

Disturbances of the World-System and the Emergence of Anti-statism: A View on Globalization and Civil Society*

Lee Su-Hoon

Globalization and civil society are two keywords that draw a great deal of attention from the academic community. They have been major topics of academic discourse in South Korea since the early 1990s. This paper is an attempt to view globalization and civil society from an anti-statism angle. This paper argues that anti-statism is widely felt in the contemporary world-system. It also argues that anti-statism has emerged for the first time in the history of the capitalist civilization since the early 1970s as a consequence of disturbances of the capitalist world-economy. This paper concludes that transformation on the global level is taking place and highlights the importance of civil society organizations.

Keywords: transformation, globalization, civil society, anti-statism, world-system

Introduction

In the latter half of the 1980s, Korean social scientists engaged in heated debates in attempt to identify and understand the political and social currents sweeping the world.¹ There existed a special emphasis

* An earlier version of this paper in Korean was presented at a joint conference of the Korean Sociological Association and the Korean Political Science Association, "Great Transformation of Korean Society: State and Civil Society," which was held in November 23, 2001 at the Faculty Hall of the Korea University of Foreign Languages. I would like to thank Prof. Yi Jōng-ok and Dr. Pak Ho-sōng for their insightful discussions and the participants who raised interesting questions.

on the newness of the times, and a presumption that a fundamental and qualitative “change” was taking place worldwide. With an epistemological understanding that the world has been going through a “transformation,” the discussions at the time underscored two particular terminologies: “globalization” and “civil society” (Han Wan-sang 1992; Yun Kŭn-sŏp 1994; Pak Kil-sŏng 1995; Im Hyŏn-jin 1998). On one side, many analysts saw “globalization” as a wave of fundamental social change, describing it as the “introduction of the global era” (Im Hyŏn-jin 1998), “expansion of civil society” (Han Wan-sang 1992), a movement “from modernity to globality” (Pak Kil-sŏng 1995), and “crisis of the world-system” (Lee Su-hoon 1995). Some even highlighted the diminishing role of the state. On the other side, a few western scholars formed another current of discussions (i.e., “end of ideology,” “end of history,” or “clash of civilizations”) based on superficial analysis that understood the previous period as a bipolar confrontation of the cold war. Conservative scholarship in these debates triumphed — most notably that of typical conservatives like Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington. With the disintegration of the Communist Bloc in 1989, many acknowledged the victory of capitalism and liberalism on a global scale.

And yet an unshakable sense of tension and apprehension lingered about the divisions that had already begun to fracture the global order. These feelings of apprehension later materialized with the start of the Gulf War in 1991 — a “hot” war unimaginable without the fall of the Communist Bloc. Although the United States’ unilateral bombing of Iraq ended the war, the fundamental problems stemming from that conflict remained unresolved and resurfaced exactly ten years later in

1. Aside from individual studies, collective discussions at the level of academic associations also took place. See Korean Sociological Association (1991), Korean Political Science Association (1991), KSA (1994), and Korean Social Science Council (1995).
2. The term “globalization” has been translated into Korean as ‘*kukchehwa*’ (internationalization), ‘at first, and then as ‘*segehwa*’ (globalization) and then recently as ‘*chiguhwa*’ or ‘*chŏnjiguhwa*.’ Strictly speaking, each translation has different connotations. Although I prefer to use ‘*chiguhwa*’ because it is the closest to the original English word, Korean scholars use the terms interchangeably.
3. It is also impressive that there is no time lapse between the world and South Korea in responses to these themes at the levels of phenomena and discourse. In other words, there is no longer a time lag between the world and South Korea.

the form of the September 11 terrorist attacks on Washington and New York. The United States responded with yet another long term and massive military campaign, this time against Afghanistan, but was once again unable to seal the cracks rapidly spreading across the globe. In attempt to find a solution, the United States returned to Iraq in force in 2003. As this most recent campaign has ended and the rebuilding of the Iraqi state has begun, one cannot dismiss the possibility of a similar military solution spreading to North Korea as the regime within its borders also has been deemed — metaphorically speaking — a “ crack ” that needs to be “ sealed. ”

It has become obvious that many analysts did not expect the period of “ transition ” to unfold in this manner. Yet the logic of postmodernism would suggest that, essentially, the tendency of our world is toward “ disintegration, ” with globalization and civil society results of this “ disintegration. ” Having said that, from the theoretical perspective of world-system analysis (Wallerstein 1974), this paper argues several points. First, in advance of a discussion of the current political state of affairs in the world, the paper acknowledges that a disturbance is taking place in the capitalist world-system. Here, a brief look at the decline of U.S. hegemony and other factors that precipitated this disturbance acts as a primer to the discussion that follows. Second, it is understood that the “ disturbance ” itself led to the formation of what we call a current of “ anti-statism. ” Here, two manifestations of anti-statism — neoliberalism and fundamentalism — are examined. Likewise, globalization and the expansion of civil society are also understood as manifestations of this current and discussed. Although both phenomena are considered in the broadest of contexts, expansion of civil society in South Korea takes the spotlight in our examination. Finally, this paper concludes with a brief return to the discussion of civil society, its function and challenges in this period of transition.

Disturbances in the World-System

World-system analysis is different from general social science in the sense that it regards the “ world-system ” rather the nation-state or national society as its unit of analysis. It also looks at the larger frame-

work of the world-system when examining social actions and analyzing social changes, and does so based on an understanding that a social system must satisfy two conditions: 1) that it is self-contained, and 2) the dynamics of its development is by and large internal. Furthermore, it argues that only systems that meet these conditions are proper units of analysis (Wallerstein 1974), and that this world-system has the ability to reproduce itself (i.e., has various mechanisms to maintain equilibrium).

Since the emergence of capitalism in the 16th century in Western Europe (Wallerstein 1980), the world-system took the form of a “ world-economy ” (i.e., a system in which no single political system exists over all, or nearly all, of the globe) and existed as a capitalist world-economy for nearly 500 years. After World War II, the world-system⁴ reconstituted itself into a hegemonic world-system led by the United States, which lasted for a period of about thirty years (from 1945 to the beginning of the 1970s) (Wallerstein 1998). Unlike the previous British hegemony, U.S. hegemony did not last long. Since the early 1970s, a period characterized by fierce competition and intense political struggle among the “ core states ” (i.e., advantaged areas of the world-economy) followed. Consequently, a “ multi-centric system ” emerged as Japan and West Germany entered the “ core ” of the world-system, replacing the U.S. hegemonic system.

Given this context, the decline of U.S. hegemony brought about multiple disturbances — geopolitical, economic, and cultural — in the capitalist world-system. I interpret them as indications of waning U.S. hegemony. This argument is not without contention. Both within and without the academic circles, the majority of scholars of international politics insist that the U.S. centered hegemonic world-system is still maintaining itself, and rationalize their claims by referring to the unprecedented economic, military, and political superiority the United States enjoys in the international arena. Such a perspective was strengthened further after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989. However, I reject this position. As I will elaborate later, the events of

4. Hereafter, the terms ‘ world-system, ’ ‘ world-economy, ’ and ‘ world-market ’ are used interchangeably.

1989 should be viewed in a very different light, with a very different shadow emerging. In fact, I argue that the collapse of the Soviet Union did not lead to the strengthening of U.S. dominance (as distinguished from “hegemony”) but weakened it by eliminating one pillar that supported the hegemonic system. Even before the collapse, it was a widely accepted fact that the Soviet Union was only a “paper giant” that maintained its status as a superpower through fictitious competition with the United States. This fabrication crumbled when the existing economic crisis worsened in the 1980s.

A second important criterion in the disturbance of the world-system is the crisis of accumulation in the capitalist world-economy. The twenty-three-year period between the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 and the 1973 “oil shock” is often called the “golden era of capitalism” (Marglin and Schor 1991; Hobsbawm 1994). During this period, the world-economy witnessed unprecedented economic growth from the 1950s to 1960s, and the centers of capital accumulation maintained good relations under the world order constructed by U.S. leadership.

However, with the rise of an economically strong Japan and West Germany on account of vigorous technological development and organizational innovation, the U.S. hegemonic world-system began to falter. As a result, cooperation in the core of the world-economy changed to fierce competition among the centers of capital accumulation. According to world-system analysis, such an increase in competition among the core capitalists, or “core struggle,” often leads to rapid deflation and devaluation. Uncharacteristically, the core struggle at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s resulted in an increase of the price of primary inputs, such as labor and energy costs. In Western Europe and North America — the centers of capital accumulation — the real wage continued to rise until it surpassed labor productivity. In the period between 1968 and 1973, a series of steep wage increases led to the reduction of profit from capital invested in trade and production. In the midst of increasing pressure on the price of primary commodities, the first “oil shock” hit. As the pressure continued to rise, the price that OECD (Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development) countries had to pay for imported oil increased threefold. This severely cut into the profit rate and thus deepened the crisis as liquidity expanded (Arrighi 1999: 12). In essence, the accumu-

lation of capital led to the crisis of over-accumulation in the latter half of the 1970s. Most of this excess of capital went into the financial sector, creating momentum for “financialization.”

A third factor is the weakening of the state. Not many scholars emphasized the importance of state structure and interstate system as did world-system analysts, including world-systems founder Immanuel Wallerstein. Though many mistakenly criticize world-system analysis as economic determinist or economic reductionist epistemology, Wallerstein actually saw “the state structure as the most important institutional accomplishment capitalism has achieved” and underlined that “state power played a critical role in the operation of the system” (Wollösüt in 1993: 50). Realizing that tensions, competitions, violence, rebellions, and chaos accompanied by the formation of the capitalist world market were resolved through the creation of state structure as such structure brought about social cohesion, Wallerstein asserted that the role of the state is to guarantee the long term stability of the world-system or overall capacity of the world-system for relentless accumulation of capital. In addition, he highlighted the fact that despite the existence of superpowers and weaker states and the rise and fall of states, in the long term, all modern states tended to become stronger.

The state is the pillar of the capitalist system. Any weakening of it poses a “critical sign of crisis” for the managers of the world-system (Wallerstein 1997: 18). For the first time in the history of the capitalist world-system, state structure and its legitimacy began to experience a crisis after the early 1970s (Wallerstein 1997), and this hand-delivered a serious challenge to capital accumulators and to those within the privileged class: how to prevent the weakening of their power base.

Since the state acts like an important political lever within the world-system, it is not surprising to see every individual political force seeking to realize its vision through possession and control of state power. Any political group wanting to carry out national liberation, creation of social welfare, or revolution has and will attempt to do so by taking control of state power. In the past, national liberationists of the “periphery” (i.e., disadvantaged area of the world-economy), socialists in the “semi-periphery” (i.e., area between the “core” and “periphery”), social democrats in the “center,” and others who promised a “better world” all succeeded in taking control of state power via popu-

lar support. As a result, developmentalist, socialist, and welfare states began to emerge in different parts of the world (including the “developmentalist states” which appeared in East Asia during the downturn of the world economy).

However, most of these political forces that promised a “better world” to the masses failed to deliver. One after another, these failures mounted, creating incurable mistrust and doubt among the populace toward the state and its legitimacy. Such failure is most obviously realized in the disintegration and collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European blocs in 1989. In one sense, the 1989 incident is *terminus ad quem*, symbolizing a critical blow to the state. After taking possession of state power in those communist states, relevant communist revolutionary forces enjoyed immense privileges instead of creating class equality. Associated *nomenklatura* and state organs degenerated into perpetrators of fear and terror. By and large, national liberationist regimes in the third world made the same mistake as the Soviets in the sense that they too failed to deliver their promises to usher in economic development and political democracy. Failure also occurred in advanced parts of the world where the welfare state lost its legitimacy by yielding to the mounting pressures of capital. Ultimately, the desire to defend the state evaporated among the people, and as a result, a current or tide of “anti-statism” began to form.

Manifestations of Anti-statism

Presently, the ebb and flow of anti-statism has formed a formidable tide. Interestingly, when the disintegration of the world-system began with the deterioration of state legitimacy, it was the privileged of the world-system who stood at the frontline of anti-statism, expanding and strengthening its current. These responses have led to the deepening of the disturbances to the point of system disequilibrium.

We argue that globalization and the expansion of civil society are main manifestations of anti-statism that came about due to these disturbances of the world-system. However, two other significant manifestations also arose: neoliberalism and fundamentalism.⁵ These, too, demand an understanding before globalization and the expansion of

civil society can be well understood. Thus it is to these other manifestations that we first turn our attention.

To begin, it is my view that Neoliberalism is actually a form of anti-statism. It is a doctrine that strongly opposes strong states or the intervention of the state in the private sphere, calls for “small government” and market regulation, and considers competition and transparency as major positive factors for activities of accumulation. But it is difficult to expect the activities of capitalists to run smoothly solely within competitive markets. In reality, intervention and regulation of a strong state allows overall cost to be reduced or passed on to those other than the producers. The same is also true for the transnational corporations (TNCs). Despite many analysts’ suggestion that TNCs are free to pursue profit-seeking activities because they operate beyond the control of a particular state, one need only glance at the activities of TNCs headquartered in a weak state within the “periphery” to realize the integral relationship shared between the state and TNCs. Without the backing of a strong state, a transnational corporation cannot pursue any normal profit-making activities.

Another fallacy perpetrated by neoliberalism is its self-proclaimed status as “champion” of capitalism. Considering the history of capitalism, which stands on the pillars of states and subscribes to the notion that monopolies are the secret to success, it is highly unlikely that capitalism can be reproduced through a doctrine that is “anti-state.” Since neoliberalism — which became the doctrine of the leaders of the world-economy — is clearly a form of anti-statism, its chances of reproducing capitalism seem slim and none; instead, it will likely further disintegrate the capitalist world-system. Ironically, what was thought to be an elixir by the managers of the system most likely will turn out to be its hemlock.

Likewise, fundamentalism is a manifestation of anti-statism. Fundamentalist and supremacy groups (and various other forms of “groupism”) are merely movements based on anti-statist doctrine and are centrifugal and disintegrative in nature. Within this current there

5. It could be said that the reappearance of anarchism after the 1989 events in the Korean academia is the strongest doctrine of anti-statism. However, it is beyond the interest of this paper. It deserves a full-fledged discussion of its own.

exist numerous groups who are literally anti-statist. Their distrust of the state tends to lead to open hostility toward the state. More often than not they are religious in nature since the state itself is secular. Terrorist groups that are mostly based in the Middle East and West Asia are anti-statist. Militia groups that formed on the basis of white supremacist ideology in the United States are also examples of such groups. Groups such as these attempt to take matters into their own hands, believing that the state is no longer capable of protecting their welfare or providing them security. Sometimes they even voice their opinions through reactionary and destructive actions. The Aum Supreme Truth cult's release of sarin gas in the Tokyo subway system in March of 1995, and white supremacist's bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma in April of that same year are prime examples of such actions.

The most recent example of intensely hostile anti-statist behavior is the September 11, 2001 terror attacks on Washington and New York. The Islamic fundamentalists believed to be the masterminds of the attack preach a violent form of anti-statism. Their words proclaim their hostility toward the concept of the secular state, and so they carry out terrorist acts against the state. While terrorism and the spreading of such terrorism is a serious problem, the paralysis it inflicts upon the state (due to the escalation of citizens' fears of the possibility of future attacks) is an even greater problem. The threat of anthrax spores that passed through the U.S. postal system is a case in point. Such incidents develop within people a sense that the state lacks the ability to respond to threats like terrorist attacks, drugs smuggling, viral epidemics, and so on. State organizations even acknowledge their inability to respond to such threats. Threats and anxieties of this nature can easily spread like wildfire throughout a population and quickly reach a critical point often described as the "uncontrollable state."

Fundamentalists see the current system as a system ridden with injustice and condemn any attitude sympathetic to the system. Modernity and rationality of the West and the capitalist civilization are insignificant to them. Thus fundamentalists are clearly one of the forces of disintegration. Their rejection of the dominant organizational principle of the capitalist world-economy is an obvious message of anti-statism.

Globalization and the Expansion of Civil Society

Like fundamentalism and neoliberalism, globalization and the expansion of civil society are also manifestations of anti-statism. In South Korea, studies on globalization flourished with the start of the Kim Young Sam government in 1993, which adopted globalization as its state development strategy (Han 'guksaohhakhoe 1994; Chŏng Chin-yŏng ed. 1995; Kim Kyŏng-won and Im Hyŏn-jin 1995; Paek Wan-gi ed. 1995; Pak Kil-sŏng 1996). Anthony Giddens' concept of globalization—the “increase of interaction”—is the most widely accepted concept of globalization among South Korean scholars. However, the issue of conceptualization becomes much more complicated if we take into account the various other concepts already in use: “compression of time and space” (geographers and sociologists), “increase in the flow of economic factors” and the “deepening of the integration of world economy” (economists), “weakening of nation-state” (political scientists), and “global culture.” Discussions on postmodernism and discourses on “global society” or “globality” also cannot be ignored. For our intents and purposes, world-system analysts define the term globalization—though they prefer the term “globality”—as the spread of the crisis of the world economic center on a global scale—the so called Asian Crisis that occurred after 1997 is also understood in this context—and identify the increase of interstate crime, drug trafficking, and immigration as key themes of globalization (Wollösüt in 1996).

Globalization has both bright and dark sides, although I tended to emphasize its darker side (Lee Su-hoon 1995). Globalization is one of many versions of anti-statism and is as anti-statist as neoliberalism. The anti-globalization movement considers globalization in equal terms with neoliberalism; yet apologists of globalization and neoliberalism talk about very similar things: globalization emphasizes competition and the opening of borders, while deregulation, privatization, and commercialization also factor in as key features. Supporters of globalization argue that it is best to eradicate any state intervention and regulation of the private sector because such intervention can lead to the formation of abusive monopolies and inefficiency. State intervention is also considered the main cause of high transaction costs. In place of

this, proponents of globalization argue for greater market regulation.

Globalization is a unilateral and uniform process where consensus is nowhere to be found, thus making it not only an ideological but also a coercive process. Even though globalization is a response to the disturbances of the capitalist world-system, it shares the same attribute of neoliberalism — which creates more problems than the progress it promises — and ultimately will accelerate the disintegration of the world-system. If capitalist civilization is moving forward for a new order (transition), in this sense, globalization is taking the role of destroyer. The emergence of rapidly growing radical and militant anti-globalization movements in the last few years is testimony to globalization's "destroyer" role.

The role of civil society has also been unique. "Global civil society" has been emerging since 1989 (Lipschutz 1992). Various networks that cut across national borders (good examples of which are environmentalist groups, human rights activists, and aboriginal communities) have formed and have begun to adopt a strategy of creating and promoting power within civil society by maximizing grassroots politics. In many cases, these grassroots grow out of local communities that stand apart from states and political parties, and are able to promote their causes across borders.

With respect to Korea, there was a burgeoning of discussions on civil society and civil movements among South Korean scholars in the 1990s (Kim Ho-gi 1995: Part 3; Cho Tae-yöp 1999). Those discussions were extremely diverse in theoretical tradition and complex — sometimes unnecessarily so — even more than the discussions surrounding globalization.⁶ I argue that the expansion of civil society in South Korea and the world is also a manifestation of anti-statism. Civil society and civil movements have emerged, seeking to build and expand alternative norms without being fixated on the legitimacy of the state since the 1989 collapse of the Communist Bloc. In other words, civil movements

6. I am not a civil society specialist and this paper does not intend to engage itself deeply into theory of civil society. However, I feel it is necessary in relation to the main topic of this paper to give a concise definition of civil society. I define civil society as "social groupings that are separated from the state, pluralistic (meaning decentralized, non-uniform, and autonomous), voluntary, and non-profit seeking."

have abandoned the idea that progress can be achieved through the state. Civil society has always been discussed with the presumption of the existence of the state and believed to exist on the basis of that presumption. However, in South Korea, certain events of the last few years suggest the relationship between civil society and the state has become blurred and problematical.

What is clear is that civil society has announced its break from realizing a “better world” through the seizure of state power. As long as the state remains as the pillar of the world-system and structure maintaining the status quo, there exists a high probability that the state will function as an obstacle impeding social change. This is something that many civil movements began to realize. In the future, if not now, civil society will likely develop a new strategy to cope with the “state-as-obstacle” condition.

In theory, the state can accumulate strong power due to its unifying and cohesive elements. Efficiency of bureaucracy in the Weberian sense also claims to be of importance here. But if the project for civil society is the realization of democracy, then the project has no choice but to oppose these two concepts. Having multiple identities, recognizing multi-dimensional aspects, building loose solidarity (and not unity), and seeking not efficiency but the ability to carry out such projects become the political road map and concrete model of society that civil society must logically seek.

In the case of South Korea, belated popular criticism against the oppression of the dictatorship in the 1970s, the state’s violence demonstrated during the 1980 May Kwangju Democratic Movement, and the rent seeking tendency exposed during the Chun Doo-hwan Regime — which led to the 1987 June Mass Uprising — reflect the current of anti-statism on the one hand, and on the other hand provided an opportunity for civil society to make a great leap forward. In spite of all these events, the state was still the dominant actor at the time. For this reason, social forces that envisioned democratization concentrated all their efforts toward gaining control of state power. Numerous former activists interested in social reform joined the state and even entered the presidential office. However, Korean civil society witnessed the state’s continual failure to bring about reform, leading many to question whether such failures were caused by the inabilities of individual

politicians or by the lack of political and cultural foundations within the state. For many, former President Kim Dae-jung — a long-time dissident and champion of the democratization movement — answered this question clearly by exhausting the premium of Korea's democratic struggle. Though Kim and his regime championed reform and security by claiming to stand for social welfare improvement and South Korean engagement with North Korea, such claims turned out to be fraudulent. Betrayed, this sowed an irremovable distrust of the state within the hearts and minds of the people.

Unsurprisingly, many South Koreans are turning away from politics, political parties, and the state itself. Times have changed. In South Korea, Roh Moo-hyun, a political leader who himself and his key policy advisors have been lifetime advocates of decentralization, won the South Korean presidential election in December 2002. The Roh Moo-hyun government intends to implement strong policies of decentralization and power dispersion. This also is an indication that South Korea has now entered into the ranks of global anti-statism.

Concluding Remarks

Diagnosis made by world-system analysts suggests that the system has moved far from equilibrium and has reached a point of bifurcation (Wollösüt in 1999). Accordingly, these analysts argue that the capitalist world-system has passed the state of "crisis" and has entered a period of "transition" (i.e., disintegration). In it we can see a shift away from the "relentless accumulation of capital," a shift in the overarching organization and operating principle of the capitalist world-system. Accordingly, in order for our premise to be true, we must identify signs of a slow-down in the drive for accumulation of capital. In addition, we must be able to show that the institutional pillar of capitalism, the "state," is in crisis, and is being replaced by other institutions or "entity." Although these two tasks alone do not qualify as sufficient conditions proving that the period we live in is a period of transition, they are necessary conditions of which one can approach the issue of transition. Without these, all discussions on transition are rhetorical.

In this paper, I attempted to relate globalization and civil society,

two keywords that dominated social science community in South Korea in 1990s, to this issue of transformation. To do so, I examined socio-political changes of our time at a world level and underscored disturbances of the capitalist world-system and the anti-statism that those disturbances caused. I conclude that anti-statism represents a notable current of our time, choose to view globalization and civil society as manifestations of anti-statism, and argue that this is something new. Needless to say, this argument needs further analyses. In that sense, this paper is still very limited.

Acknowledging these limits, what I offer here in conclusion is a much deserved second round of discussion on civil society with a focus on the “ de-prioritization ” of relentless capital accumulation.

These days, at the analytic level, civil society tends to be discussed mainly around the notion of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Together with NGOs, a similar category called non-profit organizations (NPOs) exists. NPOs essentially are organizations that emphasize the non-profitability aspect of their activities. I have a keen interest in this characteristic of non-profitability. The fact that these organizations operate in offices, carry out various activities, and employ a large number of people but have no interest in profit seeking is unique. People who work in these organizations do so not for material rewards. Their motivations seem less tangible (honor, self-fulfillment, and psychological satisfaction being a few of them). Furthermore, the number of people working in NPOs is rapidly increasing. What is even more interesting is that these organizations are, more and more, earning the trust of the populace and receiving the support of the public. As trust and support in the state and institutional politics diminish, the center of attention begins to move toward civil society.

This particular change in attitude among the public may be a minor issue. Nevertheless, if we accept the analysis that the capitalist world-system is far from equilibrium, greatly disturbed, and entering a period of disintegration (i.e., a period of transition), then the NPOs ' move to the center of attention carries significant meaning. If NPOs prove to be effective and capable, and if their credibility spreads, we become one step closer to the creation of an alternative world-system that is more democratic than the present one. If NPOs successfully build a solid base in the world at a time when the principle of relentless capital accu-

mulation is being challenged, they would essentially deal the established order a critical blow.

This notion can never be simple or mechanical. Just because the state has lost its legitimacy does not mean that the state is no longer important or that the policies implemented by the state will lose their influence. Not everyone is free from vigorous state regulation. Likewise, capital remains powerful and continues on with its profit making activities. At least for the moment, financial motives, not happiness or psychological satisfaction, remain the basis for every day life. The world market will continue to exist and for that trade and movement of capital will flourish. Even if the capitalist world-system entered a period of disintegration, it does not necessarily mean that the powers within the contemporary system will quietly pack up and sail away. On the contrary, those that hold power within this system will no doubt battle the currents and do whatever it takes to reverse the course of threatening tides.

However, although the forces of tides can be blocked, their debris eventually washes up on shore. Within the world-system, a myriad of political and cultural changes has done just that. The disturbances these changes have brought are structural and long term in nature. States are no longer what they were before and neither is the capitalist world-system. As neoliberalism and globalization have shown, responses to counter these disturbances only make the situation worse.

South Korea is deeply embedded in the world-system. Its people also breathe deeply the airs of the global era, building civil society in South Korea inseparably with the building of civil societies worldwide. The success of one depends on the success of the other. The real challenge of civil society in South Korea is not the repairing of the weakness within the establishment, something often argued by the civil movement activists. The real concern of civil society should be how to obtain an accurate analysis of our world, and not how to deal with the pieces of debris coming from the disintegration of the capitalist world-economy.

References

- Arrighi, G. (1994). *The Long Twentieth Century*. London: Verso.
- _____ (1999). "The Global Market." *Journal of World-Systems Research* 5.2: pp.1-25.
- Cho Tae-yöp (1999). *Han 'guküi shimin undong* (Civil Movements in South Korea). Seoul: Nanam.
- Chöng Chin-yöng ed. (1995). *Segehwa shidaeüi kukkapaljön chöllyak* (Strategy of State Development in the Era of Globalization). Seoul: Sejongyön guso.
- Han guksahoehakhoe (Korean Sociological Association) ed. (1994). *Kukchewashidaeöi han 'guksahoewa chibanghwa* (Korean Society and Localization in the Era of Internationalization). Seoul: Nanam.
- Han guksahoehakhoe and Han 'gukchöngch 'ihakhoe (Korean Sociological Association and Korean Political Science Association) eds. (1992). *Han 'guküi kukkawa shiminsahoe* (State and Civil Society in South Korea). Seoul: Hanul.
- Han Wan-sang (1992). "Han gukes shiminsahoe, kukka kürigo kyeküp" (Civil Society, State and Class in South Korea). In *Han 'guküi kukkawa shiminsahoe* (State and Civil Society in South Korea), Han guksahoehakhoe and Han 'gukchöngch ihakhoe (Korean Sociological Association and Korean Political Science Association) eds. Seoul: Hanul.
- Hobsbawm, Eric (1994). *The Age of Extremes*. New York: Vintage.
- Im Hyön-jin (1998). *Chigushidae segeüi pyönhwawa han 'guküi paljön* (Changing World in the Global Era and Development of South Korea). Seoul: Seouldae Ch 'ulp 'anbu.
- Kim Ho-gi (1995). *Hyöndae chabonju üiwa han 'guksahoe* (Contemporary Capitalism and Korean Society). Seoul: Sahoebi-p yöngsa.
- Lee Su-hoon (1995). *Segech 'ejeüi inganhak* (For a Humane World-System). Seoul: Sahoebip yöngsa.
- Lipschutz, Ronnie (1992). "Restructuring World Politics: The Emergence of Global Civil Society." *Millenium* 21.3: pp.24-37.
- Marglin, S.A. and J.S. Schor, eds. (1991). *The Golden Age of Capitalism*. Oxford: Clarendon.
- Pak Kil-söng (1995). *Segehwa: chabongwa munhwaüi kujobyöndong*

(Globalization: Structure Change of Capital and Culture). Seoul: Sahoebip yǒngsa.

Paek Wan-gi, ed. (1995). *Kukchehwae taehan sahoegwahakchōk ihae* (Understanding of Internationalization in Social Science). Seoul: Pakyōngsa.

Wallerstein, Immanuel (1974). *The Modern World-System I*. New York: Academic Press.

_____ (1980). *The Modern World-System II*. New York: Academic Press.

_____ (1997). "States? Sovereignty?: The Dilemma of Capitalists in an Age of Transition," Conference on "State and Sovereignty in the World-Economy," University of California, Irvine.

Wollōsūt in, Imaenyuōl (1993). *Yōksajōk chabonjuūi/chanbonjuūi munmyōng* (Historical Capitalism/Capitalist Civilization), trans. Na Jong-il and Paek Yōng-gyōng. Seoul: Ch āngjakkwabip yōngsa.

_____ (1996). *Chayujuūi ihu* (After Liberalism), tran. Kang Mun-gu. Seoul: Tangdae.

_____ (1999). *Ut bp isūt iksū* (Utopistics), tran. Paek Yōng-gyōng. Seoul: Ch āngjakkwabip yōngsa.

Wollōsūt in, Imaenyuōl woe (1998). *Ihaengūi shidae* (An Age of Transition), trans. Paek Sūng-uk and Kim Yōng-a. Seoul: Ch āngjakkwabip yōngsa.

Yun Kūn-sōp (1994). "Chōnhwangiūi sahoehakōi chōnhwan" (Society in the Period of Transition and Transition of Sociology). In *Kukchehwashidaeūi han 'guksahoewa chibanghwa* (Korean Society and Localization in the Era of Internationalization), Han 'guksahoe-hakhoe (Korean Sociological Association) ed. Seoul: Nanam.

Lee Su-Hoon is Professor of Sociology at Kyungnam University, Seoul. He received his Ph.D. in Comparative International Development and Sociology from Johns Hopkins University in 1986. He has written extensively on development and democratization in East Asia both in English and Korean. His books include *State-Building in the Contemporary Third World* and *the World-System Analysis*. He is an Executive Member of the International Sociological Association (2002-2006).