

## Public Diplomacy: Reappraising the South Korean Case through an Evolutionary Approach\*

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### Abstract

*Despite a rising academic interest in South Korea's public diplomacy, little is known about its origins and evolution. Most existing studies have focused on the modern period of South Korea's public diplomacy, in particular the government's new foreign policy agenda since the late 2000s. Contrary to popular belief, this article argues that the recent infiltration of public diplomacy into South Korea's foreign policy represents de jure intensification of activities that de facto have been practiced from the second half of the 20th century. The present research divides the evolution of South Korea's public diplomacy into four periods: origins, diversification, polycentrism, and institutionalization. Each period has its own specific patterns, ends, and means. For instance, whereas the origins period arose with cultural and sports diplomacies, diversification included specific areas of engagement with foreign publics through official development assistance, knowledge, and exchange diplomacies. In turn, polycentrism has structurally transformed public diplomacy from a solely state-led activity into a polycentric framework of public and private partnership. Lastly, the institutionalization period represents the government's recent efforts to establish a universal coordinative authority above its public diplomacy, which represents a fragmented set of activities conducted by various governmental institutions.*

**Keywords:** public diplomacy, soft power, origins, diversification, polycentrism, institutionalization

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\* This article is a revision of master's thesis submitted to the Graduate School of Pan-Pacific Studies at the Kyung Hee University in Suwon (2014), Republic of Korea.

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## Introduction

South Korea (hereafter, Korea) represents a case of rapid socioeconomic and political development. The country, once perceived as a “bottomless pit” a “nightmare,” and a “sick society” (Sung 2010, 11) which, in the words of General Douglas MacArthur, even if a “miracle” happened, would have needed a century “to recover from the Korean War” (KOICA 2011, 34). However, only half a century later the country had become one of the world’s economic powerhouses. In terms of power, the country’s development experience has had a dyadic outcome—the rise of Korean hard power and, successively, its contribution to Korea’s soft power. In other words, socioeconomic development *per se* (along with military) has meant the rise of Korea’s hard power, while concurrently it has become a soft power asset. Specifically, it has been proved of great importance since dozens of developing countries have found Korea’s development model attractive to follow.

Besides being a successful story of socioeconomic development, since the late 1990s and early 2000s Korea has experienced a sharp rise in the popularity of its cultural products, generally known as Hallyu, or the Korean wave. Hallyu, perceived in the 1980s as “provincial and tedious,”<sup>1</sup> has recently almost caused Korea mania (Jang and Paik 2012; Kim and Ryoo 2007).

Overall, due to the above-mentioned reasons and, similarly, the government’s *de jure* intensification of public diplomacy, the topic of Korea’s soft power and public diplomacy has received rising academic interest.<sup>2</sup> Yet it is worth noting that all these studies<sup>3</sup> have actually focused on the contemporary state of Korea’s public diplomacy (hereafter, KPD) since the late 2000s,

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1. *Economist*, “South Korea’s Soft Power. Soap, Sparkle and Pop. How a Really Uncool Country Became the Tastemaker of Asia,” August 9, 2014, <http://www.economist.com/news/books-and-arts/21611039-how-really-uncool-country-became-tastemakerasia-soap-sparkle-and-pop>.

2. These researchers include: Cho (2012); Dal (2012); Hong (2014); Jang and Paik (2012); Kalinowski and Cho (2012); T. Kim (2012); Kim and Ryoo (2007); Kinsey and Chung (2013); S. Lee (2011, 2012); Lim (2008); Ma, Song, and Moore (2012); Melissen and Sohn (2015); Shim (2008); Walsh (2014); and Watson (2012).

3. Exceptions include T. Kim (2012).

particularly when “MOFA officially began laying the groundwork for [the] strengthening of” KPD “as the third pillar of its foreign policy along with political and economic affairs” (MOFA 2014, 299–300). Before the 2000s, to the best of my knowledge, only Manheim (1990) had considered the 1988 Seoul Olympics through the prism of a public diplomacy campaign. Among more recent scholars, Taehwan Kim (2012) has presented the historical background of KPD and divided it into “old” and “new public diplomacy” periods. Unfortunately, so far no other research has been carried out on the comprehensive analysis of this understudied topic, focusing on its origins and linking it to the current state of affairs. Therefore, this study has been conducted in order to better understand the origins and evolution of KPD, considered in four periods: *origins* (late 1940s–late 1980s), *diversification* (early 1990s), *polycentrism* (early 2000s), and *institutionalization* (2011–present). This periodical division consists of the logic “emergence-continuity-change” (hereafter, ECC), which encompasses the foundations, continuities and changes of KPD along with the goals, ways and means of its conduct.

This article has seven sections. After the introduction, the second section presents a brief overview of the term “public diplomacy.” The third section shows the *origins* period, which emerged with cultural and sports diplomacies. The fourth section considers the *diversification* period and focuses on specific areas of engagement with foreign publics, including official development assistance (ODA), knowledge and exchange diplomacies. The fifth section presents the polycentrism period that structurally transformed KPD from a solely state-led activity into a *polycentric* framework of public and private partnership. The sixth section explores the *institutionalization* period and encompasses the government’s recent efforts to establish a universal coordinative authority above its public diplomacy, which has so far been representing a fragmented set of activities in various governmental institutions. The seventh section concludes.

## Public Diplomacy

The term “public diplomacy,” coined in 1965 by Edmund Gullion, the dean

of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University (Cull 2009), is commonly defined as “the substance of foreign policymaking and message exchange capacity” (Kelley 2009, 73–74), “the cultivation by governments of [positive] public opinion in other countries” (Szondi 2008, 2), “correcting misperceptions” (Kelley 2009, 74), “the process of intercultural communication” (Cull 2009, 19), and “promoting interests through attraction” (Pratkanis 2009, 111). Principally, unlike “traditional diplomacy” and its “government-to-government relations (G2G),” public diplomacy is “about governments talking to global publics (G2P)” (Snow 2009, 6). In terms of power, “public diplomacy is inevitably linked to . . . soft power” (Snow 2009, 3) which is an ability to influence other countries’ preferences by co-opting them, with the production of admiration and desire to be them through the attractive power of its values, level of prosperity, and other cultural assets (Melissen 2005; Nye 2004, 5). Armstrong (2009, 64) briefly generalizes it as the policy of “winning hearts and minds” of a wide public.

In the practice of public diplomacy, “informing” and “influencing” are two key features (Heller and Persson 2009, 226). Especially, its potential to inform has been raised tremendously by the so-called “death of distance” effect, which has meant an increase in the speed of information sharing capacity across the world, stemming from the invention of modern ICT (Cairncross 1997). Besides the informational sphere, public diplomacy is exercised in “sports, cultural events, exchange programs” (Heller and Persson 2009, 226), “language training,” and “radio and television broadcasting” (House of Commons 2011, 10). According to Cowan and Arsenault (2008), apart from traditional engagement in the above-mentioned areas, public diplomacy is likewise practiced through collaboration, which entails joint work with foreign publics on solving problematic issues and promoting initiatives. Structurally, public diplomacy is divided into the following four parts: (1) “understanding” of others’ “cultures, attitudes, and behaviors”; (2) “planning,” which includes “formulation and implementation”; (3) “engagement” with foreign publics in the earlier mentioned fields; and (4) “advocacy” to influence the shaping of publics’ thoughts and minds through the “transfer[ing] of information” (Gregory 2011, 355–361).

Traditionally, engagement with foreign publics had been a prerogative

of governments, referred to above as G2P. Yet recently, because of the development of “communication technologies” and a rise in citizen exchanges across national borders, accelerated by globalization, public diplomacy has partly shifted from G2P to a people-to-people (P2P) type of engagement (Snow 2009, 6). Consequently, this shift has restructured a statist public diplomacy toward a polycentric model, involving non-state actors “if not in developing, then at least in [its] conducting” (d’Hooghe 2015, 35). At the same time, Kelley (2015) draws attention to the fact that “for the work to count as ‘public diplomacy,’ the person doing the work must be a government employee or agent,” “working on some goal or objective set by the national government.” In other words, despite structural transformations, national government is still the *planner* of public diplomacy, which in turn cooperates with non-state actors in its public diplomacy approach. This is how the term public diplomacy is used in the present article.

## Origins

Chronologically, the origins period emerged between 1948 and the late 1980s, during which time the Korean government began to engage local and foreign publics through cultural and sports diplomacies. Importantly, this new policy trajectory was not merely a part of the government’s overall socioeconomic development policy, but also propelled by geopolitical factors on the Korean peninsula and in the role of leadership. In particular, these included the end of Japanese colonization in 1945, the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the establishment of Park Chung-hee’s military regime in 1961 and Chun Doo-hwan’s taking over the government in 1980. For instance, the initial projection of cultural policy in 1948 by the government of Syngman Rhee was thought to heal the Korean culture, damaged in the years of Japanese occupation, and to create “national identity” (Park 2015, 73). After the outbreak of the Korean War the goal had likewise been focused on the clash of political ideologies, to be precise on the prevention of communist ideological penetration from North Korea. Generally these problems, certainly along with economic difficulties, were manifested in the

state “rhetoric” of “*Guknan*<sup>4</sup> (national difficulty)” (Park 2015, 79).

Considering the “cultural identity” part of *gunghan*, in 1948 the government decided to establish the “Office of Public Information” (OPI) and the “National Film Production Centre” (NFPC) (Park 2015, 79–81). Unfortunately, due to the socioeconomic challenges within the country, the establishment of these agencies did not coincide with the use of “a comprehensive cultural policy” (Park 2015, 73). Yet these agencies were subsequently used by the government of Park Chung-hee, which intensified the projection and implementation of cultural policy and diplomacy. Particularly, in 1962 the NFPC was “upgraded” with the “Motion Picture Law,” which aimed to circulate “the mandated cinemas”; in 1966 “the International Taekwondo Federation” was founded to promote Korean martial arts at local and international levels; in 1968 the OPI was transformed into the Ministry of Culture and Public Information (currently the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism) (Park 2015, 80–85); in 1973 in order “to establish [and promote] a new cultural identity” based on “a specific cultural tradition,” “the first comprehensive long-term plan for cultural policy” was adopted (Yim 2002, 40); in 1976 the Korea International Cultural Association<sup>5</sup> was launched; and, last but not least, in 1979 “the first [overseas] Korean Cultural Centers were opened in New York City and Tokyo” (S. Lee 2015b, 124).

Certainly, the use of cultural policy by the government of Syngman Rhee was different from that of Park Chung-hee. Specifically, whereas in the former case the use of cultural policy had been more state oriented, in the latter case as well as being personalized and regime oriented, it also focused on “cultivating loyalty to the government” and personal loyalty to the President (Park 2015, 80). However, despite this difference, both leaders similarly prioritized the creation of a specific Korean cultural and national identity. Particularly in regards to that matter, Park Chung-hee announced in his inauguration speech in 1971 the motto “Cultural Korea,” which raised the issue of restoring Korea’s cultural heritage and historical sites and fig-

4. According to the Revised Romanization of Korean proclaimed by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism of the Republic of Korea in 2000, the Korean word “국난” should be transcribed as *gunghan*.

5. Haewon Park, e-mail interview by the author, March 20, 2017.

ures with the use of governmental aid (Park 2015, 82–84). Accordingly, in alignment with this, “the government had focused on historical memorials such as Gyeongju, King Sejong, and “Admiral Yi Sun-sin,” which eventually “became national symbols of modern Korea” (Park 2015, 84).

Gradually, consistent state policy toward the revival of traditional cultural heritage contributed significantly to the evolution of soft power potential. Especially, it has become apparent that historical places and figures have become an indispensable part of cultural and exchange diplomacies, which represent essential tools of modern KPD. Obviously, since the late 1940s and especially 1960s the government prioritized historical-cultural assets. Yet, since the 1980s, after Chun Doo-hwan came to power, state support expanded “from traditional” to “contemporary culture along with active encouragement of sports activities” (Park 2015, 87). In this regard, the launch of sports diplomacy was a big leap toward broadening the engagement field with foreign publics, which until the present day has likewise been a long-standing tool of KPD.

Within the framework of sports diplomacy, Korea initially used a regionalized approach, and in 1986 hosted the 10th Asian Games in Seoul.<sup>6</sup> Soon, the scope of the approach was broadened “with worldwide [audience] in mind,” which resulted in hosting the Seoul 1988 Summer Olympics (Larson and Rivenburgh 1989, 2). Regarding the management of the state image, the decision to host the games was made as a result of the following goals: (1) “to divert the [local] public’s attention from politics” (Park 2015, 86); (2) to improve the country’s international image damaged after the sociopolitical turbulences of 1979 and 1980, specifically Park Chung-hee’s assassination and the bloody events in Gwangju (Manheim 1990); and (3) to change in the minds of foreign publics the old image of Korea associated with “the Korean War,” “national division,” “military dictatorship” (Y. Lee 2002, 69), and “instability” (Kinsey and Chung 2013, 4), which since the 1950s had been a fundamental elements of its history. Thus, the games were thought to present Korea with “a new face” and obtain “international recog-

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6. Olympic Council of Asia, “Seoul 1986,” accessed January 17, 2017, <http://www.ocasia.org/Game/GameParticular.aspx?9QoyD9QEWPfemU/arvY96w==>.

dition” of an “advanced nation” (Larson and Rivenburgh 1989, 2).

Importantly, among the benefits of hosting the games was the positive “media coverage,” which usually helps to create a favorable image of a country in foreign publics’ minds during megasport events (Rivenburgh 2004, 5). Particularly, it was achieved in the cases of BBC (United Kingdom) and TEN (Australia), which during the Olympics canvassed Korean traditional culture, history, and positive achievements in socioeconomic development (Larson and Rivenburgh 1989, 29). Meanwhile, hosting the Olympics significantly increased the number of international visitors to Korea, raised in 1988 by 24.9% (in comparison to 1987) and composed of around 2.3 million people, which has been the highest increase in percentage achieved between 1980 and 2015 (KTO 2015).

These precedents of the launch and subsequent conduct of cultural and sports diplomacies are considered in compliance with ECC logic, and indicate the emergence of tools that are an integral part of contemporary KPD. For instance, examples of continuity include the promotion of Taekwondo, Korean Cultural Centers of the current Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism (founded on the basis of OPI and subsequent MCPI), the Korea Foundation (KF) (founded in 1991 on the basis of Korea International Cultural Association),<sup>7</sup> and, last but not least, commitment to hosting various international mega-sport events (S. Lee 2015b; Park 2015). On this point, it is argued that the given experiences of nearly four decades basically laid the foundations for the emergence of the government’s first-ever engagement with foreign publics, aimed to build the image of Korea with individual cultural and national identity.

## **Diversification**

The transition of KPD to its second period occurred in 1991, embodied in the establishment of KOICA and the KF. The creation of these two new agencies had institutionally diversified the public diplomacy tools through

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7. Haewon Park, e-mail interview by the author, March 20, 2017.



the use of ODA, knowledge and exchange diplomacies. Before proceeding, it is worth noting that the use of these tools was not entirely unknown in the evolution of KPD before 1991. For instance, regarding ODA-related activities, “the first” Korean initiative “as a donor” was a training program organized for developing countries officials in 1963, with the financial support of USAID (CIDC 2014, 27). In 1965 training programs started with Korea’s own funds, among which were: expertise sharing in 1967; dispatch of medical experts in 1968; dispatch of Taekwondo Instructors Program in 1972; aid in kind in 1977; and the launch of an International Development Exchange Program in 1982, within the Korea Development Institute, to share Korean “development experiences” with developing countries and so forth (CIDC 2014, 28). Yet, until 1991, these “programs were conducted separately by” various agencies and, for this matter, the establishment of KOICA was thought to consolidate and coordinate entire “grant ODA projects” under one system, affiliated with the MOFA.<sup>8</sup>

Periodically, critics point out that behind the launch and institutionalization of ODA policy have been the “Korean [government’s] economic interests,” manifested in “resource diplomacy” that implies “closer relations with countries with desirable resources” and getting “privileged access to” the “resources of recipient” nations (Hermanns 2013, 67–72; Watson 2012). However, while acknowledging the above-mentioned activities, it is apparent that since the beginning “a core component” of the Korean government’s approach has been the “prioritization of human capital” and “human exchanges” (Hermanns 2013, 73). This pattern of approach has been continued until recently, which in turn has ramped up Korea’s soft power capacity. Especially, it emanated from the uniqueness of Korea’s case, achieved a quantum leap in socioeconomic development, changing the country from major aid recipient<sup>9</sup> to “the 24th [donor] member” of OECD DAC in 2010

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8. K-Developedia, “History of Korea’s ODA and KOICA,” accessed January 5, 2017, [https://www.kdevelopedia.org/Development-Overview/official-aid/history-korea-s-odkoica--201412110000389.do?fldRoot=TP\\_ODA&subCategory=TP\\_ODA\\_GE#.WG6OdxKNqpo](https://www.kdevelopedia.org/Development-Overview/official-aid/history-korea-s-odkoica--201412110000389.do?fldRoot=TP_ODA&subCategory=TP_ODA_GE#.WG6OdxKNqpo).

9. From 1945 to 1975 Korea “received 6 billion USD” aid that was nearly equal to overall aid delivered to “African continent” (Sung 2010, 11). Overall between 1945 and “the late 1990s” Korea “received about USD 12.7 billion” (CIDC 2014, 23).

(CIDC 2014, 30).

Particularly, this unique case has been promoted through KOICA's special programs for developing countries' young government officials. Within the scope of these programs, participants are taught about Korea's experience, perceived in the early years of independence as a "bottomless pit," a "nightmare," and a "sick society" (Sung 2010, 11), which evolved "within a generation" into a donor country and one of the world's economic powerhouses (Fardoust, Kim, and Sepúlveda 2011, 3). Public diplomacy and the soft power pattern of this approach had especially been well described by the 1995 winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics, Robert Lucas as "aspiring young basketball player to follow the Michael Jordan model" (Sung 2010, 17).

As in the case of ODA-related activities, the promotion of Korea's international understanding and positive image had likewise been started earlier. Particularly, it relates to the Korea International Cultural Association (KICA), established in 1976 by the Ministry of Culture, that eventually laid the foundation for the current KF.<sup>10</sup> Among the initiatives of KICA was the launching of the magazine *Koreana* in 1987 in English,<sup>11</sup> which was "launched worldwide to introduce Korean culture, traditional and modern arts for a better understanding of Korea" (KF 2015, 63). According to KF Senior Programme Officer Haewon Park,<sup>12</sup> "during the era of internationalization in the 1990s, the association's scope expanded," and it eventually evolved into the current KF in 1991 becoming affiliated with MOFA." Consequently, the promotion of Korea's international understanding was broadened. For instance, in 1994 the KF launched "grant support to graduate students," "pursuing Korean Studies majors at leading universities abroad" (KF 2015, 20). Since 2004 it has been supporting "the broadcast of Korean TV drama programs in [foreign] countries," amidst which was the signed agreement in

10. Haewon Park, e-mail interview by the author, March 20, 2017.

11. Until recently, it has been made available in a total of nine languages (including Spanish, Japanese, Chinese, German, French, Russian, Arabic, and Indonesian), distributed in [around] 160 countries (Korea Foundation, "Koreana," accessed January 5, 2017, <https://en.kf.or.kr/?menu=3814>).

12. Haewon Park, e-mail interview by the author, March 20, 2017.

2015 “with eight Central and South American countries to air three Korean TV drama programs” dubbed in Spanish (KF 2015, 67).

Presently, KF activities unfold through the following four programs: (1) support for Korean studies overseas (SKSO); (2) culture and arts exchange (CAE); (3) global networking (GN); and (4) support for media (SM) (KF 2015, 6–7). Each of these programs are directed to a specific field and, accordingly, include numerous initiatives. In particular, SKSO assists foreign universities in the launching of “Korean studies professorships” and offers special “trainings, fellowships for field researches and Korean language” courses; CAE promotes exhibitions and cultural performances through its support to prestigious museums abroad; GN, besides provid[ing] grant aid to Korea-related research activities abroad, hosts special events and forums for distinguished individuals of the political, business, academic, media, culture, and sports sectors, so the participants can visit Korea and get firsthand knowledge of Korean society by themselves; SM supports the publication of periodicals, including *Koreana*, and Korea-related books in foreign languages and promotes their distribution internationally to universities, libraries, and research institutes around the world; additionally, SM promotes the airing of Korean TV drama[s] in foreign countries (KF 2015, 6–7). Through these initiatives, KF has become another “institutional arm” of MOFA to use for public diplomacy (S. Lee 2015b, 122–123), aimed “to promote a better understanding” and good images of Korea and its society around the world through “exchange diplomacy” (KF 2013a, 5).

As mentioned, the establishment of KOICA and the KF is regarded as part of the diversification of KPD tools. In this respect, it is important to consider the following national and international factors that propelled the diversification. First, “rapid economic development” and its eventual transition into “democratization and a generational shift in political personnel,” together “contributed to a marked change in the self-perception of South Koreans,” “motivated by a strong sense of moral obligation to repay” the aid it had received and active inclusion into international community as a developed nation (De Ceuster 2005, 68, 85). Especially, this qualitative change in self-perception coincided with the presidency of Roh Tae-woo, who prioritized “international exchange” more “than the [preceding] regimes” (Park

2015, 91).

Second, diversification of KPD resulted from the structural transformation in international relations and world politics due to the end of the Cold War. In particular, Korea had finally become a full member of the United Nations,<sup>13</sup> a status that was previously impossible due to the Cold War antagonism. For this matter, the government's new goal had become active inclusion into the world community with the image of a country that had achieved socioeconomic development, as well as the democratization of its political system. A third factor, likewise related to the end of the bipolar system, was the emergence of newly independent countries in post-Soviet territory, which initiated political and economic reforms in countries previously unreachable behind the so-called "iron curtain." Accordingly, these emerging and transforming countries had started to implement a new economic development model and attract foreign ODA, which coincided with the intensification of Korean ODA, knowledge and exchange diplomacies. The final, but equally important factor to reckon with was North Korea, which amidst being a hostile state was also a competing regime with competing ideological values. Notably, for this reason, during the Cold War era Korea's "aid was strategically given to form political alliances to ensure" Seoul's "dominant position over" Pyongyang.<sup>14</sup> Thus, the undertaken measures were also highly symbolic, indicating the increased potential of South Korean capacities in areas that were beyond the soft and hard power capabilities of North Korea.

All these factors, bearing in mind the country's increased intellectual and economic potential, had qualitatively diversified KPD, demonstrated in the establishment of KOICA and KF that subsequently became MOFA's "two institutional arms to use for public diplomacy" (S. Lee 2015b, 122).

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13. South Korea was admitted to the United Nations on September 17, 1991 (United Nations, "United Nations Member States," press release, July 3, 2006, <https://www.un.org/press/en/2006/org1469.doc.htm>).

14. K-Developedia, "History of Korea's ODA and KOICA," accessed January 5, 2017, [https://www.kdevelopedia.org/Development-Overview/official-aid/history-korea-s-odkoica--201412110000389.do?fldRoot=TP\\_ODA&subCategory=TP\\_ODA\\_GE#.WG6OdxKNq-po](https://www.kdevelopedia.org/Development-Overview/official-aid/history-korea-s-odkoica--201412110000389.do?fldRoot=TP_ODA&subCategory=TP_ODA_GE#.WG6OdxKNq-po).

Since then, both institutions have been “win[ning] the hearts [and minds] of the developing [and developed] countries’ people” (R. Kim 2011, 7) by becoming the “promoter of [Korean] public diplomacy” globally (KF 2013a, 5). Importantly, as long as the Korean government during this time diversified its KPD tools through ODA, knowledge and exchange diplomacies, this period is called “diversification.” Meanwhile, it is worth noting that the diversification period was not merely the continuation of preceding governments’ initiatives, but the realm of a qualitative change in the government’s engagement with foreign public. Evidently, in addition, a qualitative change had also taken place because of the changing nature of international relations and world politics.

### **Polycentrism**

Obviously, the two periods hitherto discussed emerged from the sole and direct participation of the government. Meanwhile, two major factors, the democratization and liberalization of Korea’s politico-economic system, and the Asian Financial Crisis, occurred during the 1990s, gave impetus for the structural transformation of KPD since the late 1990s and especially the early 2000s. Specifically, structural transformation meant a substantial shift from the statist approach of KPD toward polycentrism, generated by the growing role of Hallyu as a non-state actor. The so-called Hallyu phenomenon has so far been the most analyzed topic in academic scholarship, focused on KPD and soft power. For instance, already by February 23, 2013, Google Scholar had 1,940 articles capturing this phenomenon (H. Lee 2013, 185). Indeed, the analysis of contemporary KPD is impossible without considering Hallyu. In this section, the article covers the nature of Hallyu, its developmental phases and achievements, and, importantly, the way it has been integrated into KPD in its evolution.

The term Hallyu (Hanliu in Chinese) (Jang and Paik 2012), literally meaning “Korean wave” (H. Cho 2005), was initially used by Chinese media in the late 1990s to characterize a rising popularity of Korean cultural products in China (Kim and Ryoo 2007). According to Dal (2012), in regards to

the period, scope, and tools, it can be divided into two types—Hallyu 1 (H1) and Hallyu 2 (H2). H1 had initially emerged in the late 1990s in East Asian countries and by 2007 had gradually reached the entirety of Asia, and parts of the Middle East and Latin America. In this period, H1's cultural products had mainly been movies and dramas, delivered to target audiences via traditional mass media (Dal 2012). In turn, H2 started in 2007, and until the present has been enlarging its geographical scope, diversifying its cultural products with K-pop and the gaming industry and being shared through social media and new ICT (Dal 2012). Financially, within the given periods, Hallyu has produced significant results. For instance, while “in the early 2000s, Korean cultural content exports” composed around US\$500 million, in 2012 its economic asset valued US\$83.2 billion (Leong 2014).

Although Hallyu is presently considered a non-state actor, its emergence and further development has basically been the result of a public-private partnership. To be precise, the initial impetus for the gradual evolution of Korean cultural products into the contemporary “wave” abroad, was given by several presidential administrations through a long-standing state-led cultural policy. For instance, Syngman Rhee initiated the “creat[ion of] a national cultural heritage”; Park Chung-hee in 1973 established the Ministry of Culture and Information; Chun Doo-hwan specifically “focused on contemporary arts”; Roh Tae-woo directed the “cultural [products] for all the people” (Watson 2012, 314–315) and “liberaliz[ed] the media industry” (Park 2015, 92); Kim Young-sam “linked [the cultural industry to the] globalization” policy; Kim Dae-jung “tied innovation in technologies to the new cultural industry” and “export-orientated development” (Watson 2012, 314–315); and Roh Moo-hyun promoted the Han brand and intensified support of the “cultural industry overseas” (Park 2015, 112).

Certainly, the state view of cultural policy and industry varied across presidential administrations. For instance, while since Syngman Rhee cultural policy had been viewed as the “means for the ruling elite to maintain their power by preserving traditions and heritage,” the “Kim Young-sam government was the first to transform culture into an industry” (Park 2015, 99), which shifted the state's view of cultural policy from tool of “legitimization” toward “a source of untapped economic potential” (Lim 2016). This

change in particular bolstered the birth of the Korean cultural industry. To this purpose, the government in 1994 established the Cultural Industry Bureau, under the Ministry of Culture and Sport, which aimed to “encourage the growth of high value-added sectors . . . particularly [the] audio-visual industry” (Park 2015, 95–96). Additionally, the government adopted the Motion Picture Promotion Law to support “Korean film representation in theaters” (Lim 2016) and offer “incentives like tax breaks and subsidies,” which consequently attracted the interest and investment of chaebol (Park 2015, 99).

The economic approach had further been prioritized by the administration of Kim Dae-jung which, after facing the Asian financial crisis of 1997, decided to invigorate “the country’s economic competitiveness” by increasing “exports in cultural industries” (Hong 2014, 73). To this purpose, several initiatives were implemented, such as the adoption of the Broadcast Video Promotion Plan in 1998, the Cultural Industry Act in 1999, and the establishment of the Korea Cultural Contents Agency (KOCCA) in 2001, which altogether increased incentives for chaebol to invest, supported the export of cultural products, and generally helped the cultural industry to develop (Park 2015, 102–105). New initiatives coincided with the interest of private sector representatives, “looking for [an alternative source of income to] escape from” the Asian financial crisis (H. Cho 2005, 174). The successive government of Roh Moo-hyun likewise continued to support the content industry, and in 2007 created the Gaming Industry Team under the Ministry of Culture and Tourism “to promote the gaming industry both” at national and international levels (Park 2015, 111). Additionally, Roh Moo-hyun’s administration combined the rising popularity of Korean cultural products with the promotion of the “Han brand,” which encompassed “*hanbok* (Korean traditional dress), *hanok* (traditional house), *hanji* (mulberry paper),” and so forth (Park 2015, 112).

Generally, the initial impetus for the birth of Korean cultural policy, and eventually its industry, was provided by the government. Meanwhile, besides this, the gradual evolution of Korean cultural products into the “wave” had likewise been facilitated by specific external factors, which helped the initial entry of K-movies into Asian countries. Particularly in

Taiwan it was the weakening “consumption of Hong Kong and Japanese” cultural products that created “the niche market,” which in the late 1990s was filled by K-dramas (H. Cho 2005, 170). Entry into foreign markets was also in the business interest of chaebols, who used the rising popularity of Hallyu “to promote its own products,” even by “distribut[ing] free copies of [K] dramas to the broadcasting stations in Asia” (as in the case of Samsung and LG) (H. Cho 2005, 170). Progressively, Hallyu entered into the societies of Asia (Kim and Ryoo 2007), the Middle East, Africa, the Americas, and later Europe (Jang and Paik 2012).

Regarding the impact of Hallyu, it is worth considering the existing two groups of scholars that view cultural industry from a different perspective. The first group, called “cultural nationalists,” point to the existence of authentic culture, whilst the second group, called “industrialists and neo-liberals,” claim that the cultural industry aimed to transform the Korean Wave into a sustainable source of income (H. Cho 2005, 159–160). Indeed, both views are relevant, yet at the same time it might be incorrect to consider the role and impact of Hallyu from separate, different perspectives, and instead be better to highlight its multidimensional impact, which varied from economic and cultural to public diplomacy. For instance, according to the report conducted by the Samsung Economic Research Institute in 2005, countries “consuming Korean cultural products” are divided into four categories as follows: (1) “simply enjoying Korean pop culture”; (2) “buying related products such as posters, character items, and tours”; (3) “buying Made in Korea products”; and (4) “development of general preference for Korean culture itself” (H. Cho 2005, 169).

Available data indicates the contribution of Hallyu to the above-mentioned categories. For instance, according to a survey of “300 major service and manufacturing corporations,” conducted by the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 82.8% of respondents confirmed Hallyu’s sway on building “the friendly image of Korea and Korean products,” while only 17.2% stated “no improvement in image” (KCCI 2012). The same survey also showed that 43.5% of the corporations indicated its impact on “exploring new overseas markets” (KCCI 2012). Another survey of 1,173 consumers composed of visitors from Japan, China, Taiwan, and Vietnam, conducted



by the Korea International Trade Association's Institute for International Trade, revealed that 80% of respondents bought Korean products mainly because of the Korean Wave's positive image in their minds (KITA 2011). Similarly, the tourism industry has likewise experienced the impact of Hallyu. For instance, according to the *New York Times* correspondent report, around "80% of Taiwanese tourists to South Korea pick television-themed tours, visiting" the places "where their favorite dramas were filmed" (H. Cho 2005, 168).

At the same time, considering the public diplomacy sway of Hallyu, it is important to indicate its specific pattern as building the so-called "new contact zone," which implies the ability of creating a crosscultural understanding and engagement with foreign publics through the flow of cultural products (H. Cho 2005, 177). This pattern of Hallyu products has been described by various countries differently. For instance, Asian countries find the Korean lifestyle interesting to follow; Middle Eastern and Muslim countries tolerate them because of "the subtle repression of emotions," "romantic passion without over sexuality," and "emphasizing support and loyalty to the government" (Jang and Paik 2012, 198). Moreover, in Taiwan and the most part of China it led to a boom in demand for *hansik* (Korean cuisine) (Lin 2014); in Mexico it triggered local fans to ask the President Roh Moo-hyun (during his visit to Mexico) to send some Korean movie stars to Mexico (Shim 2008, 27); in Paris it resulted in a flash mob of 20,000 fans in front of the Eiffel Tower to dance and sing along with Psy's "Gangnam Style"; and, last but not least, the well-known politicians Barack Obama and Ban Ki-moon also paid attention to Psy's hit song (White House 2013).<sup>15</sup>

Ultimately, Hallyu, originally being a commercial activity, subsequently started raising Korea's popularity abroad, penetrating into the societies of Asia (Kim and Ryoo 2007), the Middle East, Africa, the Americas, and

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15. See also *Economist*, "South Korea's Soft Power. Soap, Sparkle and Pop. How a Really Uncool Country Became the Tastemaker of Asia," August 9, 2014, <http://www.economist.com/news/books-and-arts/21611039-how-really-uncool-country-became-tastemaker-asia-soap-sparkle-and-pop>; *Huffington Post*, "Ban Ki-moon Dances Gangnam Style," October 24, 2012, [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/24/ban-ki-moon-dances-gangna\\_n\\_2009883.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/24/ban-ki-moon-dances-gangna_n_2009883.html).

Europe (Jang and Paik 2012). After this, the Korean government decided “to take the advantage of [Hallyu’s success] as a policy tool” (Jang and Paik 2012, 196), channeling it to enhance its public diplomacy, which *inter alia* laid the ground for private-public partnership. Evidently, Hallyu as a non-state actor has successfully contributed to the effectiveness of KPD. In particular, it has helped in building crosscultural understanding and relationships between Korea and foreign societies. Unlike the preceding two periods, it has enlarged the circle of public diplomacy actors, structurally transforming it from a solely state-led activity into a polycentric framework of public and private partnership. Based on this new pattern, this evolution period is called polycentrism.

### **Institutionalization**

KPD entered into its fourth evolutionary period in the late 2000s, when the then newly elected President Lee Myung-bak raised the issue of improving Korea’s international image “in a groundbreaking manner” (Temporal 2015, 161) through the “Global Korea vision” (S. Lee 2015b, 121), and accordingly intensified public diplomacy and nation branding activities. The government’s new vision of Korea’s international image was laid out as the goal, yet the activities of preceding periods were enriched and incorporated as the means of fulfilling it. In this regard, it encompassed *de jure* intensification of activities that *de facto* had been practiced during the previously discussed three periods. However, compared to previous practices, public diplomacy has become “a more comprehensive, proactive, and strategic government effort of interacting with foreign publics,” which differs “from the previous one limited to international exchange and cultural understanding” (S. Lee 2015b, 121). At the same time it is worth noting that during, and right after, the Cold War almost 90% of Korea’s “diplomatic resources” were focused on “security diplomacy,” “confined to the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia” (S. Kim 2012). Thus, the new initiative manifested “changes in the perception of power” by the government, and, specifically, the rising importance of soft power cultivation that along with hard

power was deployed in order to gain the recognition of “a proud and respected nation” of the international arena (Hermanns 2013, 65–66).

According to Sook-jong Lee (2011, 140), the government’s recent incorporation of public diplomacy into its foreign policy has been incited by following reasons: (1) understanding of its feeble “political and diplomatic influence . . . compared to” the country’s hard power capabilities (the 13th largest economy and the 15th strongest military); and (2) the impossibility of “compet[ing] with [the] surrounding big powers China and Japan in terms of hard power.” Thereby, in the given *status quo* of hard power, public diplomacy and soft power have been “perceived as an alternative power source” to enhance Korea’s influence at regional and global levels. Moreover, confidence was further strengthened by Hallyu’s staggering success in raising the overall popularity of *haminjok* (Korean nation) around the globe (S. Lee 2011).

Unlike previous governments, the Lee Myung-bak government decided to establish regulatory authority over public diplomacy related activities. Partly, preceding presidential administrations founded certain institutional authorities, yet those authorities had basically been oriented toward state image-making and nation branding campaigns. For instance, in 2001 the Kim Dae-jung administration established the National Image Committee (NIC), headed by the prime minister, which was used in the “preparation” and “hosting” of 2002 FIFA World Cup under the slogan “Dynamic Korea” (Schmuck 2011, 101). Despite the NIC continuing to function after the games, the successive Roh Moo-hyun administration gave “less priority and budget” to it, instead establishing in 2003 another branding committee within the Government Information Agency (GIA), which presented in 2007 the slogan “Korea, Sparkling” (Schmuck 2011, 101–102). In turn, when Lee Myung-bak raised the issue of Korea’s lower soft power attractiveness, compared to its hard power achievements, in 2009 his government established the Presidential Council on Nation Branding (PCNB) (Temporal 2015). The action plan of PCNB encompassed knowledge, exchange, and cultural diplomacies that had likewise been practiced by other government agencies (R. Kim 2011). Later, the PCNB also did not receive the support of the successive Park Geun-hye government, and ceased to be active from 2013 (Scharf 2016).

Regarding the establishment of exact public diplomacy institutions, the government made subsequent efforts within the MOFA, with the designation of “Korea’s first Ambassador for public diplomacy in September 2011”; transformation of the Culture Diplomacy Division into the Public Diplomacy Division in January 2012 (MOFA 2014, 300); and recently establishing two new divisions of Directorate for Public Diplomacy on Policy and the Directorate for Regional Public Diplomacy under the Director-General for Policy Planning.<sup>16</sup> Unfortunately, despite these transformations within the MOFA and the according placement of public diplomacy “as the third pillar of [Korea’s] foreign policy along with political and economic affairs” (MOFA 2014, 299), practically KPD had not gotten its universal regulatory authority, as it still represented a fragmented “set of practices” out of a nationally shared and accepted “set of rules.”<sup>17</sup> Consequently, it has caused the following “three absences” (3Abs): *authority dilemma* (1A), *structural problem* (2A), and *listening* (3A).

Here, the weakness of the government’s institutional authority over its public diplomacy related activities can be referred to as the “authority dilemma,” the first of the 3 Abs. Certainly, nowadays states are no longer the sole actors in public diplomacy and complete exercise of authority over modern public diplomacy goes beyond their power capacities. Yet in Korea’s case, the “authority dilemma” has been specific. Initially, as it has showed in its origins and diversification and polycentrism periods, the government generated various components of public diplomacy through various initiatives. Yet due to the fact that since its early period the government did not comprehensively use public diplomacy under one system, it caused a progressive fragmentation of the government’s affiliate institutions in their activities. Sook-jong Lee (2015a) describes it as the absence of a “control tower” institution, which in turn caused “little information sharing and policy coordination among governmental agencies,” and operated with conflicting and overlapping activities rather than shared interests.

16. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Organizational Chart,” accessed November 29, 2016, [http://www.mofa.go.kr/ENG/ministry/organization/organizational/index.jsp?menu=m\\_50\\_60\\_20](http://www.mofa.go.kr/ENG/ministry/organization/organizational/index.jsp?menu=m_50_60_20).

17. The idea of phrases “set of rules” and “set of practices” is taken from Duffield (2007).

2A, which is tightly linked to and caused by 1A, is the *structural problem* that encompasses the absence of a comprehensive strategy composed of short-, mid-, and long-term realistic goals, and an accompanying performance assessment element. The result so far has been “a lack of coordination [in] inter-ministerial cooperation” while conducting public diplomacy (Melissen and Sohn 2015, 4). For instance, T. Kim (2012) gives the example of cultural diplomacy, as a part of public diplomacy, which is conducted by the three ministries of MOFA, MCST, and Ministry of Education (MOE). Simultaneously, these ministries are in charge of the promotion of Hangeul (Korean language) in overseas countries (T. Kim 2012, 540). MCST has the Sejong Institute with around 90 international branches; MOE manages overseas Korea Education Centers; and MOFA, through the KF, promotes Korean studies programs in around 150 universities in 50 countries (T. Kim 2012). 3A, generated by the previous problems, is the absence of the “listening” part of public diplomacy. In practice, “listening” is essential to determine the target audiences’ feelings, needs, and feedback, and, accordingly, to formulate or adjust public diplomacy related activities for their increasing effectiveness. Unfortunately, this part has not so far gotten the attention of the Korean government. In this regard, during the Sixth KF Global Seminar in 2013, Jinwoo Choi, professor at Hanyang University, criticized Korea’s public diplomacy as an effort to win the hearts and minds “by talking alone,” because of the neglect of the “listening” element (KF 2013b).

Recently, the Korean government has started to deal with these problems. So, in addition to the structural transformations within the MOFA, the government adopted the Public Diplomacy Act (PDA), which went into effect on August 4, 2016.<sup>18</sup> The goal of the PDA is “to contribute to improving [Korea’s] image and prestige in the international community by forming foundations to strengthen public diplomacy and enhance [its] efficiency.”<sup>19</sup>

18. *Korea Herald*, “New Law to Boost Public Diplomacy,” August 4, 2016, <http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20160804000679>.

19. Public Diplomacy Act, no. 13951, accessed January 20, 2017, [http://mofa.go.kr/webmodule/htsboard/template/read/engreadboard.jsp?typeID=12&boardid=15777&seqno=317913&c=&t=&pagenum=1&tableName=TYPE\\_ENGLISH&pc=&dc=&wc=&lu=&vu=&iu=&du=](http://mofa.go.kr/webmodule/htsboard/template/read/engreadboard.jsp?typeID=12&boardid=15777&seqno=317913&c=&t=&pagenum=1&tableName=TYPE_ENGLISH&pc=&dc=&wc=&lu=&vu=&iu=&du=)

Importantly, the PDA legally determines the MOFA as the main institution of public diplomacy and “gives it the authority to command Korea’s overall public diplomacy programs.”<sup>20</sup> Specifically, it planned to establish “the public diplomacy committee” in 2017 “under the jurisdiction” of MOFA,<sup>21</sup> which will be comprised of “20 members” from government institutions and “private experts,” including Minister of Foreign Affairs as the chairperson.<sup>22</sup>

Whereas the legal placement of public diplomacy under the control of MOFA is thought to solve the problem of 1A, the enshrined functions are meant to cope with the remaining two absences. Specifically, article 6 of PDA requires the MOFA to adopt a comprehensive strategy every five years, called the “master plan.”<sup>23</sup> Article 7 calls for national and subnational actors to “formulate and implement [an] annual action plan for public diplomacy activities in conformity with a master plan, and submit such action plan and [its] performance results” to the MOFA, thus avoiding “duplication” and underperformance.<sup>24</sup> Additionally, in regards to 3A, articles 10 and 11 request the “conduct [of] fact-finding research” and the launch of an “information system in order to conduct public diplomacy in a systematic and efficient manner.”<sup>25</sup> Obviously, the PDA lays “the legal and institutional groundwork” for KPD, which has been crucial in remedying the problem of institutional authority.<sup>26</sup>

In sum, the fourth period of evolution in KPD is still in its formative stage, where the “three absences” have so far been hampering a complete

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20. *Yonhap*, “New Law Set to Take Force to Harness S. Korea’s Public Diplomacy,” August 3, 2016, <http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2016/08/03/0302000000AEN2016080-3006251315.html>.

21. *Korea Herald*, “New Law to Boost Public Diplomacy,” August 4, 2016, <http://www.korea-herald.com/view.php?ud=20160804000679>.

22. Public Diplomacy Act, no. 13951; *Yonhap*, “New Law Set to Take Force to Harness S. Korea’s Public Diplomacy,” August 3, 2016, <http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2016/08/03/0302000000AEN20160803006251315.html>.

23. Public Diplomacy Act, no. 13951.

24. Public Diplomacy Act, no. 13951.

25. Public Diplomacy Act, no. 13951.

26. *Korea Herald*, “New Law to Boost Public Diplomacy,” August 4, 2016, <http://www.korea-herald.com/view.php?ud=20160804000679>.

accomplishment of KPD formation. As previously mentioned, it has resulted in the fragmentation of governmental institutions' public diplomacy related activities, coincided with the absence of a universal regulatory authority and comprehensive strategy composed of mid, short, and long-term oriented goals. Fortunately, the government's recent initiatives of structural transformations within the MOFA and the adoption of the PDA have legally brought KPD into its institutionalization period. Yet there is much work ahead for Korea to implement the PDA and draft the master and action plans. For these reasons, so long as the recent initiatives still need to be realized, it is more accurate to call the current stage the "institutionalization process" period.

## Conclusion

Academic interest in KPD is rising. Yet, the existing scholarship has predominantly captured the contemporary practice of public diplomacy in Korea's foreign policy since the late 2000s, thus leaving its possible origins and evolution barely analyzed. In the current article I have argued that the present state of KPD represents *de jure* intensification of activities that *de facto* have been practiced since the second half of the twentieth century. In this regard, KPD has been considered from a long-term perspective, chronologically divided into four evolutionary periods as follows: (1) *origins* (late 1940s–late 1980s), (2) *diversification* (early 1990s), (3) *polycentrism* (early 2000s), and (4) *institutionalization* (2011 to the present). This periodical division consists of the logic ECC, and thus captures the initial foundations, continuities and changes of KPD in terms of the goals, ways, and means of its conduct.

The *origins* period reveals the Korean government's first-ever launch of engagement with local and foreign publics through cultural and sports diplomacies, aimed at building the image of Korea with an individual cultural and national identity. The *diversification* period implies the government's expansion of public diplomacy engagement areas through ODA, knowledge and exchange diplomacies, institutionally manifested in the es-

establishment of KOICA and KF. The transition into this period has been explained by a qualitative change in the government's approach to public diplomacy, incited by political transformation within the country and the changing nature of international relations. The *polycentrism* period has consisted of the Hallyu phenomenon that, as a non-state actor, has successfully contributed to the effectiveness of KPD. Unlike the two preceding periods, *polycentrism* has structurally transformed KPD from a solely state-led activity into a polycentric framework of public and private partnership. Lastly, institutionalization has comprised the period of the government's official placement of public diplomacy as one of its foreign policy pillars, accordingly starting the *institutionalization* of KPD regulatory authority. In this sense, the structural transformations within the MOFA since 2011 and the adoption of the Public Diplomacy Act in 2016 are to be considered institutionalization efforts of the government, aimed at remedying the problem of the 3Abs.

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