

Article

# To Remember the Ming: Eighteenth-Century Joseon Envoys and their Interpreters on the Ming-Qing Transition

LAW Lok Yin



*The Review of Korean Studies* Volume 25 Number 1 (June 2022): 189-222

doi: 10.25024/review.2022.25.1.189

©2022 by the Academy of Korean Studies. All rights reserved.

www.kci.go.kr

## Introduction

Many scholars on East Asian studies in different countries are now focusing on the texts of *Yeonhaengrok* (*Records of Joseon Mission to Beijing* 燕行錄) to evaluate many topics of Korean history,<sup>1</sup> Chinese history, and the Sino-Korean relationship in the Qing Dynasty (Bae 2009; Sun 2018; Yang 2011). Scholars had a particular focus on the *Yeonhaeng* (Joseon Mission to Beijing) envoys themselves rather than the surrounding members. Therefore, the role of interpreters in the *Yeonhaeng* mission was ignored by most of the scholars.<sup>2</sup> However, interpreters in the mission not only worked for the interpreting duties in the court rituals but also participated in the duties of trading, intelligence collecting, and negotiation with the Chinese officials or commoners (Baek 2012). These duties allowed the interpreters to collect some unique information from an unexpected source, which facilitated the intellectuals to understand Qing China's society easily. Meanwhile, interpreters worked as a cultural broker to facilitate the Joseon intellectuals to grasp and consolidate stories or facts of China, which was the critical component of their memory of the Ming Dynasty.

During the *Yeonhaeng* mission, envoys regularly crossed the main battlefield of the Ming-Qing conflict,<sup>3</sup> such as Ningyuan 寧遠, Shanhai Pass 山海關, and Jinzhou 錦州. Some members of Joseon *Yeonhaengsa* had the opportunity to visit the sites with historical meaning about Ming-Qing transition during their mission to Beijing. In these sites, Joseon intellectuals

attempted to consolidate or organize the discourse or memory of those locations, which can help them to maintain or reinforce the glory of the Ming Empire. The starting point of the inquiry of this paper will be: How the Joseon intellectuals made their collective memory of the Ming Dynasty?

This article attempts to argue that Joseon intellectuals' knowledge on the outside world was not fully collected by themselves but mainly produced by the mission interpreters. Interpreters not only translated the dialogues between Joseon intellectuals and Chinese but also constructed the outside world for the intellectuals. Natalie Rothman had studied the "trans-imperial subjects," the individuals, such as converts, merchants, translators, and diplomats, traversed between Venice and the Ottoman Empire to operate the political, geographic, cultural, and ethnic-linguistic contact zone between Venice and the Ottoman Empire. In the monograph, Rothman argued that those trans-imperial subjects played a central role as a cultural broker in elaborating the key categories of alterity between self and others, such as Christendom and Islam or Europe and the Levant. This argument sheds light on the roles of these cultural brokers in the process of the creation of new knowledge for the trans-imperial relations (Rothman 2012, 1-18). In the Joseon context, the interpreters played the role of "cultural brokers" during the *Yeonhaeng* mission to facilitate the intellectuals in collecting information of China and elaborating the information as producing the new knowledge which the intellectuals were concerned.

The knowledge about China produced by Joseon interpreters was re-called as the Joseon intellectuals' memory on the Ming Dynasty. French historian Pierre Nora (1989) popularized the concept of "lieu de mémoire" (Site of Memory). As Hon Tsz-ki described,

"Lieu de mémoire" can be the specific locations where one can visit to be in touch with the past, such as a battlefield, a castle, or an abbacy. At the same time, "lieu de mémoire" can be the texts in which the past is enshrined in written and visual images, such as diaries, paintings, pictures, poems, treatises, and historical documents. "Lieu de mémoire" can facilitate the people to identify the linking between the community's past and the physical or conceptual "place." (Hon 2011, 137)

"Lieu de mémoire" helped the French historians to re-write the modern history of France, to particularly discuss how the symbolic heritages in France, like an

1. In 2001 and 2008, Im Gijung 林基中 consisted more than 100 volumes of travel records of *Yeonhaengrok* to expand the scholars' horizons of the cultural exchange between China and Korea through the worldview of envoys. His monograph was the most important work to cover the historical significance in different aspects of *Yeonhaengrok* studies. See Im 2002.

2. Huang Chun-chieh 黃俊傑 proposed to shift our focus of the study from the results of cultural exchange to its processes and named this as "the turn from results to processes." He suggested that "... However, if we adopt the new standpoint, aside from a focus on the classics we would also pay attention to the way in which the contemporary environment, atmosphere, and the political situation influenced the interpreters' approach to the classics. Furthermore, we would also keep an eye on the question of how the classics in turn might have influenced or changed the atmosphere or environment of the interpreter's time and country." Although Huang did not mention the "interpreter," he agreed that the intermediary between the interactions was extremely important. Therefore, his idea inspired this article to focus on how the "process" is more important than the "results." See Huang 2015, 244-45.

3. From 1637 to 1644, the mission only reached Shenyang before Beijing was occupied by Qing court (Wang 2018, 27).

encyclopedia, *Le Tour de France* or Eiffel Tower...etc., and to re-understand how the different demands of the human beings created the community's collective discourse and their memory on the particular location, which provided a new perspective to re-write the French history. Not only in European history, but Pierre Nora's concept is also currently adopted in the context of the East Asian world to re-discover a new perspective on writing history as well.<sup>4</sup> The studies on the Sino-Korean relations can also be addressed by Pierre Nora's concept to re-shape the current discourse on the cultural interaction between Korea and China.

After the Qing (1644-1911) Invasion of Joseon (1392-1910) in 1636, Joseon formally severed the relationship with the Ming Empire and accepted Qing's status as the center of the imperial Chinese tributary system (Wang 2015). The invasion had re-constructed the Joseon intellectuals' identity and their belongingness to China due to the collapse of the Ming Empire (Sun 2012). Although Qing forced Joseon to accept the Empire's new order (Ch'en 1984), they have utilized different kinds of discourses, objects, or political actions to commemorate the status of Ming and attempted to consider themselves as the remaining members of the Ming Empire.<sup>5</sup> If the battlefield of Ming-Qing conflict was the "lieu de mémoire," how did the intellectuals acquire the information about the site and the story behind site, especially the facts or stories of the Ming-Qing conflict?

Japanese scholar Nobuo Kanda 神田信夫 (1921-2003) (1951) revealed how the Joseon envoys grasped the intelligence of "Sanfan zhi luan" (the Revolt of the Three Feudatories 三藩之亂) through their traveling experiences in the mission to China. Apart from Nobuo Kanda, Taiwanese historian Ye Gaoshu 葉高樹 (1996) also analyzed *Joseonwangjo-sillok* (*Veritable Records of Joseon Kingdom* 朝鮮王朝實錄) to illustrate how the Joseon officials grasping the information of the revolts to reinforce their imaginations on the restoration of Ming Dynasty as well as their responses to the revolts. Although Joseon did not launch any military actions for this anti-Qing campaign (Wang 2018, 88), the

records helped Ye to identify how the Joseon's yearning attitude to Ming was still consolidated during the period of the revolt through the *Veritable Records of Joseon Kingdom*. Lee Jae-kyung (2014) also argued that most of the collected information about the revolts were not guaranteed to be a real reflection of the situation of China. The accuracy of information was diminished by the ideological prejudice, e.g., Sino-centrism or ideology of Ming' restoration, which was the significant thought to shape the recreation and reconstitution of the information about the Revolt.

Besides the ideology shaping on the collecting information, scholars also attempted to identify the envoy's sources of the information about China, especially the intelligence about the Revolt of the Three Feudatories. Ding Chennan 丁晨楠 (2019) revealed that Joseon envoys and the mission interpreters collected and recorded a lot of Tongbao (Circulars 通報) in Beijing to facilitate the Joseon court to identify comprehensive aspects of the revolt.

Lee and Ding have both identified the significance of the Yeonhaengsa activities on intelligence collection in China and explained that the comprehensive studies of the records of Yeonhaengsa could reveal how the massive structure of knowledge, culture, and information of Joseon can be produced and circulated in the diplomatic activities in the tributary system. In particular, Joseon's perception of the others (Europeans, Manchurians, and Chinese) is produced through their writing on *Yeonhaengrok*, which has been widely discussed in academia (Jo 2010; Jung 2010). However, it was not comprehensively revealed how the records of *Yeonhaengrok* were produced.

Most of the scholarly works only focused on the views of the intellectuals and envoys as they were the "record keepers" for circulating memory to different generations through the writing and publications of *Yeonhaengrok*. These works all ignored how these envoys can collect the information and produce the memory in the mission. Indeed, some overlooked *Yeonhaengrok*, such as Yi Jeong-sin's 李正臣 (1660-1727) *Yeonhaengrok* in 1722 illustrated that envoys' knowledge about China, especially their imagination on the Ming Dynasty was altered by the mission interpreters' elaboration, which was recorded as the collective memory for circulation in the intellectual circle of Joseon.

This article will argue the Joseon interpreters who were not just the messengers of information but a critical cultural broker of producing Ming memory for the intellectuals in Joseon, especially creating the memory of the Ming-Qing transition during the *Yeonhaeng* mission. This article will begin

4. To trace the development of historical memory studies in the academia in the context of East Asia, see Pan 2019.

5. *Daebodan* (Altar for Great Gratitude 大報壇) is a memorial tablet of Wanli Emperor [later extended to be three tablets for Wanli Emperor, Hongwu Emperor and Chongzhen Emperor] which allowed the Joseon court members to perform rituals to show the Joseon's gratitude toward Ming regularly and symbolize themselves as the lasting vassal of Ming. See Kye 2014.

by addressing the interpreters' duties and roles in the mission to identify how they can operate the cultural zones for producing knowledge to the envoys. It will also shed light on the *Yeonhaengrok* of Yi Jeong-sin 李正臣 (1660-1727) to examine how Yi's knowledge and discourse on Ming-Qing transition were produced by the chief mission interpreter Kim Gyeong-mun 金慶門 (1673-1737) and other interpreters.<sup>6</sup> The focus of this article will be the discussion on how the dialogue between envoys and interpreters on the landscape of the battlefield of the Ming-Qing conflict was the main component to produce and construct the Joseon collective memory on the Ming Collapse in the late Joseon period.

### Knowledge Production: Interpreters in the Mission to Qing China

Since the 17<sup>th</sup> century, many of Joseon mission members refused to communicate with any Qing officials or representatives even though they were asked to participate in the mission and travel to Beijing. Intellectuals then asked the lower-ranking interpreters for handling the tributary rituals, regular mission activities, and negotiations with the Qing government. Pak Je-ga 朴齊家 (1750-1815) and Pak Chi-won 朴趾源 (1737-1805) both realized that many scholars in Joseon have assumed that "China" was a shame but they were forced to participate in the mission.<sup>7</sup> So, how could these envoys "survive" in the mission? Pak Je-ga had elaborated, "Although they were appointed for being the mission members, all the documents, communicating works, and mission matters were given to the interpreters."<sup>8</sup>

A lot of Joseon intellectuals in the post-16<sup>th</sup> century still postulated

that they should repay the grace of restoration which received from the favor received from the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) during the Toyotomi Hideyoshi's 豐臣秀吉 (1537-1598) invasion.<sup>9</sup> Although the Ming Dynasty was collapsed, the Joseon court and their intellectuals resisted recognizing Manchus as the new ruler of the imperial empire and had the strong belongingness on the Ming Empire as before. However, the Qing's invasion in 1636 forced the Joseon court to fulfill the tributary requirements of the Qing Empire and send the ritual mission to Beijing regularly (Chun 1968). Those Joseon intellectuals, who had a negative attitude toward Qing, were compelled to participate in the diplomatic ritual activities for the Qing Empire (Zhang 1985, 13-23). The Qing Dynasty expected all subordinate countries in East Asia to send the missions to Beijing regularly because Manchus believed that tributary rituals were the major key for determining the cultural boundary and state formation of the empire.<sup>10</sup>

From 1637 to 1894, Joseon sent 698 official missions to Qing for different purposes, an average of around three missions per year (Zhang 1968, 18-19; Wang 2018, 62-65). According to the regulations, Joseon had to appoint around thirty members, including the envoys, interpreters, and other tribute guard officers, medical officers, and printing officers (Fuma 2015, 15-16). Each envoy was allowed to attach several attendants and servants, which was not limited.<sup>11</sup> This exclusive privilege of Joseon allowed many intellectuals to visit China to satisfy their curiosity about the downfall of Ming China and the society of Qing China to shape its China view.<sup>12</sup>

6. The preliminary study on Yi's *Yeonhaengrok* record was conducted by Law Lok-yin in Chinese. See Luo 2015.

7. The original words of Pak Je-ga and Pak Chi-won were alike: Je-ga remarked, "Our scholar-officials viewed China as shame since the rise of Qing..." 清興以來，國朝士大夫，以中國為恥 and Pak Chi-won said, "Since the Qing Dynasty had risen for more than 140 years, our Eastern scholar-officials thought China was barbaric society and shame on it..." 清興百四十餘年。我東士大夫夷中國而恥之。 See Pak 1961, 413; Pak 2000, 13:45b.

8. Original wording of Pak Je-ga was: "雖黽俛奉使，而一切事情，文書，言語之去來，悉委之於譯..." See Pak 2000, 413.

9. Since Ming China participated in the 1592-1598 Imjin Waeran to protect Joseon as well as its own territory, the Joseon court had reinforced the concept to "repay" the Ming's favor of "*jaejo beonbang*" (rebuilding a vassal country 再造藩邦) in the 17<sup>th</sup> century and gradually the "repay" attitude was enhanced after 1636 Manchu Invasion. See Kuwano 2015; Han 2015.

10. The earliest comprehensive study on the relations between Qing and subordinate countries was conducted by J. K. Fairbank. See Fairbank 1941. The recent work adopted new approach on looking the function of board of rites and discussed how rites had the great impart for making of the Qing Empire's formation. See Keliher 2019.

11. Kim Taejun and Kim Yil-hwan argued that the famous "Three Great Writers of *Yeonhaengrok*" 燕行錄三家, Kim Chang-eop 金昌業 (1658-1721), Hong Dae-yong 洪大容 (1731-1783), and Pak Chi-won (1737-1805) are the *jaje gungwan* (younger relatives as military officer 子弟軍官) who were only interested in bordering their horizons rather than serving their family members in the mission. These examples figured out by the authors explained some attendants of the envoys are allowed to visit Beijing without any political or diplomatic duties. During the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries, some intellectuals used this opportunity to learn more about China and its culture and society. See Kim and Kim 2014.

12. The works include but are not limited to Roux 2016; Luo 2013; Hwang 2019.

Between the contradiction of realpolitik and ideological imagination (Lee 2020), some of the Joseon mission members in the late 17<sup>th</sup> century and early 18<sup>th</sup> centuries still felt miserable for the downfall of the Ming Dynasty and the falling of Chinese civilization after the “Manchu barbarians” governed China. They were especially interested in searching the sites about Ming-Qing conflict in order to imagine the glory of the Ming Dynasty during their missions (Wu 2015, 58-108). Some monuments in Northeast China were gradually becoming the key sites and battlefields for the Ming-Qing conflict, and these intellectuals have tried to place some of their imagination or expectation in these sites. However, they lacked information or historical records after the war was ended for more than several decades.

Some intellectuals recorded their experience of *Yeonhaeng* during the late 17<sup>th</sup> century and early 18<sup>th</sup> century to identify some historical rudiments of the Ming-Qing transition. These records were identified as some components to reminisce about the sadness of the Ming Empire’s collapse. For example, an envoy of mission in 1669, Min Jeong-jung 閔鼎重 (1628-1692) talked with a Xiu Cai 秀才 (licentiate) to inquiry about the news of Southern Ming or the situation of Yongli Emperor 永曆帝 (Min 2003, 10:39a-41b). This example explained that Joseon intellectuals were very concerned about the downfall of the Ming Empire as well as the relevant issues, such as the court successors (Southern Ming) or anti-Qing activists.<sup>13</sup> Most of these Joseon intellectuals did not experience the war, but they tried to seek help from those who are the Chinese to collect more intelligence, which offered more details about the war. It demonstrated how Joseon intellectuals relied on the interpreters to be the intermediaries. Why could the Joseon interpreters be the “Cultural Broker” of the Qing-Joseon interaction?

Joseon Interpreters’ language ability was one of the essential vital indicators for them to be equipped as a “cultural broker.” In the ancient Chinese classics in the East Asian context, rituals were identified as the regulations of behaviors for the people’s interpersonal relationships as well as the norms for diplomatic relationships. Those classics also explained the importance of the interpreters for fulfilling the norms of rituals and rites. According to *Liji* (*Books of Rites* 禮記), it explained, “...the people living in the five regions spoke different languages

and had different customs, likings, and preferences. In order to make accessible what was in the minds of different peoples, and in order to make their likings and preferences understood, there were functionaries for the job. Those in charge of the regions in the east were called *ji* (the entrusted; transmitters); in the south, *xiang* (likeness-renderers 象); in the west, *didi* (those who know the Di tribes 狄鞮); and in the north, *yi* (translators/interpreters 譯)...”<sup>14</sup> This thought in *Liji* was perceived in the countries of the cultural sphere in East Asia. As Confucianism was the main ideology for Joseon’s state formation, Joseon followed the thought of *Liji* to establish Sayeokwon (Interpretation Bureau 司譯院) to train the interpreters for the *sadae* (serving the Greater 事大) and *gyorin* (neighborly relations 交鄰) diplomatic affairs in Chinese (Yang 2001), Manchu (Jurchen),<sup>15</sup> Mongolian, and Japanese since the 14<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>16</sup> The Joseon court paid most of the resources on the spoken Chinese training because *sadae* was the main ideology for Sino-Korean relations, which were perceived in Korea during the Joseon period. To fulfil the *sadae* ideology, Joseon court expected the interpreters in spoken Chinese were well-equipped in language ability and ritual knowledge to serve the members of the mission to China. For example, the ritual knowledge and daily conversation were the critical components in *Pak tongsa* and *Nogeoldae*, the text-books used in Sayeokwon for teaching the interpreters.

In different records of mission envoys, there were many examples to demonstrate how the interpreters performed their language ability and diplomatic knowledge to help the mission envoys to solve the problems during the mission in Qing China. For example, Yi Jinhyu 李震休 (1657-1710), secretary of mission in 1691, had recorded his dialogue with the Vietnamese envoys which depended on the Joseon interpreters of spoken Chinese as the intermediary between the Vietnamese envoys and himself.<sup>17</sup> Another example

14. The original Chinese words are: “五方之民，言語不通，嗜欲不同。達其志，通其欲，東方曰寄，南方曰象，西方曰狄鞮，北方曰譯...” This paragraph from *Liji* was translated by Martha Cheung. See Cheung 2006, 45-46.

15. Choe Yung-chul detailed the historical development of Manchu studies in Korea and introduced different materials in the Joseon Dynasty to offer some new idea on the study of Manchu culture and society. See Choe 2012.

16. The works on interpreters of Japanese languages are very comprehensive. The works includes but are not limited to Baek (2006), Yi (2012), and Cheng (2015).

17. “Report of Yi Chinhyu, Secretary of the Mission of Gratitude to the Grace Cum Reporting” (Saeun gyomjinjuhaeng seosanggwan Yijinhyu mun gyeonsageon 謝恩兼陳奏行書狀官李震休聞見事件),

13. Fuma, *Chosen enkoshi to chosen tsushinshi*, 187-204.



can be found in the Yi Jeong-sin's *Yeonhaengrok* in 1722. He recorded that he did not meet any Catholic missionaries in Beijing, and therefore he asked one of his mission interpreters to learn about the stories about the missionaries (Yi 2007, 8:2b-3a). The interpreter replied to Yi that he had met missionaries before, and the missionaries chatted with him in Chinese, which shared many details of the circumstances of the church in Europe as well as the faith of the Catholic Church. After that, Yi said, "Although I cannot meet them personally, it is delightful to know about the details of the dialogue."<sup>18</sup> The examples obviously explained the interpreter's ability equipped them to produce the new knowledge for the intellectuals to understand and experience the outside world through their elaboration and interpretation in the mission.

Apart from the advantages of language ability in the *Yeonhaeng* mission, interpreters had broader interpersonal network rather than the intellectuals in China. Interpreters were not only assigned to participate in the official tributary mission to Beijing but also worked for the duty to be the officer of *jejagwan* (officials of messengers 齎咨官) to deal with different minor matters.<sup>19</sup> These duties acquiesced the interpreters to have different opportunities to visit China and provided chances for them to meet different officials or commoners in China,<sup>20</sup> which demonstrated how the interpreters' duties expanded their interpersonal network in China for collecting information to produce new knowledge to Joseon society.

Interpreters in Joseon were classified as *jungin* (middle people, "technical or clerical officials" 中人) by the Korean history scholars. According to Lee Seongmu's (1991) study, *jungin* were identified as a lower social class between aristocratic yangban 兩班 and commoner *sangmin* 常民 in the Joseon society. Additionally, *jungin* was commonly referred to professional and technical

officials in the Joseon court—interpreters, medical officers, mathematicians, calligraphers, calendar specialists, and painters (ibid. 114). Through their important impacts to Joseon society, their culture and self-interest developed separately from the *yangban* community.

The Little Chinese Ideology influenced most of the elite-class scholars in Joseon, and therefore they felt deeply ashamed of associating with the Chinese (Sun 2007). In contrast to scholar-officials, the interpreters willed to interact with the lower-ranking officials in Qing as well as the local commoners in Northeast China. These activities allowed them to collect some rare and uncommon stories concerning the Ming-Qing transition due to their language ability, mission duty, and interpersonal network. For example, Kim Ji-nam 金指南 (1654-1718), the interpreter of 1692 *Yeonhaeng* mission to Beijing was asked by the deputy envoy Min Chwi-do 閔就道 (1633-1698) to search the text-books for improvement of gunpowder quality in Joseon.<sup>21</sup> Through his network in China, Kim finally found a person in Liaoyang who can offer the book in Northeast China.<sup>22</sup> The court appreciated his work and also asked him to translate the book to Hangul, which allowed the lower class workers to understand the way to improve the gunpowder quality against the Qing Empire.<sup>23</sup>

Although some of the mission envoys have criticized the interpreters' misbehaviors, such as corruption or smuggling,<sup>24</sup> they found that only depended on the interpreters to grasp new knowledge about China during their participation in the mission to Beijing. In 1722, the deputy envoy of the *Yeonhaeng* mission Yi Jeong-sin was interested in many aspects of the Qing

*Dongmun hwigo* (Compendium of Diplomatic Documents 同文彙考), Supplementary volume 3:2b-3b.

18. See Yi 2007, 8:3b: "雖不目見, 詳聞其酬酢之言, 可喜."

19. *Jejagwan's* duties include submitting documents to the Qing court, participating in joint hearing for the legal case of Joseon people in China and escorting the drifting Chinese or neighboring commoners or criminals to Beijing. See Li 2008, 60.

20. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, a well-known literati-interpreter Yi Sangjeok 李尚迪 (1803-1865) had 12 times to visit Beijing as the mission interpreter. These duties encouraged Yi to personally expand his interpersonal network in China. He had more than 100 Chinese literati as his close friends who had exchanged poems and writings with him to keep the connection between China and Korea. See Yi 2009.

21. See Kim Ji-nam's "Deckchobeop simal"; Tongmungwanji 9:45b.

22. *Tongmungwanji* 7:24b-25a.

23. Kim, *Sinjeon jachobang eonhae*, 23.

24. In 1712, Kim Changeop expressed his critics on interpreters' roles in the mission in his *Yeonhaengrok* writing: During the mission, only one or two interpreters of spoken Chinese can handle the conversation. When he observed the interpreters' conversation, most of the conversation was unfathomable...we can only rely on our or the Qing interpreters to coordinate the matters between the countries. However, the poor language skill of Joseon and Chinese interpreters were alike and therefore they can't help us to speak out. Now they use few words to work for the duty. If some critical and complicated matters are happened, how can they handle these matters. So, when they faced some issues that cannot be handled, they will offer a bribe..." 譯官無通漢語者, 其中一二人, 號為稍勝, 而觀其與彼人酬酢者, 為十言無二三言分明...兩國之情, 只憑通官譯官通之, 而譯官既如此, 通官亦不能為我國言...今以數少之語, 擇而為之, 其於曲折煩多之事, 彼此豈有通情之理? 是以, 若有一事則不能析理爭之, 無論大小, 惟務行賂..." See C. Kim 1960, 4:88b-89a; Jang 2015.

society, such as the customs, politics, and society as well as different cultural phenomenon (Luo 2015, 361). However, he did not know anything about those issues. Therefore, Yi Jeong-sin (2007, 8:4b-5a) asked different interpreters many questions in the mission for learning the knowledge and information about the Qing society during his mission. On another *Yeonhaengrok's* record, a mission envoy Kim Gyeong-seon 金景善 (1788-1853) in 1832, he asked the interpreters to invite an illusionist to their guest house for entertainment because there was nothing to do on that day (Kim 1960b, 3:118b). It specifically illustrated how the interpreters operated the contact zone for mission envoys for connecting their world and China.

Yeonhaengsa's interaction with interpreters in the mission showed that the interpreters' language ability and inter-personal network in China enriched them with the knowledge on Qing China. The intellectuals in Joseon in the 18th century mainly concerned the stories of the Ming Dynasty's collapse, and interpreter's produced knowledge created the Ming memory for the intellectuals during their mission to Beijing. The envoys' mission experiences in the battlefields of the Ming-Qing transition were the leading sources for explaining how those intellectuals created their memory on Ming's Dynasty.

### “Guhyeoldae”: Ming's Glory in Joseon Memory

Comparing to other *Yeonhaengrok*, Yi Jeong-sin in 1722 particularly remarked how his knowledge about China was learnt from the mission interpreter Kim Gyeong-mun. Yi Jeong-sin, who hold a post of Second Minister of the Board of Taxation (*hojo champan* 戶曹參判) in Joseon court (Yi 2007, 1:7a), was appointed as the deputy envoy to head the mission group visiting Qing China. It was the first time of Yi Jeong-sin's *Yeonhaeng* mission. It was remarkable that he expressed his interest in everything of the mission in one of his *Yeonhaeng* poems. In the poem, he said, “Although the mission was very rush, I was not very hurry and asked everything about the past in details.”<sup>25</sup>

To satisfy his interest in the mission, the mission interpreters acted as the cultural broker for answering the questions of Yi Jeong-sin in the mission.

One of the critical members of the 1722 mission was Kim Gyeong-mun, who provided much information about Qing China, which satisfied Yi's concern and curiosity.

Kim Gyeong-mun passed the interpretation examination in 1691 and began to serve as a teacher of interpretation in the office. He was appointed many times to be involved in numerous diplomatic missions to Qing China. For example, he served as a postal officer (*jaejagwan* 齎咨官) to Qing to explain the claim of Joseon for the border-trespassing criminal case between 1710 and 1711.<sup>26</sup> Some Koreans murdered few Qing people and robbed their cargo during their sneaking to the Qing territory to poach ginseng. Qing officials required the Joseon court to appoint legal officials to participate in the Qing's trial. King Sukjong told the court members that the Qing officials would investigate the case and that the court should not need to send the statement to China. However, Jo Taeno 趙泰老 (1658-1717), an official of the punishment office, disagreed with the decision and believed that an interpreter to submit the statement is necessary to the case.<sup>27</sup> As Jo insisted on appointing Kim Gyeong-mun as a postal officer, the court gradually agreed with Jo Taeno's suggestion to appoint Kim to handle this criminal case. This example explained that Joseon officials trusted the knowledge and language ability of interpreters for operating tributary and diplomatic missions.

Apart from escorting the Qing officials to handle the diplomatic matters, interpreters had their own personal network helped the Joseon officials to collect significant intelligence about China. While Kim Gyeong-mun was appointed as a postal officer in 1710, he met some Qing low-ranking officials in Fengcheng 鳳城. He chatted with Xiang Jisheng 項繼聖, whose father was a former subordinate of Wu Sangui 吳三桂 (1612-1678) and Huang Yi 黃儀, a *bithesi* (the clerk in charge of documents and file 筆帖式), who had worked in Taiwan (Min 2001, 66a). Both Chinese lower ranking officials provided some detailed information and unfamiliar stories about the Ming Dynasty and China's society. The interpersonal network of interpreters can facilitate the mission interpreters to grasp some extraordinary intelligence for intellectuals to learn about China in different aspects.

In 1722, Yi Jeong-sin, like other Joseon envoys in the 18<sup>th</sup> century asked

25. See Yi 2007, 1:17b: “到底輒詢前昔事，王程雖急我心閑。”

26. *Tongmun hwigo*, Supplementary 7:29a-b.

27. *Sukjong sillok*, 50:12a (Sukjong 37/3/11).

many questions about the Ming Dynasty during the *Yeonhaeng* mission. As Kim Ilhwan (2012) stated, the next generation of Joseon intellectuals who were born after Qing Invasion in 1636 were fearless enough to express the anti-Qing attitude. Indeed, the Northeast (or known as Manchuria) was the main area of the itinerary of *Yeonhaeng* mission to Beijing, and there were different historic places of battlefields in the conflict between the Manchu and Ming Dynasties, which attracted different envoys to pay attention on the landscape or site about the Ming Dynasty. Before Yi Jeong-sin reached Ningyuan, he was unaware of any myths and stories about the Ming-Qing conflict in Ningyuan. To satisfy his inquisitiveness, Yi Jeong-sin asked interpreter Kim Gyeong-mun to illuminate the details of the war.

Ningyuan was the key battlefield for the Later Jin conquest of the Ming, and the Ming army finally marked the first victory in the eight-year-long battle with Later Jin (Qing) with successful defense of Ningyuan walled city (Swope 2014, 35-59). In this case, the battle of Ningyuan can represent the glory of the Ming Empire and the effort of the Ming troops in the history of the Ming-Qing transition. Ningyuan became remarkable site for the Joseon intellectuals to express their anti-Qing sentiment as well as create their memory of Ming's glory.

Manchus began to attack Fushun, Shenyang, and Liaoyang to control most of the lands of Manchuria after Nurhaci 努爾哈赤 (1559-1626) announced the "Seven Grievances" to declare the war against the Ming Dynasty in 1618 (Di Cosmo 2017, 115). In 1626, Nurhaci realized that Ningyuan was the most prominent strategic location to the mainland of the Ming Empire and decided to take Ningyuan with his force of 100,000. Meanwhile, Yuan Chonghuan 袁崇煥 (1584-1630) was assigned to be the governor of Liaodong with full authority to command all forces outside the Shanhai pass. During that time, Yuan and other generals built the fortress of Ningyuan, Jinzhou, Xiaolinghe, Songshan, Xingshan, and Youzhen to construct a defending line to defend and protect Shanhai pass. As a result, the Manchus were not able to break the defense of the Ningyuan garrison because of Yuan's military preparation (Swope 2014, 60-63). However, the Ming court executed Yuan after the Ningyuan battle because the emperor believed that he was collaborating with the enemy during the war. As Yuan saw the only Ming commander successfully repel the Manchus, Yuan was mourned for restoring the Ming's glory after the Ming collapse in China and even in Joseon. For the Joseon envoys, Ningyuan played

a vital role in helping them to learn the story of Yuan, which helped them to create the memory of Ming's glory in the Ming-Qing transition.

In the fourth month of 1722, the *Yeonhaeng* mission group reached *Ningyuan*. Yi Jeong-sin has recorded that he visited a beacon and found a command post called "Guhyeoldae" (Spitting Blood Command Post 嘔血臺) in Ningyuan countryside. He heard that it was related to a story about Hong Taiji 皇太極 (1592-1643) and asked a mission interpreter, Kim Gyeong-mun, for the details of the story. Kim replied to Yi in a very informative elaboration about the story of Hong Taiji during the Ningyuan battle. Kim's reply is as follows,

"I heard a Chinese myth and story. During the period of Qing Taizong, Yuan Chonghuan was the commander at Ningyuan for blocking the attack by Later Jin. Although Qing Taizong has attempted to break through Ningyuan, he was still defeated by Yuan's army. Therefore, Hong Taiji frequently consulted his counselors for a strategy on the post outside Ningyuan, where he can look down the situation of Ningyuan. Finally, Qing Taizong tried to fire the wall by the cannons and aimed to destroy one side of the walls. Qing Taiju stepped on the command post again after the day of shelling and decided to command the army to attack the Ming's army again. He suddenly found that the wall was 're-built' as new without any damage. Qing Taiju was shocked and spat the blood on the post. He thought that Yuan was so amazing and determined to force the enemy to retreat. When Qing Taizong asked the army for shelling the war, the soldiers told Yuan Chonghuan about the situation of the shelling. Yuan just replied to him, 'I have already known that. You are very annoying.' Everyone in Yuan's army was nervous, but Yuan just asked a soldier to do something and then ending the meeting. Yuan tried to ask the subordinate to paint the shape of the wall in an extensive fabric for covering the damaged sides.

"Meanwhile, the subordinates can have enough time to repair the wall. A few days later, the wall was completely restored. After Qing Taizong has known the truth, he lamented that my strategies and skills could not be compared with Yuan. When Yuan was still staying in Ningyuan, the Qing army was frightened for attacking the Yuan's army. After Yuan was killed and Zu Dashou replaced Yuan's position, Ningyuan falls into Qing's hands. That is why this command post was called as 'Spitting Blood Post.'"

(Yi 2004, 7:45b-46a)



In this detail explanation, Kim told Yi about the source of the command post and the story behind the “Guhyeoldae.” Ningyuan was the first battlefield to mark the victory of Ming’s army in the Ming-Qing battle, and it became an important location for the intellectuals’ imagination for Ming history. Yi Jeong-sin has never experienced the war, but he attempted to look for the details of the story, which reinforced their imagination for the glory of the Ming Empire. Kim’s interpretation elaborated Yuan to be the smartest and the most intelligent commander in the Ming army, and he was the only one who could hinder the invasion by Qing Taizong. Even though it cannot demonstrate the exact picture of the reality of the war, many intellectuals like Yi Jeong-sin willed to believe Kim’s explanation as to the part of their memory on the glory of the Ming Dynasty.

Pierre Nora signified the sites of memory, engaging the community to identify the collective memory of the shared past.<sup>28</sup> Some places or objects with significance, such as a monument or a flag, associate the community with their past and shared memory. His idea revealed how the community re-shaped their understanding or their collective memory of the past through the connection to the site of memory. In the mission records of Yi Jeong-sin, it obviously showed that the interpreters played the leading role of the cultural broker to reconstruct the envoys’ memory on the Ming-Qing conflict, which particularly shared the glory side of the Ming Dynasty during the battle. The memory of the Ming Empire in the last few decades was re-interpreted in Kim Gyeong-mun’s interpretation of Yuan in Ningyuan as well as the story of “Guhyeoldae.” Although Yi did not comment the Kim Gyeong-mun’s interpretation, Kim’s information and elucidation were recorded in his *Yeonhaengrok* as the affirmation of Kim’s efforts. Kim’s interpretation was not only affirmed by Yi personally, but also his explanation on the story of the Ming-Qing battle was consolidated as the common memory of the Joseon Yeonhaengsa and intellectuals on the Ming Collapse. The similar memory was recorded in the *Yeonhaengrok* of Yi Hae-ung 李海應. According to *Gyesan gijeong* 蔚山紀程 in 1803, Yi introduced the similar story of Guhyeoldae as follow,

It was a command post called spitting blood post on the top of the mountain [Jiming Shan]. When Yuan Chonghuan stationed in Ningyuan [on a day in the battle], Qing Khan impatiently attacked the wall with cannons until the evening. Before the morning, Yuan Chonghuan asked the subordinate to paint a fabric to cover the damaged wall. On that night, it was cold and rainy, and the Ningyuan wall became an iced city wall. Qing Khan went on the post and found the damaged wall was restored on another morning. Khan was shocked and spat the blood on the post. It was the story of this command post’s origin. (Yi 1960, 2:40a-b)<sup>29</sup>

Yi Hae-ung’s writing and Kim Gyeong-mun’s introduction on “Guhyeoldae” looked alike. The discourse about “Guhyeoldae” in Joseon society revealed how interpreter’s explication on the Ming memory was widely and profoundly circulated in the academic circle in Joseon. Even in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, another Joseon intellectual Kim Gyeong-seon (1962, 2:58b) still annotated the exact version of the impression of Yuan and the story of “Guhyeoldae” in his *Yeonhaengrok*. Kim remarked that the story was learned from the interpreters. The example of “Spitting Blood Command Post” indicated that the information from interpreters about the Ming’s downfall re-constructed the Joseon intellectuals’ own imagination on Ming Dynasty to shape their memory about the Ming-Qing Battle.<sup>30</sup>

### *Zu Dashou’s Archway and the “Scapegoats” of Ming’s Collapse*

Apart from “Guhyeoldae,” an archway in Ningyuan also attracted Yi Jeong-sin’s attention. The archway was built by Zu Dashou 祖大壽 (?-1656) and Zu Dale 祖大樂 who were the successors of Yuan Chonghuan’s commander position for defending Ningyuan.<sup>31</sup> During the 1640s, Zu Dashou was isolated in Ningyuan after Songshan and Jinzhou were both captured by Hong Taiji,

29. “[雞鳴山]山頂有所稱嘔血臺。昔袁崇煥鎮寧遠時，清汗急攻之。以火砲碎城將入。值日暮，以詰朝爲期，崇煥夜以畫布作城，綳障其城毀處。適天雨且寒，一夜間成一冰城，汗乘曉望之，崩城已完。大驚遂嘔血于此。故臺以是名。”

30. When Hong Dae-yong recorded his journey in Ningyuan, he had underlined that the story of Guhyeoldae was the improbable folk legend, which was widely circulated by the Joseon Koreans. See Hong 2000, outer 8:13b.

31. For the biographical information of Zu Dashou, see Tetsuro 2017.

28. Also see Weedon and Jordan 2012, 143-53.

although he had repelled the Qing forces for few years in Ningyaun. Zu Dashou was asked to surrender, and he was permitted to serve the Qing army in 1643. After his surrendering to Qing, Zu became a typical “traitor” in the discourse of Chinese history. Before Zu surrendered to Qing, Zu Dashou was identified as the victorious commander in Ningyuan for a decade, and that is why Ming Emperor Chongzhen gave an archway to affirm his contribution in Ningyuan. The story of Zu’s archway was recorded in the Yu Cheok-gi’s 俞拓基 (1691-1767) *Yeonhaengrok* in 1754. Yu pointed out that building an archway was a common practice for the Chinese elites to show off their family achievement in academic or political aspects. When he arrived at the town of Ningyuan, Yu became very indignant after he saw the Zu’s archway. He berated Zu Dashou while their family was receiving the kindness and grace from the country; he still decided to surrender. Yu (2001, 56-57) criticized, “Zu brothers received the grace from the Ming Emperor, but they were so arrogant and willingly surrendered to the barbarians. It is our dynasty’s heartache! Our dynasty’s heartache!”<sup>32</sup> Yu’s record revealed that the archway as the site of memory to shape the envoys’ understanding of how Zu’s yield was the main factor for shaping the Ming’s collapse.

How could the envoys like Yu Cheok-gi apprehend the story and memory behind the archway? One of the sources is the interpreters’ collected and created information for the archway. In the 1722 *Yeonhaeng* mission, Yi Jeong-sin heard about the origin of Zu’s archway and the story about Zu Dashou from the interpretation of Kim Gyeong-mun which explained the source of the envoys’ understanding on Zu’s archway:

Yi asked, “Who built it [the archway]? What has happened?”

Gyeongmun replied, “[Zu] Dashou, son of Zu Chengxun, who leads one group of Ming army to Pyeongyang in repelling the Japanese in Imjin Waeran. Chengxun firstly worked as the assistant regional commander of East of the Pass and later promoted to be the regional commander. His sons, [Zu] Dashou and [Zu] Dale, were the military officers as well. Emperor Chongzhen appointed [Zu] Dashou to replace Yuan Chonghuan as the chief commander. However, he and his wife flaunted their status every day by showing the 70 teals of silvers awarded by the emperor. This

situation and replacing a ferocious tiger by a crippled ewe were alike. [Zu] Dashou did not dedicate himself to protecting the country but completely waste the military funds and provisions in building the archway. He was conceited and believed he could become a well-known person in human history. In fact, an arrow was not shot, and the gate was immediately opened for surrender once the enemy arrived due to Zu’s cowardly attitude. The 300-year history of the Ming Dynasty was ruined in the hands of [Zu] Dashou in one day, followed by the collapse of Ningyuan and the outer areas of the Pass.” (Yi 2007, 7:47a-48a)

Yi thought that although [Zu] Dashou has died, the archway became a substitute of Zu, which was cursed by all. His first wish of being an immortal figure was ended in eternal infamy<sup>33</sup> (Yi 2007, 7:48a). In fact, Kim’s interpretation did not reflect the reality of Zu Dashou’s archway. The archway was built as an affirmation because Zu successfully defended Ningyuan for a few years after the Qing Invasion of Manchuria.

However, Kim’s interpretation has shaped the archway as a symbolic figure of Zu’s coward attitude. Yi believed Kim’s interpretation and agreed on Zu Dashou as the sinner to ruin the Ming Dynasty. These dialogues between Yi Jeong-sin and Kim Gyeong-mun revealed that the interpreters not only helped the intellectuals to identify scapegoats for the fall of the Ming Empire but also re-constructed the new memory of Ming Collapse and battle between Ming and Qing which allowed them still commemorating the Ming’s glory in their thought. Another envoy Kim Jeong-jung 金正中 (1960, 159b) commented, “In my view, [Zu] Chengxun’s two sons were the true pigs and dogs. Why the pen [writing about Zu] and tongue [talking about Zu] had to be polluted? Only Yuan should be esteemed in the past thousand years history.” Kim Jeong-jung put the responsibility of the Ming’s collapse on Zu Dashou. Apart from Kim Jeong-jung’s ridicule on Zu Dashou, some other intellectuals like Kim Gyeong-seon’s writing on the story of Zu’s archway was same as Yi Jeong-sin’s record (J. Kim 1960, 2:59b-60a). It is obviously seen that Kim Gyeong-mun’s interpretation became the Joseon intellectuals’ common memory on the Ming-Qing battle, which was continually circulated in the intellectuals’ circle in Joseon society decades by decades. Of course, Kim Gyeong-mun may not be

32. “祖家父子兄弟受恩，自大如此，而大壽兄弟甘心降虜倒戈，本朝痛矣，本朝痛矣。”

33. 窃以爲大壽雖死，而牌樓尚在，人得而指點而唾罵之。其所願誇耀而流芳者，適足以遺臭而聲罪也云。

the first one to know the story, but his language ability and cultural background allowed him to share the information to let the intellectuals record the story for producing and circulating this memory of Ming Empire for the intellectuals of the Joseon society.

If Guhyeoldae in Ningyuan was the space for Joseon intellectuals to identify the Ming's glory in their collective memory, then Zu's archway was the site for Joseon intellectuals to identify the responsibility of the war in their collective memory. The connection between their memory and those historical sites was operated by the interpreters. The dialogue between Yi Jeong-sin and Kim Gyeong-mun revealed that information collected by interpreters was transmitted to be the shared cultural memory of the Joseon mission members. Reading and circulating the *Yeonhaengrok* was the common practice in the late Joseon society. The interpreters produced memory on the Ming's downfall, and the Joseon intellectuals commonly believed the collapse was ruined by the surrenders with a coward attitude and the emperors' wrong decision for replacing Yuan Chonghuan. It revealed how the interpreters' elaboration on the historical sites about the Ming-Qing transition became the commonly believed memory of the Ming-Qing transition in the Joseon intellectuals' community.

### Producing Ming Memory on Shanhai Pass

Shanhai Pass was the traditional symbolic site with historical value in Chinese history, as the pass for the Great Wall in the early period of the Ming Dynasty to guard the narrow passage between Manchuria and Mainland China (Dreyer 1988, 1012-1103). During the Ming Dynasty, different rulers believed that the pass served as a significant outpost against the barbarians. Those rulers spent many resources to reinforce the garrison for defending the empire. The location of Shanhai Pass was also a significant contact zone for the Joseon Yeonhaengsa as well. It is because Shanhai Pass was the main gate of the empire's mainland, and all the Joseon mission had to cross the Pass before entering Beijing. In the 15<sup>th</sup> century, Yi Seungso 李承召 (1422-1484) expressed his feeling on Shanhai Pass in his poem, "I seem to be quite joyful when I saw Liaoyang in the distance.

However, I am wild with joy after I reached Shanhai Pass."<sup>34</sup> This example demonstrated that how Joseon Yeonhaengsa expressed their expectation for the mission in Shanhai Pass after their one-month-long trip to Manchuria from Joseon (Hwang 2013).

As Hwang Pogi's (2012, 28-29) analysis on Joseon literati's writing and *Yeonhaengrok*, the intellectuals frequently expressed their imagination and feelings on Chinese civilization in their writing on Shanhai Pass before the Ming-Qing transition. From the poems of Kim Keukseong 金克成 (1474-1540) and Choe Suk-jeong 崔淑精 (1433-1480) in the 15<sup>th</sup> century to express their view when they reached Shanhai Pass in the mission,<sup>35</sup> we can deduce that the Joseon intellectuals in the Ming Dynasty mainly symbolized Shanhai Pass was the boundary for protecting the China Empire in different dynasties as well as the cultural space to show the civilization inside the Pass. However, the image of Shanhai Pass in the eyes of Joseon intellectuals was reconstructed after the Qing troops entered Shanhai Pass.

In 1644, Wu Sangui and his army garrisoned Shanhai Pass to balance the power of Li Zicheng inside the gate and the Qing army outside the Pass.<sup>36</sup> By the end of the Ming-Qing conflict, Wu Sangui, the regional commander of Shanhai Pass, opened the gate of Shanhai and allowed the Qing army to suppress Li Zicheng's insurrectionary army. Wu Sangui was labeled a traitor in Chinese historical records as well as in the Joseon records. The decision of Wu Sangui about opening the Shanhai Pass for the Qing army re-shaped the Joseon intellectuals' understanding and elaboration on Shanhai Pass.

In 1645, a member of the Joseon envoys, Seong Yiseong 成以性 (1595-1644), reached Shanhai Pass and he asked the interpreters about this place. His interpreter, Kim Gwi-yin 金貴仁, elaborated about Shanhai Pass through the poem, "You ask me what the place is it. This is the First Pass under Heaven, Shanhai Pass. Although the wall and parapet looked as before, the Chinese

34. The original words of the poem are "遼陽始遠似欣然, 及到關門喜欲顛." See Yi 1988, 2:391.

35. The original words of Kim Keuk-seong's poems are "秦築防胡萬里城, 雄圖千古保無爭. 乾坤朝暮關開闔, 山海高深管重輕. 從此民勞得休息, 始知贏滅在焚坑. 聖皇若問治安策, 二帝三王未可更." See Kim 1988, 3:36a. The original words of Choe Sukjeong's poems are "長城斷處海漫漫, 東北諸蕃第一關. 推轂丈人來鎮靜, 負戈戎卒自安閒. 遊春士女迷街巷, 促暮笙歌鬧闌闌. 聖代如今威化遠, 重櫻不用鎖連環." See Choe 1988, 1:27a.

36. For the discussion of this issue, see Hsi 1975, 443-53.

civilization over a hundred years was collapsed.<sup>37</sup> This example illustrated that how the image of Shanhai Pass in the Joseon society was re-shaped as the site for expressing their sadness to the Ming's collapse after the Qing's capture of Beijing, which was influenced by the Joseon interpreters' elaboration in the mission.

Shanhai Pass was the midway stop of the *Yeonhaeng* route to Beijing, and all the mission envoys had the opportunity to visit and stay around the Pass. It aroused the intellectuals' interest in the story behind Shanhai Pass, and the interpreters tried to be the intermediary to create the memory of Shanhai Pass to those intellectuals. In 1722, Yi Jeong-sin initially yearned to consult Kim Gyeong-mun about the historical origins of Shanhai Pass when he arrived at the Pass. However, Kim shifted the focus from the history of Shanhai Pass to the story about Wu Sangui surrendering at the Shanhai Pass.

Kim firstly explained to Yi that the Pass was not built in the Qing Dynasty but during the Ming period. He also expounded that the characters of "Tianxia diyi guan" (the First Pass under Heaven 天下第一關) on Shanhai Pass were not written by Li Si 李斯 (280BC-208BC) (Yi 2007, 55a). Consequently, he changed the topic of conversation from the origin of Shanhai Pass to the story of Shanhai Pass during the period of Ming-Qing transition.

Kim Gyeong-mun linked Shanhai Pass and Wu Sangui in his interpretation. Kim Gyeong-mun annotated that when Wu Sangui was threatened by Li Zicheng to surrender, Dorgon 多爾袞 (1612-1650), the commander immediately reached Shanhai Pass after Wu asked him to provide military support for suppressing Li Zicheng's rebellion (Yi 2007, 7:55a-b). To ensure Wu Sangui's loyalty, Dorgon forced Wu Sangui to wear the Manchu queue in Shanhai Pass. Dorgon also disallowed Wu to enter the Pass via the main gate to dwarf the status of Wu Sangui and reinforced the Qing's legitimacy on the military action of crossing the Shanhai Pass. Kim Gyeong-mun then elaborated on how Dorgon led the Qing army to repel all the Li's army and successfully captured Beijing with the Chinese commoners and officials' greeting (Yi 2007, 7:56a).

Kim Gyeong-mun also showed the incomplete part of the wall in Shanhai Pass to Yi Jeong-sin. As Kim Gyeong-mun explained, the reason why the

incomplete part has not been restored is because the Qing court might want to commemorate their glory moment of obtaining the power of the world (Yi 2007, 56a-b).

Other Joseon intellectuals' discourse on Shanhai pass in the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries revealed that the interpretation of Kim Gyeong-mun about the damaged part of Shanhai Pass was still circulated in Joseon. When Seo Gyeong-sun 徐慶淳 (1803-1859) and Pak Sa-ho 朴思浩 (1784-1854), the members of envoys in the mission to Beijing reached Shanhai Pass, they both signified Shanhai Pass as the place for Qing people to engrave their history to become the ruler of China. They had annotated in their records that the Qing emperor asked not to restore it and required to cross this damaged part to remind their glory history and be mindful of the danger during the peaceful time.<sup>38</sup>

Before the Ming-Qing transition, Joseon literati's writing imagined Shanhai Pass as "Ryo-Yeon gugye" (the old boundary between Liao and Yan 遼燕舊界) in the Ming period (Jeong 1988, 1:24a), which was a common geographical understanding on the function of Shanhai Pass in the past. However, scholar Hwang Pogi revealed that Shanhai Pass was re-shaped as "Hwa-i daebye" (the great borderline between Chinese and Barbarians 華夷大界) in the Joseon context after the Ming-Qing transition.<sup>39</sup> Although "Hwa-I daebye" was one of the inscribed boards in Shanhai Pass as early as Ming Dynasty, Hwang (2012, 29) argued that none of the Joseon envoys underlined this concept in their *Yeonhaengrok* until the 18<sup>th</sup> century.

When we read different *Yeonhaengrok*, how could these Joseon intellectuals transmit and create those discourse about the Ming-Qing transition in Shanhai Pass as the site of memory? In the dialogue between Yi and Kim, it evidently demonstrated how the memory of Ming Dynasty was produced and circulated in Joseon. Yi was only interested in the historical story behind Shanhai when he reached the Pass. However, Kim's interpretation of Shanhai Pass was mainly focusing on the story of Wu and the Qing's myth in Shanhai Pass, which gradually produced the new memory on the Pass in Joseon academia. The

38. The original words of Seo Gyeong-sun are "若值皇帝幸行, 則必由此作路, 似是清人遺識興王之跡也." See G. Seo 1960, 2:128b. The original words of Pak Sa-ho are "其後康熙遺教不葺, 皇駕幸關外, 必由此路, 以示安不忘危之意." See Pak 1960, 1:22a.

39. The words of "Hwai taegy" were firstly remarked by Seo Ho-su 徐浩修. See Seo Ho-su, *Yeonhaeng-gi* (Record of a Trip to Beijing 燕行記) in *Yeonhaengrok seonjip*, 4:136a.

37. The original words are: "為問此地是何處, 天下第一山海關, 連雲粉堞渾依舊, 百年文物不勝悲。" Seong 2006, 1: 47b.



dialogue revealed that interpreters had the right to produce a memory of a site for the envoys and shifted their memory in another image on the same site. Although the interpreters shared knowledge may not be accurate, their elaboration produced the collective memory of the intellectuals on how Ming was collapsed, and how Shanhai Pass was the primary site to commemorate the history of Ming's downfall.

### Conclusion: Interpreters and Re-producing Joseon's Ming Memory

Wang Mingke (2011) illustrated that the studies of historical memory did not aim for deconstructing our existing historical knowledge but provide new perspectives to handle the historical sources regarded as the legacy of social memory. Therefore, the historical issues and figures, which were apparently reflected in the texts, were not the only focus of current historical studies, but the individual or social context behind the texts should be revealed to understand the community's identification at that historical time.

In the discourse of this article, the text of *Yeonhaengrok* not only described the experiences of the *Yeonhaeng* mission during the Qing Dynasty but also revealed how the Joseon *Yeonhaengsa* grasped the information of the battlefield of Ming-Qing conflict to emerge their collective shared memory on the Ming Dynasty. In particular, the records of *Yeonhaengrok* exposed the interpreters to play a significant and irreplaceable role in shaping and producing the envoys' memory on the Ming-Qing battlefield. The examples of Yi Jeong-sin's *Yeonhaengrok* demonstrated that Kim Gyeong-mun's interpretation obviously shaped his imagination on the war and that the record of *Yeonhaeng* mission became the circulated memory in the Joseon society.

Indeed, Kim's knowledge has not been recorded in any personal writings and books until Yi Jeong-sin recorded his interpretation as part of his *Yeonhaengrok*. Yi curiously inquired about different matters in the mission, and Kim Gyeong-mun took advantage of his ability and background to share the information. However, the records of Joseon interpreters' information and knowledge were passively selected by the envoys. Kim Gyeong-mun was not able to select the information to be recorded, and only Yi decided to select his concerning story and information, which was obviously influenced by the

“Little China” or “Joseon China” ideology.<sup>40</sup> Therefore, the case study of this article expounded how the interaction between envoys and interpreters shaped their imagination of the “Ming Dynasty” in their commonly believed memory. Envoys' memory on the Ming Dynasty was solidified as the commonly shared idea through their traveling experiences in the sites of Ming-Qing conflict as well as the interpreters' provided intelligence. The interpreters' produced knowledge was evidently identified in different examples of *Yeonhaengrok* after many decades, which explained how knowledge and memory of Ming China was widely circulated in the life of Joseon scholars.

This article explored how the memory of the “Ming Dynasty” was re-constructed in the *Yeonhaengrok* records. Interpreters' knowledge and interpretation not only emerged the imagination of the Ming Dynasty in the Joseon envoys' mind but also re-shaped the self-representation of the Joseon society in the post-Ming period, which facilitated them to identify and affirm their position of a loyalist in the immortal and glorious Ming Empire. The memory studies facilitated this article to create a new perspective for rewriting the history of pre-modern Korea and Qing- Joseon relations. Apart from the historical sites and places about Ming-Qing conflict, the people's biographical information regarding Ming Collapse, the Qing's official historical writing on the Ming-Qing battle or the news about Southern Ming were also the significant “sites of memory” for re-constructing the Joseon's memory of Ming. These connections deserve in-depth studies in the near future to reveal how those memories were constructed and circulated in the late Joseon period.

40. Although the interpreters repeated or reinforced the Joseon scholars' discourse of historical knowledge, their information was the main source to allow the scholars and even the Joseon court to affirm their commonly believed memory.

## References

- Bae, Younghee. 2009. "Yanxinglu de yanjiushi huigu (1933-2008)." 燕行錄的研究史回顧 (1933-2008) [Historical Review of Researches of *Yeonhaengrok*]. *Taida lishi xuebao* 臺大歷史學報 [*Historical Inquiry*] 43: 219-55.
- Baek, Okkyoung. 2006. "Yeokgwan Kim Jinam ui Ilbon cheheom gwa Ilbon insik: 'Dongsaillok' eul jungsim euro" [Interpreter Kim Jinam's Japanese Experiences and Understanding: Case Study of Kim's Records during the Sojourn in Japan]. *Hanguk munhwa yeongu* [Studies of Korean Culture] 10: 169-98.
- . 2012. "18 segi Yeonhaengsa ui jeongbo sujip hwaldong" [Activities of Yeonhaengsa for Collecting Information during the 18<sup>th</sup> Century]. *Myeong-Cheongsa yeongu* [Journal of Ming-Qing Historical Studies] 38: 201-29.
- Chang, An-yeong. 2015. "18 segi jisigindeur-ui nun e bichin yeokgwan tongyeok ui munjejeom gochal: *Nogajae yeonhaeng ilgi*, *Eulbyeong Yeonhaengrok*, *Yeorhailgi* reul jungsim euro" [Observation on Interpreters' Ability in the 18<sup>th</sup> century from the Views of Intellectuals: Case Studies of *Nogajae's Yeonhaeng Diary*, *Yeonhaengrok* in 1765 and the *Jehol* Diary]. *Eomunnonjip* [Collected Works of Language] 62: 349-72.
- Ch'en, Chiehhsien. 1984. "On the Causes of the War between Manchu and Korea in 1636." In *Proceedings of International Conference on China Border Area Studies*, edited by En-shean Lin, 105-16. Taipei: National Chengchi University Press.
- Cheng, Yongchao. 2015. "Kōkeiki no gaikō keiken tsushinshi to enkoshi o chūshin ni" 洪啓禧の外交経験:通信使と燕行使を中心に [Hong Gye-hi's Dipomatic Experience: Missions to Tokugawa Japan and Qing Dynasty] In *Nikkan gakujutsu kōryū-kai: gengo bunka o megutte* 日韓学術交流会:言語文化を巡って [Meeting of Academic Exchange between Japan and Korea: Regarding Language and Culture], edited by Project of Academic Exchange between Japan and Korea, Comparative Studies of Language and Culture, Graduate School at Nagoya University, 136-48. Nagoya: Project of Academic Exchange between Japan and Korea, Graduate School at Nagoya University.
- Cheung, Martha P. Y. 2006. *An Anthology of Chinese Discourse on Translation*. Vol.1 of *From Earliest Times to the Buddhist Project*. Manchester: St. Jerome Publishing.
- Choe, Suk-Jeong. 1988. *Soyojae jip* 逍遙齋集 [Collected Works of Choe Suk-Jeong]. Seoul: Korean Classics Research Institute.
- Choe, Yung-chul. 2012. "Manchu Studies in Korea." *Journal of Cultural Interaction in East Asia* 3: 89-101.
- Chun, Hae-jong. 1968. "Sino-Korean Tributary Relations in the Ch'ing Period." In *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations*, edited by John K. Fairbank, 90-111. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Di Cosmo, Nicola. 2017. "Nurhaci's Gambit: The Concept and Praxis of Sovereignty in the Rise of Manchu Power." In *The Scaffolding of Sovereignty: Global and Aesthetic Perspectives on the History of a Concept*, edited by Zvi Ben-Dor Benite, Stefanos Geroulanos, and Nicole Jerr, 102-23. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Ding, Chennam. 2019. "16-17 segi Joseon Yeonhaengsa ui Jungkuk tongbo sujip hwaldong" [Joseon Emissaries' Intelligence-collecting Activities of Chinese Tong-Bao during the 16-17<sup>th</sup> Centuries]. *Hanguk munhwa* [Korean Culture] 79: 165-201.
- Dongmun hwigo* 同文彙考 [Compendium of Diplomatic Documents]. 1978. Edited by Seungmunwon 承文院 [Office of the Diplomatic Correspondence]. Seoul: National Institute of Korea History.
- Dreyer, Edward L. 1988. "Military Origins of Ming China." In *The Cambridge History of China: Volume 7 The Ming Dynasty 1368-1644 Part 1*, edited by Frederick W. Mote and Denis Twitchett, 58-106. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Fairbank, John King. 1941. "On the Ch'ing Tributary System." *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 6 (2): 135-246.
- Fuma, Susumu. 2015. *Chosen enkoshi to chosen tsushinshi* 朝鮮燕行使と朝鮮通信使 [The Joseon Envoys to China and Japan]. Nagoya: Nagoya University Press.
- Han, Myung-ki. 2015. "The Inestimable Benevolence of Saving a Country on the Brink of Ruin: Joseon-Ming and Joseon-Later Jin Relations in the Seventeenth Century." In *The East Asian War 1592-1598*, edited by James B. Lewis, 278-93. London: Routledge.
- Hon, Tsz-ki. 2011. "A Rock, a Text, and a Tablet: Making the Song Emperors'

- Terrance as Lieu de Mémoire.” In *Places of Memory in Modern China: History, Politics and Identity*, edited by Marc Andre Matten, 133-65. Leiden: Brill.
- Hong, Dae-yong 洪大容. 2000. “Damheom Yeongi” 湛軒燕記 [Hong’s Records of Mission to Beijing]. *Damheom seo* 湛軒書 [Collected Works of Hong Dae-yong]. Seoul: Korean Classics Research Institute.
- Hsi, Angela. 1975. “Wu San-kuei in 1644: A Reappraisal.” *Journal of Asian Studies* 34 (2): 443-53.
- Huang, Chun-chieh. 2015. *East Asian Confucianism: Texts in Contexts*. Taipei: National Taiwan University Press.
- Hwang, Bogi. 2012. “Cong Liaoyan jiuji dao huayi dajie: Chaoxianren bixia de Shanhaiguan yixiang” 從遼燕舊界到華夷大界——朝鮮人筆下的山海關意象 [From the Old Boundary between Liao and Yan to the Boundary Between Chinese and Barbarians: Shanhai Pass in the Koreans’ Representation]. *Qingshi yanjiu* [The Qing History Journal] 4: 28-36.
- . 2013. “Mingqing Chaoxian shizhe bixia de Shanhaiguan” 明清朝鮮使者筆下的山海關 [Shanhai Pass Written by the Korean Envoys in the Ming and Qing Dynasties]. *Hunam daxue xuebao (shehui kexue ban)* [Social Sciences Edition, Journal of Hunan University] 27 (4): 81-85.
- Hwang, Ju-yeon. 2019. “Culture and Affect in Aesthetic Experience of Pictorial Realism: An Eighteenth-Century Korean Literatus’ Reception of Western Religious Painting in Beijing.” *Aisthesis* 12 (1): 175-88.
- Im, Gi-jung. 2002. *Yeonhaengrok yeongu* 燕行錄研究 [Studies of *Yeonhaengrok*]. Seoul: Iljisa.
- Jeong, Mun-bu. 1988. *Nongpo jip* 農圃集 [Works of Master Nongpo]. Seoul: Korean Classics Research Institute.
- Jo, Yoong-hee. 2010. “New Directions for Research and the Tradition of *Yeonhaengrok*.” *The Review of Korean Studies* 13 (2): 135-57.
- Jung, Jae-Hoon. 2010. “Meeting the World through Eighteenth-century Yonhaeng.” *Seoul Journal of Korean Studies* 23 (1): 51-69.
- Kanda, Nobuo. 1951. “Sanhan no ran to Chōsen” 三藩の亂と朝鮮 [Revolt of the Three Feudatories and Joseon]. *Sundai shigaku* [Sundai Historical Studies] 1: 60-75.
- Keliher, Macabe. 2010. *The Board of Rites and the Making of Qing China*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Kim, Chang-eop. 1960. *Nogajae Yeonhaeng ilgi* 老稼齋燕行日記 [Nogajae’s Yeonhaeng Diary]. Seoul: Daedong Institute for Korean Studies, Sungkyunkwan University.
- Kim, Gyeong-seon. 1960. *Yeonwon jigji* 燕輶直指 [Instructions on a Journey to Yanjing]. Seoul: Daedong Institute for Korean Studies, Sungkyunkwan University.
- Kim, Il-hwan. 2012. “Yeohaengnok e natanan guhyeodae ui uimi yeongu” [Study on the Meaning of Guhyeoldae in Yeonhaengnok]. *Hanguk munhwa yeongu* [Studies of Korean Literature] 43: 197-233.
- Kim, Jeong-jung. 1960. *Yeonhaengrok* 燕行錄 [Records of Yeonhaeng Mission]. Seoul: Daedong Institute for Korean Studies, Sungkyunkwan University.
- Kim, Ji-nam 金指南. “Deukchobyeop simal” 得硝法始末 [Origins of the Obtaining the Manual for Making Gunpowder]. *Sinjeon jachobang eonhae* 新傳煮硝方諺解 [Korean Exegesis of New Manual for Making Gunpowder]. Kyujanggak Archive at Seoul National University (古662.2-G421s).
- Kim, Ji-nam, Gyeong-mun Kim, and Tam Yi, eds. 1720 (2006). *Tongmun-gwan ji* 通文館志 [Annals of the Interpretation Bureau]. Seoul: Kyujanggak Institute for Korean Studies.
- Kim, Keuk-seong. 1988. *Kim seonsaeng Ujeong jip* 金先生憂亭集 [Collected Works of Master Kim Keuk-seong]. Seoul: Korean Classics Research Institute.
- Kim, Minho. 2017. “One from the East, One from the West: The Uneasy Encounters between Hong Dae-yong and Augustin Hallerstein in Mid-Eighteenth Century Beijing.” *Acta Koreana* 20 (2): 501-28.
- Kim, Taechun, and Yilhwan Kim. 2014. “Jaje gungwan gwa yeokgwandeur-ui sahaeng sidae” [The Era of Younger Relatives as Military Officer and Interpreters’ Mission]. In *Yeonhaengsa wa tongsinsa* [Missions to Beijing and Missions of Communication], edited by Kwang Jeong, Yukio Fujimoto, and Mun Gyeong Kim, 71-87. Seoul: Pakmunsa.
- Kuwano. Eiji. 2015. “Joseon Korea and Ming China after the Imjin Waeran: State Rituals in the Later Joseon Period.” In *The East Asian War 1592-1598*, edited by James B. Lewis, 294-322. London: Routledge.
- Kye, Seung B. 2014. “The Altar of Great Gratitude: A Korean Memory of Ming China under Manchu Dominance, 1704–1894.” *Journal of Korean Religions* 5 (2): 71-88.
- Lee, Jaekyung. 2014. “Sambeon ui ran jeonhu Joseon ui jeongbo sujip gwa

- jeongse insik” [Joseon’s Acquiring Intelligence and Understanding Situation on Revolt of the Three Feudatories]. *Hanguk saron* [Historical Discourse of Korea] 60: 186-237.
- Lee, Joseph Jeong-il. 2020. “Distancing All Around: Post-Ming China Realpolitik in Seventeenth-Century Korea.” *Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Cultural Review* 9 (1): 297-326.
- Lee, Songmu. 1991. “The Rise of the Chungin and their Characteristics.” *European Journal of Korean Studies* 1: 107-16.
- Li, Shanhong. 2008. “Mingqing shiqi Chaoxian duihua waijiao shijie chutan” 明清時期朝鮮對華外交使節初探 [Brief Study on Joseon’s Mission toward Ming-Qing China]. *Lishi dang’an* [Historical Archives] 2: 55-62.
- Luo, Leran (Law Lok Yin). 2013. “Qingdai Chaoxianren xiyangguan de xingcheng: yi Hong darong yanxing wei yanjiu zhongxin” 清代朝鮮人西洋觀的形成——以洪大容燕行為研究中心 [The Shaping of Joseon’s Views on the West during the Qing Period: Based on the Study of Hong Dae-yong’s Yeonhaeng Mission] *Taiwan Journal of East Asian Studies* 10 (1): 299-34.
- . 2015. “Yangxing shituan daren wenhua meijie de Chaoxian yiguan: yi Jinqingmen wei yanjiu zhongxin” 燕行使團擔任文化媒介的朝鮮譯官——以金慶門為研究中心 [Joseon yeokgwang as Cultural Agents in the Yeonhaengsa Mission: Kim Gyeong-mun as a Case Study]. *Hanxue yanjiu* [Chinese Studies] 33 (3): 345-78.
- . 2016. “Dongya wenhua jiaoliu shiye xia de Chaoxian yiguan juese: yi yiguan Jin zhinam de huodong wei zhongxin” 東亞文化交流視野下的朝鮮譯官角色——以譯官金指南的活動為中心 [The Role of Joseon Interpreter by the Perspectives of East Asian Cultural Interaction: The Study of Kim Ji-nam’s Activities]. *Dongyanghak* [Oriental Studies] 62: 55-76.
- Min, Jeong-jung. 2003. *Nobong seonsaeng munjip*. 老峯先生文集 [Collected Literary Works of Min Nobong]. Seoul: Korean Classics Research Institute.
- Min, Jin-wo. 2001. *Yeonhaengrok* 燕行錄 [Records of Yeonhaeng Mission]. Seoul: Dongguk University Press.
- Nora, Pierre. 1989. “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire.” *Representations* 26: 7-24.
- Pan, Zongyi (Pan Tsungyi). 2019. “Lishi jiyi yanjiu de lilun, shijian yu zhanwang” 歷史記憶研究的理論，實踐與展望 [Theory, Practice, and Prospect of the Studies in Historical Memory]. In *Dangdai lishixue xinqushi* 當代歷史學新趨勢 [Trend of Contemporary Historical Studies], edited by Zhushan Jiang [Chu-shan Chiang], 247-83. Taipei: Lianjing chuban.
- Pak, Je-ga. 1961. *Jeongyujip* 貞莢集 [Collected Works of Pak Jeongyu]. Seoul: National Institute of Korean History.
- Pak, Ji-won. 2000. *Yeonamjip* 燕巖集 [Collected Works of Pak Yeonam]. Seoul: Korean Classics Research Institute.
- Pak, Sa-ho. 1960. *Simjeon go* 心田稿 [Draft Works of Pak Sa-ho]. Seoul: Daedong Institute for Korean Studies, Sungkyunkwan University.
- Rothman, E. Natalie. 2012. *Brokering Empire: Trans-Imperial Subjects between Venice and Istanbul*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Roux, Pierre-Emmanuel. 2016. “The Catholic Experience of Joseon Envoys in Beijing: A Contact Zone and the Circulation of Religious Knowledge in the Eighteenth Century.” *Acta Koreana* 19 (1): 9-44.
- Seo, Gyeong-sun. 1960. *Monggyeongdang ilsa* 夢經堂日史 [Daily Records of Seo Gyeong-sun]. Seoul: Daedong Institute for Korean Studies, Sungkyunkwan University.
- Seo, Ho-su. 1960. *Yeonhaeng-gi* 燕行記 [Record of a Trip to Beijing]. Seoul: Daedong Institute for Korean Studies, Sungkyunkwan University.
- Seong, Yi-seong. 2006. *Gyeseo ilgo* 溪西逸稿 [Draft Manuscript of Seong Yiseong]. Seoul: Korean Classics Research Institute.
- Sun, Weiguo. 2007. *Daming Qihao yu xiao zhonghua yishi: Chaoxian wangchao zunzhousiming wenti yanjiu* 大明旗號與小中華意識：朝鮮王朝尊周思明問題研究 1637-1800 [The Banner of the Great Ming and the Idea of Little China: The Joseon Dynasty’s Admiring Zhou Dynasty and Commemorating Ming]. Beijing: Commercial Press.
- . 2012. “An Analysis of the ‘Little China’ Ideology of Joseon Korea.” *Frontiers of History in China* 7 (2): 220-39.
- . 2018. *Cong zunming dao fengqing Chaoxian wangchao dui Qing yishi de shanbian* 從「尊明」到「奉清」——朝鮮王朝對清意識的嬗變 [From “Honoring the Ming” to “Submitting to the Qing”: The Transformation of Joseon Korea’s Attitude towards Qing China, 1627-1910]. Taipei: National Taiwan University Press.
- Swope, Kenneth M. 2014. *The Military Collapse of China’s Ming Dynasty, 1618-44*. London: Routledge.
- Wang, Ming-ke. 2011. “Lishi shishi, lishi jiyi yu lishi xinxing” 歷史事實，



- 歷史記憶與歷史心性 [Historical Facts, Historical Memory and Historical Mentality]. *Lishi yanjiu* [Historical Research] 5: 139.
- Wang, Yuancong. 2015. "Claiming Centrality in the Chinese World: Manchu-Joseon Relations and the Making of the Qing's 'Zhongguo' Identity, 1616-43." *The Chinese Historical Review* 22 (2): 95-119.
- . 2018. *Remaking the Chinese Empire: Manchu-Korean Relations, 1616-1911*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Watanuki, Tetsuro. 2017. "Zailun Zu dashou yu zujianjiang" 再論祖大壽與祖家將 [Re-examining Zu Dashou and the Zu family's Private Generals]. *Jilin shifan daxue xuebao (renwen shehui kexue ban)* [Humanities & Social Science Edition, Journal of Jilin Normal University] 45 (6): 26-40.
- Weedon, Chris, and Glenn Jordan. 2012. "Collective Memory: Theory and Politics." *The Cultural Politics of Memory* 22 (2): 143-53.
- Wu, Zhengwei (Wu Cheng-wei). 2015. *Juanjuan Mingchao: Chaoxian shiren de Zhongguo lunshu yu wenhua xintai* 眷眷明朝—朝鮮士人的中國論述與文化心態 [Reluctantly Remembering Ming Dynasty: Joseon Scholars' Discourse of China and Cultural Attitude]. Taipei: Xiuwei zixun.
- Yang, O-jin. 2001. "Han-guk eseo ui Jungguk-eo yeokgwan yangseong e daehan yeoksajeok gochal" [Historical Observation on the Training of Interpreters of Spoken Chinese in Korea]. *Jungguk eoneo yeongu* [Studies of Chinese Language] 11: 1-33.
- Yang, Yulei. 2011. *Yanxing yu Zhongchao wenhua guanxi* 燕行與中朝文化關係 [Yeonhaeng and Sino-Joseon Cultural Relations]. Shanghai: Shanghai cishu chubanshe.
- Ye, Gaoshu. 1996. "Chaoxian Lichaoshilu suojian junchen dui Sanfanzhiluan de taidu" 朝鮮《李朝實錄》所見君臣對「三藩之亂」的態度 [Joseon Ruler and Officials' Attitude on Revolt of the Three Feudatories through the Veritable Records of Joseon Kingdom]. *Furen lishi xuebao* [Fu Jen Historical Journal] 8: 167-84.
- Yi, Chun-hui. 2009. *19 segi Han-Jung munhak gyoru: Yi Sangjeok ul jungsim euro* [Literature Exchange between Korea and China in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century, Case Study of Yi Sangjeok] Seoul: Saemunsa.
- Yi, Hae-ung. 1960. *Gyesan gijeong* 蔚山紀程 [Records of the Journey to Gyesan]. Seoul: Daedong Institute for Korean Studies, Sungkyunkwan University.
- Yi, Jeong-sin. 2007. *Yeogong yugo* 樸翁遺稿 [Draft Manuscript of Yi Yeogong]. Seoul: Korean Classics Research Institute.
- Yi, Sanggu. 2012. "17 segi jeonban ui Jo-II gwangye jeongae wa waehak yeokgwan jedo ui byeonhwa" [The Development of Joseon-Japan Relations in the Early 17<sup>th</sup> century and the System and Evolution of the Interpreters of Spoken Japanese]. *Joseon sidaesa hakbo* [Journal of History in Joseon Period] 62: 251-29.
- Yi, Seung-so. 1988. *Samtanjip* 三灘集 [Collected Works of Yi Seungso]. Seoul: Korean Classics Research Institute.
- Yu, Cheok-gi. 2001. *Simhaengrok* 潘行錄 [Records of Mission to Shenyang]. Seoul: Dongguk University Press.
- Zhang, Cunwu (Chang Tsun-wu). 1985. *Qinghan zongfan maoyi* 清韓宗藩貿易 [Zongfan Trade between the Qing and Korea]. Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica.

---

Dr. **LAW Lok Yin** (lylaw@hkmu.edu.hk) is an Assistant Professor of Social Sciences and Research Fellow of Public and Social Policy Research Centre at the School of Arts and Social Sciences, Hong Kong Metropolitan University. Before that, he completed his PhD in Chinese (Humanities) at Nanyang Technological University, MA in Comparative and Public History at The Chinese University of Hong Kong, and his undergraduate studies at Hong Kong Baptist University. His research interests include history of Sino-Korean relations, Cultural History of East Asia, and History and Culture of Hong Kong.

## Abstract

Manchus conquered Beijing and re-structured the social and political order of China in the 1640s. Meanwhile, Joseon Korea necessitated following the Qing's new tributary rituals to appoint envoys visiting China regularly, although Joseon intellectuals refused to accept the Qing's new order. Joseon's mission route to Beijing was the primary battlefield for the Ming-Qing conflict. It provided opportunities for them to encounter different battlefield sites, such as Ningyuan and Shanhai Pass. In looking for the glory of the Ming Dynasty, some Joseon intellectuals were curious about the places of the Ming-Qing transition. As a result, members frequently asked the appointed interpreters for interpretation of the information. Interpreters acquired extensive experiences in China and widespread network with Chinese to collect information of the past. Joseon intellectuals relied on interpreters' elaboration to understand the history of the Ming-Qing transition and even recorded the intelligence in their *Yeonhaengrok*. The record was circulated as the intellectuals' shared memory of the Ming-Qing transition in Joseon intellectuals' circle. This article attempts to address how the Joseon interpreters worked as the "cultural broker" to utilize their social network and knowledge to construct the discourse of the conflict during the Ming-Qing transition for re-shaping the memory of Joseon intellectuals on Ming Empire. The article's argument demonstrated the Joseon interpreters as an intermediary, who operated the cultural contact zone in East Asia to produce and circulate the knowledge in China for the Joseon community to create their own memory of the past.

**Keywords:** Joseon interpreters, *Yeonhaengrok*, historical memory, Ming Dynasty