

# **Bringing International Anti-Landmine Norms to Domestic Politics: Korea Campaign to Ban Landmines as an Effective Intermediary**

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This paper assesses the role of the Korea Campaign to Ban Landmines (KCBL) in the internalization of anti-landmine norms in the Republic of Korea. The KCBL, a NGO network specializing in landmine issues, has been a successful intermediary between international anti-landmine norms and domestic politics. It has carried out fact-finding surveys to reveal the existence of landmine victims who were overshadowed by security concerns, and has co-opted politicians and other social movement groups to increase awareness of landmines as a human security threat. Also, it has pressured the Korean government to give up “dumb” landmines and clear landmine fields in the rear. The Korean government, which has faced a dilemma between international criticism and security concerns, has partially incorporated anti-landmine norms, even though it refused to sign the Ottawa Convention in 1997. Furthermore, the National Assembly has been reviewing a few draft bills which would compensate landmine victims. This case shows that non-governmental actors can play a crucial role in internalizing international norms in domestic politics.

Keywords: international norms, internalization, anti-personal landmines, the Ottawa Convention, the Korea Campaign to Ban Landmines, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines

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## **1. Introduction**

Landmine issues attracted worldwide attention in the 1990s. Since Asia

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\* The author appreciates Jai-kook Cho and Eun-young Moon's sharing of information that the Korea Campaign to Ban Landmines has collected since 1997.

Watch and Physicians for Human Rights published *Landmines in Cambodia: The Coward's War* in 1991, Western human rights activists have challenged the military effectiveness of landmines and framed landmines not as a means of security but as a cause of human insecurity (Banerjee and Muggah 2002:43-6; Ohe 2004; Price 1998; Wexler 2003:576-8). Their activities led Western countries to adopt a series of export moratoriums and eventually ended with the signing of the Ottawa Convention in 1997 to ban anti-personnel landmines (Rutherford 2004; Sigal 2006).<sup>1</sup> Anti-personnel landmine norms have been firmly established at the global level.

Anti-personnel landmine norms have been partially internalized by the Republic of Korea. South Korea, which has not signed the Convention yet, keeps producing anti-personnel landmines, stockpiling anti-personnel landmines, and maintaining mined areas (ICBL 2007).<sup>2</sup> South Korea appears to avoid international pressure to ban anti-personnel landmines by citing “the security situation on the Korean Peninsula” (Republic of Korea 2006). In contrast to the seeming refusal to accept anti-personnel landmine norms, South Korea has already silently incorporated international anti-landmine norms. It has released detailed information related to landmines publicly, has been clearing mine fields in the rear, and continues to provide financial assistance to help landmine victims abroad (ICBL 2007). The Republic of Korea is a *de facto* conformist to international anti-landmine norms.

This paper discusses the role of the Korea Campaign to Ban Landmines (hereafter KCBL) in the internalization of anti-landmine norms in Korea. The non-governmental organization has brought anti-personnel landmine norms

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1. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (hereafter ICBL) invited pro-ban states to discuss plans to ban anti-personal landmines in January 1996 and all eight states (Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, and Switzerland) accepted the ICBL's invitation. The first meeting between the ICBL and the eight states evolved into the “International Landmines Strategy Session,” which eventually led to the Ottawa Convention. The ICBL directly participated in sponsoring a UN resolution calling for a ban against landmines (UNGA Res/51/45) and drafting the Ottawa Convention (Sigal 2006:96-101).
  2. The Republic of Korea has been a member to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (hereafter CCW) since 1983. South Korea ratified CCW's Protocol I, which prohibits the use of weapons to injure victims primarily by fragments undetected with X-rays, in 1983 and Protocol II, which prohibits the use or transfer of non-detectable anti-personnel mines and the use of non-self destructing/non-self deactivating mines outside marked minefields, in 2000.

from the global level to South Korea. First, this paper reviews landmine statistics and landmine casualties in the Republic of Korea. Second, it introduces the founding of the KCBL. The network creation shows a top-down social movement where a small number of altruistic entrepreneurs mobilize latent grievances into a political campaign. Also, it explores the KCBL's role as an intermediary between international norms and domestic politics. Finally, it assesses several competing answers to the question of why the Republic of Korea partially conforms to international anti-landmine norms.

## 2. Anti-Personal Landmines in the Republic of Korea

Security concerns dominate the human insecurity issues of landmines in Korea. Though more than one million landmines have been placed,<sup>3</sup> about two million landmines have been stockpiled, and there have been many landmine victims. The issue of landmines in Korea has not been salient. Landmines were framed as an effective defense tactic. When faced with a series of challenges by international and domestic organizations, South Korea finally provided details on landmine stockpiles and transactions in May 2006.

### Landmine Statistics

South Korea has officially declared the possession of 407,800 anti-personnel landmines, including 382,900 “dumb mines” (non-self destructing/non-self deactivating mines) and 24,900 “smart mines” (self-destructing/deactivating mines).<sup>4</sup> Also, the USFK has about 1.1 million “dumb” anti-personnel mines for future use in Korea and a substantial number of “smart mines” as a part of the

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3. The South Korean military and the US Forces Korea (hereafter USFK) have placed at least one million landmines in the Demilitarized Zone (hereafter DMZ) and the Military Control Zone (hereafter MCZ), which is immediately below the southern boundary of the DMZ, to slow down the speed of a North Korean invasion, if it should happen (ICBL 2002:682).

4. This stockpile statistic is not consistent with the Korean government's previous responses. Colonel Gi-ok Kim (International Arms Control Division, Ministry of National Defense) estimated that the stockpile was two million in 2003 (Kim 2003). The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations estimated that there were one million buried mines and “about twice as many landmines in stockpile as those that are buried” in 2005 (Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations 2007).

War Reserve Stocks for Allies, Korea (WRSA-K). These mines are stored at US military installations in Korea and are available if necessary to US and South Korean forces (ICBL 2007).<sup>5</sup>

The Republic of Korea has stopped producing non-self-activating anti-personnel landmines and banned any transfer of non-self-activating anti-personnel landmines since 1997. But since 1998, South Korea has produced self-destructing anti-personnel mines. Hanwha Corporation produces anti-personnel mines which can be set to self-destruct 48 hours after deployment. In addition, the same company produces two types of Claymore mines in command-detonated mode, not with tripwires. The company has exported a remote-controlled Claymore to New Zealand (Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations 2007).

It is estimated that at least one million landmines have been buried in South Korea (Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations 2007). There are two types of landmine fields in Korea. One includes about 1,100 “planned mine fields” where mines have been placed for military purposes and their location has been marked on maps. There have been three waves in the burial of anti-personnel landmines. First, the Korean War has left many planned mine fields. Military units under the UN Command placed landmines to protect military installations or slow down the advancement of enemy units. Second, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the USFK buried anti-personnel landmines to protect military installations out of fear of a provocation by North Korea, one of the former Soviet Union’s allies.<sup>6</sup> Third, the South Korean military buried anti-personnel landmines to protect air defense units which were placed in high elevation areas in the late 1980s. Fearing a North Korean air strike or commando attack to foil the 1988 Olympic Games or the 1986 Asian Games,

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5. On December 30, 2005, President Bush signed Public Law 109-159, whose Section 1(c) states that any items remaining in the WRSA-K “shall be removed, disposed of, or both by the Department of Defense” when the United States ends the war reserve stocks program in 2008. Considering that the Korean military employs “smart mines,” it is unlikely that the “dumb” anti-personnel landmines will be sold to Korea.

6. The USFK, which claimed that all landmines in Korea were deployed under Korean military supervision (USFK Statement, January 20, 2003), acknowledged that “military units under the UN Command placed landmines in Korea as joint operations” (USFK Response to Inquiry from Citizen’s Newspaper, February 3, 2006). In addition, the USFK placed landmines and controlled landmine fields for operational necessities from 1953 to 1973. The US military units handed over the information on landmine burial to the South Korean military in 1974.

the South Korean military fortified its defensive military installations. Planned mine fields marked with “Mine Field Danger” were about 21.8 km<sup>2</sup> in 2006 (ICBL 2007).

The other type includes 202 “unconfirmed mine fields,” where mines have supposedly been buried but their location has not been clearly identified. The advances and retreats during the Korean War led military units to mishandle mine maps, leaving unconfirmed mine fields. Also, torrential rain has swept mine fields or stockpiled mines to create unconfirmed mine fields.<sup>7</sup> Unconfirmed mine fields marked with “Unconfirmed Mine Field Danger” accounted for about 90.7 km<sup>2</sup> in 2006 (ICBL 2007).<sup>8</sup>

### Landmine Victims

There is no reliable and comprehensive data on landmine victims in Korea. The Korean court and the Korean military destroyed all information on landmine casualties every five years until 1990 since the information was not classified as “worthy of record.” Victims injured during their military duty receive a veteran’s pension and free medical services at the veterans’ hospitals. Also, the South Korean government provides benefits to military mine survivors, including tax breaks and employment benefits for their children. Although there is no reliable data, the KCBL estimates there have been 2-3,000 military casualties since the Korean War (ICBL 1999:48-482).

Civilian landmine victims were in an unfavorable situation when filing for compensation. They first had to submit their claims to the District Compensation Board under the jurisdiction of the National Defense Ministry. The District Compensation Board often declined to file landmine victim cases claiming that claimants inadvertently trespassed on landmine sites. Since landmine accidents are detrimental to the career of military officers and law officers in the Korean military are partially accountable to their commander at the division level, law officers would rule in favor of their commanders rather than mine victims. Only after claims were denied by the District Compensation Board could claimants

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
7. More than 1,000 mines were lost from 1998 to 2001 (Korea Times, December 17, 2001). In September 2002, Typhoon Lusa displaced eighty-four anti-personnel mines in Gangneung, Gangwon Province and only fifty-two were retrieved (Kim and Ko 2002).

8. The Korean military has kept clearing militarily useless “planned mine fields” and “unconfirmed mine fields” in the rear since April 1999.

appeal to the Special Compensation Board of the National Defense Ministry or bring their grievances to a civil court. As the legal process took a long time from the District Compensation Board to civil court and the burden of proof was on claimants, poor claimants would give up filing lawsuits.<sup>9</sup> According to a KCBL survey of two Gangwon Province villages, only four out of fifty-two landmine victims filed compensation claims and only three received any type of assistance (KCBL 2006:33-40).

Landmine victims who reside in the MCZ have been in more jeopardy. Since the military controls civilian movement in the MCZ, landmine victims are afraid of arbitrary interventions from the military officers who are accountable for landmine accidents. If their family members were not allowed to work their land in the MCZ, landmine victims might have to give up farming. Also, military commanders would stop civilian movement to cover up their negligence after

**Figure 1** Civilian Landmine Victims in South Korea<sup>10</sup>



Source: KCBL 2006:74-82.

9. Claimants may bypass the District Compensation Board and file lawsuits directly against the State since 2002.

10. Figure 1 does not represent all civilian landmine victims in South Korea. The KCBL started carrying out a series of on-the-spot interviews, checking governmental records, and receiving self-reports in 1997.

mine accidents. Forty-four out of fifty-two landmine victims, who were identified by the KCBL's survey in 2006, did not report their misfortunes to the military or the police for fear of any further discrimination (KCBL 2006:35-42).

Figure 1 reveals an unusual surge of landmine victims in the late 1990s. There are two explanations for this surge. First, floods in North Korea dislocated landmines located in the DMZ into South Korea. North Korea has been plagued with floods annually because an energy shortage in the early 1990s led North Koreans to cut down trees in the upper reaches of the Han and Imjin rivers. South Koreans on an outing to the lower reaches of the Han and Imjin rivers might step on misplaced landmines. Second, the surge of reports by landmine victims may be a sign of the introduction of international anti-landmine norms to Korea. Landmine victims who tended to blame their own negligence or were afraid of discriminations from the military until the 1980s came to report their accidents in the late 1990s.<sup>11</sup> The introduction of the Ottawa Convention coincides with the surge of self-reporting landmine victims in the late 1990s.

### South Korea's Compliance to International Anti-Landmine Norms

Though it has refused to sign the Ottawa Convention,<sup>12</sup> South Korea has complied with international anti-landmine norms in several ways. First, the South Korean government has enforced a moratorium on the export of anti-personnel landmines since 1997. Faced with the UN General Assembly resolution on landmines (Resolution 48/75, December 16, 1993) and U.S. President Clinton's letter for export moratoriums of anti-personnel landmines (December 7, 1993), South Korea introduced a one-year landmine export moratorium in 1997 and annually renewed it until 2003. In 2004 South Korea declared a permanent landmine export moratorium.

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11. The KCBL's survey in 2006 reports that only seven out of fifty-four victims heard about the application process to compensate their misfortunes: 2 from neighbors, 4 from civil movement groups, 1 from mass media, and none from the military or government (KCBL 2006:41). This statistic is a piece of supporting evidence that NGOs are conduits of anti-personal landmine norms in South Korea. Also, the five civilian landmine victims who suffered in the 1960s and 1970s and reported their issue to the KCBL from September 2006 to March 2007 claimed that they had not reported their accidents to any governmental agency because they did not know where to file their case (KCBL 2008).

12. South Korea has not abided by the Ottawa Convention in two ways. First, it has not banned the use of anti-personnel landmines. Instead of destroying non-self activating anti-personnel landmines, the South Korean military attached metal objects to plastic anti-personnel landmines so that they would be easily detected. Second, South Korea maintains a large stockpile of landmines.

Second, South Korea has been clearing landmines in the rear since 1999. Even though planned landmines in the rear are useful in protecting military installations, the South Korean military cleared out all planned landmine fields in the rear in 2006. Also, it has cleared five unconfirmed landmine fields and plans to de-mine ten more areas by 2009 (Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations 2007). Furthermore, it plans to clear landmines placed in the DMZ if “the political and security situation on the Korean Peninsula” improves (Chung 20002). To connect the inter-Korean railroad, the two Koreas have already cleared landmines in two areas of the DMZ in 2001-2002.

Third, South Korea has fully abided by the CCW’s Protocol II. It has attached metal washers to plastic anti-personal landmines, which metal detectors can easily identify, in 1999 (Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations 2000). It has stopped producing “dumb” non-self deactivating/non-self destructing landmines and started producing “smart” landmines. Also, it has provided financial support for mine clearance activities abroad.

**Table 1** Mine Clearance and Funding to the UN by South Korea

Year	Cleared Mines	Cleared Fields	Mine Clearance Funding to UN
1999	n.a.	n.a.	\$300,000
2000	6200*	10	\$430,000
2001	4700^	5	\$150,000
DMZ	840		
2002	6019†	7	\$100,000
DMZ	1000		
2003	13000	17	\$1,500,000
2004	8800	9	\$3,150,000
2005	8500	7	\$1,050,000
2006	7800	8	\$50,000

Note: \* mark includes the number of the cleared mines at the 10 minefields in the rear from 1999 to 2000.

Note: ^ mark includes the number of the cleared mines at the DMZ and the 5 minefields in the rear.

Note: † mark includes the number of the cleared mines at the DMZ and the 7 minefields in the rear.

Source: ICBL, various years.



### 3. KCBL as an Effective Intermediary

The KCBL started as a network of twenty-eight non-governmental organizations in 1997. It has contributed much to the internalization of international anti-landmine norms in Korea. This section reviews the founding of the KCBL and its activities on the basis of interviews with several key actors.<sup>13</sup>

#### Founding of the KCBL

There were two catalysts to the KCBL's establishment (Interview with Jai-kook Cho, 2007). One was the Ottawa Conference titled "Toward a Global Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines" in 1996. The Ottawa Process, which was unofficially launched in January 1996 and ended with the Ottawa Conference in 1996, publicized anti-personnel landmines as a human security threat. Two activists pondered how to make the Ottawa Process a part of domestic politics: Jai-kook Cho, a Christian reformist and former research fellow at the Christian Institute for the Study of Justice and Development (hereafter CISJD), and Dae-woon Lee, who worked for People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (hereafter PSPD). In 1996 Dae-woon Lee, who has been an anti-American/anti-war activist, approached Jai-kook Cho to see whether the two NGOs could carry out joint projects to pressure South Korea to join the Ottawa Convention.

The other catalyst was the revelation of unconfirmed mine fields and unassisted civilian landmine victims. Kyung-lan Chung from CISJD overheard discussions between Mr. Cho and Mr. Lee and informed the two men about the presence of unassisted civilian landmine victims. Ms. Chung's husband, Chang-soo Kim,<sup>14</sup> was a close friend of Si-woo Lee, a freelance photographer and anti-war activist who was familiar with civilian landmine victims and mine fields in Keumhwa and Yunchun counties in Gyeonggi Province. Ms. Chung introduced the photographer to the two activists. The above five activists became core members of a landmine network and Jai-kook Cho was selected as interim coor-

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13. The author interviewed Jai-kook Cho (Coordinator and Executive Commissioner, KCBL) and Eun-young Moon (Secretary, KCBL) on August 1, 2007 and November 12, 2007. The author carried out another interview with an anonymous high-ranking military officer on October 14, 2007.

14. Chang-soo Kim worked for the National Security Council from 2003 to 2007. He contributed to the increase of Korean funding for mine clearance to the United Nations (Interview with Jai-kook Cho).

dinator. Mr. Cho and Mr. Lee received permission from the director of their respective NGOs to launch a landmine network.

CISJD and PSPD sent invitation letters to around fifty NGOs. Mr. Cho contacted reformist Christian networks and Mr. Lee approached anti-war, pro-unification, pro-democracy, and human right groups. Twenty-eight NGOs officially launched the KCBL on November 6, 1997. The twenty-eight NGOs can be classified into six categories based on their primary interest: six Christian social movement groups, two medical networks to provide humanitarian assistance, seven anti-war/pro-reunification groups, three environmental groups, nine pro-democracy/human rights groups, and one NGO that specializes in landmine issues.

The KCBL is a small network in terms of staff and finances. It only has one full-time secretary and several graduate and undergraduate student volunteers. Key members have donated money to finance KCBL's activities and the cost to maintain its office (Interview with Eun-young Moon, 2007). Since its direct support base includes a small number of landmine victims and their relatives and since the majority of Koreans still value national security over human insecurity concerns related to landmines, the KCBL has not expanded into a grass roots organization. Its membership size has been almost constant since 1997. Thus, the network has had difficulty in attracting donations.

### KCBL's Activities

The KCBL is the ICBL's Korean chapter. It has been an effective mediator among international landmine organizations, the South Korean government, and landmine victims in Korea. The KCBL's activities may be classified into four areas. First, it has carried out a series of fact-finding surveys. It has identified 246 civilian landmine victims and thirty-six planned mine fields in the rear, issued four landmine reports which identified landmine victims and mined sites, distributed several video documentaries, and held photograph exhibitions. The KCBL's fact-finding activities have debunked the South Korean government's claim that the use of anti-personnel landmines "has not caused any civilian casualties and inflicted suffering on their lives" and "the actual mined area on the Korean Peninsula is restricted to the 155-mile Demilitarized Zone" (Lee 1997). The KCBL has represented the interests of unnoticed civilian landmine victims against the Korean government.

Second, the KCBL has connected human rights groups and humanitarian

assistance groups with civilian landmine victims. The KCBL has mobilized a group of lawyers who are interested in humanitarian issues to provide free legal services to civilian landmine victims. Also, it has connected medical groups with civilian landmine victims. Foreign landmine NGOs provide financial support to civilian landmine victims in Korea through the KCBL network. In sum, the organization has been an intermediary between human security concerns and civilian landmine victims.

Third, the KCBL has projected international anti-landmine norms toward the South Korean government. The KCBL has employed two bottoms-up approaches: (1) The KCBL has organized rallies and demonstrations to pressure the Korean government to sign the Ottawa Convention with the help of other human rights groups and NGOs who specialize in landmine issues. (2) It has employed a connection with the ICBL to urge the Korean military to abide by anti-personnel landmine norms. The KCBL has asked the ICBL to pressure the Korean government to release information on landmines in Korea. Also, it fully utilized the international media coverage which is produced with the ICBL's annual report.

Additionally, the KCBL uses two top-down approaches: (1) It directly lobbied national assemblymen and participated in the development of draft bills to clear landmine sites and compensate civilian landmine victims in 2000 and 2005.<sup>15</sup> National assemblymen who were involved in civil rights or student movements have been favorable to the two draft bills for their political orientations;<sup>16</sup> those whose districts include unconfirmed landmine sites have been enthusiastic about introducing bills to clear landmine sites for their reelection.<sup>17</sup> (2) It utilized personal networks in the government. The Kim Dae-Jung and the

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15. The first draft bill was introduced on September 5, 2003. However, the Judiciary Review Committee in the National Assembly suspended discussion about the first draft bill on the grounds that it has retroactive clauses. The KCBL participated in the development of a second draft bill with Assemblyman Sung-kon Kim in 2005. The second draft bill has not been introduced yet.

16. The percentage of former civil rights and student movement leaders in the National Assembly was more than 20% in the 17<sup>th</sup> National Assembly (2004 to 2008) (Yoon 2004:31). The presence of former civil rights and student movement participants in the National Assembly opened the window for anti-landmine movements.

17. Assemblyman Hyung-oh Kim, who played a key role in the development of the first draft bill from 2002 to 2003, did not participate in the development of the second draft bill in 2005. After the Republic of Korea Army finished clearing a mine field in his district (Youngdo, Busan) in 2003, he lost interest in the anti-personnel landmine movement.

Roh Moo-Hyun administrations recruited many former civil rights activists into key governmental positions from 1998 to 2007. Former civil rights activists who worked for these administrations and are sympathetic to the KCBL have influenced the Korean military to conform at least partially to the landmine treaty. These activities have led the Korean military to control landmines more tightly, stop the use of economic “dumb” mines, introduce expensive “smart” mines, and clear planned mine fields in the rear (Interview with anonymous high-ranking military officer).

Fourth, the KCBL has connected the anti-landmine movements in Korea and abroad. The organization periodically provides information on other anti-landmine NGOs’ activities as well as its own to the ICBL, which annually updates country landmine reports. Twice it carried out joint fact-finding surveys in Korea with the Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines (JCBL). It participates in global anti-landmine NGO conferences and represents Korean anti-landmine movements at the global level (KCBL 2006:7-10).

#### 4. Conclusion

The Republic of Korea has been regarded as a pariah in landmine issues. It has faced challenges domestically and internationally because it has refused to sign the Ottawa Convention. It has already incorporated international anti-landmine norms in many ways. Except for the use and stockpile of anti-personnel landmines, South Korea has conformed to the landmine treaty. It has stopped exporting anti-personnel landmines, cleared planned mined sites in the rear because of human security concerns, provided financial assistance to de-mining activities abroad, and made anti-personnel landmines easily detectable. Even though South Korea is not a member of the Ottawa Convention, anti-landmine norms have been partially internalized in Korea. The regulative effects of norms are surely identified in the Korean anti-landmine case.<sup>18</sup>

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18. Norms have the constituting effect of defining the identity of an actor (Katzenstein 1996:5). Though it is hard to identify the constituting effects of international anti-landmine norms in Korea at the national level, anti-landmine norms have surely challenged the conventional image of landmines as defensive instruments. Even the Korean military considers human security concerns and conventional security concerns at the same time (Interview with anonymous high-ranking military officer).

Why has the Korean government incorporated international norms in landmine issues? There are three potential answers: coercion, self-interest, or legitimacy.<sup>19</sup> The coercion explanation appears inconsistent with international situations. Though the Clinton Administration pressured the Korean government to enforce a moratorium on the export of anti-personnel landmines, there was no punitive threat for non-compliance. Meanwhile, when the Bush Administration did not pressure South Korea to ban anti-personnel landmines, the South Korean government made the export moratorium permanent. In addition, South Korea had already implemented almost all requirements of the CCW's Protocol II before it officially signed it in 2000.

The self-interest explanation appears unconvincing. The landmine export moratorium has prevented Korean firms from exporting landmines. Mine clearances in planned mined areas give security disadvantages, which makes South Korea more vulnerable to a North Korean invasion. The disclosure on landmine stockpiles and production is inconsistent with security concerns. "Smart" landmines cost more. Attaching metal objects to plastic mines is neither economic nor militarily useful. In sum, the compliance to international anti-landmine norms does not give any material or security advantage at the national level.

The legitimacy explanation appears most convincing. The best supporting evidence is South Korea's financial assistance to clear mined areas abroad. The South Korean government has expressed sympathy toward international anti-landmine norms since 1997 and decided to provide foreign assistance to clear landmines in order to deal with international pressure (Choi 1997). South Korea's mine clearance funding may be interpreted as a tactic to neutralize criticism, as anti-landmine activists in Korea allege. But South Korea appears to satisfy the two conflicting interests: security concerns and conformity to legitimate international anti-personnel landmine norms. Furthermore, the Korean military sometimes gives priority to human insecurity rather than conventional security concerns in deciding whether to clear landmines.

The KCBL's activities provide an answer to the question of why South Korea cares about its legitimacy in landmine issues. The organization has brought international norms to domestic politics through a top-down path where a small number of NGO leaders cooperate with governmental officials who are

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19. The three tentative explanations are roughly parallel to neorealist, neoliberal, and idealist/constructivist theories in international norms (Wendt 1999:250).

sympathetic to the anti-personnel landmine norms.<sup>20</sup> The organization has acted as an intermediary among the Korean military, politicians, international and domestic anti-landmine groups, and civilian landmine victims. By co-opting with the Korean military and politicians, it has contributed to the internalization of international anti-landmine norms.

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20. The internalization of international norms has been a "blind spot" in the study of international institutions (Keohane 1998:392). This research identifies the presence of KCBL as an intermediary between international norms and domestic politics in the "blind spot."

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