

Evolving Electoral Cleavages in Korea

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This paper explores changes in Korea's voter alignments. Since Korea has experienced abridged social changes, she appears to have undergone dramatic changes of political cleavages as well which is contrary to the 'fixation' theory of Lipset and Rokkan. The main cleavages shown in Korean politics are urban-rural, regional, generation, and ideology cleavages. Urban-rural cleavage dominated the era of authoritarian rule because electoral fraud with threats or bribery was less likely in more modernized urban areas while illegal electioneering was more prevalent in under-modernized rural areas where the level of education was relatively lower. After democratization, regional cleavage became the main cleavage since voters chose candidates based on strong regional ties in the absence of the issue of democratization that had dominated Korean politics for forty years. Though it was still the main one, regional cleavage became weakened by new cleavages of generation and ideology in the 2002 presidential election. In the 2007 presidential election, regional cleavage appears to have been modified significantly. The capital region, used to being a swing region, became a strong electoral basis for Lee Myung-bak. Noticeably voters in the region began to cut their connections to their birth-places.

Keywords: electoral cleavage, urban-rural cleavage, regionalism,
generation cleavage

I. Introduction

Korean voters under the authoritarian regimes such as the 3rd through the 5th Republics were familiar with the news saying that the governing party won in most rural districts while the opposition parties won in most urban districts. However, democratization, achieved by the June uprising in 1987, changed elec-

toral maps. The east and the west belts of Korean Peninsula were covered with different party colors. Yeongnam and Honam regions¹ were covered with the darkest colors since they are the centers of regionalism. Moving away from the regions the colors got brighter.

During the 2002 presidential election, new lines of division emerged even though regional cleavages continued. Home and workplaces came to be the front lines of the election war. Cho Gab-je, a well-known conservative columnist, argued that fathers should not give allowances to their children in college if they voted for presidential candidate Roh Moo-hyun. On liberal websites, however, such college-age children exchanged plans to persuade their mothers and grandmothers to vote for Roh since it was impossible to persuade their fathers who had stern political beliefs in general. In workplaces, workers could not discuss politics face to face with their superiors, but they prayed for their preferred candidate to be elected. When the election result was announced, sons, daughters and workers celebrated their victory. Fathers and superiors, on the other hand, were disappointed, wondering perhaps their time had passed.

During the 2007 presidential election, we witnessed another change in electoral cleavages. Home and workplaces were no longer the front lines. It was difficult to find intense voter conflicts at homes or in offices. Seoul and Gyeonggi, known as swing regions, became hotbeds for the candidate, Lee Myung-bak.

The subject of this paper is an exploration of the changes in voter alignments in Korea. The analysis is directed toward three specific research objectives. The first task will be to examine patterns and causes of the transformations in electoral cleavage structures by reviewing previous studies. Second, this paper will focus on the cleavage patterns of the 2007 presidential election by analyzing its outcome and the survey data conducted by East Asia Institution(EAI). Third, linkages between social changes and electoral alignments will be examined.

1. There are nine provinces and seven metropolitan cities in Korea. The nine provinces are Gyeonggi, Gangwon, Chungcheongnam, Chungcheongbuk, Jeollanam, Jeollabuk, Gyeongsangnam, Gyeongsangbuk, and Jeju. The seven metropolitan cities are Seoul, Incheon, Daejeon, Gwangju, Daegu, Ulsan, and Busan. Because of the geographical proximity and cultural similarity, these nine provinces and seven metropolitan cities are grouped as follows: Jeollanam, Jeollabuk provinces, and Gwangju city are grouped as Honam region; Gyeongsangnam and Gyeongsangbuk provinces, Daegu, Ulsan, and Busan cities are grouped as Yeongnam region; Gyeonggi province and Seoul are grouped as the capital region; Chungcheongnam and Chungcheongbuk provinces are grouped as Chungcheong region.

II. Social Changes and Cleavage Transformations: Review of Literature

There has been considerable theorizing on the linkage between developmental changes and mass political alignments since the pioneering work of Lipset and Rokkan (1967). They sought to formulate a broad conceptual scheme that accounts for the origins of political conflicts and cleavages within a given national community.²

They identified four cleavages produced by national and industrial revolutions. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when national revolutions swept across Europe, conflict for political hegemony rose between central elites and populations who initiated national building, and the rest of the populations. This produced a cleavage between the center and the periphery. National Revolutions also produced a cleavage between the secular government and the church over the issues of relocating people for the development of the nation (Lipset and Rokkan 1967).

Industrial revolutions, on the other hand, caused urban-rural and capital-labor cleavages. In the course of industrialization, landowners clashed against the newly growing industrial group. This resulted in urban-rural cleavage. As industrialization deepened, industrial powers gained more power, creating a new conflict between labor on one side and employers on the other. Thus, a capital-labor cleavage emerged.

Lipset and Rokkan further argued that modern political parties were established by following these axes of cleavage. The parties, then, continued even after the cleavages dissolved because loyalty to the political parties based on these cleavages was strongly fixed.

Their 'freezing' hypothesis persuasively explains European party systems. It is, however, also true that many parties do not continue to represent the same cleavages on which they were established. Some parties represent wholly new cleavages. Some cleavages are weakened or disappear.

For example, the Republican and Democratic parties in the U.S., both being

2. Political cleavage studies can be grouped into two categories according to their theoretical emphasis. The sociological model first proposed by Lipset and Rokkan focuses on how social cleavages translated into political party systems. The institutional model was argued by scholars who focused on party strategy and institutions in cleavages that translated into political party systems.

more than 150 years old, represent considerably different cleavages from those on which they used to be based. Historically, the Democratic Party represented Southern land-holders and the Republican Party represented Northern industrial groups. As the U.S. industrialized, the competing economic interests of capital and labor weakened the political alliance between them. Finally in the 1930s, capitalists remained to support the Republican Party and labor turned to the Democratic Party (Rogowski 1987).

Along with the shift in economic interests, this regional cleavage had also gone through considerable change. After the 1960s, the Democratic Party candidates began to be elected in the Northeast which used to be the Republican Party's playing field. Also, Republican Party members began to be elected in the South. Today, the Democratic Party dominates in the Northeast whereas the Republican Party dominates in the South.³

For the United States, the political cleavages represented by the political parties have changed enormously even though the political parties remain, but for the United Kingdom, as older political cleavages are replaced by new ones, the political parties are also replaced by new parties. The first political cleavage, represented by Whigs and Tories, originated around the issue of restricting the power of the King and the Church in favor of enforcing the power of the Parliament. In the early twentieth century, the Labor Party was established as the new capital-labor cleavage replacing the older Whig-Tory cleavage (Self 2000).

History also shows that an old cleavage may merge into a new one. For example, religious differences were catalysts for the most important cleavage in European countries during the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries when nation states began to be built. Now, except for Ireland and a few other countries, religion is no longer a major political cleavage. As shown in Germany and France, religion merged into centrist or right political parties, and it does not have much impact on the political systems.⁴

As Lipset and Rokkan argued, it is true that remnants from old political cleavages can be found in modern party systems, and as a result party systems

3. Several reasons have been discussed for this change of regional cleavage. Some said that the wealthy moved to the Southern region as the region developed. Others said that the liberal North region turned to support the Democratic Party and the conservative Southern region turned to support the Republican Party because the racial issue, the Vietnam War, and cultural radicalism appeared as the central axes of political cleavages (Schneider 1981).

4. For example, Christian Democratic Union in Germany, Nouveau Centre in France, Unione dei Democratici Cristiani.

endure.⁵ At the same time, however, it is also true that main political cleavages change as society changes. Political cleavages evolve as old political cleavages lose their political positions or ally themselves with new political cleavages.⁶

III. Transformation of Electoral Cleavages in Korea

Korea's modern political history is not as old as that of Western states. Since, however, Korea has experienced abridged social changes during a relatively short period of time, she also experienced dramatic changes in political cleavages.

1. Modernization and Urban-Rural Cleavage

During the first National Assembly election in 1948, forty-eight political parties and organizations participated, and the result was that 42.5% of the seats were taken by independent candidates. Major issues that split voters were not found during the election. The only main issue of the election was the personality of the candidates.

During the 2nd National Assembly election, 'Centrists' decided to run for election, and this resulted in ideological conflicts between the Left and the Right in some electoral districts where Centrist candidates ran. Nevertheless, no national electoral cleavages were formed because independent candidates dominated the election. Independents earned 60% of the seats (Sim and Kim 2006:434-450).

In 1951, ahead of the 3rd National Assembly election, President Rhee Seung-man established the Liberal Party, the first ruling party in modern Korean history. It generated a conflict structure between the ruling and the opposition parties. Since then, though the names of the ruling and opposition parties have changed, the basic conflict structure continued until the June Democracy contention in 1987.

5. The following political scientists argued that political cleavages in party systems endure, and thus party systems themselves show few significant signs of increased instability: Bartolini and Mair (1990), Klingemann and Fuchs (1995), Mair (1993, 1997), and Rose and Urwin (1970).


6. The following political scientists argue that since the 1970s, political cleavages have weakened and system stability has decreased: Crewe and Denver (1985), Dalton, Flanagan, and Beck (1984), Dalton and Wattenberg (2000), and Pedersen (1983).

The ruling party ran for the National Assembly on issues of rapid industrialization or modernization. On the other hand, opposition parties asked voters for support on democratization. Between the competing pledges, rural areas often chose the ruling party that promised economic development while urban areas tended to choose the opposition parties that promised democracy.

Figure 1 shows the results of the 1952 Lower House election according to residential region. The Liberal Party, the ruling party, won only one seat in Seoul. The largest opposition party, the Democratic Party, won 14 seats in Seoul. In twenty-six other cities, the Liberals won 13 seats, whereas the Democrats won 29 seats. The Liberals won 55.6% of the seats in the rural areas, called ‘Eup’,⁷ while the Democrats won only 20.2% of the seats (Yoon 1978, 1981). This electoral cleavage between urban and rural areas continued until democratization (Lim, 1968; Song 1971; Kim and Koh 1972; Kihl 1973; Yun 1981; Choe and Kim 1985).

What were the factors behind the apparent urban-rural cleavage? Numerous studies argued that modernization was the main cause. As modernization proceeded rapidly under the guidance of the government, the level of education in urban areas increased. As a result, electoral fraud generated by threats or bribery was less likely in urban areas. In rural areas where the level of education was relatively lower, illegal electioneering was more prevalent (Song 1971; Kim and Koh 1972).

Figure 1 1952 Lower House Election Results by Residential Region



Source: Yoon (1978: 198).

7. ‘Eup’ is the smallest administrative district.

2. Democratization and Regional Cleavage

During the 1971 presidential election, the incumbent candidate, Park Chung-hee, acquired overwhelming support in Gangwon and Yeongnam regions. An opposition candidate, Kim Dae-jung, gained more votes than Park in Seoul, Gyeonggi, and Honam regions. Voters were divided over whether the region where they lived benefited from the government's development initiatives (Song 1971).⁸ This division line between the East and West belts was overlapped by the home regions of these two presidential candidates.

However, the regional cleavage which appeared in 1971 did not become a major political cleavage immediately. After his narrow victory, President Park Chung-hee amended the constitution, and replaced the direct presidential election system with the indirect election system. In the presidential elections of 1972 and 1979, Park gained almost 100% of the votes from the delegates for the presidential election, thus hiding the electoral cleavages if there had been a direct election. The second reason was that strengthened authoritarianism made issues of industrialization versus democratization the main political conflict during the following decades.

The 1987 presidential election was the first democratic direct election in sixteen years. Democratization was no longer the most important political issue. The cleavage between industrialization and democratization (urban and rural), accordingly, was attenuated. In the absence of the issue that had dominated Korean politics for forty years, voters chose candidates based on strong regional ties. This regional cleavage was very similar with that of the 1971 presidential election, and replaced the urban-rural cleavage.⁹ The 1992, 1997, and 2002 presidential elections, presented in Table 1, show nearly the same regional cleavage. Voters divided along the regional line, the West Belt on one side and the East Belt on the other. There were some variations in forming regional coalitions.

8. Statistical resources from the 1960s are not available, but the indication can be found from the fact that Honam region did not have a major industrial complex developed by the government and several major industrial complexes were located in the capital and Yeongnam region.

9. Jeong (1996) indicated that in the 14th National Assembly election (1992) the first opposition party was supported in the order of the metropolis, urban areas and rural areas, which means that the urban-rural cleavage has not vanished entirely. Nevertheless, the conflict between the urban and rural regions lost its position as a political cleavage. As rapid urbanization caused a rapid reduction of the rural population, the rural electorate became too small to be a counterpart in the axes of political cleavage.

In the 1992 presidential election, Kim Young-sam, a candidate of the governing party, carried Gyeongsangnam, Gyeongsangbuk and Chungcheong provinces, while Kim Dae-jung, a candidate of the first opposition party, had an absolute victory in Honam. On the other hand, the DJP¹⁰ coalition based on Honam and Chungcheong produced a conflict against Yeongnam in the 1997 presidential election. Chungcheong played a pivotal role in winning the elections for the DJP. The same regional cleavage continued to play a role in the 2002 presidential election. Roh Moo-hyun's campaign pledge to relocate the capital city from Seoul to Chungcheong helped to keep that region in his coalition.

In the 2002 election, however, it seemed that the regional conflict lessened. As shown in Table 1, the differences in the votes that the two candidates earned in each region were reduced, and the average deviation between them is smaller compared to those of other elections.

The statistics reflected changing voter attitudes. In Chungcheong province, for example, votes were mostly determined by campaign issues such as the relocation of the capital city, and not by the connection of 'the region's favorite boy'. In Yeongnam region, the absolute support for a certain political party in previous elections decreased since the new crosscutting cleavages appeared. They were generational and ideological cleavages. The new cleavages pushed the young generation to join with liberals to support Roh Moo-hyun from the governing party. This resulted in reducing absolute support for Lee Hoe-chang from the first opposition party whose regional base was Yeongnam.

Table 1 1992-2002 Presidential Election Results by Region (%)

Region	1992		1997		2002	
	Kim Young -sam	Kim Dae-jung	Kim Dae-jung	Lee Hoe-chang	Roh Moo-hyun	Lee Hoe-chang
Capital Region	36.0	34.8	41.4	37.8	50.5	44.3
Chungcheong	36.2	27.3	43.1	26.9	51.8	40.9
Yeongnam	68.0	10.0	13.2	58.1	25.5	68.6
Honam	4.2	90.9	92.9	3.3	92.3	4.9
Gangwon	40.8	15.2	23.3	42.4	40.9	51.8
Jeju	39.3	32.4	39.8	35.9	55.3	39.4
Total	41.4	33.4	39.7	38.2	48.5	46.2

Source: Korea National Election Comission (<http://www.nec.go.kr/sinfo/index.html>).

10. A coalition between Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-pil.

3. New Crosscutting Cleavages: Generation and Ideology

The generational cleavage was noticed by academics as early as the 1987 presidential election. Jeong (1993), for example, concluded that the generational cleavage had a stronger effect than the urban-rural cleavage after analyzing the 1987 presidential election, the 1988 National Assembly election, and the 1991 local government election. Lee (1990) reported similar results after studying the 1988 National Assembly election.

It was, however, the 2002 presidential election when the generational cleavage appeared as a main political cleavage. Table 2 shows that the influence of generational cleavage increased significantly in the 2002 presidential election even though it was also found in 1997.¹¹ One of reasons was the accidental deaths of two junior high school girls by an armored vehicle of the U.S. Armed Forces. It placed the peace issue at the forefront.

The young generation, without any experience of the Korean War and the Cold War era, was more generous to North Korea than the older generation. On the other hand, the young generation had a negative position regarding the alliance between Korea and America. This made the young generation support Roh Moo-hyun who pledged to end the Cold War structure on the Korean Peninsula. In addition, as political leaders who had strong regional connections, such as the three Kims,¹² retired from the political arena, the old regional conflict started to weaken. As a result, it seems that the generational cleavage became more protruded.

Interestingly, the generational cleavage overlapped with the ideological one.¹³ This overlapping is closely related with unique perceptions of ideology in Korea. As mentioned before, since the experiences of each generation varied strongly, they developed unique attitudes toward North Korea.¹⁴ The older generation who experienced the Korean War, sees the U.S as a close friend and ally,

11. In the 1997 presidential election, the generation cleavage did not affect the vote for the two major candidates. The election results in Table 2 show that Lee In-je, the third candidate, was favored by the young generation.

12. The three Kims are Kim Young-sam, Kim Dae-jung, and Kim Jong-pil.

13. Table 2, presenting mean ideology by age group, shows the younger generations are much liberal than the older ones (Kang 2003:95).

14. It is different from the definition of ideology in western countries where the ideology was mainly defined according to the self-regulation of the non-government sector and government control, i.e., the size of the government (Kim 2007:65).

and North Korea as an enemy who invaded once and will do so again in the future. On the other hand, the younger generation, mainly born after world-wide détente, sees North Korea as a very weak country and the U.S. as an unrestrained super-power.

Except during the early stage of Korea’s establishment, ideology does not pose any special meaning to Korean politics. Koreans had concentrated on more imminent issues such as industrialization and democratization. After they achieved these tasks, it was no wonder that they came up with the issues of ‘South-North relations’ and ‘unification’. Korea remains the only Cold War region in the world, and so the most urgent problem is to ease the confrontation. Voters are divided over how to resolve the problem.

Table 2 The Voting Results of the 1997 and 2002 Presidential Election by Age Group (%)

Gener- -ation	2002*				1997**		
	Lee Hoe-chang		Lee Hoe-chang		Lee Hoe-chang	Kim Dae-jung	Lee In-je
	MBC-KRC	KBS-Gallup	MBC-KRC	KBS-Gallup			
20s	59.0	62	34.9	31	21.9	25.8	33.9
30s	59.3	59	34.2	34	22.9	24.0	30.2
40s	48.1	47	47.9	49	22.4	18.8	20.1
50s	40.1		57.9		32.8	31.4	15.9
60s	34.9	40	63.5	58			

*: Excerpted from KBS and MBC exit polls.
 **: The 1997 Presidential Election post poll of Korea Social Science Data Center.
 (Kang 2003: 298-299).

Table 3 2002 Presidential Election Voting by Ideology

Ideology	Presidential Candidate		Total
	Lee Hoe-chang	Roh Moo-hyun	
Liberal	115 (22.5%)	395 (77.5%)	510 (100.0%)
Centrist	169 (43.3%)	221 (56.7%)	390 (100.0%)
Conservative	225 (64.3%)	125 (35.7%)	350 (100.0%)
Total	509 (40.7%)	741 (59.3%)	1250 (100.0%)

$$\chi^2=151.386 \text{ df}=2 \text{ p}=.000$$

Source: Kim and Yoon (2003: 87).

Table 3 shows that ideology played a significant part in the 2002 presidential election. Roh Moo-hyun was supported by 77.5% of the liberal voters and Lee Hoe-chang was supported by only 22.5% of them. Roh was supported by 35.7% of the conservative voters; Lee was supported by 64.3% of them.

IV. Electoral Cleavages in the 2007 Election

As reviewed above, the main cleavages shown in Korean politics are: urban-rural cleavage, regional cleavage, generation cleavage, and ideology cleavage. From their appearance and disappearance, an evolutionary path of election cleavages seems to be highly related to social change. Based on preliminary analysis of previous elections, the 2007 presidential election will be explored to see if these four cleavages continue to evolve or change their routes. It will also be examined whether totally new cleavages appear.

1. Urban-Rural Cleavage

Table 4 clearly shows that there is a difference in voting behavior depending upon the size of cities and urban or rural areas for the 2007 presidential election. Lee Myung-bak acquired 50.1% of votes in big cities, 47.4% in small cities, and 45.5% in rural areas. Jung Dong-young, on the other hand, acquired 18.5% of votes in big cities, 23.6% in small cities, and 32.1% in rural areas. Lee won more votes in urban areas while Jung won more votes in smaller cities and rural areas.

Table 4 2007 Presidential Election Support Rating by Type of Area (%)

Region	Candidate	Big City	Small City	Rural Area	Total
Seoul & Gyeonggi	Lee Myung-bak	51.4	50.7	53.3	51.1
	Jung Dong-young	19.3	17.8	20.0	18.6
Yeongnam	Lee Myung-bak	55.9	62.5	62.1	58.8
	Jung Dong-young	9.6	9.8	6.9	9.5
Honam	Lee Myung-bak	20.7	14.0	3.2	14.2
	Jung Dong-young	67.2	68.4	90.3	71.1
National	Lee Myung-bak	50.1	47.4	45.5	48.6
	Jung Dong-young	18.5	23.6	32.1	21.7

Source: Post-election survey of the 2007 presidential election by East Asia Institution.

At first glance, the urban-rural cleavage continued to appear in the 2007 election. However, the cleavage may not be a major one because the type of area is closely related to the regions the areas belong to. Lee collected more votes in large cities since he earned a large portion of votes in the capital region. Jung's support was concentrated in Honam region where most of it consists of rural areas.

Further, in Yeongnam and Honam, the urban-rural cleavage seems to work, but the direction has shifted. In Yeongnam, Lee received far more votes in small cities and the rural region than in big cities. Jung received more votes in the big and small cities than in the rural areas. In Honam, Lee acquired more votes in big and small cities than in rural areas while Jung received far more votes from rural areas than from cities. In quick conclusion, it seems that regional cleavage played a bigger part in rural areas than in cities. Overall, the size of cities and urban or rural area did not act as a major variable in influencing or representing voters

2. Regional Cleavage

Table 5 shows the influence of regional cleavage in the 2007 presidential election. Though Lee Myung-bak collected nationwide support, he received more in Seoul & Gyeonggi and Yeongnam. On the other hand, he received only 8.9% of votes in Honam. This regional alignment is similar to that of the 1992 presidential election when Kim Young-sam defeated Kim Dae-jung.

However, a significant amount of change can be found in the regional cleavage which has dominated Korean elections since democratization. The change originated in Seoul and Gyeonggi, which used to be a swing area, and no political party received overwhelming support from these regions. Lee Myung-bak carried the region with an unprecedented margin. He became the candidate of the Grand National Party over Park Geun-hye because Seoul and Gyeonggi, where half of the Korean population lives, supported him. It was the first time ever that a politician who had a political base in these regions became a major party candidate. This implicated a shift in the electoral base of the GNP when one remembers that Yeongnam and Honam have served as the main electoral bases to major parties for around forty years.

It should also be noted that there had been a strong connection between voters in Yeongnam or Honam and voters who were originally from the region but lived somewhere else like Seoul or Gyeonggi. In 2007, however, the connections were considerably weakened.

Table 5 Support Rating by Region and Voters' Hometown (%)

Region	National*			Seoul & Gyeonggi **			Ratio
	2002		2007	2007			
	Lee Hoe-chang	Roh Moo-hyun	Jung Dong-young	Lee Myung-bak	Lee Myung-bak	Jung Dong- young	
Seoul & Gyeonggi	44.3	50.5	23.9	52.0	53.0	14.2	43.6
Chungcheong	40.9	51.8	22.5	36.8	57.3	12.7	15.4
Yeongnam	68.6	25.5	10.2	62.0	69.9	6.5	14.8
Honam	4.9	92.3	79.5	8.9	25.5	45.7	17.0
Gangwon/Jeju	48.6	44.6	22.2	48.2	52.7	16.1	9.2
Total	46.2	48.5	26.0	48.4	51.1	18.8	
Mean	28.1	29.8	35.6	28.6	10.5	10.7	
Deviation							

*: Final election results by the Korea Central Election Committee

**: Post-election panel survey by East Asia Institution

Among the six regions, Lee Myung-bak received the second lowest number of votes in Chungcheong because he was against relocating the administrative capital. However, according to a panel survey, the voters in Seoul and Gyeonggi who came from Chungcheong were the second most supportive. In addition, Lee Myung-bak was supported in Honam region by slightly over 10% compared to the 25% of the capital region voters from Honam region. This discordance could also be seen in votes for Jung Dong-young.

In addition to such weakening of connections, the fact that the population of non-capital born is decreasing has a political implication. In the result of the panel survey, 43.6% answered that they were born in the capital region. Though this result might be different from the real census, it means that almost half of the population considers the capital region as their hometown. It again implies that the connections with Yeongnam and Honam regions will decrease as the number of voters who consider the capital region their hometown increases. The independent choice of the voters in this region will be increased.

3. Generational and Ideological Cleavages

The generational and ideological cleavages, which played a significant role in the 2002 election, did not protrude so much in 2007. Lee Myung-bak won over Jung Dong-young in all generations. This is in contrast to the fact that Roh Moo-

hyun acquired twice as many votes as Lee Hoe-chang from voters in their 20s and 30s in 2002. Even Lee acquired more votes than Jung Dong-young from the same generations. It also has to be noted that Lee received 3%pt more votes than Lee Hoe-chang from those in their 20s and 30s while Jung received only one-third of the votes that Roh Moo-hyun received from the same age group..

Figure 2 shows that Lee Myung-bak received more votes from the older generation, but the slope of Lee Myung-bak is less stiff than that of Lee Hoe-chang. This means that a generational difference in votes for Lee Myung-bak was less than that for Lee Hoe-chang.

For Jung Dong-young, the distribution of votes by generation shows interesting results. Jung received the lowest support from 20s followed by those in their 60s and 40s. The result did not show a linear relation. For Lee Myung-bak, the difference in support along the generation axes seems to be relieved whereas there is no significant relation between generation and support for Jung Dong-young. We, thus, may conclude that the generational cleavage was weakened in 2007.

Turning to ideology, the result of the post-election survey shows a significant difference in votes by ideology. Lee Myung-bak was voted for by 31.1% of liberal respondents and by 57.6% of conservative respondents. Conservative respondents voted for him more than the liberal ones by over a 20%pt margin. In contrast, 33.8% of the liberal respondents and only 12.9% of the conservative respondents voted for Jung Dong-young.

Table 6 Post-Election Survey Result by Age Group (%)

Generation	2007*		2002**	
	Lee Myung-bak	Jung Dong-young	Roh Moo-hyun	Lee Hoe-chang
20s	37.4	17.5	59	34.9
30s	37.4	25.4	59.3	34.2
40s	50.0	21.3	48.1	47.9
50s	56.2	25.4	40.1	57.9
Over 60s	69.0	19.3	34.9	63.5
Total	48.5	21.7	48.5	46.2
Mean	10.1	2.9	8.7	10.5
Deviation				

* Post election panel survey for the 17th presidential election, East Asia Institution.

** : Results from MBC-KRC joint survey

Figure 2 Post-Election Survey Result by Age Group





Table 7 Post-Election Survey Result by Ideology (%)

Ideology	2007*		2002**	
	Lee Myung-bak	Jung Dong-young	Roh Moo-hyun	Lee Hoe-chang
Liberal	31.2	33.9	77.4	22.5
Centrist	48.7	24.9	56.6	43.3
Conservative	57.7	12.9	35.7	64.3
Total	48.6	21.8	59.3	40.7
Mean	9.8	7.3	13.9	13.9
Deviation				

* : Post election panel survey for the 2007 presidential election, East Asia Institution

** : Kim and Yoon 2003:87.

Figure 3 Post-Election Survey Result by Ideology



Compared with the result of the 2002 presidential election, Jung Dong-young received far less votes than Roh Moo-hyun did among the liberals. Lee Myung-bak was far less inclined to conservative voters than Lee Hoe-chang was. Considering the fact that Lee Myung-bak acquired almost twice the number of votes that Jung did, it seems that the ideological cleavage was also weakened in 2007.


4. Gender

Gender has never been significantly noted as an electoral cleavage in Korea. Even in the 2007 presidential election, no gender difference in choice was found. However, going back to the GNP's primary where Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye contended to be the candidate, the story should be modified.

Figure 4 shows the support rating by men and women in the age groups of 20s, 30s, and 40s for Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye. The result of the first survey started to show a gender gap in the support rating, and it grew larger in the second survey. For Lee, the support rating of men in the first survey was 46.8% and became 43% in the second while the support rating of women in the first survey was 43.6% and was reduced to 34.6% in the second. The decline in the support rating of men was not significant. On the other hand, the decline reached 10%pt in the support rating of women.

For Park, the support rating of men was 15.3% in the first survey and it became 16% in the second. That of women was 23.2% in the first survey and 29.6% in the second survey. The support rating of men was not changed signifi-

Figure 4 Support Rating by Gender and Generation (%)



cantly, but that of women increased by 6% pt. In the second survey, as a result, the women's was about double the men's. Thus, it could be said that female respondents in the age groups of 20s, 30s, and 40s favored a female candidate, which indicates gender cleavage might exist if a female candidate had run.

When the female candidate failed to become a candidate for the general election, there was no significant difference in electoral choice between men and women. It seems that gender based political awareness was put aside when the female candidate was gone.


V. Conclusion: Evolution Path of Political Cleavage after 2007 in Korea

The cleavages shown in the 2007 presidential election can be summarized as follows. First, the influences of ideological and generational cleavages on voters' choice have been reduced compared to those in the 2002 presidential election, though they still appeared. One of the reasons can be found in the difference of the major issues in the two elections. The economy became the main issue in 2007 while decomposition of Cold War tensions had been the main issue in 2002. For the issue of relaxation of Cold War tensions, generational cleavage played a significant role because the post-war generation did not experience the Korean War. For the issue of the economy, as shown in the '88,000-won generation debates', the young generation was just as insecure as the older generation.

From this, we might expect that the kind of generational cleavage shown in 2002 would not appear again in the near future. At the core of the cleavage, there were tensions between the generations that experienced the Korean War and those that did not over the policy toward North Korea and the alliance between Korea and the U.S. However, the demographic change caused by natural aging will reduce the generation that experienced the Korean War and the generational conflict resulting from a wide gap in historical experiences will be reduced. Since then, of course, a degree of relaxation of Cold War tensions in Korea has made the issue less controversial.

Second, the 2007 presidential election showed that the regional cleavage, which had dominated past elections, changed significantly. There had been East-West regional conflict between Yeongnam and Honam, and the capital region

Figure 5 Positioning of policies of Lee Myung-bak¹⁵



had been a swing area. However, in 2007, the capital region appeared as a strong electoral basis for Lee Myung-bak. One of the reasons was that the voters in the capital region raised their voices for the former mayor of Seoul. Another reason was that the decreasing population outside of the capital region made their choices unconnected to other regions.

When we consider that the ideological cleavage originated from the pros and cons of North Korean policies in Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung administrations, the policies of newly elected Lee Myung-bak will also raise another conflict. Figure 5 shows that Lee is placed at the moderate region for North Korean policies. On the other hand, he is placed as a strong supporter for a free market. Thus, it seems that the policies for North Korea will not be a big issue, but free market oriented policies will likely raise conflict between supporters of a free market and a fair market. When this happens, the meaning of ideology will change. The ideology will be divided not by the policies for North Korea but by the degree of government intervention.

15. SBS and Korea Manifesto Action Center asked campaign camps to place potions of each candidate. Initials represent presidential candidates in the 2002 and 2007 presidential election. LMB: Lee Myung-bak; JDY:Jung Dong-young; KYG:Kwon Yung-gil; GOV:Roh Moo-hyun Administration; LJ:Lee In-je; and LHC:Lee Hoe-chang

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