

A Proposal of an Alternative Approach Toward Attitude

Sang Chin Choi

Department of Psychology, Chung Ang University

1. Introduction

Much research on the relationship between attitude and behavior has been done, but with unfortunately inconsistent results. Some studies have found the relationship to be below while other studies have shown that, under appropriate conditions, measures of attitudes correlate very highly with observed behavior.

In spite of such insufficient predictability of behavior by attitudes, the concept of attitude is still considered one of the most important constructs in social psychology. Such a prevailing emphasis on attitude is believed to have its basis in the following two sets of assumptions. The first is that attitude is, still, one of the most powerful instruments for predicting behavior if it is properly measured and/or the measured attitude is interpreted with caution in consideration of other situational constraints. This line of opinion is well reflected in such definitions of attitude, such as behavioral dispositions, implicit responses, inferred dispositions, or having conative components. The other assumption is that attitude itself is a significant construct without any connection with behavior. Theorists of this second inclination define attitudes simply as likes and dislikes or "good" and "bad" in feeling.

Probably because of both the generally recognized importance of the concept of attitude in social sciences and existing ambiguities inherent in that

construct, many differing theories and conceptualizations for that concept have been developed in different fields of social sciences, predominantly in psychology.

Even though these theories in relation to the formation, maintenance, and changes of attitudes are addressed to different questions and concerned with different variables and processes, most of them are directed basically toward proposing concepts concerning determinants of attitude and processes of attitude development and change. For example, although the possibility that attitudes have genetic components cannot be totally disregarded, the theories of learning and behavior strongly suggest the determinants and processes of attitude change on the basis of their own conceptualization about attitude. Theories, which emphasize cognitive processes – such as cognitive consistency theories, value-expectancy theory, dissonance theory, judgment theory, and balance theory – can be considered as another strong source of hypotheses about determinants and processes of attitude development and change.

A third group of theoretical orientations to attitude such as psychoanalysis, self-theories and other clinical approaches, have their roots in personality theories.

These three groups of theories are concerned more with either one of the following different processes – that is, external reinforcement processes, cognitive processes, and personality process. Such differences in the emphasis on different processes, however, can be seen as more a matter of semantic preference and conceptual strategy and less a question of truth versus falsity (Campbell, D.T., 1963; pp. 112-135).

The present study addresses itself to both cognitive and personality processes. More specifically, the dynamic relationships among attitudes, cognitions, and personality will be explored. On the basis of the exploration, an alternative approach to attitude prediction and change will be proposed.

2. A common-sense conceptualization of an alternative attitude model

It is a general preference to review previous theories before proposing a

new approach. It is, however, intended here to start with the construction of cognitive steps necessary for the development of an alternative model to be proposed here and to discuss about the previous theories in the appropriate context in the process of discussions.

It is often observed that the ways of observing and interpreting the same social phenomenon differ among people and among different groups of persons. For example, psychologists prefer frequently to grasp social phenomena in a psychological sense while sociologists prefer to understand social phenomena within a sociological framework. Such a phenomenon is often called "selective perception." It is also generally agreed that such selective perception processes have their origin in different frames of reference, which can reflect an individual's needs, interest, cognitive style, and whatever designations that may affect the perception and cognition processes. It can be further inferred that every individual might have developed different frames of reference through different socialization experiences.

It can be assumed that attitude formation involves perceptual and cognitive processes in which the frame of reference has a significant place.

On the basis of this line of deductive reasoning, it is hypothesized that an individual's attitude toward an attitude object might have been developed on the basis of his own frames of reference. In other words, the frame of reference of an individual will be reflected in attitude formation. It seems necessary to note here that the frame of reference is, in its ways of functioning, similar to the notion of "format" operating in perceptual and cognitive processes. In fact, it does not make any difference whatever term is used in this context. Because of its brevity, the term "format" will be used instead of frame of reference henceforth. The functions of format are different from those of each elemental cognition. Format once developed has its impact on a wider range of elemental cognitions than one elemental cognition. Therefore, it can be postulated that format has a significant influence on the development of attitudes which involve a substantial degree of cognitive processes.

The consistency principle postulated in cognitive consistency theories

can be considered as a different level of format. The consistency principle is concerned with universal psychological process across individuals, groups of individuals and cultural variations. On the other hand, format as conceived in the above context is concerned with the individual psychological process which characterizes individual differences. More specifically, cognitive consistency theories assume that every individual has the tendency to achieve consistency between one's attitude and cognitions. The content of cognitions involved in the process of achieving consistency with attitude can be diverse. One group of cognitions involved would be related to utility dimension, another group of cognitions to moral or religious value, and still another group of cognitions to perceptions about significant others' attitudes and so forth. At this point, it can be inferred that those dimensions emphasized are different from individual to individual. Some individuals put emphasis on utility dimension, others on moral dimension, and still others on perceptions on others' attitudes. Consistency theories attribute such differences in cognitive dimensions and in emphasis among individuals and groups of individuals to the differences in value, motivation and whatever sources which might account for the differences. However, they did not propose any specific hypotheses or principles concerning such differences. Formats as proposed here are concerned with the differences rather than universality. Different sub-principles applied in achieving consistency between attitude and cognitions by individuals can be called formats. In this respect, the consistency principle can be conceived as a higher-order universal principle, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, formats to be further specified later can be considered as lower-order individual or group specific principles.

In an ideographic sense, those formats applied in the process of formation of attitude toward an attitude object A will be different from individual to individual. On the one hand in a nomothetic sense, certain formats employed can be common within a particular group of individuals. The present paper is inclined to follow the latter line of formulation based on the following assumptions; Different individuals would have developed different cognitive structures in terms of content and quality on the basis of different experiences among


themselves.

On the other hand, in terms of formats which function in the process of perception, cognitions and learning, there may exist some commonalities among individuals within a relatively homogeneous group or within a particular culture. The concepts of cultural norm, learning to learn, cognitive style, locus of control, and personality typologies provide explicit and implicit support for the assumption of commonalities within a particular group in ways of perceiving social objects and events.

At this point, it should also be questioned whether the format A predominantly functional within an individual, can be universally applied across different attitude objects. The question can be further expanded to the long-lasting controversial issue of consistency of human behavior. This issue of consistency of formats will be avoided here for the following reason. The concept of format first finds its meaning in making differential predictions of attitude toward a particular attitude object of concern in terms of different formats applied to the evaluation of the particular attitude object, not of other attitude objects, by different groups of individuals. Therefore, consistency of format schema across different attitude objects is the question to be answered in the studies to be followed. Of course, the kinds of formats to be elaborated later would become significant personality constructs or cognitive constructs if the consistency of format schema can be maintained in future research on this point.

At this time, it seems necessary to develop further discussions about formats with a diagram in which the dynamic relationships among formats, content of cognitions, and attitude are depicted with heads of arrows.

Diagram 1. The relationships among attitude, content of cognitions, and three formats.



In the diagram, three components – attitude, content of cognitions and formats – are distinguished. Functions of each component and the relationships among the three will be explained in the following, with an exemplar attitude object of abortion.

A. Formats

First of all, formats constitute the criteria of evaluations of attitude object. The criteria can be diverse, i.e., economic cost-benefit aspect, internalized moral and religious value, family relation, esthetic value, opinions of others, and so on. Which criteria will be emphasized in relation to attitude object can be different from person to person and from group to group. For example, an individual may form a favorable attitude toward abortion mainly on the basis of cost-benefit analysis. On the other hand, another individual may develop a favorable attitude mainly because her (his) morality about abortion does not contradict the idea of abortion. Still another person may learn to have a favorable attitude toward abortion mainly by being influenced by significant others. In the three cases above, the same attitudes were developed in terms of three different criteria. In other words, the criteria used for the evaluation are different among three individuals. Those criteria are in reality not exclusive of each other. The arousal of one criterion in the evaluation of abortion does not mean that the other two will not be aroused. Sometimes two or more criteria are aroused at the same time, but often with differential emphasis among them. The arousal of these formats are not always conscious. In fact, unconscious arousal is more frequent.

Second, the format significantly influences the ways of organizing cognitive content with respect to the development of attitudes. It is generally accepted that attitudes have a substantial degree of cognitive components. For example, when some one likes or dislikes abortion, she (or he) usually have some reasons for liking or disliking it. In addition to the explicit reasons, there may be many other cognitions related to the attitude object. Those reasons and other cognitions related to attitude object constitute the content of cognitions. The content of cognitions, as exemplified earlier, can be diverse

by nature, some reflecting utility aspect, some reflecting moral dimension, while the others reflecting perceptions of significant others' attitudes. It was also indicated earlier that those cognitions of a different nature have a differential weight on the formation of attitude for different individuals or different groups. The formats affect which cognitions would have more weights on attitude than the others. For example, when an individual applies the efficiency-utility format with high saliency, the nature of cognitions involved would tend to reflect the economic aspect of cost-benefit analysis. On the other hand, if an individual employs the moral-esthetic format, the nature of cognitions involved would reflect the moral and esthetic aspect of an expressive nature, not of an instrumental nature predominantly.

Third, the formats affect the directions of cognitive development. More specifically, the efficiency-utility format would facilitate the development of cognitions related to efficiency and utility; the moral-esthetic format, the development of cognitions related to moral-esthetic aspects; and the consensus format, the development of cognitions about other individuals. As indicated in Diagram 1 by the direction of arrows, the cognitive content also affects the arousal of particular formats. For instance, if an individual has developed a substantial amount of cognitions related to the efficiency-utility aspect with respect to abortion, these cognitions would increase the probability of the arousal of the efficiency-utility format. The same analogy can be applied to the case of other cognitions of a different nature.

In Diagram 1 three formats were postulated. Other different type of formats also can be proposed. However, the processes through which those three formats are derived, and justifications for proposing those three specific formats will be discussed in Section 4.

B. Content of cognitions

As discussed earlier, content of cognitions refers to total cognitions related to an attitude object. It was also pointed out that cognitions can be different in terms of their nature or dimension, and the dimensions of cognitions directly involved in the evaluation of an attitude object would be affected by the

nature of the format aroused. In this connection, it is important to notice here that the aroused format is already absorbed into the nature of cognitions directly involved in attitude formation.

On the other hand, it is impossible to measure which format is functional with high saliency within an individual without reference to the cognitive content involved because the arousal of formats is in most cases unconscious. Therefore, the arousal of a particular format should be inferred only through the examination of the nature of cognitions involved in attitude formation. For example, if the cognitions reflecting the utility aspect are distinguished as reasons for liking or disliking abortion, it can be inferred that the efficiency-utility format is functional. To extend the notion to a statistical concept, if the measures of cognitions related to be utility aspect show high correlation with the measures of attitude toward abortion for a particular group of people, it can be inferred that the efficiency-utility format is functional with high saliency for that group in the process of evaluating abortion. In this respect, content of cognitions can be conceived as a vehicle loaded with elemental cognitions and formats.

C. Attitude

According to Smith's definition of attitude, attitudes are defined here as inferred dispositions according to which the individual's thoughts, feeling and perhaps actions are organized with respect to a psychological objects. Furthermore as Fishbein (1972) and others conceptualize it, an attitude is composed mainly of beliefs which have an affective value.

It was earlier indicated that attitudes are determined mainly by content of cognitions and formats. It should, however, be noticed here that attitudes also affect the direction of development in cognitions and the arousal of a particular format. It is often observed that individuals having favorable attitudes toward abortion have more favorable knowledge toward abortion than others having unfavorable attitudes toward it. It is also observable that individuals having favorable attitudes toward abortion tend to count on any particular format by which favorable cognitions exceed unfavorable ones rather

than the other format by which unfavorable cognitions might overcome favorable ones. The circular causal relationships among these three components can be postulated. However, it is difficult to test which precede the other. It, thus, seems to be a matter of convenience and strategy to conceptualize which component is followed by the other. In the present conceptualization, it was assumed that content of cognitions and formats determine attitudes. Furthermore, it was postulated that formats determine the nature of cognitive content involved in attitude formation.

In order to provide a more coherent theoretical background for the common-sense conceptualization discussed up to this point, a schema theory will be introduced, and those three components discussed above will be translated into the concept of schema. Further development of the model introduced in preliminary fashion will be attempted.

3. Concept of schema

Some of the tenets, assumptions, definitions and principles postulated in schema theory by Stotlant, et al. (1972. p. 72-98) were summarized as follows: Persons tend to organize the external chaotic world in meaningful and significant ways in order to increase their ability to cope with external and internal environments by increasing the accuracy of prediction of the external and internal world, otherwise, unpredictable. Unit of such cognitive organization is named schema. More specifically, shcemas are abstract and generalizable rules regarding certain regulations in the relationship among events, detailing the perceived regular co-occurrence of some categorized events.

But schemas developed do not always facilitate prediction of and coping with environment. Schemas do not always correspond to objective reality because they are developed through subjective experiences and communications with others.

Such cognitive units -- that is, schemas -- tend to be organized in hierarchical order in which lower-order schemas are subsumed under higher-order schemas. Therefore, higher-order schemas have a common denominator in

which lower-order schemas share in common among themselves, characterizing higher levels of abstractions than lower-order schemas. The number of schemas involved in the organization is affected by an individual's channel-capacity which is analogous concept to information processing capacity. The higher-order schemas can also be subsumed as lower-order schemas in another hierarchical organization. The higher-order schemas are more persistent and less likely to be changed than the lower-order schemas. In case there are inconsistencies between a higher-order schemas and the lower-order schemas subsumed by it, the lower-order schemas are more likely to be changed than the higher-order one.

Such a relatively higher persistency of higher-order schemas compared with lower-ones is explained by the concept of familiarity. Once a higher-order schema is developed, it is perceived by an individual as more efficient ways of organizing one's world than lower ones because the higher-order schema has in it the common denominator shared among lower-order schemas. Thus lower-order schemas tend to be neglected and to be replaced by the higher-order schema. However, it does not mean that higher-order schemas once developed never change regardless of their inconsistencies with lower-order schemas. If the number of inconsistent lower-order schemas are large and the inconsistent lower-order schemas have low probabilisms, they could also change the higher-order one.

Probabilism, here, means the perceived probability of exceptions with which the schema is likely to be held. The concept of expectancy, that is, perceived probability in a value-expectancy model, is analogous to the concept of probabilism with a reversed direction. That is, low probability means high probabilism and vice versa.

Another concept, named consistency schema, seems necessary to be introduced at this point. It was described earlier that within a hierarchical organization there tends to be maintained a consistency between higher-order schemas and lower-order schemas. Then it should be answered what makes it necessary to keep consistency between two different levels of schemas. The answer is obviously consistency schema which has been developed through an early

socialization process. Children, since born, are exposed to the external world. As they grow up, children are more and more involved in the process of finding a relationship among events and among schemas, consequently developing schemas and higher-order schemas. Both the number of schemas and perceived relationships among schemas also increase. The repetitive perceptions of the relationships between events and schemas or between lower-order schemas and higher-order schemas experienced through schema development get them to recognize consistency in those relationships, ultimately letting children come up with an important principle in the later schema development, that is, consistency schema. This consistency schema is analogous to the consistency principle postulated in consistency theories. This concept in Stotland's conceptualization is further expanded and elaborated in its scope and content as can be noticed in the following illustrations. Once developed, this schema works as indispensable instrument for developing other schemas from events and higher-order schemas from lower-order schemas, in addition for expanding horizontal underlying structures of higher-order schemas, and for validating both higher-order schemas against lower-order schemas and lower-order schemas. Since the consistency schema is developed from abstraction of the repeated perceptions of relationships among events and schemas and is almost inevitably applied to any level of schema development, this is called higher-order schema, thus showing extremely high resistance to change. That is the reason why it is also called principle schema.

In the following section, those concepts such as schema, lower-and higher-order schemas, probabilism, and consistency principle discussed in this section will be geared into the common-sense conceptualization of an alternative model presented in the previous section.

4. Translation of common-sense conceptualization into schema concepts

According to the schema concept, any statement that reflects an individual's attitude can be considered as schema, specifically, attitude schema. It can be also inferred that a strong attitude statement such as "I really like to have

abortion under any circumstances" is a attitude schema of low probabilism and any moderately weak attitude statement is an attitude schema of high probabilism. For example, if a person believes that to have abortion is good under some conditions, his attitude schema is of high probabilism.

Attitude schemas are usually developed on the cognitive basis as often verbalized as reasons or justifications for making an attitude statement of a certain level of probabilism. Those reasons supporting the attitude schemas, either favorable or unfavorable, refer to content of cognitions, the other component, as indicated in Diagram 1. Those stated reasons or justifications can also be considered as schemas. Those schemas will be called "content schemas" because those schemas are related to contents of cognitions. The concept of probabilism also can be applied to the content schemas. Content schemas, however, are lower-order schemas for attitude schemas, because attitude schemas are abstractions of those content schemas. It was earlier indicated that individuals have a tendency to maintain consistent relationship between a higher-order schema and lower-order schemas subsumed by it. Such a consistency notion can be applied to the relationship between an attitude schema and content schemas.

Furthermore, it can be proposed that when inconsistency is found between these two levels of schemas, content schemas, rather than attitude schemas, are more likely to be changed. Dissonance theory suggests ways to change lower-order schemas which are inconsistent with higher-order schemas. Dissonance theory postulates three ways of reducing dissonance, that is, changing one or more of the dissonant elements, adding elements consonant with already existing cognitions, and changing importance of elements involved. Because attitude is a relatively abstract and higher-ordered schema, it may be hard to be changed. The probabilisms of content schemas are assumed to be developed through an implicit two-step process. The first step is concerned with the beliefs concerning the likelihood that a particular attitude object will be followed by or associated with particular outcomes (for the cases of efficiency-utility and moral-esthetic formats) or with the beliefs concerning the likelihood that a particular person is referenced with higher preference than

the others for gathering information about an attitude object. The second step is related to the beliefs about the importance of particular outcomes for the cases of efficiency-utility and moral-esthetic formats or the beliefs about the referenced persons' attitudes toward an attitude object. Therefore, the probabilisms of content schemas can be inferred by the combination of the probabilisms associated with beliefs involved in the two steps.

Finally it should be mentioned how formats indicated in Diagram 1 are related to the concept of schema. It was aforementioned that consistency schema is a higher-order principle schema in that it functions as a principle in the process of developing a higher-order schema from lower-order schemas, in the process of expanding horizontal lower-level schemas, and in the process of validating both a higher-order schema against lower-order schemas and lower-order schemas against higher-order schema. It was also mentioned in Section 1 that formats are concerned with individual-and group-specific lower-order principles, while the consistency principle is a universal higher-order principle. To illustrate the functions of formats in relation to the schema concept, formats function as organizing principles in the process of developing attitude schema (higher-order schema) from content schemas (lower-order schemas), in the process of expanding the horizontal structure of content schemas subsumed under attitude schema, and in the process of validating both content schemas (lower-order schemas) against attitude schema (higher-order schema) and attitude schema (higher-order schema) against content schemas (lower-order schemas). As can be observed in the above, formats function in similar fashion to principle schema. The only differences are that format are concerned with individual or group differences and limited to attitude, on the one hand, and the consistency principle is concerned with universal psychological process, on the other hand. Therefore, formats can be named attitude format schemas. However, attitude format schemas will be called format schemas hereafter for the sake of simplicity.

At this point, discussions about the processes through which the three format schemas are derived will be made. Smith (1969) proposed his functional approaches toward attitude change with following illustrations (p. 94).

“Not tied to any single theory, a group of recent approaches to the development and change of attitudes is nevertheless oriented to the personality as an empirical system. These functional approaches attempt a relatively comprehensive account of the functions that a person’s opinions and attitudes serve in the ongoing economy of personality on the assumption that knowledge of the motivational basis of attitudes should point to the conditions under which change can be expected.... Smith, Bruner, and White (1956), on the basis of an intensive clinical study, offer a classification in terms of three broad functions served by opinions and attitudes: (1) objective appraisal, (2) social adjustment and (3) externalization. Any persistent attitude is likely to serve all three functions to some extent, but there is considerable variations from issue to issue and from person to person with respect to the functions that predominate.” At this point, it suffices to understand that objective appraisal is analogous to the efficiency-utility format, social adjustment to consensus format, and externalization to ego-defense.

In line with Smith’s functional viewpoint of attitudes, Katz (1959) proposes four functional basis of attitudes. To quote, “. . . holding any attitude brings a bit of order into the flux of a person’s psychological world; the specific content of a person’s attitudes reflect to varying degree his appraisal of how the attitudinal objects bear upon his interests and enterprises.” In addition, he specified four functions which are similar to those proposed by Smith: adjustment, ego-defense, value expression, and knowledge. Furthermore, he dealt with the personality construct as such; personality is an organized whole, basically consistent and hierarchical. It is marked by striving. It includes selective awareness of goals and techniques to pursue them. Striving is characterized by cognitive activity and it seems to be intrinsically motivated. An attitude must take into account its presumed relationship with personality.

Smith’s and Katz’s conceptualization of attitudes can be summarized as follows. Attitudes serve the functions of an individual’s adjustment and adaptation. Those functions are objective appraisal (which constitutes part of Katz’s adjustment function), social adjustment (which also constitutes part of Katz’s adjustment function), externalization (Katz’s ego-defense func-

tion), value expression, and knowledge. Such functions of attitudes are differentially emphasized by an individual in such a way as consistent with personality.

In a different context, Stotland postulated a functional basis of schemas as follows: holding schemas brings order to the internal world according to the economy of adjustment and adaptation, increasing ability to cope with the internal and external environment. As those functionalists' concept of attitude can be compared with Stotland's concept of schemas, both attitudes and schemas serve the functions of adjustment and adaptation. In this connection, functions of attitude schemas are induced to be similar to those of attitude as proposed by Smith and Katz. Furthermore, the functions of attitude schemas would correspond to those of format schemas because format schemas direct the development of content schemas and the ways of organizing content schemas, consequently affecting the development of attitude schemas. For example, if an individual applies the efficiency-utility schema in the process of attitude development toward abortion, his attitude schema toward abortion can be conceived to be serving the function of the efficiency-utility function for that attitude-schema which, in turn, is the function of that format schema.

In the earlier summarization of attitude functions, five functions were identified. Those five functions are considered comprehensive enough to cover the different assumptions on which different attitude theories — such as cognitive consistency theory, balance-theory, value-expectancy theory, judgmental theory, psycho-analytic theories, economic utility theory, and conflict theory — are formulated. For example, behavioral learning theories, value-expectancy theory, economic-utility theory, and conflict theory can be regarded as emphasizing the utility function; judgment theory and modernism-traditionalism approaches in relation to diffusion of innovation can be considered to have reference to the value-expression function of attitudes; psycho-analytic theories appeal to ego-defense function; and finally, social influence approaches to attitude change rely on social adjustment function.

Two functions from among the five functions — that is, ego-defense and knowledge functions — however, will be excluded from the functions of format

schemas for the following two reasons. First, the ego-defense mechanism is activated unconsciously. Therefore it is very difficult to identify the functioning of ego-defense mechanism in a survey-type group research. Besides, if other functions are found to be strong enough to explain the variation of attitude, then the exclusion of ego-defense function can be justified to a certain degree. Second, knowledge function is conceived to be analogous to the functions of consistency schemas which works as principle for acquiring all sorts of schema, that is, knowledge. Therefore, knowledge functions are considered as being more related to the function of higher-order format, that is, consistency principle rather than functions of format schemas. Therefore, this function is also excluded from the functions of format schemas.

The three remaining functions here are objective appraisal, social adjustment, and value expression. These three functions provide the basis for proposing the three format schemas. However, it seems necessary to note here that the three format schemas are derived from the combination of analyses scheme of TAT protocol developed by Devos (1969) and the three functions of attitude mentioned above. The definition of each format schema will be given in the following section.

5. Definitions of the three format schemas

A. Efficiency-utility format

Efficiency-utility format schema is defined as the framework with which one may evaluate attitude object both in terms of physical and economic utility on the basis of relatively elaborate cost-benefit analysis and in terms of the criteria of achievement, control over nature and environment, the development of ability, feeling of adequacy in ability, competition with others in respect to achievement, and mutual cooperation for efficiency and economic advantage. Therefore, content schemas associated with this schema will be concerned with economic cost-benefit aspect, work, efficiency, activism, and achievement. The individuals applying this format schema with high saliency would also tend to evaluate attitude object in terms of those aspects specified

above.

B. Moral-esthetic format schema

The moral-esthetic format is defined as the framework with which one evaluates attitude objects in terms of the congruence of an attitude object with his expressive values such as affection (love, contact, union, fusion), nurturance (care, help), psychological pleasure-pain, like-dislike, harmony with others, harmony with or subjection to nature and environment, loneliness, comfort, deprivation, neglect, morality, social sanction, religious beliefs, conscience, familiarities, sexual union, and adequacy not related to ability and achievement. The content schemas associated with this format will reflect those expressive values described above. Individuals applying this format schema with high saliency tends to evaluate an attitude object in terms of those expressive criteria.

C. Consensus format schema

Consensus format is defined as the framework with which one evaluates attitude objects in terms of the perceptions of significant others – attitudes toward an attitude object. The term “significant others,” here, refers to most preferred persons for gathering information about a particular attitude object. Therefore significant others as preferred sources of information gathering can be different for different attitude objects and for different individuals.

6. Some considerations on the relationships of format schemas with personality and socio-demographic characteristics

According to the formulation of functional approaches, attitudes are conceived to be, to a large extent, reflections of value and personality. Therefore, attitudes tend to be formed in such a way as to maintain consistency with personality, as to realize them, and, in turn, as to constitute part of personality structure. In this respect, functional approaches emphasize personality and value with respect to the study of attitude.

The three format schemas proposed are near parallels to the functions served by attitudes. In this connection, it can be inferred that a particular format schema which shows some saliency for a particular group of people would very probably be likely to reflect the personality characteristics of the group. The format schema is an object, situation, and time bound concept while personality is a relatively object situation and time free concept. In this sense, personality can be seen as being reflected in the process of attitude formation through the mediating concept of format schema. Such a notion can be extended to the concept of culture. That is, culture can be included in the process of attitude formation through the mediating process of format schemas. In an intuitive sense, persons from a modern culture would more likely to show high saliency on the efficiency-utility format while the persons from a traditional culture would show high saliency on the moral-esthetic format schema. The relationships between particular format schemas and socio-demographic variables are also assumed to be held on the basis of this line of inferences.

In another context, Herzberg (1959) proposes two factor theories of motivation, that is, satisfaction factor and dissatisfaction factor. He labels the former as motivation factors, the latter as hygiene factors. Motivation factors such as promotion, work itself, self-actualization, and achievement are more related to satisfaction rather than dissatisfaction while hygiene factors such as wage, working conditions, and human relationships are more related to dissatisfaction rather than satisfaction. Such an approach in distinguishing two factors of satisfaction and dissatisfaction may conceivably be applied to the area of attitudes.

To put it more specifically, some factors might be more closely related to positive aspects of attitudes than to negative aspects of them, while the other factors might be more highly correlated with negative directions of attitudes than with positive directions of them. We often observe that the reasons of liking a particular attitude object is not opposite of or lacking in those reasons. such an approach also can be applied to the case of disliking. In the case of abortion, reasons for approving it are, to a large extent, related


to efficiency utility aspects while reasons for disapproving abortion are more closely related to moral-esthetic dimensions than the former aspects. Furthermore, it is also inferred that values, social sanction, and religious beliefs are working more toward the direction of checking a certain behavior rather than toward the direction of facilitating that behavior, on the one hand, and efficiency-utility aspects are functioning more toward the direction of eliciting behavior rather than to the direction of checking that behavior on the other hand. In this connection, the efficiency-utility format is hypothesized as the satisfaction factor, and the moral-esthetic format is postulated as the dissatisfaction factor.

7. Some considerations about personality variables

Finally, it seems necessary to discuss what personality variables would be closely related to the three format schemas. There can be found many types and levels of personality characteristics because a substantial number of personality theories has been developed for different purposes with different theoretical backgrounds. Therefore, it is very difficult to identify the personality classification system which corresponds to the system of the three format schemas. It was hypothesized here for the constructive purpose that there could be postulated a personality classification system which is identical with the system of formats. Accordingly, three personality traits – efficiency-utility oriented personality, moral-esthetic value oriented personality and other-directed personality – were hypothesized to be identified. The next step was to identify the personality traits which were already studied and might be classified in either one of the three hypothesized personalities. Those personality traits which would be appropriate for either one of three hypothesized traits are listed hypothetically in Box A of the comprehensive schematic diagram to be followed.

In the below diagram, arrows of unbroken lines represent the directions of direct influences, and arrows of broken lines refer to the directions of indirect influences.

Diagram 2. The determinants and processes of attitude formation



Such a functional classification of the determinants of attitude as represented in Diagram 2 must be regarded as devices of heuristic convenience, not as theories that are true or false. But the hypotheses derived from the model could provide a useful guidelines for understanding dynamic nature and determinants of attitude. What need to followed in relation to validation of model would be to apply those hypotheses to practical setting.

REFERENCES

- Campbell, D. T. Social attitudes and other acquired dispositions. In S. Koch (Ed.), *Psychology: A study of a Science*, Vol. 6. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963.
- Fishbein, M. and Ajzen, I. Attitudes and opinions. In *Annual Review of Psychology*. Palo Alto, Calif.: Annual Reviews, Inc., 1972.
- Stotland, E. and Canon, L. K. *Social Psychology: A cognitive approach*. W. B. Saunders Company, Philadelphia. 1972.
- Smith, M. B. *Social Psychology and Human Values*. Chicago; Aldine Publishing Company, 1969.
- Smith, M. B., Bruner, J. S., and White, R. W. *Opinions and Personality*. New York: Wiley, 1956.
- Katz, D. and Stotland, E. A. A preliminary statement to a theory of attitude structure and change. In S. Koch (Ed.), *Psychology: A Study of a Science*. Vol. 3. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959.
- DeVos, G. *Manual for Scoring Vectoral Concerns on the Thematic Apperception Test*. Unpublished, 1969.
- Herzberg, F., Mausner, B., & Snyderman, D. B. *The Motivation to Work*, John Wiley & Son, 1959.

態度에 대한 代案的 一接近

최 상 진

중앙대학교 심리학과

지금까지 태도의 개념은 심리학, 경영학, 교육학 등을 포함한 사회과학의 제영역에서 인간의 행동을 설명하고 예언하는 데 중요한 개념으로 사용되어져 왔다. 그러나 이러한 보편성과 중요성에 반비례해서 태도의 개념과 이론은 아직도 사회과학의 타개념에 비해 이론적 정제화가 뒤떨어졌을 뿐만 아니라 행동의 설명력 및 예언력에 대해서도 이론가 및 연구자들의 회의를 불러 일으켜 왔던 것도 사실이다. 심지어는 태도의 개념이 인간행동을 이해하는 데 잘못 설정된 개념이 아니냐는 극단적 비판까지 대두되게 되었다.

그러나 태도가 아직도 성격이나 인지 또는 지각의 다른 어느 개념보다 인간의 행동과 보다 가깝게 밀착되는 개념이며 또 그러해야 한다는 전통적 통념은 아직도 지배적이다. 이러한 태도개념의 중요성과 모호성에 부응하여 태도에 관한 이론도 혼잡스러울 정도로 다양하고 많다. 따라서 현재의 연구동향은 새로운 이론의 창출보다 기존이론의 통합 및 정련에 초점을 맞추고 있다.

이러한 추세에 따라 본고는 기존의 이론의 하나인 가치-기대 이론의 문제점을 분석하고 이를 보완하기 위한 대안적 접근을 제시하며 동시에 사회심리학 및 사회학에서 중요하게 다루어 온 사회적 압력의 개념을 태도의 하위 결정요인으로 개념화시켜 태도의 한 종합적 이론구성을 하는 데에 목적을 두고 있다. 이러한 과정에서 하나의 통합된 이론체계를 구축하기 위해 인지적 접근이론의 한 형태인 스키마(Schema) 이론을 도입했으며, 끝으로 태도의 결정요인과 성격 및 태도의 3者 관계를 설정하는 종합적 이론모형을 제시하였다.