

Political Sociology of *Kwagöch ŏngsan* in South Korea

Cho Hee-yeon

This paper examines the dynamics of *kwagöch ŏngsan*, which previous studies have failed to consider from the perspective of political sociology. The process of *kwagöch ŏngsan* in South Korea, far from being unilinear, is complex, complicated, and tension ridden. I shall attempt to overcome the theoretical boundary set by the diversity of individual *kwagöch ŏngsan* cases to construct a general theoretical framework for the dynamics of *kwagöch ŏngsan*.

Kwagöch ŏngsan is not simply concerned with the past but is very much an effort here and now prescribed by the dynamics of the present class and social struggles. The redress of past injustices itself becomes an issue related to the present, which in itself, makes such redress all the more difficult. In this sense, it can be said that *kwagöch ŏngsan* makes slow progress in the here and now struggles from below despite certain political limitations.

Keywords: kwagöch ŏngsan, political space for redressing past injustices, Korean democratization movement

1. Introduction

Over the years, the issue of *kwagöch ŏngsan* (often translated as settling or redressing past injustices) has been the main focus and task of various South Korean social movements. Usually, the redress deals with the issues or events of the past whose facts are yet to be disclosed, thus carries an implication of being acts of justice by the oppressed or

the victims. In most cases, the redress focuses on crimes against humanity such as massacres. In South Korean society, there have been relentless demands for fact finding and reinstatement of the victims' impaired reputations related the Kwangju Massacre, the Cheju April 3 Incident (or Uprising), and the civilian massacres of the Korean War, whose facts all have remained undisclosed and the responsible unpunished.

Although only a few studies specifically dealing with the concept of *kwagöch öngsan* have been carried out, there have been a myriad of studies on undisclosed or suppressed cases or massacres. Unlike these previous studies that are mostly descriptive, this paper aims to construct a general framework of analysis on the dynamics of the redress of past injustices.

The most representative case to become the focus of *kwagöch öngsan* is mass killing or massacres committed by state power. In the case of South Korea, the Cheju April 3 Incident, the civilian massacres of the Korean War, and the Kwangju Massacre would fall into this category. Accordingly, there have been academic and practical attempts to resolve the task of *kwagöch öngsan* concerning the massacres. In academia, many suggestive papers were written dealing with the issue and the ways it should be resolved. In particular, a considerable amount of case studies have accumulated. On the Kwangju Massacre, a special fact finding committee published a National Assembly report in 1988 (Oilp al kwangju minjuhwaundongjinsangjosa t ükp ýölwíwonhoe 1990). The National Commission on the Cheju April 3 Incident made an official report of the Cheju April 3 Incident (Chejusasamsagön chinsanggyumyöng mit hüisaengja myöngyehoebokwiwonhoe 2003). Furthermore, there have been numerous papers on specific cases of massacres that have attempted to formulate a general theory on *kwagöch öngsan* instead of being descriptive only.¹

This paper examines the dynamics of *kwagöch öngsan*, which previous studies have failed to consider from the perspective of political sociology. The process of *kwagöch öngsan* in South Korea, far from being unilinear, is complex, complicated, and tension ridden. I shall attempt to overcome the theoretical boundary set by the diversity of individual *kwagöch öngsan* cases to construct a general theoretical framework for the dynamics of *kwagöch öngsan*.

2. Theoretical Background

Kwagöch öngsan, or redressing the past injustices, refers to a process that includes fact-finding of abuse of power and crimes against humanity committed by a state or a group in power and realizing justice by punishing the violators and compensating the victims. In every case of *kwagöch öngsan*, uncovering or vindication of suppressed truth is always involved. There is also a dichotomy of the crime(s) and criminal(s) versus the victim(s). In this sense, redress is only possible through long-term struggles and efforts by the victims who have been constrained in pursuing fact-finding and justice by the power of the criminals.

Generally, the precondition of redress is a political shift. When the old regime is replaced with a new one by mass resistance from below, a judicatory process demanding legal and moral responsibilities of the 'criminal' acts of the state begins. In the case of a regime with low support from its people attempting to maintain its existence by severe state violence but fails, a demand for *kwagöch öngsan* of the old regime's state violence that are criminal in nature is usually made. If the state violence under the old regime includes crimes against human-

1. Studies on the civilian massacres of the Korean War by Kang Jeong-gu (1996), Kim Tong-ch'un (2000), and Han gŭkchönjaeng chönhu minganinhaksal chinsanggyumyöng põmgukminwihoe (2001) and on the Kwangju struggle by Chöng Kön-shik (2001) are more than case studies as they attempted to formulate a general theory on *kwagöch öngsan*. The special issue of *Korea Journal* Vol. 42, No. 3 titled "The Issue of Settling the Past in Modern Korean History" is an attempt to comprehensively analyze the various issues of *kwagöch öngsan* and to extend the discussion to outside of Korea by dealing with the redress of pro-Japanese collaboration, the civilian massacres of the Korean War, the redress of the April 19 Revolution period, the suspicious deaths in the dictatorial regime, and the *kwagöch öngsan* of the transition process to democracy. Aside from these publications, there are also studies by Pak Won-sun (1996), Kim Tong-ch'un (2001), Cho Hee-yeon ed. (2001), Sö Süng (2000), Han gŭkchöngshinyön' guhoe ed. (1997), Kang Sang-hyön (2002), and Yöksamunjeoyön guso, Yöksahakyön guso, Chejusasamyön guso, and Han gŭkyöksayön guhoe eds. (1998).
2. Here, what is 'criminal or illegal' may differ according to the opinions of the people of the new regime. Often, when the activities, such as anti-dictatorship struggles, which have been legally oppressed and repressed by the old regime gain the wide support of the people, the very legal acts of oppression and repression become the objects of redress and punishment in the new regime. In particular, acts that violate the universal rights guaranteed by democracy such as torture and massacres become the prime objects of redress.

ity³ like barbaric massacre, genocide, or torture, the need for and the legitimacy of redress becomes greater, ultimately becoming a moral responsibility. Such a process is generally called *yoksach òngsan* (redress of history) or *kwagöch òngsan*. The reason why the process of bringing justice to the Jewish holocaust under the German Nazis has been continued to this day since the end of World War II can be explained in this context. In South Korea, the efforts to punish the ruling power as the totalitarian dictatorship is replaced by a democratic system through a mass resistance from below, as in the case of the June Great Democratic Struggle of 1987, developed into a form of *kwagöch òngsan*.

But then what makes something an object of redress? Such a question arises because not all acts of the old regime are considered objects of redress. As a matter of fact, there is no clear line distinguishing one from the other. An act becomes an object of redress and punishment when it is defined as unethical and immoral from the perspective of the people whose consciousness has been changed. Especially, massacres, rape, extreme racial discrimination, and genocide become objects of redress as they are defined to be arbitrary violence of the state or abuse of power. In this sense, a question of whether the act was legal or illegal at the time when it was carried out is unimportant. Torture was and is illegal from the moment it is committed while a garrison decree had an effect of a positive law when it was promulgated. Nevertheless, what was considered legal may be re-defined as unjust or illegal according to the developments of politics and people's consciousness. Of course, even the most extreme acts of violence that are justified as legitimate acts of the state must have a consensus among rulers, the very actors of such deeds. With this consensus as a premise, the acts of the old regime become the objects of *kwagöch òngsan*. In this sense, redress deals with the violence of the old regime that has gained the consensus of the people that such was unethical and immoral. In other words, the

3. It is estimated that 3,000 persons were killed by torture and more than 100,000 people have disappeared during the military rule of Pinochet who came into power after having overthrown the Allende regime in 1973. It is also reported that 30,000 people in Argentina have disappeared as a result of the Junta's 'dirty war' carried out against the leftists. In 1974, 200,000 or so East Timorese out of a total population of 800,000 were killed during the Indonesian occupation after the withdrawal of the Portuguese.

redress of past injustices carries with it an ethical dimension.

If so, then what determines its ethical dimension? It is the victims, or broadly speaking, the subjectivity of the people, such as an awareness of rights. The acts that become objects of redress may not be considered illegal at the time when they are carried out. However, unethical acts may become illegal as people become increasingly aware of their rights through various struggles against the ruling system that have maintained diverse forms of oppression, discrimination, and inhumane violence. The reason why tyranny and atrocities of the rulers and the abuse of state once thought to be the ruler's prerogative is questioned is due to an increase in awareness of people's rights.

The subject of redress also broadens as the degree of the people's subjectivity increases. For example, the massacres of Gypsies during the Medieval Age, oppression of gay and lesbians, and violent repression of pagans themselves have never been raised as issues but were buried and forgotten as historical facts.⁴ However, with the development of democracy and changes in people's awareness of their rights, the issue of redress is expanded and realized through democratic and institutionalized channels. In fact, the declaration of human rights as universal values by the United Nations Human Rights Declaration and the recent establishment of the International Court of Justice by the international community to punish crimes against humanity are prime examples of such development and change.

People's struggles to reform a regime sometimes take the form of revolution that results in a revolutionary change of the ruling system. However, most often, such struggles are in the form of passive revolution demanding reform of the ruling system. The changes in the ruling system are carried out using various means ranging from active to passive revolution. When such changes occur, a new regime comes into power with the question of dealing with the discrimination, oppression, and inhumane violence committed by the old regime. In particular, when a consensus is formed amongst the people that recognized past

4. In the case of homosexuals and lesbians, SöTong-jin (1993) traces how homosexual identity was established through transition from an oppressive period when it was considered a sin or disease through to modern society.

oppression and discrimination carried out by the old regime as inhumane and immoral, the issue of redressing these acts of oppression and discrimination is naturally raised.

In addition, the actors who commit such oppression and discrimination may be individuals or the state itself. In the case of individuals, their acts are prosecuted and punished by the state, however, when the actions are taken by the state itself, there is no higher authority to punish the state. For this reason, *kwagöch öngsan* is closely related to state power.⁵ Therefore, *kwagöch öngsan* primarily concerns the abuse and arbitrary use of violence by state power (Stohl and Lopez eds. 1994). In the context of modern society, *kwagöch öngsan* is especially demanded when the acts of the ruling power go beyond the boundary of modern legality and become acts of violence considered to be inhumane and immoral. In fact, the concept of state power implies that there is a consensus that the state's violence towards its people is legitimate. However, *kwagöch öngsan* is the very process of questioning such legitimacy of state violence.⁶ Nevertheless, this violence always involves a certain kind of violence that is ruthless, thus, it refers to state violence in a broad sense.

A clear difference exists in the nature of questioning state violence in pre-modern and modern societies. *Kwagöch öngsan* examined in this paper is the redresses premised on modern democracy. Of course, *kwagöch öngsan* was demanded even in pre-modern society. For example, there were cases of honor restoration of a family who have been wrongfully defamed (*pyegamangshin*) or 'wrongful deaths' of the past thrones during the Chosön period. There were also numerous cases where particular past grievances were settled by the supreme ruler. Be that as it may, the *kwagöch öngsan* of the pre-modern period

5. State power, the subject of criminal acts, is often exercised by oppressive state organs — organs with physical power like the army and the police — and state agents. However, sometimes, civilian groups like militia or foreign powers like the US may also be involved in the use of state power. In the case of the civilian massacres of the Vietnam War, the Korean Army was the foreign power that committed atrocities.

6. The reason why state violence (or state power) committed by a past regime becomes the focus of *kwagöch öngsan* is because even if the power of the ruler is recognized and legitimized through legal means, it does not mean every use of that power is legitimized.

usually depended on the subjective attitude or good will of the ruler. In other words, redress depended on the attitude change of the very person who had the capacity to wield state violence. However, in modern democratic society that has since undergone a revolution, redress is carried out in an institutional manner through legal channels. The difference between the pre-modern and modern periods is whether *kwagöch ōngsan* takes the form of a legal procedure or is resolved in a court of justice. This is because a change of relation between the people and the ruler took place in modern democratic society and as a result, the people are able to question the illegitimacy of the state power through various legal procedures or through collective action. Therefore, in modern democratic society, state power is never made legitimate unconditionally. A political space is created where the people can demand justice in the case of abuse or the illegal use of state violence that goes against the principles of democracy. When the power of the state is abused to maintain the status quo or used in illegal means to oppress the dissenting struggle resulting in deaths of innocent people, an opportunity arises within the democratic institution to make a legal complaint. It is possible for immoral acts of violence committed by the state in a certain period to be seen as legitimate through the ruling ideology or in the name of a higher purpose like national security. At the time of the violence, they may have been legitimized by the laws of society. Sometimes, they are justified as a means to overcome national 'crisis' in the sense of sacrificing the minority for the majority. Nevertheless, these acts of violence are re-defined as inhumane or undemocratic, thus, the demand to redress these past 'crimes' are made.⁷

As discussed so far, *kwagöch ōngsan* has the following features that

7. See Cho Hee-yeon (2002) for state violence and the victims of the democratic struggle. In principle, the relief of serious human rights violations like civilian massacres includes honor restoration, compensation, punishment of the violators, and preventative measures (Kang Kūm-shil 2002: 266). The general principles of *kwagöch ōngsan* are best shown by the five great principles on the resolution of the Kwangju question. The demands of the May movement — Fact finding, punishment of the criminals, compensation, honor restoration, and commemorative activities — became an important guideline for other *kwagöch ōngsan* cases (Chōng Kūn-shik 2001).

are distinguished from simply punishing past criminal acts. First, there has to be a social consensus determining a past act as inhumane. Regardless of whether such an act falls under the prerogative of the absolute ruler, if a common understanding sets in that it is inhumane and immoral and must be brought to justice, then grounds for the demand of redress are created. In other words, *kwagöch öngsan* contains an ethical dimension. Second, therefore, the redress concerns acts such as torture, massacre, rape, genocide, etc., or certain tolerated or necessary acts used to maintain a regime, such as war. To be sure, deaths of civilians accompany war. Many people also die in power struggles. However, what the redress targets is an act of violence that was unnecessary and inhumane but was carried out for a certain political purpose. In this sense, the object of redress is unrelated to the fact of whether it was legal or not at the time. Third, the most important theme of *kwagöch öngsan* is state power or the arbitrary use of violence. In other words, when the ruling power or institution of power abuses the very power it has been given the right to use, the legitimacy of abuse comes into question and redress is demanded. Fourth, *kwagöch öngsan* is a modern phenomenon in nature. This is because laws or institutions guarantee resistance against the abuse of state power under modern democracy. Under modern democracy, there is a rule for the use of state power, the so called rule of domination by the people. However, when excessive violence, inhumane discrimination, or an arbitrary act that goes against such rule is committed, that act will become an object of redress later on. Fifth, *kwagöch öngsan* is raised as an issue or is demanded at a time of political change, the reason being that the people's awareness of their rights increases and more people become critical of the criminal acts of their past rulers as they experience political change.

Having considered the general features of *kwagöch öngsan*, it is now important to realize that individual cases of *kwagöch öngsan*, in reality, do not take a single form but are very diverse. They take not a unilinear process but a very complex and complicated one. First, an opportunity for *kwagöch öngsan* arises with political change. When the ruling regime or ruler who has committed injustice is overthrown, an opportunity is provided for the demand of redress. However, how this political change is carried out directly affects how or in what form

kwagöch ŏngsan will be realized. In other words, *kwagöch ŏngsan* will take different forms depending on whether the old regime is overthrown by a revolution from below or a compromise from above.

In the case of revolutionary transition from below, reforms or restoration would be carried out by a completely new group of people. Having no ties to the old regime, they would be able to carry out *kwagöch ŏngsan* without compromise. For example, in France after the bourgeois revolution, the oppression and tyranny of the *ancient regime* were considered to be anti-national crimes and the people associated with the old regime were guillotined. The radical and uncompromising *kwagöch ŏngsan* that was carried out in France after the collapse of Germany Nazism is another example.⁸

On the contrary, in the case of political change of a compromise from above with the old ruling power taking the initiative, a *kwagöch ŏngsan* takes on a very complex process with contested characteristics. On the complexity of *kwagöch ŏngsan* attempted after a political change from above, the degree of complexity is elevated by the fact that certain issues of redress fail to be raised while some realized redresses fail to bring complete justice. In particular, when the continuity of the old regime in the new regime is strong, it becomes much harder to raise the issue of *kwagöch ŏngsan*. As a result, the issues to be redressed are isolated and marginalized and all responsibilities are handed down to the victims who now must engage in a new and difficult struggle to realize the redress. As the victims carry out a long and hard struggle to re-raise the issue of *kwagöch ŏngsan*, they may gain another opportunity to realize it. If the issues of *kwagöch ŏngsan* that were raised to deal with the remnants of the old regime after a political change are called 'current issues,' these past issues that failed to be raised the first

8. In August 1944, when Paris was liberated from German occupation, France immediately opened a Court of Justice to deal with Nazi collaborators. As a result, more than 990,000 Nazi collaborators were sentenced. Among them, 6,700 were executed, 2,700 sent to hard labor for life, 10,000 sent to hard labor, and 22,800 were imprisoned (Chu Söp-il 1999). Of course, complete political break and harsh punishment do not have to be simultaneous. Han Hong-gu (2003: 106) argues that "even if the independent fighters including the Provisional Government group came into power, the scope of *injökch ŏngsan* (redress and punishment of individuals) would not be wide as what happened in France."

time and remained unsettled can be called ' historical issues. ' Current issues of redress are those that are raised immediately as current affair issues after the change of the regime. However, historical issues are raised when the victims or dissenting groups rebuild their struggles to raise the forgotten or marginalized issues back to the level of public discourse.

Contested characteristics of *kwagŏch ŏngsan* are mainly due to the resistance of the old ruling power or related people. Since redress includes punishment and investigation of state violence committed by the old regime, they are inevitably confronted with the strong resistance from individuals — sometimes even their descendents — or groups who were once part of the old regime. In other words, surviving individuals or groups of the old regime mobilize institutional or non-institutional means at their disposal to resist any attempt by the victims or advocacy groups to demand *kwagŏch ŏngsan*, which will eventually demand justice and punishment.⁹ Especially, in the case of a compromising transition when the individuals or groups of the old regime maintain strong institutional or non-institutional power, a much stronger resistance will be made against any attempt of *kwagŏch ŏngsan*.

Of course, there are differences between current issues and historical issues. One difference is the expiration of statutory limitation for prosecution. Current issues are those whose statutory limitations have not expired whereas for historical issues, their statutory limitations have expired and thus are not concerned with the prosecution of the violators. For example, the issue of *ch inilch ŏngsan* (redressing pro-Japanese collaboration) raised during the Kim Dae-jung government, popularly called the people 's government, is an example of the latter while the demand of a fact-finding investigation of the torture of Kim Kŭn-t 'ae in the Kim Young-sam government, also known as the civilian government, would fall into the former category. Of course, such a difference can be eliminated as the National Assembly takes legal mea-

9. After Nelson Mandela took power in South Africa in 1994, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was formed to investigate the apartheid of the old regime and other criminal acts without ' punishment. ' Nevertheless, it was met with repeated interference or terrorist threats.

asures to suspend the period of statutory limitation or legislate a retrospective law as in the cases of the Jewish Holocaust. Nevertheless, historical issues mainly concern ethical and political dimensions and not the punishment of the crime. Therefore, there is a clear difference in how strong the violators resist depending on whether the redress is a current or historical issue.

In addition, the resistance to *kwagöch ŏngsan* does not always come from the violators themselves. Any individual or group in the present time who is tied to the past in question or who has ideological legitimacy in association with the past can resist the redress. For example, in March 2003, an old cylinder printer of the *Chosŏn Ilbo* was removed from Independence Hall. It was strongly resisted by the *Chosŏn Ilbo* since the issue of pro-Japanese collaboration at the time of the removal was closely related to the ethical legitimacy of the *Chosŏn Ilbo* whose records during Japanese colonialism are in question.

The resistance of the old ruling power is primarily directed towards deterring the process of *kwagöch ŏngsan* becoming a social issue. Their efforts to hinder such a process are carried out using their institutional and non-institutional power — it includes the media. The next step is to interfere with the attempt to perform fact-finding investigations on torture, suspicious deaths, and massacres committed under the old regime. Sometimes, they denounce *kwagöch ŏngsan* as “an attempt to hinder social unity by uncovering the past, ‘destroy the evidence, deny accusations, or intentionally withhold information to make investigation difficult. Instead of admitting wrongdoings and seeking forgiveness from the victims by disclosing the truth, they consistently resist the fact-findings by denying their guilt and evade any responsibility. Once this fails, they then try to minimize the scope of compensation and honor restoration of the past victims in the process of redress or, if everything fails, uncooperatively participate in the process. In such circumstances, *kwagöch ŏngsan* would be carried out incompletely or as a token gesture. In the presence of threats from the violators or social psychological pressures resisting the redress, another possibility would be a demand of impunity from the victims. Unlike the resistance from the old ruling power, such a demand of impunity from the victims adds further complexity to the contested characteristics of *kwagöch ŏngsan*.

Based on what has been discussed so far, *kwagöch öngsan* are present struggles around past issues (Hirsch 1995). It is ' here and now ' in that its nature and scope are determined by present power relations. A discussion on the concept of ' political space for redressing past injustices ' may be useful here.¹⁰ Political space for redressing past injustices implies that an opportunity to put forth a political and social agenda to re-examine the criminal state violence committed under the past regime is given. In this sense, *kwagöch öngsan* is not a historical excavation but a present struggle. This political space for redressing the past injustices itself is the product of class struggle and on-going struggles to demand redress are an extension of class and social struggle. In other words, power relations formed by present class and social struggle defines and determines the complexity of *kwagöch öngsan*. Thus, the political space for redressing past injustices defines the qualitative characteristic of *kwagöch öngsan*. In this sense, this paper is able to put forward the expression of a ' political sociological analysis of *kwagöch öngsan*. '

Going back to the previous discussion, such political space for redressing past injustices is characterized by the structural or macroscopic relations, on one hand, and a specific mode according to present struggles taking place in the matrix of power relations. Related to the former, the macroscopic characteristic of *kwagöch öngsan* is determined by the general nature of political change — whether it is a revolution overthrowing the old regime from below or a compromise from above — as mentioned above. A redress cannot take place outside the terrain generated by the present power struggle. In the case of South Korea after 1987, when the old ruling power had succeeded in its return to office, it was impossible for redress to take a revolutionary form.

However, despite such a limitation, the form of *kwagöch öngsan* or *yöksach öngsan* may differ depending on the subjective activities in the space ' here and now. ' Moreover, this space for redressing the past

10. Another concept for such political space could be Tarrow 's concept of ' political opportunities ' (Tarrow 1994). Political opportunities are determined by the structural characteristic of change such as change from below or change from above.

injustices can be expanded to a certain degree as the bereaved families or social movement continue to raise the level of struggle.¹¹ Here, the scope of *kwagŏch ōngsan* depends on how hard the bereaved families or social movement struggle to try to generate a social issue. The transition from the old to the new regime provides a minimum space for redressing past injustices. Unlike the past, a space is created where a redress of a past injustice can be publicly demanded. Nevertheless, such a space does not automatically lead to *kwagŏch ōngsan*. It is the struggle of the bereaved families or social movement against the resistance of the actors of the past injustices that leads to the redress.

3. *Kwagŏch ōngsan* in the Liberation and the April 19 Revolution Periods and Their Failures

With such a theoretic framework, I will now examine the various struggles and rows that took place around the issue of redress found in contemporary Korean history. Political changes in certain periods after liberation provided opportunities for the issues of *kwagŏch ōngsan* to be on the social agenda in Korean society. First, the period between the liberation and the end of the Korean War was a period of class and social struggles centered on the issue of defining the characteristics of the Korean nation-state (it includes the task of *ch inilch ōngsan*, redressing and punishing pro-Japanese collaboration).

After liberation, Korean society had, on one hand, the task of nation building while on the other hand, the task of removing the vestiges of Japanese colonialism. The main objective related to the latter task would be *kwagŏch ōngsan*. As mentioned already, the fate of *kwagŏch ōngsan* is heavily dependent on the characteristics of the political space at the time. For example, once the US military government changed its plan from building a joint government of the Left and

11. According to Chŏng Kŭn-shik (2001), in the beginning of the struggle for *kwagŏch ōngsan*, it was the survivors or bereaved families with *puch 'aeüshik* (a feeling of indebtedness) to the deaths who started the movement. However, as the truths were disclosed by the efforts of these people, yet another feeling of indebtedness emerges among the people toward the initiators of the movement.

Right to a building an anti-communist pro-American government, *ch 'inilch õngsan* confronted a huge political obstacle. Those supposed to be brought to justice on charge of being in the pro-Japanese group, the *ch 'inilp 'a*, began resisting in various ways to frustrate the efforts to realize *ch 'inilch õngsan*. Moreover, having transformed to anti-Communists, these *ch 'inilp 'a* were able to succeed in de-prioritizing the task of *ch 'inilch õngsan* in the protection of the US. Looking at more closely, the National Assembly legislated the " Act on the Punishment of Korean Traitors, "Sept. 22, 1948 and by Sept. 1949, the Special Commission for Korean Traitors, Panmintũkwi, processed a total of 682 cases involving 305 pro-Japanese figures who were arrested, 173 remaining wanted, and 61 who gave themselves up. As a result, 559 persons were sent to the special prosecutor and 202 were charged. One person was sentenced to death while one received life in prison. Aside from these two, twelve served prison sentences, eighteen had their rights suspended, six were cleared of their charges, and two had their sentences discharged. Even those imprisoned were all free by 1950. Nevertheless, the task of *ch 'inilch 'õngsan* was never fulfilled as the members of the Special Commission were terrorized and condemned as pro-communists while the accused defended themselves by calling themselves the patriots who subjugated the Communist Party. The fate of the Special Commission came to an end as armed policemen attacked its office following an order from President Rhee Syngman who was pressured by the Right on June 6, 1949 (Kim Chin-kuk and Chõng Ch áng-hyõn 2000: 71). Furthermore, with the assassination of Kim Ku, pen name Paekpõm, 20 days later, the task of *ch 'inilch õngsan* was quickly turning into a historical issue due to the terror of the Right. As such, the struggle of *kwagõch 'õngsan* around the issue of *ch 'inilch 'õngsan* during the liberation period ended short of its aim and as the division of the Korean peninsula began to set in place, the task of *kwagõch õngsan* was also marginalized and the process came to a halt.

The Korean War changed the urgency of *ch 'inilch 'õngsan* into something historical and at the same time created another issue for *kwagõch õngsan*, the civilian massacres. This issue deals with various civilian massacres committed during the Korean War, including the civilian massacres carried out during the Cheju April 3 Uprising.¹² The

civilian massacres during and after the Korean War consist of mass killings of civilians by the US, South Korean Army special forces, police, and non-regular militia like Söbukch öngryöndan (Söbuk Youth Corps) that make up one category as South Korean Right and the killings by the Left which include North Korean People 's Army, partisans, and local leftists. The killings were known to be indiscriminate as the members of Podoyömmaeng (National Guidance League) from south of P'yöngtaek, detainees, residents of the remote areas, refugees, rebels, communists, and other innocent civilians were killed.¹³ Furthermore, it was not only the North and South Korean armies, the US army also committed massacres. Unlike conventional acts of war, these civilian massacres were carried out in revenge or as plain ruthless acts, thus they have become an issue for *kwagöch öngsan*. However, they were suppressed by the conditions created by anti-communist sentiment that prevailed in South Korea after the Korean War.

Another important struggle of *kwagöch öngsan* took place after the Rhee Syngman regime was overthrown by the April 19 Revolution, a student and civilian led revolution in the 1950s. After the success of the revolution, a myriad of *kwagöch öngsan* issues were raised to deal with those who were responsible for the killing of demonstrators, corrupt politicians and bureaucrats, and even the unsettled *ch 'inilch 'öngsan* and civilian massacres during and after the Korean War (Sawolhyökmyöngyönguso ed. 1990: 361-2). If the corrupted election and political corruptions of the Rhee Syngman regime that started the April 19 Revolution were the ' current issues ' of *kwagöch öngsan*, then, *ch 'inilch 'öngsan* and civilian massacre issues were ' historical issues. '

New political space for *kwagöch öngsan* was created. The process of *kwagöch öngsan* that was discontinued in the liberation period was revived again with the emergence of a new political space. With the

12. For more information on the Cheju April 3 Uprising, see Chemin Ilbo April 3 Reporting Team (1994-1998) and Yang Cho-hun (1998).

13. For more information see *Chönjaenggwa chiptanhaksal* (2002) published by Han 'gukchönjaeng chönhu minganinhaksal chinsanggyumyöng pömgukminwiwonhoe. In particular, the chapter written by Kang Jeong-gu provides an excellent general survey of the massacres while chapter 2 gives information on various individual cases in different regions.

amendment of the Constitution in November 1960, four special laws—the Act Restricting the Civic Rights of Anti-democrats, the Act on the Punishment of Election Frauds, the Special Measure Act on Unlawful Accumulation of Wealth,¹⁴ and the Act on the Organization of Special Court and Special Inspectors Office—were enacted to partially realize the tasks of *kwagŏch ŏngsan* (Kim In-gŏl woe ed. 1998:214). As a result, the Special Inspectors Office was created and 609 high officers of the Rhee Syngman regime had their civic rights suspended. Since the April 19 Revolution signified a revolutionary change from the old regime, *kwagŏch ŏngsan* in its strictest sense was attempted. The suicide of Vice-President Yi Ki-bung in relation to the corruption of the presidential election that became the igniter of the revolution reflects the mood of this revolutionary period. However, as the April 19 Revolution, led by students and joined by citizens, gave a way to the political parties of the establishment to replace the old regime, it failed to make a revolutionary reform of state organization. Therefore, despite significant achievements made in the newly created political space against the institutional and non-institutional resistance of the old power, the *kwagŏch ŏngsan* of this period ended short of its completion. Panmintŭkwi was dissolved in February 1961 with many limitations, such as the failure to find out who gave the order to fire at the demonstrators during the April 19 Revolution, among others (Sawolhyŏkmyŏngyŏn ġuso ed. 1990: 361-2).

Along with such current issues, the civilian massacres during the Korean War were again brought up as an issue in the process of *kwagŏch ŏngsan* at the time. With the public debate on the murder of Pak Yŏng-bo on May 11, 1960, immediately after the April 19 Revolution, the *kwagŏch ŏngsan* of the civilian massacres of the Korean War began in the form of an organized campaign of the bereaved families demanding fact findings and punishment of the

14. The Special Measure Act on Unlawful Accumulation of Wealth was legislated on May 28, 1961, by the order of the Supreme Council of National Rehabilitation, and was replaced by the Act on Unlawful Accumulation of Wealth that came into effect on June 14, 1961. As the law on unlawful accumulation of wealth became more general, the issue of corruption and unlawful accumulation of wealth became vague (Ilwolsŏgak p ŷŏnjippu ed. 1983).

killers. As a result, a seven day investigation team was formed by the National Assembly on May 31, 1960. However, having police officers involved in the massacres as members of the investigation team, the investigation was far from being thorough. The activities the National Assembly on this issue came to an end with a recommendation to legislate a special measure act on civilian massacres to establish a military, prosecutor, and police joint investigation team under the executive branch of the government for fact finding and prosecution of those responsible based on the prohibition of double jeopardy and suspension of statutory limitation and a report of the investigation which identified 8,716 victims and 10,041 houses damaged found in Köch'ang, Köje, Hamyang, Tongrae, Ulsan, Ch üngmu, Kup ó, Masan, and Sanch önggun of South Kyöngsang province, Munkyöng of North Kyöngsang province, Hamp yöng of South Chölla, and Sunch 'anggun of North Chölla (Kim Tong-ch 'un 2002: 247).

Unfortunately, even such curtailed *kwagöch öngsan* were once again subdued by the establishment of the ' counter-revolutionary ' Junta regime that came into power in the midst of social confusion after the revolution. As the power of political and social struggles that erupted with the April 19 Revolution — they also became the base of the power from below making *kwagöch öngsan* possible — was made illegal and oppressed by the counter-revolutionary repression, *kwagöch öngsan* was interrupted. In the same way that *ch 'inilch öngsan* was marginalized and disrupted by anti-communist US politics and the structure of division after emerging as an urgent task of the post liberation period, the redressing and punishing of anti-democratic figures which emerged as the urgent task of the time immediately after the April 19 Revolution had a similar fate since they were stopped by the ' May 16 Revolution. ' Only a few anti-democratic figures were punished as a token gesture from above by the Junta regime that lead the May 16 coup d 'etat.

Table 1. Kwagöch öngsan in different periods

Period	Theme of Redress	Political Conditions and the Process of the Redress
Liberation	Redressing the Pro-Japanese Collaboration	Korea was liberated from Japanese Colonialism; a political space was created for the redress of the pro-Japanese collaboration; due to the change of the policy of the US military government, the Korean War and the division, the process of redress is halted.
April 19 Revolution	Punishment of anti-democratic persons	A political space is created for the punishment of anti-democratic politicians and people involved in election and other frauds after the April 19 Revolution; the efforts by the victims of the historical issues (e.g. the civilian massacres during the Korean War) that passed on unsettled in the liberation period to realize the redress of historical injustices; the campaign was marginalized after the May 16 military coup; a selective punishment in an attempt to legitimize the Junta regime.
1987 June Democratic Struggle	Investigation of massacres and Punishment of the dictatorship; investigation of suspicious deaths under the dictatorship.	The 1987 June Democratic Struggle, the June 19 Declaration, the defeat of the democratization movement camp in the presidential election in December; gradual process through continued struggles from below; further gradual progress through the minority party in office but with many flaws.

In conclusion, it is important to understand that as a political space for redressing the past injustices was created by the April 19 Revolution, efforts were made again to revive the disrupted process of the past *kwagöch öngsan*. In other words, two different issues of *kwagöch öngsanngsan* — ‘historical issues’ that were never completed and the new current issues like election frauds and killings of demonstrators raised by the revolution — co-existed in the political space for the *kwagöch öngsan* of the April 19 Revolution period. With the development of student and reunification movements by reformists that emerged after the April 19 Revolution, issues of *ch ’inilch öngsan* and the civilian massacres of the Korean War were rediscovered. At this point, the redress of the civilian massacres took on the form of an identification campaign centered around the victims while the issue of *ch ’inilp ’a* had ethical and political dimensions as the statutory limitation expired. However, in the case of current issues, *kwagöch öngsan* focused on redressing and punishing particular individuals or groups responsible for the atrocities, thus, took on the form of a struggle and social tension.

4. The Dynamics of *Kwagöch öngsan* During the Transition to Democracy After 1987

On May 16, 1961, South Korea entered the age of military authoritarian regimes that lasted for 27 years. Ruled by totalitarian dictators these regimes openly used state violence such as massacres, tortures, and oppression. However, a mass resistance rose up from below in the latter half of the 1970s. By June 1987, the resistance came to a climax with a so called democratic struggle which pushed South Korea into a new period of transition to democracy. It meant the end of the Junta regimes that lasted a quarter century due to the class and social struggle of the Korean masses from below and the creation of the atmosphere for the demand of *kwagöch öngsan* with regards to the various criminal acts of state violence committed by the Junta regime.

Up until the June Democratic Struggle in 1987, there existed two roads toward democratization in South Korea. First was the path to 'conservative democratization from above' and the other was the path to 'radical democratization from below.' The former path is a road of compromise whereas the second path is a road to revolution. As I have pointed out already, the June Democratic Struggle in 1987 was a climax of the tide of anti-dictatorship and democratic struggles that grew out from the decades of the 1960s and 70s. The tide culminated into a grand struggle where more than a million people, including students and middle class citizens, came onto the streets sending a warning to the military regime that its time had ran out. However, the struggle was halted as it accepted a gesture of democratization shown by the regime to weather its crisis, the June 29 Declaration, and secured a direct presidential election, far from its original intention of overthrowing the Junta regime. Its failure became clearer in the following direct presidential election when Roh Tae-woo, from the military, won the presidency in the midst of a break up of between Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam, leaders of the anti-dictatorship and democratic movement. This signified that the demilitarization of the ruling regime took the path of conservative democratization from above and not the path of radical democratization from below. In this context, such structural limitations of the political change of the time created another political

space for *kwagŏch ŏngsan* but also drew very tight boundaries around it to the point that a new struggle had to be fought to make further progress on *kwagŏch ŏngsan*.

The path of conservative democratization from above taken at that time took on a more concrete form in the *minsŏngunpujŏnggwon* (elected military regime) as the Junta regime succeeded in restoring its power through a revolution through election. Afterwards, it maintained its power through a three party merger creating a new political party that was able to win over the moderates of the anti-dictatorship and democratic movement in March 1990. If the former strategy of winning the election after dampening the strength of the June struggle with the announcement of the June 29 Declaration led to the birth of the Roh Tae-woo government, the Kim Young-sam government was the result of the latter strategy of preserving the power by joining hands with friendly opposition politicians such as the party merger in 1990.

Nevertheless, there have been continuous struggles from below to carry out *kwagŏch ŏngsan* despite the structural limitations of the politics of the period, the path of conservative democratization from above. Most important, the structural limitations clamping down on the *kwagŏch ŏngsan* do not operate as structural determinism might suggest. Instead, these limitations are the result of a structural selection of strategies taken in mutual interactions of the old power bloc and the resistant movement.

The basic response of the Roh Tae-woo government on *kwagŏch ŏngsan* was to oppress it while there was a struggle from the outside by the minority party and civic organizations to realize the redress by force. Fortunately, the minority party controlled National Assembly was able to push for *kwagŏch ŏngsan* through National Assembly hearings on Kwangju and the corruption during the fifth Republic. However, the efforts to redress the Kwangju Massacres and punish the criminals ended short of their aims with a compromise — the apology of the former president Chun Doo-hwan and his seclusion at Paektan Temple.

Despite such a compromising and mediocre settlement among the established politicians, the efforts from below to realize *kwagŏch ŏngsan* of the past dictatorships continued. On the contrary, the Kim Young-sam government was a product of a coalition of a group of anti-dicta-

torship minority party politicians and the old political power rooted in the past dictatorships. Having such a background, the former anti-dictatorship minority party politicians naturally sought to make a compromise from above on the issues of redress. In the process, the civilian government redefined the Kwangju People's Struggle as the Kwangju Democratization Movement and ruled that the December 12 Incident was a coup. Obviously, such redress of past injustices had great limitation. The overarching limitation given by the path of 'conservative democratization from above,' which was carried over to the Kim Young-sam government from the Roh Tae-woo government, was that *kwagöch öngsan* had to be carried out on a limited basis, and even then, only for the most extreme injustices like massacres committed during the Junta regime.

The most successful fight against the impunity of *kwagöch öngsan* from below was the campaign to punish the murders of the Kwangju Massacre. In 1994, a campaign for the legislation of a special law and the arrest of the conspirators of the May 18 Rebellion was initiated as the year when the statutory limitation on any criminal prosecution related to the Kwangju Massacre was due to expire in 1995. On July 18, 1995, when a decision by the court that the prosecution of any acts committed during the period from the declaration of the state of emergency on May 18 to the inauguration of President Chun Doo-hwan had no grounds for prosecution was announced, a full-scale struggle for the arrests of Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo was sparked. Many intellectuals participated in this struggle that led to the arrests of former presidents Chun and Roh due to the efforts of the Kim Young-sam government (Kang Nam-hun 1997). Be that as it may, the *kwagöch öngsan* under the Kim Young-sam government met with the same fate its predecessors confronted, which was an incomplete and superficial process of *kwagöch öngsan*.

Before moving on, I would like to examine two laws related to *kwagöch öngsan* enacted by the Kim Young-sam government. First, the act related to the compensation of people related to the Kwangju democratization movement was enacted on August 6, 1990 to compensate and reinstate impaired reputations of people who were killed, harmed, imprisoned, fired from work, or removed from the citizens' register, and to give legal basis for the commemoration activities and

construction of a cemetery. However, this law — although its enactment had to be won by a struggle from below — provides a good example how incomplete the process of *kwagŏch ŏngsan* was carried out as it failed to address the demands of fact finding and the punishment of injustices, thus, removing the Kwangju democratization movement from the sphere of *kwagŏch ŏngsan*.

As I have mentioned above, the process of *kwagŏch ŏngsan* is a complex process that should be understood in the interaction of the regime or the ruling power and the people from below, or from the *kwagŏch ŏngsan* movement itself. In this sense, even a small achievement of *kwagŏch ŏngsan* contributes to the further development of the struggle from below. In this case, the arrests of Chun and Roh lead to a further development of the *kwagŏch ŏngsan* movement related to the Kwangju democratization movement. The efforts went beyond just seeking compensation to the demand for the punishment of the murderers that crystallized in the form of legislation of the special law related to the May 18 democratization movement. Promulgated in December 1995, this law prescribes the period between May 18, 1980, and February 24, 1993 as the period when the state was restricted to pursue any prosecution and interprets that the statutory limitation was suspended in this period making possible the punishment of those who were responsible for the Kwangju Massacre. Furthermore, it also stipulates that anyone who was tried and found guilty related to the May 18 democratization movement would be given a retrial and gives legal basis to the commemoration of the democratization movement. Interestingly, it also showed a change of attitude by the government when it considered that the ‘ compensation ’ already given by the act related to the compensation of people related to the May 18 democratization movement was indeed, ‘ reparations. ’ This goes to show that however incomplete or marginalized the process of *kwagŏch ŏngsan* is, further struggles from below may lead to its continuation and development to a higher level.

Like the previous periods, there has also been some progress on the historical issues of *kwagŏch ŏngsan* under the Kim Young-sam government. The prime example is the Special Measure Act related to the reinstatement of the impaired reputation of people related to the Kŏch ʻng Incident. Many innocent civilians were killed during and

after the Korean War, not by the war itself but by the South Korean army, police, the US army and right wing youth corps. Such killings include massacres that swept through entire villages or regions. After having been deterred in the April 19 Revolution period, a small flame of the *kwagöch òngsan* of civilian massacres has been kept alive by the bereaved families in individual cases of the in different regions such as Hamp'yong, Yösun, Köch'ang, and Mungyong, among others. In particular, the *kwagöch òngsan* campaign for the Köch'ang Incident gained momentum as the bereaved families, victims, and concerned people pressured the government to identify the deaths, compensate the victims, and carry out commemoration activities. Although, it was the only issue to be redressed, however limited, it showed that it is possible for even a 40 year old historical issue of *kwagöch òngsan* to be

Table 2. *Kwagöch òngsan* laws legislated under the Kim Young-sam government

Type	Title	Date	Content	Background
Current Issues	Act related to the compensation of people related to the Kwangju democratic movement	1990.8.6.	Compensates and reinstates impaired reputations of people who were killed, harmed, imprisoned, fired from work, and removed from the citizens' register. Commemoration activities and construction of a cemetery.	The issue of fact-finding for the Kwangju Massacre and prosecuting those responsible became not only important issue for the victims but was the main concern of the social movement. A public hearing was held during the Roh Tae-woo government. A related law was legislated followed by the enactment of a special law related to the prosecution and fact-finding.
	Special Act related to the May 18 Democratization Movement	1995.12.21	Suspends the statutory limitation on the criminal acts committed during the Kwangju Massacre. Prescribes the period from May 18, 1990, to Feb. 24, 1993 as a period when obstacles existed for the state to pursue prosecution, and based on such grounds, the statutory limitation was considered suspended during this period making possible the prosecution of the people responsible for the massacre.	
Historical Issues	Special Measure Act related to the reinstatement of impaired reputations of people related to the K?chang Incident	1996.1.5.	Identification of the victims and bereaved families of the incident. Reinstates impaired reputations of people who were killed and of the bereaved families. Commemoration activities and construction of a cemetery and a memorial monument.	Although the issue of civilian massacres during the Korean War has been oppressed since the May 16 coup, the bereaved families and victims continued the movement.

reopened for redress.

In the following period, the birth of the people's government — the Kim Dae-jung government — signified something of a reverse turn from the path of conservative democratization from above. If the Roh and Kim Young-sam governments succeeded in the reproduction of the old regime through 'adaptations' of the ruling power, the establishment of the people's government — despite its affiliation with the Liberal Democrats United — meant the beginning of an anti-dictatorship opposition party government. As a result, a new political space much broader than the past was created. This directly led to the implementation of much more institutionalized means to carry out *kwagöch öngsan* that went beyond the legislation of related laws. This is what I would call a reverse of turn.

Nevertheless, such a reverse turn could not exist outside the macroscopic limits generated by the conservative democratization from above that had occurred since 1987. Specifically, the macroscopic limits have their origin in the coalition of the Kim Dae-jung government with the Liberal Democrats United, a marginal political party of the old ruling power bloc. On the one hand, the new government was progressive in that it was the first opposition party government. However, on the other hand, it had a dual characteristic from birth in that it was created by a coalition; it was not a break from the old ruling power. As a result, the process of reforms of the Kim Dae-jung government, including *kwagöch öngsan*, were complicated. Such a complex of duality is reflected in the process of various redresses under the people's government in that the political space for such redresses was expanded, but with tension existing between the macroscopic limits such as strong resistance from the old ruling power and the struggles from below.

5. The Dynamics of *Kwagöch öngsan* under the Kim Dae-jung government

This section examines how dynamically the process of *kwagöch öngsan* was carried out. In other words, I will attempt to analyze the dynamics of the process of compensation and honor restoration related to state crimes and violence committed during the military dictatorship

after the establishment of the Kim Dae-jung government, the first opposition party to come to office in 50 years, also referred to as “ the people ’ s government, ” with the macroscopic limitation of ‘ compromised democracy from above. ’

I will start by examining the redress related laws legislated under the “ people ’ s government. ” The change of government by the minority party for the first time in 50 years has expanded the political space for redress and, as presented in Table 3, various laws related to redress were legislated. Most important, various issues of *kwagŏch ŏngsan* related to oppressions of the past regime were discussed and efforts to settle them were made. What could be called current issues of *kwagŏch ŏngsan* include fact-finding investigations of suspicious deaths (*ŭimunsa*), and honor restoration of those involved in the democratization movement, among others. Generally speaking, these acts can be divided into four categories. Accordingly, the act related to honor restoration and compensation of persons related to the democratization movement, the act to commemorate the democratization movement, the special act related to the fact-finding investigation of suspicious deaths, and the act related to the treatment of bereaved families of the Kwangju massacre. Second, the act related to the fact-finding investigation and honor restoration of persons related to the Cheju 4-3 Incident was legislated in the effort to tackle issues of historical *kwagŏch ŏngsan* that remained unsettled. Lastly, as a preventative measure, the National Human Rights Commission of Korea Act was enacted. In addition to these, there is the act on the commemoration of the democratization movement to pass on the spirit of the movement to the future generation through various commemorative activities by the state.

Looking at them in detail, the first act related to the democratization movement to be legislated and is the act related to the compensation of the democratization movement proposed by the both ruling and opposition party members of the National Assembly on July 9, 1999, and promulgated on December 28, 1999. In the following year, the act related to the honor restoration and compensation of people related to the democratization movement was promulgated on January 12 after being signed by the president.

Another act related to the democratization movement is the special

act related to the fact finding of suspicious deaths. The draft of the act was proposed by the National Association of Bereaved Families for National Democracy (president Pae Ŭn-shim) and the revised version of the draft was passed at the general session on December 28, 1999, along with the democratization movement compensation act.¹⁵ Originally, the act prescribed the period between December 17, 2000 to September 16, 2002 as the term of the fact finding investigation. However, the term of the fact finding commission on suspicious deaths that supervised the fact finding was extended one more year through a revision on November 2002.

Lastly, another act related to the democratization movement is the act on commemorating the democratization movement. The proposal for the legislation of this act was first initiated by the Democracy Foundation in 1999. The initiative was developed further into a campaign by People's Solidarity for the Succession of the Spirit of Democratization Movement formed in April 2000. This act provides a legal basis for the state to establish semi-governmental organization(s) for the commemoration of the democratization movement.¹⁶ The commemorative activities include construction of the Democratic Movement memorial hall and democratic memorial park, collecting, archiving, systematizing and researching historical documents, democracy education, awareness campaigns, and supporting the democracy development.

For the Kwangju Democratic Struggle, formerly called the Kwangju Massacre, the act related to the honorable treatment of bereaved families of the Kwangju Democratic Struggle was enacted. As mentioned above, there has been a partial redress of the Kwangju Democratization Movement and honor restoration and compensation based on the act went into effect on August 6, 1990. However, an effort to elevate the victims of the Kwangju massacre to the status of *kukkayugongja*

15. For historical and social significance of the movement for the fact finding of suspicious deaths see An Pyōng-uk (2001).

16. In order to commemorate various democratic struggles in the Southwestern region such as the 1979 Pusan-Masan Democratic Struggle, Pusan Democratic Memorial Park was created along with the Pusan democratic society research institute on October 16, 1999 in commemoration of the 20th anniversary of the Pusan-Masan Democratic Struggle..

(national heroes and medal receivers) and was realized through a new act. This signifies a fundamental shift in the understanding of constitutional principles.¹⁷ Up to this point, the status of *kukkayugongja*, people whose merits are commemorated by the state, was usually given to anti-communists, war heroes, policemen, and soldiers. Such a list implies that merits recognized by the state at that time were the death or sacrifice of those who stood on the repressing side. However, when people who were on the side of resistance received recognition from the state as *kukkayugongja*, a qualitative change was signified in that the range of merits not only included the sacrifice for the security of the nation but also the sacrifice in resistance for democracy.

If these acts reviewed so far are related to the current issues of *kwagöch öngsan* that attempt to redress the injustices of the past authoritarian regimes, the special act on fact finding and honor restoration of the Cheju April 3 Incident deals with a historical issue of *kwagöch öngsan*. Stipulating the investigation of the persons killed during the state of unrest in Cheju Island that started on April 3, 1947 and lasted until April 3, 1948, followed by armed conflict that lasted till Sept. 21, and its repression, publication of a report, commemoration and honor restoration of the victims, and compensation, this act was a result of the long and hard work of the bereaved families and concerned people of Cheju Island. Specifically, the Pan-Korean Committee to Commemorate the 50th Anniversary of the Cheju April 3 Incident was formed, led by the Cheju 4-3 Research Institute on April 1, 1997. After changing its name to the Pan-Korean Committee for the Fact Finding and Honor Restoration of the Cheju April 3 Incident, they began their commemoration activities and the campaign for the legislation of a special law.

Lastly, the National Human Rights Commission of Korea Act for the improvement of human rights, and dealing with human rights violations committed during past dictatorships was passed by the National Assembly on April 30, 2001 and went into effect on May 24. Relatively

17. For a criticism of people related to the democratization movement and the Kwangju democratization movement becoming *kukkayugongja* and the May 18 cemetery becoming a national cemetery, see Mun Pu-shik (2002), and on the debate around his criticism see Cho Hee-yeon (2002) and Hwanghaemunhwa (2002, winter).

more progressive than other countries, this act was legislated primarily by the efforts of the Joint Committee for Civic Organization for the Realization of National Human Rights Commission that led the campaign for the legislation of this act from Sept. 2001 to April 2001. As Kim Tong-ch'un argues, " *kwagŏch ŏngsan* cannot be completed with democratization of oppressive state organs like the army and police and other legal and institutional mechanisms that control the arbitrary use of state power, thus the main question is establishing a safe mechanism for human rights and political democracy in the present time. " The National Human Rights Commission of Korea is a good example of the institutionalization of prevention, which is far more advanced than the level of seeking redress of the injustices committed by the state.

Table 3. *Kwagŏch ŏngsan* laws legislated under the Kim Dae-jung government

Type	Title	Date	Content	Background
Current Issues	Act related to honor restoration and compensation of persons related to the democratization movement	1999 12.28	Honor restoration and compensate impaired reputations of persons who have been killed, missing, harmed, fired from work, imprisoned, etc. for their involvement in the democratization movement, commemoration activities (construction of a cemetery).	Rep. Yu Son-ho and 104 other Rep. 's of the National Congress for New Politics proposed on July 9, 1999; Rep. Yi Shin-bom and 25 other Rep. 's of the Grand National Party proposed it on July 30, 1998.
	Special Act related to the fact-finding of suspicious deaths	1999 12.28	Investigate the cases of deaths believe to be related to the democratization movement and committed by past authoritarian regimes.	Association of Bereaved Families for National Democracy petitioned for legislation in 1994; Rep. Yi Sang-su and 155 others proposed it in 1999.
	Act to commemorate the democratization movement	2001 6.28	Construction of the Democratic Movement Memorial Hall and Democratic Memorial Park; collect, archive, systematize and research historical documents; democracy education, awareness campaign, support democracy development.	Minju Foundation initiated a legislation campaign in 1999. People 's Solidarity for the Succession of the Spirit of Democratization Movement was formed in April 2000 to continue the activities.

Table 3. Kwagöch öngsan laws legislated under the Kim Dae-jung government (continued)

Type	Title	Date	Content	Background
Current Issues	Act related to the treatment of bereaved families of the Kwangju Massacre	2002 1.26	Expand the support for the victims of the Kwangju Massacre to the level of <i>kukkayugongja</i> (the national heroes or medal receivers) (education, employment, and health benefits).	Based on the Act related to the compensation of people related to the Kwangju Democratization Movement promulgated on August 6, 1990, the significance of the movement was redefined and the compensation and reinstatement of impaired reputations were realized. However, a campaign to recognize the victims as <i>kukkayogongja</i> was started (progress from the previous redress efforts).
Historical Issues	Act related to the fact-finding investigation and honor restoration of persons related to the Cheju 4-3 Incident	2000 1.12	Investigate the persons killed during the state of unrest in Cheju Island that started on April 3, 1947 and lasted to April 3, 1948, followed by armed conflict that lasted till Sept. 21, and its repression; publish a report; commemorate and reinstate impaired reputation of the victims; give compensation.	Pan-Korean Committee to Commemorate the 50th Anniversary of the Cheju 4-3 Incident was formed led by the Cheju 4-3 Research Institute on April 1, 1997. They began the commemoration activities and the campaign for the legislation of a special law
Preventative Measure	National Human Rights Commission of Korea Act	2001 4.30	Research laws related to human rights; recommend reforms; investigate and deliver human rights violations and discrimination; human rights education, etc.	Joint Committee for Civic Organization for the Realization of National Human Rights Commission initiated the campaign from Sept. 2001 to April 2001.

In addition, the act related to the livelihood support and commemoration of 'comfort women' of the Japanese colonial army was enacted on December 11, 2002, providing a legal basis for economic and medical support to 'comfort women' survivors in the situation where Japan refuses to listen to the international campaign demanding apology and compensation for the victims.

It is important to understand that this legislation is nothing more than the result of a broader process while a close analysis of the process of *kwagöch öngsan* that gave rise to these results is in order. In this section, I will examine the complicated characteristics of the process of *kwagöch öngsan* during the people's government, especially, its institutionalization. Having witnessed the first opposition party government in 50 years, people in the social movement expected that there would be various institutional efforts within the Kim Dae-jung government to carry out *kwagöch öngsan*. However, it became clear that the Kim Dae-jung government was reluctant to pursue the task. In response, various attempts were made from below to start the process of redress. First, in the case of acts related to the democratization movement and suspicious deaths, the parents of the victims who were killed by the Junta regime were most active and played a central role in the campaigns. The most dramatic example of their devotion to the movement was their tent-in demonstration in front of the National Assembly building that lasted over a year. Keeping in pace with the activism of bereaved families, the People's Solidarity, made up of civic and minjung organizations that formed in April 2000, engaged in outreach programs and petition campaigns. Of course, at a distance, there were various students, workers, peasants, and intellectuals struggling against the dictatorship that provided the foundation for the *kwagöch öngsan* movement. Nevertheless, it was the devotion and subjective activism of the bereaved families along with the civic and minjung organizations that were primarily responsible for the legislation and institutionalization of *kwagöch öngsan*. It is they who have utilized the political space for *kwagöch öngsan* that appeared with the start of the first opposition party government in 50 years and pushed the struggle forward, despite its macroscopic limitations.

Looking back on the process of democratic reforms since 1987, reforms were difficult to achieve without the strong push from below,

especially so, when conservative democratization from above was the preferred strategy for reform. A similar situation is found in the process of honor restoration. This is because the complexity of the people's government is reproduced in the process of *kwagöch öngsan*, including the enactment of the act related to honor restoration of the democratic movement.

For example, with the narrow definition on identifying the people related to the democratization movement, the act related to honor restoration of the democratization movement created tension and conflict in the process of determining the limits of honor restoration and compensation. In other words, the complex nature of the Kim Dae-jung government forced the compensation and honor restoration of the democratic movement to be carried out, but in a minimalist sense. The act stipulates that "the democratization movement refers to the activities of the people since August 7, 1969, for recovery and extension of freedom and civil rights that would contribute to the establishment of democratic constitutional order in resistance to authoritarian rule, which deranged liberal democratic order of society and infringed upon the fundamental rights of the people guaranteed by the Constitution." Such prescription defines the movement at its minimalist sense, thus, leaving the task of realizing the definition of the democratization movement in its broadest term to the struggle from below.¹⁸ In reality, the periodization of the dictatorship by the act itself is a reflection of the power relations at the time. In a situation where the ruling party is a minority in tension with the majority opposition party and where the Liberal Democrats United claiming to have succeeded the Park Chung-hee regime has the 'casting vote' in the National Assembly, the legislated act stipulated the applicable period for the compensation and honor restoration to be not from May 16, 1961, the start of the military coup d'état, but from the time when President Park announced his

18. It is inevitable that such a minimalist legal definition on the democratization movement will be in tension with the struggle to broaden as possible the definition. For debates related to this issue such as extending the scope of the democratization movement to the time of May 16 coup d'état or including anti-state crimes or national security crimes as part of democratization movement see the proposal for the revision of the act related to the honor restoration and compensation of the democratization movement by the People's Solidarity, <http://www.krde-mo.org>.

intention to amend the Constitution to allow him to run for the presidency for a third time. It also left the ending period vague, open for wide interpretation.

If the *kwagöch öngsan* of the civilian government was limited to fact finding and punishment of the most extreme massacres such as the Kwangju Democratic Struggle, the legislation of the special act related to the fact finding of suspicious deaths under the dictatorship that included a very wide range of questionable deaths suggests that the *kwagöch öngsan* of the people 's government was more intense than the previous one.

The complicated nature of *kwagöch öngsan* is also observed in the process of the creation of the National Human Rights Commission of Korea. The road toward the establishment of the commission was a long and twisted one that included confrontations between existing oppressive state organs like the Ministry of Justice and the Prosecutors ' Office, and human rights organizations concerning the status and responsibility of the commission, and between the founding committee and the Ministry of Administration and Home Affairs concerning the organization of the commission such as its size and rank, etc. As a matter of fact, it reflects the dynamics of *kwagöch öngsan* since 1987. It was a complicated process where resistance from the old ruling power and the structural limitations made possible by the conservative democratization from above co-existed with the struggles from below that were encouraged by the expanded political space due to the establishment of the people 's government, although it faced macroscopic limits.

As discussed thus far, the working of the dynamics of *kwagöch öngsan* -especially, the current issues-is observed in the legislative process of the laws mentioned above. In other words, the complicated nature of the power structure of the people 's government is reflected in the complex characteristics of *kwagöch öngsan*, including the demand for the reinstatement of the impaired reputations of the democratization movement.

Taking the opportunity given by the expansion of the ' political space for redressing past injustices ' under the Kim Dae-jung government, a struggle to settle the historical issues of *kwagöch öngsan* was initiated. *Ch 'inilmunje* (the question of pro-Japanese) remained as a

historical issue having failed to be completely settled during the liberation and April 19 Revolution periods. However, it has been continuously raised by civic and social organizations concentrating on national and historical issues along with prominent nationalists. By their efforts, a National Assembly *ch 'inilch 'öngsan* (redressing and punishing pro-Japanese collaborators) was initiated and as a result, a list of 708 anti-nationalists were announced by a group calling themselves the National Assemblymen for the Restoration of National Spirit (hereafter, National Assemblymen) on February 28, 2002. Originally, Kwangbokhoe (Restoration Association) drafted a list of 692 persons but the group added 16 more to the list. The National Assemblymen created the list according to the Act on the Punishment of Anti-Nationalists enacted in 1948. The list of 708 persons includes Yi Wan-yong, the key figure in Japan's Annexation of Korea, *ülsaojök* (five ministers of Taehan who were in favor of the Protectorate Treaty with Japan), members of the Privy Council in the Japanese colonial period, pro-Japanese organizations like Iljinhoe, and high ranking police officers, judges, prosecutors, bureaucrats of the Japanese Government General in Korea, etc. However, the added 16 included Kim Hwal-ran, the founder of Ehwa Woman's University, Kim Söng-su, the founder of the *Donga Ilbo*, and Pang Ung-mo, the founder of the *Chosön Ilbo* creating a big controversy as the conservatives vehemently protested their inclusion. This goes to show that even the *kwagöch öngsan* of historical issues causes confrontation with present power holders who are tied to the people in question.¹⁹

The last example is the efforts to settle the issue of the civilian massacres during and after the Korean War. No reinstatement of impaired reputation has been made in these cases except for the Köch äng Incident under the civilian government and the Cheju 4.3 Incident during the people's government. To resolve the unsettled cases, a pan-national committee for fact finding with regards to the civilian massacres during and after the Korean War was formed on Sept. 7, 2000 to

19. It is reported that National Assemblymen for the Restoration of the National Spirit intends to propose a special act related to the fact finding of pro-Japanese collaborations and national traitors during Japanese colonialism.

carry out protests, petition campaigns, and other activities. This signified that the *kwagŏch ŏngsan* movement which focused on the victims²⁰ by centering around individual cases has developed into a more general movement.

At this moment, a draft of the act related to the fact finding and reinstatement of the impaired reputation of the victims of the civilian massacres during and after the Korean War has been petitioned for legislation by Rep. Kim Won-ung and 47 others. In an anti-Communist society where the very people who are responsible for the civilian massacres and their descendants hold institutional and non-institutional power, such demands are difficult to realize. Even so, various efforts to realize *kwagŏch ŏngsan* of the civilian massacres continue.

As such, campaigns for the legislation of special laws related to the reinstatement of the impaired reputations of the Tonghak peasant revolutionary army members and related to the fact finding investigations of the forced mobilization during the period of Japanese colonial aggression have also been initiated. Aside from these, there are also issues concerning the legislation of laws on the compensation and reinstatement of impaired reputations of the democratization movement and of people who suffered from pro-North stigmatization for being involved in Cheilhan 'gukminjut 'ongilyŏnhap (Koreans in Japan for Democracy and Reunification United). In January 2003, a civic network for *kwagŏch ŏngsan* was formed to pursue a more integrated *kwagŏch ŏngsan* by various civic organizations related to *kwagŏch ŏngsan*.

As discussed above, *kwagŏch ŏngsan* is not simply concerned with the past but is very much an effort here and now prescribed by the dynamics of the present class and social struggles. The redress of past injustices itself becomes an issue related to the present, which in itself, makes such redress all the more difficult. In this sense, it can be said that *kwagŏch ŏngsan* makes slow progress in the here and now struggles from below despite certain political limitations.

20. For more information on the suffering of the Left related victims and bereaved families in anti-communist society centered around women see Lee Ryong-kyong (2003). See also an article by Lee Ryong-kyong featured in this issue (editor).

Reference

- An Pyöng-uk (2001). "Üimunsawa üimunsajinsanggyumyöngüi üüüi " (Suspicious deaths and the significance of the fact findings of suspicious deaths). *Yöksawa hyönshil* 39(march):1-21.
- Chejumasamsagön chinsanggyumyöng mit hüisaengja myöngyehoebok-wiwonhoe(2003). *Chejumasamsagön chinsangjosa pogosö* (Report of the fact findings of the Cheju April 3 Incident), unpublished.
- Cheminilbo sasamchwijaeban (1994-8) *Sasamül malhanda* (About April 3). Cheju: Cheminilbosa.
- Chön Chae-ho (2002). " Han 'gukminjujuüüwa haksængundongmin-jujök shilch öngwa yöksajök hüisaeng " (Korean democracy and the student movement: National practices and historical sacrifice). In *Kukkap 'okryök, minjujuüit 'ujaeng, kürigo hüisaeng* (State violence, democratic struggle and sacrifice), ed. Cho Hee-yeon. Seoul: Hamgeiknunch 'aek.
- Cho Hee-yeon (1998a). *Han 'guküi minjujuüüwa sahoeundong* (Democracy and social movements in South Korea). Seoul: Tangdae.
- _____ (1998b). *Han 'guküi kukka, chöngch 'ipyöndong, minjujuüü* (State, political changes, and democracy in South Korea). Seoul: Tangdae.
- _____ (2001). " 5-18gwa 80nyöndaeh sahoeundong " (May 18 and the social movement of the 1980s). In *5-18 Minjunghangjaengsa* (A history of the May 18 people 's struggle), Kwangjugwangyökshi 5-18 saryop yönych 'anwiwonhoe. Seoul: Tosöch 'ulp 'an Koryöng.
- _____ (2002). *Kukkap 'okyök, minjujuüit 'ujaeng, kürigo hüisaeng* (State violence, democratic struggle and sacrifice), ed. Cho Hee-yeon. Seoul: Hamgeiknunch 'aek.
- _____ (2002). " ' kwaing 'gwagoch öngsaninga, ' kwaso 'gwagoch ' öngsaninga: Mun Pu-shik ssiöi ' uri anüi p 'okryök ' nonüie taehan chaesöngch 'al. " *Kyegan kyöngjewa sahoe*.
- Cho Hee-yeon and Cho Hyön-yön (2002). " Kukkap 'okryök, minjujuüit 'ujaeng, hüisaenge taehan ch öngronjök ihae " (General understanding on state violence, democratic struggles and sacrifice). In *Kukkap 'okryök, minjujuüit 'ujaeng, kürigo hüisaeng* (State violence, democratic struggle and sacrifice), ed. Cho Hee-yeon. Seoul:

Hamggeiknünch 'aek.

Choe Ch'ong-gi (2002) " Han 'guküi ch'ongch 'ibyöndonggwa saböpchök ch 'öbölüi pyönhwa " (Changes of politics and legal punishments in South Korea). In *Kukkap 'okryök, minjujuüit 'ujaeng, kürigo hüisaeng* (State violence, democratic struggle and sacrifice), ed. Cho Hee-yeon. Seoul: Hamggeiknünch 'aek.

Ch'ong Kün-shik (2001). " Ch 'öngsangwa pokwonürosöüi owolundong: Kwangjuüi kyönghöm " (the May movement as ch 'öngsan and restoration: Experience of Kwangju), Newsletter of Chejusasamyön 'guso, April 3, unpublished.

Chu Söp-il (1999). *P 'ürangsüüi taesukch 'öng: Tügölüi nach'i hyöpryök panyökcha ch 'ödän chinsang* (The great purge of France: Facts about De Gaulle 's dealing of the Nazi collaborators and traitors). Seoul: Chungshim.

Han Hong-gu (2003) *Taehanmin 'guk* (Republic of Korea). Seoul: Hanyöreshinmunsa.

Han 'guk chönjaeng chönhu minganinhaksal chinsanggyumyöng pömgukminwiwonhoe ed. (2002). *Chönjaenggwa chiptanhaksal* (War and massacres). Seoul: Han 'guk chönjaeng chönhu minganinhaksal chinsanggyumyöng pömgukminwiwonhoe.

Han 'gukch'ongshindaeyön 'guhoe ed. (1997). *Hanilganüi mich 'öngsangwaje* (Unsettled tasks in Korea-Japan relations). Seoul: Aseamunhwasä.

Hirsch, Herbert (1995). *Genocide and the Politics of Memory-Studying Death to Preserve Life*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.

Hwanghaemunhwa (2002). Winter.

Ilwolsögak p 'yönjippu ed. (1983). *Sailguhyökmyöngron I: charyo p 'yon* (Theory of the April 19 revolution vol. 2: Materials). Seoul: Ilwolsögak.

Kang Küm-shil (2002). " Minganinhaksalsagöne kwanhan pöpchökin munjejömgwa haegyölbanghyang. " In *Chönjaenggwa chiptanhaksal* (War and massacres), ed. Han 'guk chönjaeng chönhu minganinhaksal chinsanggyumyöng pömgukminwiwonhoe. Seoul: Han 'gukch'önjaeng chönhu minganinhaksal chinsanggyumyöng pömgukminwiwonhoe.

Kang Sang-hyön (2002). " Cheju sasam haksalsagönüi sahoehakchök

- yön 'gu: Taeryanghaksal shigi (1948nyon 10wol chungsun 1949nyön 5wol chungsun) rül chungshimüro, " M.A. thesis, Department of Sociology, Seoul National University.
- Kang Jeong-gu (1996). *Pundangwa chönjaenggwa han 'gukhyöndaesa* (Division, war, and contemporary Korean history). Seoul: Yoksapip yöngsa.
- _____ (2002). " Han 'gukchönjaeng chönhu minganinhaksalui shilt 'ae. "In *Chönjaenggwa chiptanhaksal* (War and massacres), ed. Han 'guk chönjaeng chönhu minganinhaksal chinsanggyumyöng pömgukminwiwonhoe. Seoul: Han 'guk chönjaeng chönhu minganinhaksal chinsanggyumyöng pömgukminwiwonhoe.
- Kim Chang-han woe (1989). *80nyöndaeha han 'guknodongdongsa* (History of Korean labor movement in the 80s). Seoul: Choguk.
- Kim Chin-guk and Ch öng Ch 'ang-han (2000). *WWW.Han 'gukhyöndaesa.COM* (WWW.contemporary Korean history.com). Seoul: Minyön.
- Kim In-göl woe eds. (1998). *Han 'gukhyöndaesagangüi* (Lectures on contemporary Korean history). Seoul: Tolbegae.
- Kim Tong-ch ün (2000). *Chönjaenggwa sahoe: Uriegehan 'gukchönjaenghün muösiössna?* (War and society: What are the implications of the Korean War for us?). Seoul: Tolbegae.
- _____ (2001). " 20segi kukkap 'okryökkwa kwagöch öngsan. " *Ingwongwapa yöngghwa*.
- _____ (2002). " Minganinhaksalmujeüi haegyölpangan " (A proposal for the resolution of the issue of civilian massacres). In *Chönjaenggwa chiptanhaksal* (War and massacres), ed. Han 'guk chönjaeng chönhu minganinhaksal chinsanggyumyöng pömgukminwiwonhoe. Seoul: Han 'guk chönjaeng chönhu minganinhaksal chinsanggyumyöng pomgukminwiwonhoe.
- Kim Yu-jin (2002). " Minjujuüihaenggi kwagöch öngsanüi tonghak " (Dynamics of kwagöch öngsan in transition to democracy). In *Kukkap 'okryök, minjujuüit 'ujaeng, küriego hüisaeng* (State violence, democratic struggle and sacrifice), ed. Cho Hee-yeon. Seoul: Hamgeiknünch 'aek.
- Korea Journal* (2002). Special Issue: The Issue of Settling the Past in the Modern Korean History 42.3.
- Kwangjugwangyökshi 5-18 saryop yöngch 'anwiwonhoe (2001). 5-18

- Minjunghangchaengsa* (History of May 18 People 's Struggle). Kwangju: Kwangjugwangyökshi 5-18 saryop 'yönch 'anwiwonhoe.
- Lee Ryong-kyong (2003). " Han 'gukchönjaeng chönhuchwaikkwallyön yösöngyujöküi kyönghömyön 'gu: Yösöngjuüip'yönghwagaenyömesö " (Dynamics of Social Movement for Transitional Justice in Democratic Transition Period ; with focus on the Social Movement for Uncovering the Truth about Suspicious Deaths). M.A. Thesis. NGO Graduate School, Sungkonghoe University.
- Mun Pu-shik (2002). *Ilröbörin kiökül ch 'achasö: Kwanggiüi shidaerül saenggakham* (In search of lost memories: Thinking of the age of insanity). Seoul: Samin.
- Minjuhwaundongjöngshingyesüngyönda (2001). " Minjuhwaundong myöngyehoebok mit posang dünge kwanghan pöpryul kaejöngan " (A proposal for the revision of the act related to the honor restoration and compensation of the democratization movement), unpublished.
- Oilp 'al kwangju minjuhwaundongjinsangjosa t 'ukp yölwiwonhoe (1990). *Kukchöngjosabogosö* (National Assembly investigation report). Seoul: Oilp 'al kwangju minjuhwaundongjinsangjosa t 'ukpyölwiwonhoe.
- Pak Won-sun (1994). *Kukkaboanböbyön 'gu* (A study of the national security act). Vol. 1. Seoul: Yöksapip 'yöngsa.
- _____ (1996). *Yöksarül paro sewoya minjoki sanda* (Nation will live only when the history is restored). Seoul: Hangyöreshinmunsa.
- Sawolhyökmyöngyön 'guso ed. (1990). *Han 'guksahoepyönhyökundonggwa sawolhyökmyöng* (Korean social transformational movement and the April Revolution). Seoul: Hangilsa.
- Sö Tong-jin (1993). " Kündae chabonjuüisahoeesö tongsöngae chöngch 'esöngüi sahoejök kusöngge kwanhan yön 'gu " (A study of the social composition of the identity of gay and lesbians in modern capitalist society). M.A. Thesis, Department of Sociology, Yonsei University.
- Sö Süng (2000). " Tongashiae issösö kukkat 'erörrijü m hüisaengjadülüi myöngyehoebok, paesange taehan yön 'gu " (A study of the honor restoration and reparation of the victims of state terrorism in East Asia). M.A. Thesis, Seoul National University.
- Stohl, Michael and George A. Lopez eds. (1994). *The State as Terrorist: The Dynamics of Governmental Violence and Repression*.

Connecticut: Greenwood Press.

Tarrow, S. (1994). *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Yang Cho-hun (1998). “Chejususamüi yöksajök chomyöng” (A historical examination of the Cheju April 3 Incident). *Chejudoyön 'gu* 15.

Yi Chae-o (1984). *Haebanghu han 'gukhaksangundongsa* (History of student movements after liberation). Seoul: Hyöngsöngsa.

Yi Sam-söng (1998). *Ishipsegi munmyönggwa yamang* (20th century civilization and ambition). Seoul: Hangilsa.

Yöksamujeyön 'guso, Yöksahakyön 'guso, Chejususamyön 'guso, and Han 'gukyöksayönguhö eds. (1998). *Chejususamyön 'gu* (A research of the Cheju April 3 Incident). Seoul: Yöksapip 'yöngsa.

Cho Hee-yeon is Professor at the College of Social Sciences, Sungkonghoe University. He received his Ph.D. in Sociology at Yonsei University. He teaches and researches political sociology and industrial sociology. He has written numerous articles and books on the Korean democratization movement and is also Director of Korean Democracy Movement Archives.