

An Overview of Theory and Research of Source Monitoring in Children's Testimony Context

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Source monitoring (SM) plays an indispensable role in children's lives, requiring essential skills to mediate their ability in various cognitive and social functions. The accuracy of such skills significantly impact children's knowledge base and beliefs about the world. The current review aimed to present a vast and comprehensive review of research on children's SM, exploring the results of applied and experimental studies. The discussion also addressed applied research related to children's SM involving the misinformation effect paradigm as well as training children in SM skills. This review served to propose a window into a coherent starting point for researchers investigating children's SM, building a valuable synthesis of currently available information to identify critical areas for potential future research.

Key words : source monitoring, postevent misinformation effect, misattribution errors, suggestibility, child's testimony

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Definition and Theory of Source Monitoring

Source monitoring (SM) is the theoretical cognitive processes in which an individual associates memories and other mental information with specific sources from his or her past experiences. Reporting on past experiences requires differentiating between memories related to witnessing an event versus memories of imagining, seeing, inferring, or hearing about that event. Thus, individuals need a sophisticated set of source monitoring processes and SM enables children to mediate the success of a variety of aspects of their lives, including the attainment of knowledge, their event memory, and their suggestibility of remembering.

Previous research has explored children's struggles to distinguish between factual perceptions of memories and imagined experiences. Johnson, Hashtroudi, and Lindsay (1993) developed the Source Monitoring Framework (SMF) based on reality-monitoring theory, elaborating upon Johnson and Raye's Reality Monitoring (RM) model (1981). The RM model focused on processes by which people discriminate between memories of actual versus imagined experiences. Origin RM allows a person to recognize the origin of internal and external events when both the internal and external potential events are publicly observed. Here the focus is on distinguishing between the self versus other nature of events. Meanwhile, children require additional types of source comparisons

-namely, external SM and internal SM. External SM is the process of discerning memories from various external events (e.g., publicly perceived). In contrast, internal SM involves distinguishing between memories of events generated by the individual operating the SM. Internal SM also involves differentiating between memories of self-generated, private events (e.g., did a child actually meet Winnie the Pooh or merely imagine it?) or two self-generated events in which one is external and the other internal (e.g., did a child clean her room or just pretend to?), which is also known as realization judgment (Foley, Santini, & Sopasakis, 1989). Current research in the field is fundamentally concerned with the influence of such division upon individuals who misidentify memory source, ascribing memory information from one source to another. Such misattributions can result in errors in prompt, automatic SM processes or follow more deliberately mediated hypotheses. For example, certain tasks orient people through delicate source judgments (e.g., testifying in court), while others focus the individual on a specific goal (e.g., telling an entertaining story), paying little heed to the sources. Undoubtedly, an individual may develop more conservative and structured SM skills while testifying in court rather than while entertaining others at a party. According to source monitoring framework, false-memory phenomena emerge when thoughts, images, and feelings from a source are incorrectly assigned to a different memory. Such

misattribution occurs for a variety of reasons. For example, an individual might recall the memory of an exceptionally dramatic fantasy and misjudge it for an actual event if specific cautious SM is lacking. The attribution in this situation is made promptly while the individual focuses on other aspects of task performance or assigns attributes to a situation (e.g., thoughts and images take place in relation to a particular source that are not reliably indicative of the source).

Thus, source distinctions include those related to a reality aspect (e.g., was this event real or a dream?), an aspect concerning a specific person (e.g., did he or she say it?), an aspect related to an action (e.g., did I walk to a place or did I take my car?), and a temporal aspect (e.g., did this event happen yesterday or a week ago?). Additional dimensions may help us differentiate memories and knowledge, such as distinguishing whether an event happened or not (e.g., did I go to a place this year or not?). As such, source distinctions rely on several factors (e.g., distinguishing among internal events, distinguishing among external events, and distinguishing between internal and external events), and can be produced in regards to the status (public versus private) or the origin (self versus another person) of the events. The nature of the source judgment can depend on current task demands and be affected by the individual who is remembering, his or her current orientation or situation, and so forth.

Consequently, scrutinizing SM ability in children requires considering the distinction of sources and the children's ability to establish a multifaceted set of SM processes not only to identify sources of a specific memory, but also to distinguish among memories of multiple events, surmises, and representations emerging in response to internally and externally generated cues.

Developmental Changes in Source Monitoring

Researchers believe that SM remains reasonably stable throughout adulthood, with some decline in later years, whereas critical changes in SM occur among children aged 3 to 8 (Roberts & Blades, 1995; Robison, 2000). Children's SM development does not evolve as a succession of Piagetian-like jumps; rather, it is established in gradual steps (Lindsay, Johnson, & Kwon, 1991). Developmental investigations have identified dissociation among various SM types (e.g., Foley, Johnson, & Raye 1983; Welch-Ross, 1995); consequently, children may seem to be competent using SM in one measure while exhibiting source misattributions in another measure (e.g., Roberts & Blades, 1999) or even fluctuate when challenged with delays (e.g., Roberts & Blades, 1995). Thus, age might be an indicator of SM rather than a guaranteed predictor of ability.

Given the broad range of developmental literature available, researchers have

conventionally concurred that children disorient the boundary between fantasy and reality. Piaget (1929) argued that children also confuse the mental and the physical, dreams and reality, and appearance and reality. Indeed, studies have demonstrated that young children struggle to differentiate between experiences through perception and imagined experiences. Studies have indicated that six-year-olds have more difficulty discriminating between saying a word versus imagining saying it than nine-year-olds or adults do (e.g., Foley et al., 1983). Apparently the cues involved in this differentiating process are not well developed before late childhood. In addition, young children make numerous source misattributions, struggling to distinguish between actually experienced events and those they were merely told about (e.g., Parker, 1995). However, young children have demonstrated the ability to distinguish between an action they did and an action someone else did as well as between such sources of memories (except when at least one of the sources is self-generated) (Foley et al., 1989). Yet younger children are significantly more prone to err when distinguishing between real and imagined acts/words when both concern them.

Undoubtedly, the relation between age and SM is complicated. Children as young as five perform as well as adults when identifying sources of recollections in certain situations, yet those as old as nine perform more poorly than adults in other situations. For example, Foley

and Johnson (1985; Foley et al., 1983) determined that young children performed as well as adults when asked to remember which person (not including themselves) had carried out a particular action; they were more likely than adults to err when asked to remember their own action versus imagined actions. Such results led Foley and her colleagues (e.g., Foley et al., 1989) to suggest that young children struggle to distinguish between memories of actual and imagined self-generated acts (“realization judgments”). Foley et al. (1983) asked 6- and 9-year-old children and adults to say certain words and listen to an experimenter say other words; the 9-year-olds and adults showed evidence of the “it had to be you” bias when inaccurately recognizing items whereas the 6-year-old children did not. In another condition focusing on stating the words versus imagining themselves saying other words, adults demonstrated the “I must have imagined it” bias whereas neither of the children’s populations (6- and 9-year-olds) did. Rather, young children showed an “I did it” bias when asked to remember whether they or an adult co-participant made particular contributions to a collaborative project (Foley & Ratner, 1998a), which the authors attributed to their proneness to conceptualize themselves performing the actions they saw the adult perform. Even quite young children can show SM biases; the 6-year-olds in Foley and Ratner’s (1998b) study more often incorrectly conjured memories of

imagined actions as accounts of actual actions than conversely, especially when instructed to imagine themselves performing the action as opposed to imagining seeing themselves perform the action.

Numerous factors may affect developmental change and invariance in SM, including children's ongoing experience (and hence memory records), which differs from adults'. Children may be better than adults at imagining that they performed the action, as their memories of imagined and actual self-performed actions are more similar. Moreover, the kinds of memory records that occur quickly and easily during testing differ for children and adults as adults seem more prone to access particular kinds of source-specifying information particularly useful in certain situations. Finally, children's deficiencies in retrieval strategies and reasoning processes when automatic SM processes unsuccessfully identify the source may stem from age-related changes in SM. When adults are uncertain about the source, they may strategically discover additional source-specifying information or employ reflective reasoning whereas children may be less successful in executing such operations.

Clearly, no single age determined when competent source memory performance emerges. Memory as a source is not a prearranged, simple skill that a child easily acquires at a particular age. Rather, SM involves inferences about various aspects of event memories and depends upon a number of types of mental activities (perceptual

analysis and reflective integration during encoding, retrieval of memory records, and decision-making processes during tests). SM involves gradual and situation-specific developmental changes rather than sudden and general changes. Thus, researchers should respect the developmental qualities of SM when investigating children's SM abilities and processes.

Children's Source Monitoring in Forensic Research

Both adults and children exposed to misinformation after an observed event tend to incorporate misleading details into subsequent reports—a phenomenon typically called “postevent misinformation effect” (Bruck & Ceci, 1999; Ceci & Bruck, 1993, 1995). Early theorists suggested that such misinformation alters the original memory in some fashion (Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978), although some have suggested that both the original event and misinformation concurrently remain in the memory, consequently diminishing accuracy via misattribution to an erroneous source. The postevent misinformation effect is particularly evident when individuals provide information about a past event; they may incorporate information from postevent suggestions—mostly when asked direct questions, although the trend emerges in free recall reports as well. Some false reports depict true source memory confusions; the witness may remember

observing an event only barely suggested (with or without accurately remembering the suggestion itself) (Higham, 1998). As other reports have also indicated, witnesses knowingly rely on memories from extra-event sources when answering specific event-related questions (e.g., “I don’t remember the man having a mustache, but I do remember that the experimenter said he had one, so I’ll agree to that”). False reports from extra-event information can be positively held (i.e., the person does not remember observing the suggested event, but is assured that it occurred by the authority in the suggestion source). Individuals may subsequently develop critical source confusion (i.e., the witness knows the report was based exclusively on extra-event information but subsequently “remembers” witnessing the suggested event) (Ackil & Zaragoza, 1998).

SMF can elucidate such source misattribution errors. Information about a memory’s origins is not accessed as a distinct “source” trace; rather, it is gleaned from the memory representation’s integral qualitative characteristics, incorporating perceptual, semantic, contextual, and affective details as well as the nature of the “cognitive operations” that occur during encoding. Evaluating these characteristics’ quality and influence leads to indicative information about the memory’s origins. Thus, source information is not directly accessed but inferred via an attributional judgment process at retrieval (Johnson et al., 1993). Johnson et al. (1993)

also conjectured that source errors stem from individuals’ ineffective estimations of these qualitative characteristics; thus, source judgments are predominantly created via a “heuristic process” as individuals rely on evaluating the perceptual detail’s vividness and the memory’s familiarity. Consequently, critical source information may unintentionally be ignored. Accurate source decisions seem more likely after accepting a controlled “systematic process” as individuals use a higher level of deliberation as well as question the credibility of the selected source by examining such disagreement with further supplementary knowledge.

Lindsay and Johnson (1989) proposed that post-event misinformation effects may be a result of the failure to operate the systematic judgment process, which is required for accurate source decisions. The authors manipulated the “judgment process” at retrieval using a three-phase misinformation paradigm (Loftus, 1979). They showed adults a picture and then provided a narrative with half of the target items adjusted to reflect misinformation. They tested participants’ event-related memory using either a yes/no recognition test (“Did you see X in the picture?”) or a source-directed test in which participants noted whether they had experienced the target items according to one of four source options (“Did you see X in the picture, text, both, or neither?”). To eliminate potential suggestibility, participants evaluated all possible source options (see Chambers &

Zaragoza, 2001; Zaragoza & Lane, 1994 for similar findings), demonstrating that misinformation effects did not rely exclusively on overwriting the event trace. Rather, the sub-optimal utilization of source information (a fundamental component of memory not motivated by traditional recognition procedures) pointed to the suggestibility effect to some extent. Reports of suggestions may originate from an awareness of extra-event information or signify genuine source confusion (Poole & Lamb, 1998; Poole & Lindsay, 1998).

The age-suggestibility connection is further complicated from the variation-in both research and real life-in the degree to which the testing situation leads participants to presuppose that extra-event information is a legitimate source. Conditions encouraging participants to employ such extra-event information as a source can lead adults (who listen to support subsequent remembering processes and search their memory efficiently) to be more likely than younger individuals to report suggestions (see also Brainerd & Poole, 1997). Yet both children and adults can infringe upon event reports from extra-event sources once they become aware of their process of picturing extra-event sources or erroneously believing (due to reassurances from others) that they are remembering the event itself.

Minimizing (but not eliminating) such false reports without negatively affecting accuracy may require instructing witnesses not to utilize

memories from a designated extra-event source (i.e., "exclusion" instructions) or distinguishing between reports based on memories of the event itself versus those of an extra-event source (i.e., a source-memory test). Forensic interviewers can utilize such methods to reduce false reports (without impacting accuracy) when particular source of misleading suggestions is relevant (e.g., a parent in a custody dispute).

SMF provides helpful descriptions and premises regarding how the cognitive system differentiates memories from various sources. A more organized approach for identifying the system's applicable processes as well as the significant effect of age requires more general empirical and hypothetical work. However, studies that depend on the established framework have already discovered a significant amount regarding the specific conditions that may affect how children and adults confuse memories from a variety of sources as well as interventions that assist witnesses in avoiding reports of suggestions. One study examined stages of improvement in detail among children's SMF. The study sought to define how to train children's SM ability when they must recall past events. A new interviewer tested the participating children three days after presenting a story (and two days immediately following a misinformation event). Participants were instructed to "Tell me everything you can about the A story, which you heard that day when you saw the pictures and heard the story" (standard condition) or that they had heard

misleading suggestions and should not base any of their responses on the post-event information (“exclusion” condition) (Jacoby, Woloshyn, & Kelley, 1989; Lindsay, 1990). Although reliable misinformation effects arose in both conditions, a four-way interaction arose among age, recency of post-event information, test instructions, and target versus control items. In the standard condition, recent suggestions were more often incorrect than those presented two days earlier; adults reported recent suggestions more often. In the exclusion condition, adults and third graders reported recent details less often; preschoolers did not use the exclusion instructions at all. In addition, neither age nor test instructions controlled the misinformation effect in regards to low recency, signifying that positive SM confusions lead to erroneous reports among all age groups.

Various factors affect individuals’ awareness and unawareness in using extra-event information in both eyewitness misinformation and real-world eyewitness situations. These factors include memorability of event aspects and suggestions, knowledge credibility as a source of answers, memorability and effectiveness of source-specific information in both event memories and suggestions, and the ability to use source-specific memory information along with natural and intentionally controlled decision-making processes to determine memory sources. Memory related to event data and repeated event data is essential for event memory source, posing unique

challenges for SM. Contents of such memories provide only extremely indirect cues. For instance, a student in an automobile accident may be able to recall various related details years later due to the distinctiveness and salience of the event. However, the memory records of the accident will likely not propose direct cues to the actual date of the event. The memories may help delineate the time period (e.g., if the individual traveled the route only during a specific period and geographical information can be determined accordingly), yet such constraints may be inaccurate (a notable exception is memories of events basically associated with specific dates). Indeed, people often have difficulty dating autobiographical events. Friedman (1987) interviewed people nine months after a major earthquake. Although the respondents tended to mark the correct time of day of the earthquake to within one hour, they misjudged the month by nearly two months.

Children demonstrate similar outcomes as well. However, children performing better on SM assessments tend to be less susceptible to suggestion. In Principe’s (1997) study, four-year-olds took turns with a researcher to perform simple actions (e.g., touching one’s lips); the researchers then administered a surprise memory test related to which individual performed which action. Better SM performance was related to greater declines in incorrect information about an experience. Leichtman, Morse, Dixon, and Spiegel (2000) verified the

association between SM abilities and suggestibility among three-to six-year-olds. All of the hypothetical approaches noted herein suggest the possibility that event-related knowledge reinforces the misinformation effect as it is consistent with false post-event information.

Challenges and Suggestions: The next wave in children's Source Monitoring research

As the previous discussions have suggested, numerous inspiring, original, and practical research issues related to children's SM are possible specially in the forensic context. This section will outline some meaningful challenges concerning research of children's SM as well as provide suggestions for future research.

Strengths and Limitations in Assessing SM

One of the greatest challenges facing researchers in this field is assessing SM among preschoolers. Some researchers have successfully used traditional SM questions (e.g., "Did you do that or did she do that?") to discriminate between self-and other-performed actions (Robinson, 2000) while others have supplemented verbal questions with props (Thierry, Spence, & Memon, 2000) or avoided memories of two events (as in dual-choice SM questions) by evaluating memory for one source at a time using cued recall questions (Roberts & Blades, 2000). Traditional source questions inevitably force the child to choose between (usually two)

relevant sources, which can augment the number of correct source attributions through guessing. Younger children may feel more pressured than other age groups to guess in order to offer an authoritative adult an answer. Indeed, perceived experimental pressure may result in a source attribution from the forced-choice procedure. In addition, children tend to choose the last option in a sequence (Walker & Hunt, 1998), consequently slanting results in a multiple choice question. Open-ended prompts may offer an alternative for eliciting source reasoning, although such an approach may not be rational with young children. According to Robinson (2000), 3-to 4-year-olds have difficulty answering open-ended source probes (e.g., "How did you know it was a X?"), although they can answer a forced-choice question (e.g., "Did you see it, or did I tell you it was a X?"). In other words, source errors arose only in response to "traditional" SM questions.

Overcoming methodological challenges associated with traditional, forced-choice source questions is not impossible. The two options can be balanced to enable each choice to appear at the end of a question an equal number of times. Moreover, preliminary practice in answering source questions can ensure that children are actually considering the sources (rather than saying just "yes"). A cautious, comprehensive analysis of alternative explanations may further enhance the validity of conclusions regarding young children's SM (as exhibited in

Robinson, 2000).

Furthermore, analyzing the patterns of source misattributions can help researchers determine whether response biases are operating above and beyond experimental treatments. Source misattributions are more common for other-performed actions than self-performed actions (Ranter, Foley, & Gimpert, 2000). Lorsch (2000) reported that children noted a falsely recognized distracter as a word more often than they noted it was a picture. As the response options were counterbalanced, such error patterns likely did not stem from response biases.

Researchers must be aware of children's related developmental abilities (e.g., oral abilities). Forced-choice questions incorporating multiple options can be verbally challenging for young children. Most SM assessments require children to make the source of information verbally explicit, which may hide any working knowledge they have. According to Roberts and Blades' (1995) results, three-year-olds could (at short delays) differentiate between actions that they had performed and those that they had pretended to perform, yet their SM appeared significantly poorer than older children's and adults' during a traditional verbal source discrimination test. Similarly, Lorsch (2000) found that children with learning difficulties appear to have a verbal memory deficit compared to children without such disabilities; he hypothesized that their SM deficits may also be limited to verbal processing. However, such a

premise requires additional exploration. Clearly, opportunities-and needs-exist for developmental psychologists interested in producing various testing procedures to generate a richer picture of children's SM.

A crucial task for any investigative interviewer is to elicit a minimally contaminated account of the alleged incidents while gleaning details from other sources. Interviewers often ask children whether an event actually happened; this helps distinguish between the actual event(s) and contaminating sources. However, such an approach may not always be supportive; children's pragmatic understanding of the term really may be quite different than an adult's, as in the case where a child's mom "really" told her to create a story (Poole & Lindsay, 2001). Researchers pursuing new methodologies should be cognizant of such potential disagreements when working with young children.

Source Monitoring Memories of Multiple/ Repeated Events

Another challenge facing researchers is investigating how children process multiple sources (e.g., events experienced three, four, five, or more times). Most research to date has focused on exploring children's ability to distinguish between memories of two sources. However, in reality, children might face distinguishing between memories from more than two sources (e.g., when alleging multiple incidents of sexual abuse). Research on the

development of scripts can clarify the processes related to children's memories from multiple sources. Studies indicate that children develop generalized event representations after repeated exposure to similar events, enabling them to organize and retrieve information common to the occurrences (Farrar & Goodman, 1992). Yet developing scripts can also lead to memory errors as details from similar occurrences are reported as occurring in the target occurrence (e.g., Powell & Thomson, 1996) given that the common features are abstracted with repeated experience while specific instantiations are retained as "slot fillers" for the specific details (Hudson, Fivush, & Kuebli, 1992). Consequently, children remember common features well, but have difficulty associating a particular instantiation to fit the "slot." According to Powell and Thomson (1996), SM theory explains how children can remember the content of memories while remaining confused in regards to which instance involved those details (e.g., claiming that a detail was present in the first event when it was actually experienced in the second event). Meanwhile, script theory successfully explains how specific occurrences comprise one general event representation.

Research examining the relation between multiple experiences and suggestibility remains novel. One study concluded that errors made by children who experienced an event four to six times versus those made by children who experienced an event just once showed distinct

patterns (Powell, Roberts, Ceci, & Hembrooke, 1999). After repeated experiences, children resisted suggestions incorporating misleading and inaccurate details more often than children who watched an event just once however, they still confused the various events. Children's accuracy depended upon whether the details varied across the occurrences. Thus, memory is strong when dealing with invariant details while source confusions still emerge when dealing with varying details.

Researchers have demonstrated that children's memory for invariant details is generally good (Powell et al., 1999) whereas source confusions exist regarding details that vary. Future SM research may be able to elucidate ways in which adults and children can distinguish between details they have encountered on multiple occasions.

Role of SM in Children's Emotional Events

Investigating SM's affects in mediating specific aspects of children's social-cognitive understanding is crucial if researchers expect to understand how children develop theories about other people's minds (i.e., theory of mind). How do children use the cues in their own SM judgments to determine what other people are thinking? Given the broad range of literature available regarding the relationship between SM and children's suggestibility (Welch-Ross, 2000; Leichtman et al., 2000), researchers should explore how children's emotional state affects traumatic

memory source discriminations. Several studies with adults have demonstrated that focusing on emotional content may impair subsequent SM, even if it improves content-related memory (Johnson, Nolde, & De Leonardis, 1996). Such findings address essential issues about children's SM for emotionally engaging memories as well as broader issues related to the generalizability of findings to specific situations (e.g., investigations of sexual abuse). For example, if a child involved in a sexual abuse investigation is also in abuse-related therapy, his or her rehearsal of memories will likely facilitate modifying qualitative profiles, thereby crucially impacting his or her SM of events actually experienced versus information gathered from other sources. Indeed, emotional arousal can improve memory for occurrence while deteriorating memory for source. For example, Mather, Mitchell, Raye, Novak, Greene, and Johnson (2006) used a short-term source task to demonstrate that better item identification occurred with emotional (rather than neutral) pictures, whereas better memory occurred when dealing with pictures' spatial locations when the pictures were neutral. Emotionally evocative materials may foster narrowed attention, thereby weakening the binding of the evocative item and its surrounding context.

Few studies have examined children's SM in a social context despite the indirect harm on personal relationships that source confusions can cause if an individual constantly confuses the

source of specific pieces of information. Source confusions can also reinforce social and cultural norms. Researchers have explored adults' SM skills in a variety of social phenomena, including arguments (Ross & Holmberg, 1990), memories of conversations (Brown, Jones, & Davis, 1995), and client-therapist relationships (Lindsay & Read, 1994). Exploring similar phenomena among children would be appropriate for future research, particularly as such social factors affect judgments of the source (perceived versus imagined) of other people's memories are affected by social factors, including the interpersonal context in which the judgment took place. Although an account's increased perceptual and emotional detail usually suggests a memory of an event that actually occurred, this could not be confirmed when distrust about the sincerity of the account was induced in those making the judgment (Johnson, Bush, & Mitchell, 1998). Additional research into the functional outcome of children's SM could likely provide answers for understanding the interaction between children's memory and their social/emotional development.

Conclusion

Children access information in various ways—discussions with others, media, observations, and formal instruction—while adults decide what new information children should have access to,

particularly regarding stressful experiences. Such information sources can enhance children's appreciation and knowledge of their environment, thereby influencing their memories of specific events and experiences. However, it is vital to understand the nature of the impact of such information on their memories. Copious research has explored the nature and development of SM processes in children, shifting the focus from studying SM as a secluded skill to comprehending how the processes involved in the source decision process (from encoding to attribution) affect representations-particularly regarding children's event memory. The results thus far indicated that SM skills emerge during preschool years, although very young children may have a working knowledge of different sources of information before they can reproduce or verbally report on their source for attributional reasoning. Furthermore, SM development appears to continue throughout life, meaning children may eventually overcome certain types of source distinctions before others.

This review has sought to incorporate and provide a profitable synthesis of SMF knowledge as well as theoretical perspectives by examining the extensive literature related to children's SM ability and how their ability influences event memory. Moreover, the discussion herein has sought to demonstrate the methods typically used to measure SM, including the strengths and limitations of these procedures. Finally, it has addressed the meaningful challenges currently

facing researchers and outlined relevant suggestions for future research, including how to explore the detail stages of development in children's SM and how to train children to develop SM in order to recall a past event while bearing in mind individual differences in SM in experimental designs.

Contemporary researchers examining children's SM have provided meaningful implications for legal arenas. Hopefully, these vast and far-reaching questions will be answered in the next surge of SM researches related to children as such knowledge can be incorporated into practical court settings where children have to testify.

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아동 증언의 맥락에서 ‘출처 감찰’ 이론과 연구들의 동향

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최근 들어 아동이 목격한 혹은 경험한 범죄 사건을 증언하게 되는 경우가 증가하면서 아동 증언의 신뢰성에 대한 관심이 집중되고 있다. 그 중에서도 아동의 출처 감찰 (Source Monitoring) 수행은 다양한 인지적, 사회적 기능들을 수행하기 위해 필수적으로 요구되는 능력으로, 과거 특정 사건에 관한 출처의 정확한 기억은 아동의 올바른 지식과 신념 형성에 매우 중요한 정보가 된다. 특히, 우수한 출처 감찰 수행은 아동이 법정에서 면담자에 의한 사후 오정보 및 유도 질문에 얼마나 잘 저항할 수 있는가에 절대적인 영향을 미치는 것으로 보고되어 왔다. 따라서 본 논문은 연령에 따른 아동의 출처 감찰 수행에 대한 이론적, 실험적 선행 연구들을 법정에서의 아동의 증언 능력과 접목하여 검토해 보았다. 보다 신뢰로운 아동 증언을 이끌어 내기 위한 범조계 전문가들과 아동 심리학자들의 구체적인 방안 마련과 지속적인 학술적 고찰은 아동의 출처 감찰 능력에 관한 총체적인 이해에 바탕을 두어야 할 것이다.

주요어 : 출처 감찰, 오정보 효과, 잘못된 귀인 오류, 피암시성, 아동 증언