as contradictory to individualization (G. Park 2012), (3) rely exclusively on positivist research in family sociology (Shim and Han 2010; Shim 2011; Kim and Lee 2012; H. Kim 2013), (4) focus too intently on a demographic framework related to low fertility or immigration,[5] and (5) do not pay attention to issues of agency as well as potential cultural and political changes.

I believe that positivist methods restricted to family sociology fall short of a new time diagnosis, regardless of whether we accept the importance of the cultural and institutional differences between Western and Asian societies. To give a diagnosis of contemporary society, we need to move away from the conventional interpretation that equates the positive with the *objective* or the *permanent*, and toward a bold theoretical interpretation of what is empirically observed.

In my opinion, mainstream discussions on individualization in South Korea reflect conventional positivism as usual. To provide an Asian variant of a new time diagnosis comparable to Beck's, elements such as the radicalization of democracy, the institutionalization of citizenship, economic development and wealth—in Beck's words, "the triumph of modernity"—must be considered as seriously as crisis and risks. It seems to me that because the 1997 financial crisis (i.e., an economic crisis of capitalism) is their starting point, Korean sociologists' diagnosis of the times is more comparable to that of Marx than to that of Beck. There are two factors that may be involved in this positivist diagnosis of the times: economic reductionism (the overemphasis on the 1997 financial crisis) and a cultural antipathy to individualism that is deeply rooted in Korea and in the (male-dominated) field of sociology.

In what follows, by making comparisons between the German *Sonderweg* and Korea's special path to modernization, I will show how the aforementioned "triumph of modernity" reveals the differences in "the simultaneity of the non-simultaneous" (Bloch 1962) in these two distinctive cases.

5. Refer to the proceedings of the international conference on "Life and Humanity in Late Modern Transformation: Beyond East and West," held at Seoul National University on May 30–31, 2013. The conference was organized by the Center for Social Sciences at Seoul National University and chaired by Chang Kyung-Sup.

The Special Paths to Modernization

The German Sonderweg

The term *Sonderweg* ("special path") refers to the special path of development that the German economic and political bourgeoisie in the country's late industrializing phase. From today's globalized perspective, the *Sonderweg* may have to be recategorized as one of many general paths to modernity. At the same time, because Germany's modernization was linked to the rise of the National Socialist Party—a stark example of the dark side of modernization—and the country's defeat in World War II, Germany's *Sonderweg* became a very sensitive historical issue.

In Germany, where industrialization was initiated by an absolute monarch in a top-down fashion, the ruling clique enforced a strategic plan to develop a market economy so as not to be outpaced by the advanced industrial and imperialist nations of the United Kingdom and France. Therefore, Germany's modernization was artificially advanced by a systematically formed bureaucracy and the *Bildungsbürger* ("cultured citizens"; a civil class that was nurtured through education but not economic capital), while the bourgeoisie were excluded.[6] Due to the absence of the bourgeoisie, who could have played a leading role in overthrowing the old regime through economic empowerment, Germany had no tradition of liberalism and democracy. Notably, Germany's *Sonderweg* lacked two factors: a united territory, which would compose the space of the civil state and the freedom to express civil order. The absence of these crucial ingredients characterizes the German *Sonderweg* during the modernization process, which later culminated in the formation of the modern nation-state.[7]

The expression "German *Sonderweg*" is also related to the self-consciousness of German intellectuals encountering Western societies in which

6. For this reason, historical research into Germany's *Sonderweg* is also research into *Bildungsbürger*. In Germany, the social importance of science and knowledge was stressed early thanks to the modernization spearheaded by *Bildungsbürger*.
7. For an explanation of the concept of the "belated nation" (*verspätete Nation*) in Germany, see Plessner (1959; as quoted in Habisch 2012).

democracy and the nation-state were developing hand in hand with the economy. This self-consciousness was very ambivalent. On the one hand, German intellectuals were proud of their highly cultivated tradition of modern humanism; on the other hand, they acknowledged that democracy could not emerge in their country spontaneously and was essentially transplanted later (Kocka 1988, 3–4). At the same time, though, they remained critical of modern technologies. What sets Korea's special path to modernization apart from German *Sonderweg* is the Korean intellectuals' receptive attitude toward modern culture. Unlike their German counterparts, Korean intellectuals expressed their cultural self-consciousness through the ideology of *dongdo seogi* 東道西器 ("Eastern Way and Western Technology") in the 19th century. In contrast to the Germans who were proud of their *modern* humanity and wary of modern technology, Korean intellectuals took the opposite direction by accepting modern technology selectively while rejecting *modern culture*.

Since the end of World War II, the German *Sonderweg* has been considered a negative concept. Moreover, the absence of liberal political and economic traditions in Germany at that time prevented the spontaneous emergence of democracy in the country.[8] As such, liberalism in Germany was available only to the *Bildungsbürger*, and only in the form of limited cultural capital that could not be converted into economic capital in the market. In turn, political liberalism was further restricted. This absence of political and economic liberalism is the core concept behind the German *Sonderweg*.

8. Kocka (1988, 13) cites two reasons for supporting the historical significance of the German *Sonderweg*. The first is that Germany faced a multitude of problems regarding the formation of a nation-state—the introduction of a parliamentary system in the constitutional monarchy and class conflict—which erupted all at once, unlike other Western countries. Kocka observes that such experiences prevented Germany's left wing from pursuing liberalism or a liberalistic labor movement. The second is Germany's prolonged bureaucratic tradition. The top-down reform by bureaucrats imposed restrictions on civil virtues and liberalistic practices.

Korea's Special Path to Modernization

The peculiar "simultaneity of the non-simultaneous" which manifested in German history is comparable to the formation of the authoritarian state, a process that was visible in many non-European countries decolonized after World War II. In the case of Korea, the task of forming the modern nation-state was imposed from the outside, and the parliamentary system was imported from outside the country after its liberation from Japanese occupation. Similar to Germany, Korea also experienced a stark ideological confrontation between the classes before it was fully industrialized.[9]

Koreans were governed by a traditional Confucian bureaucracy for hundreds of years before the Japanese occupation. Approximately ten years after independence and the establishment of a democratic state in the Southern half of the Korean peninsula, the military seized power through a coup, established an authoritarian regime, and started to push for modernization through bureaucratic means. Under the military junta, the bureaucracy functioned very efficiently, and the country made a successful transition to industrial civilization with neither political/economic liberalism nor cultural liberalism—that is to say, *modern* individualistic culture among intellectuals.

During the authoritarian phase of modernization that began in the 1960s, South Korean intellectuals positioned themselves as a governing class responsible for the continuation of traditional morals and ethics as well as for the attainment of scientific proficiency. Unlike the German *Bildungsbürger*, they failed to promote a liberalism that would have helped lay the cultural foundation for modernity. Thus, while South Korea's intellectuals spearheaded a collectivistic culture and capitalism as the holders of educational capital, they were subordinate to political authoritarianism and to the market. They traversed this path instead of experimenting and propagating

9. Habisch (2012, 17) posits that German society could not accommodate a liberal democratic culture during industrialization due to the top-down liberalization process advanced by cultured citizens; thus, German laborers were harshly exploited and treated as *Menschenmaterial* ("human material"), which caused social problems much more serious than those in the United Kingdom.

the ideas of individualism and liberal culture.[10] Thus, the educational capital was easily converted to economic, social, and political capital. Today's intellectual class in Korea may also be considered holders of cultural capital, more in Bourdieu's sense of the term than in the German *Bildungsbürger* sense.[11]

Individualization after World War II: Applicability of Methodological Cosmopolitanism

A defeated nation in World War II, Germany stepped up its political efforts to become more Westernized, and by leaving its *Sonderweg* behind, it fell under the influence of the Allied Forces. One such effort was the institutionalization of political education, which revealed Germany's growing awareness that expunging Nazism would not be possible by mere human will or a change of systems. It reflected the realization that the liberal political culture that enables democracy is not just a functional additive to the market system and that its formation is dependent upon historical conditions. For Germany, liberal political culture was not an organic phenomenon that was functionally differentiated in the process of modernization, but a representation of cultural capital to be obtained through public education.

Though Beck appears uninterested in Germany's *Sonderweg*, the country's post-war Westernization is the foundation of his individualization theory. Thus, to apply the theory accurately to the reality of Korean society, we must first consider how democratic political culture was realized in Germany, and only then can we consider the differences between Germany and South Korea in terms of institutionalized solidarity. Without the institutionalization

10. Of course, in Korea, there was a cultured class that concentrated its efforts on fostering cultural development in academia, similar to the German *Bildungsbürger*. However, unlike Germany, they failed to build the basis for liberal culture.
11. Kocka (1988) is representative of the scholars who emphasized the nature of the bourgeoisie in *Bildungsbürger*. Eyal et al. (2007) bridge Kocka's views with those of Bourdieu and define *Bildungsbürger* as the bourgeoisie who took the lead in capitalist development in the regime shift to de-socialism in Central Europe.

of liberal political culture through political education, institutionalized individualism would not have been realized in Germany. Liberalism had been just an ideology of the *Bildungsbürger* and would not have developed into feasible politics without pressure from the Allied Forces, even though, ironically, Germany was a highly cultured modern nation endowed with such major thinkers as Kant and the individuality-oriented *Bildungsbürger*.

Institutionalized Individualism and the Second Phase of the Individualization in the West

While the first phase of individualization in the West involved the emergence of individualistic morality and the institutionalization of civil society (which led to a stronger nation-state framework), as observed by classical sociologists in the early modern era, the second phase of individualization perceived by Beck in contemporary society involved the possible institutionalization of global civil society (Beck 2008b). Beck's cosmopolitanism bears a strong resemblance to that of Kant (2010) as well as Rawls' (2000) justice of international relations. In contrast to Marxist internationalism, Kant and Rawls did not consider cosmopolitanism in the form of a world republic or a world empire. Similar to Kant, Beck does not perceive nation-states and cosmopolitanism as mutually exclusive.

However, unlike Kant and Rawls, Beck explains the conditions for cosmopolitanism and global justice within a sociological framework. While Kant advocated cosmopolitanism based on transcendent practical reason (*praktische Vernunft*)—namely, the categorical imperative *(kategorischer Imperativ*)—and Rawls explained international justice through a normative conception lens based on the duty of assistance, Beck foresees a cosmopolitanism based on actual responsibility for the distribution of produced risks. Beck argues that the seemingly "postmodern" culture of the West (that is, the dissolution of modern patterns of unity and institutions) could lead to "cosmopolitanization" through individualization in a much stronger sense than in the early modern era, and he cites historical progress to support his argument (for example, the stronger civil rights achieved within institutions in the West).

Beck (1999) argues that with the increase in risks accompanying the development of scientific civilization and neoliberalistic globalization, a novel type of institutionalized welfare system that goes beyond the current welfare state is required, and to fulfill this requirement, a new social contract at the global level is needed (Beck 2002, 2008a, 2010). Therefore, he presents globalized risks and the realities of risk production as foundations for such a social contract. He considers individuals, who may cross cultural and mental borders regardless of time and space thanks to globalization, and nation-states, which bind individuals to their territories, as the subjects of the new social contract. In this way, world risks are individualized, globalized, and localized by individuals who form borderless multidimensional networks and NGOs and also by nation-states that build international relations (Beck 2002, 2010). Beck also believes that the democratic (or undemocratic) interactions between individuals, between nation-states, and between individuals and nation-states can build a dense space for cosmopolitanization and that cosmopolitan norms, communities, and institutions could emerge within that space.[12]

Individualization in Korea: "Compressed Individualization"[13]

Neither political liberalism nor individualistic citizenship norms existed during the catch-up modernization process in South Korea. It headed off potential conflict of norms and the possibility of anomie by modernizing

12. Beck (2011) developed his discussion on globalization into "cosmopolitan" sociology, but he later distinguishes the concept of "cosmopolitanization" from "cosmopolitanism," with the latter involving norms, and the former, reality. Specifically, Beck (2011, 18) defines cosmopolitanization as the phase of globalization, which means "the end of the 'global other.' The global other is here in our midst" and also as "cosmopolitanization" as a situation in which one must incorporate cultural "others" who are socioeconomically excluded (i.e., immigrant housekeepers, low-income foreign laborers) into his or her own social world, regardless of one's cosmopolitan awareness or intentions. Therefore, cosmopolitanization naturally accompanies socioeconomic and cultural conflict.
13. Here I use the term "compressed" to challenge Chang's concept of "compressed modernization" mentioned above. While Chang's term describes modernization *without* individualism, mine means the opposite.

Confucian ethics selectively. In a historical situation similar to that of Germany, the authoritarian regime adopted the market economy without citizens' liberation. As a result, opportunities for political associations to produce modern social ethics were denied. When political freedom was not allowed, individuals were not able to integrate individualism into civil ethics, and Confucian filial piety (*hyo*) acted as a catalytic force that maintained social solidarity.[14]

In one way, Confucian *hyo* had a positive influence on South Korea's compact modernization process by providing individuals, who were atomized by the market economy, with a stronger layer of protection in the form of a *blood community*. Through the systematic and extended norms of familism (including kinship and pseudo-kinship relations), individuals could manage both the successes and risks of the market. Thus, in contrast to the (religion-based) conservative welfare system in Germany, private reciprocity among families and relatives laid a quasi-official foundation for social welfare in South Korea.

Such kinship-centered reciprocity can be interpreted as a modernized form of the "generalized reciprocity" (Sahlins 1972, 193–194) of tribal societies. As many feminist anthropologists have noted, kinship-centered generalized reciprocity stratifies prestige based on social hierarchy, while also being based on a principle of community that blocks class stratification. During Korea's rapid modernization, Confucianism functioned as a religious and ethical code (or better yet, a cosmology) that justified the generalized reciprocity of patrilineal kinship—which had been solidified in the late Joseon dynasty—as a modern organizing principle.[15]

The Confucian kinship-based community was protected by family-

14. Korean *hyo* possibly played a role similar to Catholic social ethics, which laid the foundation for the social market economy in Germany after World War II. However, while Catholicism possesses a strong affinity with individualism because, in principle, the individual chose to accept it as their religion regardless of blood ties, Confucian *hyo* is a non-individualistic value because it relies on blood ties as its ethical foundation.

15. Chang's notion of *institutionalized familialism* fits into this line of explanation. And yet, by implying that institutional change can only occur in a top-down manner, Chang shuns the possibility of institutional change that is either caused by or entails cultural change.

related provisions in civil law and supported socially through ritual ceremonies that were performed nationwide in families and kinship systems. Urbanization and the migration of the population to cities extended kinship networks across the nation. Along the path of mobility, non-consanguineous connections (regional relations) were also extended. With the expansion of such connections, general authoritarian groups were formed with a hierarchy determined according to the order of entry into the group. Hierarchical groups emerged as a new model for modern social solidarity and existed hand-in-hand with the authoritarianism prevalent in politics and organizations. The patrilineal community principle that offset class stratification justified such collectivist groups based on regionalism, school affiliation, and organizational relations as well as kinships as *natural* and *common* norms in Korean society.

After Korea's successful industrialization, however, such norms were systematically challenged. The challenges came in three ways: through the democracy movement, the women's movement, and the labor movement. Erupting in the 1980s and 1990s, each drastically changed Korea's cultural landscape. Through the democracy movement, workers' right activism (driven by male workers), and the campaign for amending the Family Act to promote gender equality, South Korean society entered the modern individualization phase, or Beck's "first phase of individualization," in which individual citizenship, the nuclear family, and class conflicts are normalized.[16]

In Korea, mainstream discussions on individualization have ignored

16. Recently, Korean families no longer form around the practice of filial piety but are shifting toward a very modern and interest-based practice of family binding, which is the shared goal of class reproduction by means of education (Hong 2016). A number of studies also show that even though the society's values on marriage, divorce, and cohabitation remain traditional, the Korean cultural attitude toward sexism and the preference for boys is changing rapidly, and that women have now become less familistic than men (Eun 2013; Eun and Lee 2005; Lee and Suh 2008; Park, Lee, and Chun 2008; Shin and Lee 2015). Additionally, the attitude toward divorce does not necessarily match the actual pattern of divorce; for instance, while highly educated women display a more positive attitude toward divorce, in reality divorce is more common among their less educated counterparts (Oh 2015; Park and Raymo 2013). These studies imply that married women are not necessarily more familistic, just as divorced women are not necessarily more individualistic.

this first moment of individualization; therefore, scholars argue for the simultaneity of familism and individualization in their concept of "compressed modernization." However, I would characterize individualization in Korea as "compressed individualization" (Hong 2015) in the sense of "simultaneity of the first and second phases of individualization." What I wish to emphasize with this characterization is that individualization in Korea accompanies, and is thoroughly complementary to, the *emergence of individualism*, not culturally persistent familism. On a related note, I want to point out that the validity of *institutionalized familialism* proposed by Chang has been significantly attenuated as Korean society has established welfare systems that include more or less general pensions for the elderly, free school meals, and childcare services.

Particularly in the 1990s, women and the youth initiated cultural changes —as implied by the discourse on feminism and Generation X at that time.[17] Additionally, the working-class movement led to the institutionalization of class conflict to some degree. South Korea celebrated its successful economic development and entered the club of affluent nations. This moment of the "triumph of modernization," with all the historical significance it implies, is wholly absent in the discussions on individualization in Korea, although it is, in fact, the starting point of the contemporary individualization phenomenon, not only in Germany but in Korea as well.

The financial crisis of 1997 can be better understood as the moment at which the negative and risk-imposing effects of individualization began to outweigh its positive outcome, the dissolution of *others.* The process of individualization has only accelerated since then, and its trajectory has become more adverse. Institutional modernization based upon newly achieved wealth and newly emerging citizenship awareness began to weaken. In other words, individualization has dual aspects. It is emancipating in its capacity to dissolve the categories of *others* and promote cultural diversity; at the same

17. During this period, feminism rapidly garnered social currency. Furthermore, the growing individualistic tendencies of the younger generation appeared almost shocking to the older generation, so much so that they were branded the "new human race" (a moniker that originated in Japan).

time, it also poses a threat to the individual as it leaves the burden of social and ecological risks on individual citizens. As the negative aspect of individualization becomes more pronounced, the denunciation of desires for individuality as egoism becomes more intensive in South Korean society. Therefore, in my opinion, the distinctive feature of individualization in South Korea is not the coexistence of familism and individualization as merely "risk-averse" decisions of "family-oriented" individuals, but a normative tension between weakening familism and emerging individualism. Such an interpretation of contemporary individualization in Korea must be given greater analytical weight and consideration. The symptoms of this normative tension are the anomic phenomena typical in Korean society today, such as having the highest suicide rate among OECD nations, low levels of personal happiness and satisfaction, and rampant misogyny, especially among the youth.

In summary, individualization in South Korea is not an expression of frustrated familism caused by the economic crisis, but an expression of frustrated individualism in the context of institutionalized (but now no longer predominant) familism in Korea—just at the moment when individuality is discovered and asserted. Instead of adhering to the notion that collectivism or familism is a distinctive trait of Korean (or Asian) modernity, we need to envisage an alternative and a more fruitful approach that might provide a better diagnosis of our times.

Conclusion

I am certainly not saying that the world should follow the European example because it is *universal*. Rather, what I want to note is that Korean society can no longer simply eschew the emergence of political liberalism and individualism—however different it may be from Western individualism—at the core of its ethics because Korea has chosen to adopt the Western market economy system, which comes with certain social effects. Functionalism is wrong in positing that the market economy, democracy, and the nuclear family are the universal institutions of modernization. However, I think it

would be correct to assume that the market economy creates the *desire* for democracy and individualism and that politically it would be difficult to come to terms with the outcomes of the market economy without the norms of democracy and individualism in place.

In two or three generations, kinship groups will shrink significantly for Korean people due to continued modernization and low birth rates. Young women began to place more importance on individualistic values in the 1990s. Also, in general, both women and men today tend to agree on having only one child or postponing childbirth. In addition, the increase in youth unemployment rates has begun to make many men anxious about starting a family. In this situation, the *consanguinity-centrism* in Korea will likely be left as a mere ideology or as symbolic capital for families in the highest income group.

Because Confucian familism functioned positively during Korea's rapid modernization, Asian cultural values tend to be identified with Confucianism. However, Confucianism is only one of many values in the Asian tradition. We are not doomed to choose between Westernization and Confucianism to address the cultural changes that occur during the compressed individualization process. East Asian culture, with its unique religious tradition, has a practical and flexible nature, in contrast to its Western counterpart represented by the doctrinally exclusive one-true-God dogma of Christianity. East Asia has preserved a harmony between spiritual traditions by embracing the coexistence of various gods and forms of spirituality.

If Asia adopts the civil norms and political liberalism of the West in addition to its market economy, it will be possible for it to make the already practical and flexible East Asian culture flourish and to celebrate that florescence of diversity.

REFERENCES

Atkinson, Will. 2007. "Beck, Individualization and the Death of Class: A Critique." *British Journal of Sociology* 58.3: 349–366.

Barad, Karen. 2007. *Meeting the Universe Halfway.* London: Duke University Press.

Bauman, Zygmunt. 1988. *Freedom*. Philadelphia: Open University Press.

Beck, Ulrich. 1992. *Risk Society.* Translated by Mark Ritter. London: Sage Publishing House. Originally published as *Risikogesellschaft* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986).

_____. 1994. "Kinder der Freiheit: Wider das Lamentoüber den Werteverfall." In *Kinder der Freiheit,* edited by Ulrich Beck, 9–33. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

_____. 1997. *Wiheom sahoe* (Risk Society). Translated by Hong Seong-tae. Seoul: Saemulgyeol. Originally published as *Risikogesellschaft* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986).

_____. 1999. *Areumdapgo saeroun nodong segye* (Brave New World of Work). Translated by Hong Yun-Ki. Seoul: Thinking Tree. Originally published as *Schöne neue Arbeitswelt* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1999).

_____. 2002. *Macht und Gegenmacht im Globalen Zeitalter* (Power and Counter-Power in the Global Age). Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

_____. 2008a. *Die Neuvermessung der Ungleichheit unter den Menschen* (The Re-Measurement of Inequality among People). Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

_____. 2008b. *Der eigene Gott* (Their Own God). Frankfurt am Main: Insel.

_____. 2010. *Geullobal wiheom sahoe* (World at Risk). Translated by Park Mi-Ae and Lee Jin-Woo. Seoul: Ghil. Originally published as *Weltrisikogesellschaft* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2007).

_____. 2011. "We Do Not Live in an Age of Cosmopolitanism but in an Age of Cosmopolitanisation: The 'Global Other' Is in Our Midst." *Irish Journal of Sociology* 19.1: 16–34.

Beck, Ulrich, and Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim. 1990. *Das Ganz Normale Chaos der Liebe* (The Normal Chaos of Love). Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

_____. 1994. "Individualisierung in modernen Gesellschaften. Perspektiven und Kontroversen einer subjektorientierten Soziologie" (Individualization and Precarious Freedoms: Perspectives and Controversies of a Subject-Oriented Sociology). In *Riskante Freiheiten* (Risky Freedoms), edited by Ulrich Beck and Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim, 10–42. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Bloch, Ernst. 1962. *Erbschaft dieser Zeit* (Inheritance of This Time). Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Chang, Hye-kung, et al. 2012. *Gajok-ui mirae-wa yeoseong gajok jeongchaek jeonmang* (The Future of Family and a Policy Prospect for Women and Family). Vol. 2. Seoul: Korean Women's Development Institute.

Chang, Kyung-Sup. 2003. "The State and Families in South Korea's Compressed Fertility Transition: A Time for Policy Reversal." *Journal of Population and Social Security* (*Population*), supplement to Volume 1: 596–610.

_____. 2010a. "The Second Modern Condition? Compressed Modernity as Internalized Reflexive Cosmopolitization." *British Journal of Sociology* 61.3: 444–464.

_____. 2010b. *South Korea under Compressed Modernity.* New York: Routledge.

_____. 2014. "Individualization without Individualism: Compressed Modernity and Obfuscated Family Crisis in East Asia." In *Transformation of the Intimate and the Public in Asian Modernity*, edited by Emiko Ochiai and Leo A. Hosoya, 37–62. Leiden: Brill.

Chang, Kyung-Sup, and Min-Young Song. 2010. "The Stranded Individualizer under Compressed Modernity: South Korean Women in Individualization without Individualism." *British Journal of Sociology* 61.3: 540–565.

Duncan, Simon, and Darren P. Smith. 2006. "Individualisation versus the Geography of 'New' Families." Working Paper 19. Families and Social Capital ESRC Research Group, London South Bank University, London.

Eun, Ki-Soo. 2013. "Dongasia sahoe-ui janyeo seongseonho" (Gender Preference for Children in East Asia). *Gajok-gwa munhwa* (Family and Culture) 25.4: 1–33.

Eun, Ki-Soo, and Yun-Suk Lee. 2005. "Hanguk-ui gajok gachi-e daehan gukje bigyo yeongu" (Family Values in Korea from a Comparative Perspective). *Hanguk inguhak* (Korean Journal of Population Studies) 28.1: 107–132.

Eyal, Gil, Szelényi Iván, and Eleanor R. Townsley. 2007. *Jabonga eomneun jabonjuui* (Making Capitalism without Capitalists: The New Ruling Elites in Eastern Europe). Translated by Yim Hyun-Jin, Jung Il-Jun, and Jung Young-Cheol. Seoul: ShiYuShi.

Goldscheider, Frances K., and Calvin Goldscheider. 1993. *Leaving Home before Marriage. Ethnicity, Familism, and Generational Relationships.* Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Goldthorpe, John H. 2002. "Globalisation and Social Class." *West European Politics* 25.3: 1–28.

Habisch, André. 2012. "Die christliche Sozialethik im Entwicklungsprozess der Moderne" (Christian Social Ethics in the Process of Modern Development). In *Tradition und Erneuerung der christlichen Sozialethik in Zeiten der Modernis-*

ierung (Tradition and Renewal of Christian Social Ethics in Times of Modernization), edited by André Habisch, Hans J. Küsters, and Rudolf Uertz, 9–41. Freiburg: Herder.

Hong, Chan-Sook. 2015. *Gaeinhwa: haebang-gwa wiheom-ui yangmyeonseong* (Individualization: The Ambivalence of Risky Freedom). Seoul: Seoul National University Press.

_____. 2016. "Dongbuga gajokjuui maengnak-eseo bon Hanguk yeoseong gaeinhwa-ui banghyang" (Scenarios of Female Individualization in the Context of East Asian Familism). Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Critical Sociological Association of Korea, Seoul, October 22.

Kant, Immanuel. 2010. *Yeongu pyeonghwa ron* (Perpetual Peace). Translated by Lee Han-Gu. Seoul: Seokwangsa. Originally published as *Zum ewigen Frieden* (Königsberg: Friedrich Nicolovius, 1795).

Kim, Hye-gyeong. 2013. "Bugye gajokjuui-ui silpae? IMF gyeongje wigi sidae-ui gajokjuui-wa segyehwa" (Failure of the Patrilineal Stem Family System? Familialism and Indiviualization among the Generation of Economic Crisis of Korea in 1998). *Hanguk sahoehak* (Korean Journal of Sociology) 47.2: 101–141.

Kim, Hye-gyeong, and Sun-mi Lee. 2012. "Gaeinhwa-wa wiheom: gyeongje wigi ihu cheongnyeoncheung seongingi ihaeng-ui bulhwaksilseong-gwa yeoseong naebu-ui gyecheunghwa" (Individualization and Risk: The Uncertainty of Transition from Youth to Adulthood and the Stratification of Women after the Economic Crisis). *Peminijeum yeongu* (Issues in Feminism) 12.1: 35–72.

Kim, Hye-yeong. 2001. "Hanguk daehaksaeng-ui gajokjuui byeonhwa" (Changes in the Familism of Korean College Students). *Hanguk cheongsonyeon yeongu* (Studies on Korean Youth) 12.1: 79–105.

Kocka, Jürgen. 1988. "German History before Hitler: The Debate about the German Sonderweg." *Journal of Contemporary History* 23.1: 3–16.

Lee, Eun-Young, and Woon-Seok Suh. 2008. "Han·Jung·Il samguk-ui seongbyeol insik chai-e daehan hyeonhwang bunseok" (An Empirical Study on the Differences of Perception among Males/Females in Three Countries: Korea, China, and Japan). *Hanjung sahoe gwahak yeongu* (Korean-Chinese Social Science Studies) 12: 161–187.

Lee, Min-a. 2013. "Gyehoekjeok mujanyeo gajok: Hanguk sahoe-eseo ai gatgi-ui uimi-wa gajokjuui-ui yeokseol" (We Do Not Want a Baby: The Meaning of Childbearing and the Paradox of Familism in Korea). *Hanguk sahoehak* (Korean Journal of Sociology) 47.2: 143–176.

Lee, Won-jin. 2011. "Gaeinhwa-inga gyecheunghwa-inga? saengae sageon-gwa

sahoe gyecheung-i bingon jinip-e michineun yeonghyang" (Individualization or Stratification? The Effect of Life Course Event and Social Stratification Determinants on Poverty Transition). *Hanguk sahoehak* (Korean Journal of Sociology) 45.5: 25–60.

Lepsius, M. Rainer. 1992. "Das Bildungsbürgertum als ständische Vergesellschaftung" (The Educational Citizenship as a Social Socialization). In vol. 3 *of Bildungsbürgertum im 19. Jahrhundert* (Educational Citizenship in the 19th Century), edited by Werner Conze, Jürgen Kocka, and M. Rainer Lepsius, 8–18. Stuttgart: Klett Cotta.

Mayer, Karl U., and Hans-Peter Blossfeld. 1990. "Die gesellschaftliche Konstruktion sozialer Ungleichheiten im Lebensverlauf" (The Social Construction of Social Differences in Life Course). In *Lebenslagen, Lebensläufe, Lebensstile* (Situations in Life, Life Courses, and Lifestyles), edited by Peter A. Berger and Stefan Hradil, 297–318. Göttingen: Schwartz.

McDowell, Linda. 1991. "Life without Father and Ford: The New Gender Order of Post-Fordism." *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, *New Series* 16.4: 400–419.

Oh, Jihye. 2015. "Hanguk gihon yeoseong-ui ihontaedo-e gwanhan yeongu: gajeong nae yoin-gwa gajeong wae yoin-eul jungsim-euro" (A Study of Korean Ever-Married Women's Attitude toward Divorce: Focusing on Internal and External Factors). *Gajok-gwa munhwa* (Family and Culture) 27.1: 233–270.

Ostner, Ilona. 2004. "Individualisation—The Origins of the Concept and Its Impact on German Social Policies." *Social Policy and Society* 3.1: 47–56.

Park, Gi-nam. 2012. "Gaeinhwa sidae-ui yeoseong undong banghyang tamsaek" (Exploring the Direction of the Women's Movement in the Individualization Era). *Peminijeum yeongu* (Issues in Feminism) 12.1: 73–116.

Park, Gyeong-suk, Yeong-hye Kim, and Hyeonsuk Kim. 2005. "Namnyeo gyeolhon sigi yeonjang-ui juyo wonin" (Main Causes of Delayed Marriage among Korean Men and Women). *Hanguk inguhak* (Korean Journal of Population Studies) 28.2: 33–62.

Park, Hee-Bong, Hee-Chang Lee, and Ji-Yong Chun. 2008. "Han·Jung·Il 3 guk-ui gachi byeonhwa seonghyang bunseok" (Comparative Analysis of Korean, Chinese, and Japanese Ideological Changes). *Hanguk haengjeong nonjip* (Korean Public Administration Quarterly) 20.2: 501–532.

Park, Hyunjoon, and James M. Raymo. 2013. "Divorce in Korea: Trends and Educational Differentials." *Journal of Marriage and Family* 75: 110–126.

Park, Min-ja. 2003. "Honin-ui uimi-eseoui namnyeo chai: daehaksaeng-eul jungsim-euro" (Gender Difference in the Meaning of Marriage: With a Focus on

University Students). *Gajok-gwa munhwa* (Family and Culture) 15.2: 3–32.

Plessner, Helmth. 1959. *Die verspätete Nation: über die politische Verführbarkeit bürgerlichen Geistes* (The Belated Nation: The Political Feasibility of the Bourgeois Spirit). Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer.

Rawls, John. 2000. *Manmin beop* (The Law of Peoples). Translated by Jang Dong-Jin, Kim Ki-Ho, and Kim Man-Gwon. Seoul: Acanet. Originally published as *The Law of Peoples* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).

Sahlins, Marshall. 1972. *Stone Age Economics.* New York: Transaction.

Schulze, Winfried. 2002. "Vom 'Sonderweg' bis zur "Ankunft im Westen": Deutschlands Stellung in Europa" (From "Exceptionalism" to "Arrival in the West": Germany's Position in Europe). *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht* (History in Science and Teaching) 53: 226–240.

Shim, Young-Hee. 2011. "21 segi hyeong gongdongche gajok model-ui mosaek-gwa jiwon bangan" (In Search of a Community Family Model of the 21st Century from the Perspective of the Second Modernity and the Individualization Theory). *Asia yeoseong yeongu* (Asian Women) 50.2: 7–44.

Shim, Young-Hee, and Sang-Jin Han. 2010. "Family-Oriented Individualization and Second Modernity." *Soziale Welt* (Social World) 61.3-4: 237–256.

Shin, Kyeong-a. 2012. "Seogu sahoe gaeinhwa nonui-e daehan yeoseongjuuijeok gochal" (Feminist Critique of Individualization Thesis in Late Modern Society). *Peminijeum yeongu* (Issues in Feminism) 12.1: 1–33.

_____. 2013. "Sijanghwadoen gaeinhwa-wa bokji yokgu" (Marketized Individualization and Welfare Needs). *Gyeongje-wa sahoe* (Economy and Society) 98: 266–303.

Shin, Seung-Bae, and Jung-Whan Lee. 2015. "Dongasia-ui gajok gachigwan-gwa haengbokgam bigyo" (A Comparative Analysis of Family Values and a Sense of Happiness in Korea, China, and Japan). *Sahoe gwahak yeongu* (Social Science Studies) 39.3: 279–310.

Smart, Carol, and Beccy Shipman. 2004. "Vision in Monochrome: Families, Marriage and the Individualization Thesis." *British Journal of Sociology* 55.4: 491–509.

Sohn, Seong-Young, and Eunjung Kim. 2010. "Yeodaesaeng-ui gajok gachigwan-eul tonghae salpyeobon jeochulsan munje-ui ihae" (A Study of the Gender and Generation Differences of the Family Values and Perception of Low Fertility in Korean Society). *Hyeonsang-gwa insik* (Phenomenology and Cognition) 34.4: 169–200.

Song, Min-Young. 2011. "From Demographic to Normative Individualization: A Comparative Study of Family Values in Korea and Japan." *Hanguk sahoehak*

(Korean Journal of Sociology) 45.6: 153–174.
Van Deth, Jan W. 2001. "Wertewandel im internationalen Vergleich. Ein deutscher Sonderweg?" (Value Change in International Comparison. Germany's Special Path?). *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* (Politics and Contemporary History) B29: 23–30.
Winkler, Heinrich A. 2005. *Der lange Weg nach Westen* (The Long Way to the West). München: C. H. Beck.