본 연구에서는 재판에서 제시되는 유일한 증거, 특히 검사로 하여금 피고인에 대한 유죄심증을 가지도록 한 유일한 증거가 피고인에 대한 일반인의 유무죄 판단에 미치는 영향을 확인하고자 하였다. 또한 유일한 증거의 종류와 피고인의 유죄를 나타내는 추가증거의 제시 여부에 따라 각 증거의 증명력과 피고인이 유죄일 확률에 대한 추정이 달라지는지 검증하였다. 이를 검증하기 위하여 일반인 250명이 본 연구에 참여하였으며, 실험 참가자들은 간단한 재판 시나리오를 읽고, 피고인의 유무죄 여부, 각 증거의 증명력 및 피고인의 유죄확률에 대한 물음에 응답하였다. 연구 결과, 유일한 증거가 제시되었을 때, 일반인들은 무죄판단보다 유죄판단을 더 하는 경향이 있었다. 추가증거는 각 증거의 증명력과 피고인의 유죄확률 추정에 중요한 역할을 하는 것으로 나타났으나, 유일한 증거의 종류와 추가증거의 유무에 따라서 유무죄 판단 양상이 달랐다. 논의에서는 재판에서 검사의 기소이유와 동일하면서 유일한 증거의 증명력이 과대추정될 가능성과 제시되는 증거 종류의 영향력에 대해 논의하였다.
The current study aimed to test the impact of unique evidence, on which the prosecution was solely based, upon the lay people’s verdict for the defendant. We also examined if the probability of the defendant’s guilt and the probative value of evidence would vary by the type of the sole evidence and the existence of additional evidence. In the study, 250 lay people participated and were asked to read one of the four simple trial scenarios, to render a verdict for the defendant, and to estimate the probative value of evidence and probability of the defendant’s guilt. The results showed that lay people tended to return a guilty verdict. The additional evidence was found to play a significant role in estimation of the probability of the defendant’s guilt and of the probative value of the evidence, depending on the type of the additional evidence. In discussion, it was suggested that lay people would overestimate the probative value of the unique evidence that was the sole basis of the prosecution. Finally, we discussed the influence of the evidence type on legal judgement in trials.
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