How and when the *Gyeongguk daejeon* System Dismantled?: A Study on Political Meaning of the *Daehan* Empire’s Birth

Park Hyunmo

The Joseon dynasty, based on its approximate 500 year-long *Gyeongguk daejeon* system, maintained its two governmental features: internationally “respecting the senior state” (*sadae*) with China and “keeping friendship with neighboring countries” (*kyorin*) (Jurchin and Japan) on the one hand, while it domestically pursued respect for Confucian proprieties and conceded only relative sovereignty to the Joseon king on the other hand. This political system, however, was dismantled in 1897 following the birth of the *Daehan* Empire, which proclaimed itself as a self-reliant independent nation in the international community and in which unlimited sovereign authority was granted to the emperor.

How is the *Daehan* Empire different from the Joseon Dynasty? For this, I compared the provisions of the *Daehanguk gukje* (hereafter, *Gukje*), which was established with the birth of the *Daehan* Empire in 1897, with those of the *Gyeongguk daejeon* as follows.

First, *Gukje* states that the *Daehan* Empire is an independent empire that can make its own decisions regarding important matters of the Empire, such as the dispatch of diplomats, declarations of war, and conclusion of peace treaties. In comparison, *Gyeongguk daejeon* accepted a junior status to China and scrupulously observed the ritual practices of a tributary state, based on the tradition of “the respect for the senior state (*sadae*) diplomacy”.

Second, another point to be noted is the stipulation that grants unlimited military power to the emperor. According to the *Gukje*, the emperor has the command of the military and naval forces, the right of enacting and enforcing laws, and even the power to pardon (Article 6). Compared with this, the royal authority prescribed in the *Gyeongguk daejeon* is relative. Unlike the *Gukje*, according to which the emperor is supposed to assume all responsibilities from the enactment of laws to the appointment of government officials, the *Gyeongguk daejeon* system makes it a principle to entrust all those responsibilities to ministers.
1. Dismantling of the Joseon Dynasty

When and why did the Joseon dynasty collapse? A quick answer to this question would be to say that it was annexed by Japan in 1910. However, to be more specific, we need to take note of the year of 1897. With the establishment of the Daehan Empire (Great Han Empire) in October of that year, the title of King Gojong (r. 1864-1906) was upgraded from king to emperor, and the name of the state was changed from the Joseon kingdom to the Daehan Empire. As the country’s polity and constitution were also altered and redefined according to the Daehanguk gukje (State Law of the Daehan Empire), “the Joseon dynasty that had lasted for 505 years ceased to exist” (Yi Seong-mu 1998, 1192; Han Young-woo 2001: 193).

There is a perspective that focuses on the Korean-Japanese Treaty (the so-called Protectorate Treaty of 1905), which was concluded in November 1905. Seo Jae-pil (also known as Philip Jaisohn) said in his address of April 1919, “Korea had remained an independent kingdom until 1905” (National Committee on Independence History 1974: 99-100). When Ito Hirobumi forced Emperor Gojong to ratify the treaty, Emperor Gojong refused to do so saying, “If I ratify the treaty, it will lead to the extinction of this country. I can never permit the treaty to go through. I would rather die for my country.” Despite that, the following day, Ito Hirobumi concluded the treaty by receiving the signatures of Korean ministers, without the attendance of Emperor Gojong (Hwang 2005: 254-257). This is why some view the Protectorate Treaty of 1905 as the direct factor for the fall of the Joseon dynasty, in particular, focusing on the facts that
Korea was stripped of all its diplomatic rights by Japan (articles 1 and 2), and its domestic sovereignty was also taken by the Japanese Residency-General. With regard to the second question of why the Joseon dynasty perished, a longer-range historical approach is needed. The situation at the end of the dynasty, which is commonly referred to as the era of “in-law government” (sedo jeongchi), was too complicated for us to simply conclude that the Joseon kingdom collapsed due to the force of the Japanese imperialists in 1905 or in 1910. As early as the period of King Sunjo(1800-1834), Jeong Yag-yong pointed out, the disorder of the political system saying, “There is not a single thing without abuse in this country. If we do not deal with these abuses now, the country will collapse without fail” (Jeong Yag-yong 1997: 79). Yi Jae-hak, who served as a censor-general in the period of King Heonjong, said in his memorial to the Throne, “Because rules and regulations have been broken and even a tiny bit of this country is sick, both the king and people are worrying about this situation.” He also added, “It was not yesterday that our country fell into this disastrous state. It is all because the wicked officials have abused their power and exercised arbitrary control over the whole country, and consequently its resulting evils have accumulated over a long period of time” (Sunjo sillok [Annals of King Sunjo], 6th day of September, 27th year of King Sunjo’s reign; hereafter, Sunjo sillok 27/09/06).

As Bak Je-hyeong also mentioned in his book, titled Joseon jeonggam (Mirror of Korean Politics), at the end of the Joseon dynasty, an extremely turbulent situation was created by a series of incidents, such as the peasants’ massive uprising (Peasant War in January 1894), the outbreak of war between foreign troops on the Korean Peninsula (Sino-Japanese War in July 1894), the murder of Queen Min by Japanese assassins (The Eulmi Incident in October 1895), and the king’s removal to the Russian legation (in February 1896). Although all these show that Joseon no longer functioned as a state, they cannot be considered as direct factors that account for the fall of the kingdom. That is, they are not sufficient to change the fact that Japan annexed the Joseon dynasty by force, but one certain thing is that state discipline and the political system, which had sustained the Joseon dynasty over a long period of time, was already mostly dismantled in the era of in-law government.

1. In this publication, Bak Je-hyeong described the incidents of Western warships intruding upon the territory of Korea (yangyo) as well as abuses of such systems as the private academy system (seowon) and the grain loan system (hwangok) from the reign of King Cheoljong to the regency by Grand Prince Heungseon (Bak Je-hyeong 1992).

① How and when the Gyeongguk daejeon System Dismantled? 199
The objective of this paper lies in examining when and how the legislative order and the political tradition, which enabled the Joseon dynasty to endure for many centuries, was dismantled, in terms of the dismantling of the “Gyeongguk daejeon (Grand Code for State Administration) system.” In particular, this paper defines the establishment of the Daehan Empire in October 1897 as that point of time when the Gyeongguk daejeon system was dismantled and then examines the characteristics of Joseon’s polity and constitution. With this, I shed light on the fact that the political leader’s experiment to strengthen royal power without the people’s support or participation made the state weaker.

2. Significance and Characteristics of the Gyeongguk daejeon System

The term “Gyeongguk daejeon system” has only recently begun to be used and has a variable meaning depending on who uses it. For instance, the Institute of Korean Studies at Yonsei University, which first used the term, defined it as “referring to the whole national system of Joseon, formed on the basis of the Gyeongguk daejeon” in its project carried out in 2002 with the support of the Korea Research Foundation. This definition “encompasses all fields of the Joseon state, such as politics, economy, society and culture” (Oh Yeong-gyo 2004: 6), without being limited to Gyeongguk daejeon and its subsequent rules and legislation. But it is so comprehensive that it does not help us to grasp the concrete meaning of the term. Depending on the perspective, it can be seen as referring to all things concerning the Joseon dynasty.2

In comparison, Yi Won-taek defines the term as referring to the system encompassing “Gyeongguk daejeon as well as Gukjo oryeui (Manual of the Five State Rites) and Daemyeongnyul (Daminglu in Chinese; Great Ming Code) as its right-wing legislation” (Yi Won-taek 2003: 24). That is, he insists that the Gyeongguk daejeon system should be interpreted as including not only the whole content of the Gyeongguk daejeon but also that of the Gukjo oryeui, which is

2. The researchers of this project presented various analyses of the characteristics of the Gyeongguk daejeon system. For example, Do Hyeon-cheol defines the “centripetal political system” as its characteristic, while Jeong Ho-hun points out its characteristics in the shift “from the Goryeo-like order, which allows for the enforcement of private rights to the order pertinent to Joseon, which is represented by the exertion of strong sovereignty contributing to the interest of the nation” (Oh Yeong-gyo 2004: 44, 82-94).
described as “having to be applied to the state rites” in the *Daejeon*. In sum, according to this definition, the *Gyeongguk daejeon* system indicates the entire state administration system of Joseon, which covers even regular rites (*Gukjo oryeui*) and punishment regulations (*Daemyeongnyul*), to say nothing of government structure, the financial management framework, and national mainstay industries (*Gyeongguk daejeon*). This definition is less comprehensive than that of the Institute of Korean Studies, and it lacks concreteness and precision. That is why it inevitably has to face the questions of what the actual content of the *Gyeongguk daejeon* system was and what was not included in this system.

Given all this, this paper explores the characteristics of the *Gyeongguk daejeon* system, using the converse strategy of examining the content of the *Daehanguk gukje*, which can be considered to have stipulated the dismantling of the system, rather than focusing on describing how the system was established and what the system contained exactly and what it addressed. This is because in the process of discovering what was dismantled, its content and characteristics will be naturally discussed. If this approach works out, the hypothesis that the *Gyeongguk daejeon* system was dismantled with the establishment of the Daehan Empire in 1897 will be verified accordingly.

Before getting into details, it is necessary to briefly mention the purpose of the enactment of the *Gyeongguk daejeon*, or the “spirit of the *Gyeongguk daejeon*.” Because in order to prove that the *Gyeongguk daejeon* system was distorted and degenerated in the late Joseon period, the era of “in-law government,” it is at least required to determine what the *Gyeongguk daejeon* aimed for. With regard to this, it is also necessary to examine King Sejo’s measures to strengthen royal power as being the background against which the *Gyeongguk daejeon* was compiled and enacted. Refuting the claim that in regarding the execution of a condemned criminal it should first be reported to the State Council (Uijeongbu), King Sejo said, “How on earth can state matters be reported first to subjects? If this is allowed, nobody knows when the state power will be handed over to them” (*Sejo sillok* [Annals of King Sejo] 23/06/07). By this, he meant that the king should be the actual leader in state management, and therefore, it was not proper to report state affairs first to a subject, that is, the minister of the State Council (He was certainly mindful of the restoration of State Council control over the Six Boards). From this, it can easily be surmised that this posture of King Sejo influenced the way the *Gyeongguk daejeon*, which was firmly established during his reign, was implemented in the direction of enhancing royal authority. So to speak, the *Gyeongguk daejeon* system was the “political system of the royal
dynasty,” in which “all power—political, economic, military, and social—was concentrated on the king” (Do Hyeon-cheol 2004: 195-201). To be sure, it meant the establishment of public order, which returned all profits back to the state by moving out of the framework of the Gyeongje yukjeon (Six Codes of Administration), which allowed “the Goryeo-like order, that is, the private-rights order” (Jeong Ho-hun 2004: 90-91).

Another characteristic of the Gyeongguk daejeon is its effective device for checking royal power. According to the Daejeon code, the king had to consult his subjects on important state matters through a “periodic meeting held in the royal audience hall” (eojeon hoeui) before making a decision. In addition to this, various monitoring procedures such as surveillance and remonstrance (ganjaeng), scrutinizing an officials’ appointment (seogyeong), and inquisitions (gyuchal) were established and supposed to be implemented at the level of officials. The remonstration official, called eongwan (lit. “tongue official”), was endowed with certain legal privileges based on the Gyeongguk daejeon, and therefore could at any time point out the “erroneous politics and misdeeds” of political leaders, including the king, and issue an admonition or warning (“Gyeonggwanjik” chapter in Ijeon, vol. 1 of Gyeongguk daejeon). The State Councilor was the general coordinator of state management and he performed a wide variety of duties, ranging from the selection and dispatch of talented men to the administration of national mainstay industries (ibid.), but he had to be kept under the superintendence of the Office of the Inspector General (Saheonbu), which was in charge of “assessing all government officials’ administrative achievements and failures and issuing warnings when necessary” and of preventing them from “committing immoral behavior or being engaged in fraudulent stratagems.” The Gyeongguk daejeon system can be characterized by its well-organized government system, in which “high- and low-ranking officials are intertwined with each other, and are supposed to check each other.” In other words, this was a system of mutual checking between the king and his subjects as well as between high- and low-ranking officials (Yi Jung-hwan 1993: 134).

Then, how to understand the duality of the Gyeongguk daejeon system? On the one hand, it aimed to establish a strong centralized government with the monarch as the head of the state. On the other hand, it had an internal checking system on both royal and bureaucratic power. In sum, the Gyeongguk daejeon aimed at the “centralization of the state” and at the same time “decentralization within the government system.” That is, the Gyeongguk daejeon system sought to maintain a centralized state order by laying down strict hierarchical
stipulations concerning almost all matters, ranging from “such trivial ones as the width of women’s skirts to major ones such as the size of ancestral tombs,” while at the same time seeking to stave off power abuse and political corruption by establishing power checking procedures within the ruling class. This demonstrates the dual order of concentration and check, immanent in the Gyeongguk Daejeon.3


In August 1897, a half year after King Gojong moved out of the Russian Legation and back to his palace in Seoul (February 1897), he changed his reign name from “Geonyang,” which was adopted under the pressure of Japan, to “Gwangmu,” which symbolizes the theme of “wealthy nation, strong army” (buguk gangbyeong). Following this, in early October of that year, he became the Emperor of the Daehan Empire, with a coronation ceremony at Wongudan in Seoul.4 Next, he issued an imperial edict that declared, “The name of this country is the Daehan Empire and this year is the first year of Gwangmu.” The country name of “Daehan” was adopted to mean “the Great Han” encompassing the Mahan, Jinhan, and Byeonhan(Three Hans), the three confederacies that

3. The ‘gukje’ can be said to be ‘the head’ of the system of the Tae Han Empire, which also had ‘the body’ and ‘the limbs’ such as the Penal Code, the Law of Army, the Financial Law, and a series of Enforcement Ordinances of the Tae-Han Empire. We must compare the ‘gukje’ with the Gyeongguk Daejeon while paralleling the Penal Code etc. to Daminhilu (The Law of Ming China), Sukyo-Jiprok (Law Code of 1698), and Gaksa-Sukyo (Law Code of 1634) which were ‘the body’ and ‘the limbs’ of the Gyeongguk Daejeon system. In short, the ‘gukje’ is equivalent to the Gyeongguk Daejeon. See the work of Park Byoung-ho (1974) and Moon Joon-Young’s article (1999) for the change and characteristics of the system of the Tae Han Empire.

4. At the time of the Coup of 1884 (Gapsin Jeongbyeon), Kim Ok-gyun insisted on changing the title of the king to Emperor and using the Joseon king’s own reign title. At the time of the Sino-Japanese War the Japanese commander Keisuke Ootori also suggested that King Gojong adopt the title Emperor. But King Gojong saw through his intention, which was to estrange Joseon from the Qing, and rejected the suggestion. In October 1895, following the Japanese murder of Queen Min (also known as the Incident of the Year Eulmi), cabinet ministers like Jo Hui-yeon persuaded King Gojong to change the title and obtained the King’s consent. However, King Gojong finally refused to be enthroned as Emperor, owing to objections from neighboring countries. After King Gojong’s return from the Russian Legation in 1897, the debate over changing the title became heated again. For example, conservative Confucian scholars such as Choe Ik-hyeon and Yu In-seok criticized this insisting, “It is just like adopting the barbarian
existed on the middle and southern Korean peninsula from around the 2nd century B.C. to the 3rd century A.D. As King Gojong stated, “the Three Hans were unified by the Goryeo dynasty and became a large country by embracing those from the northern Mohe tribe to the southern Tamna people in the period of the Joseon dynasty” (Gojong sillok, 13/10/34). With this, the unification of three confederacies and the embracement of several tribes demonstrated that the country was qualified to be an empire. King Gojong also clarified that the reason he changed his title to “Emperor” was to “lay the groundwork for accomplishing the country’s complete independence and to exercise its autonomous rights.” A lot of benefactory measures were implemented, like giving a mass amnesty, raising the ranks of every government official by one grade, and lightening taxes (Jeong Gyo 2004: 219-222).

On August 17, 1899, the year after Gojong’s assumption of the title “emperor,” the Daehan jeguk gukje was proclaimed and thus the blueprint for the Daehan Empire began to take concrete shape. Why did Emperor Gojong not proclaim the Constitution simultaneously with or immediately after his assumption? The reasons can be identified in various aspects, but what is certain is that it was because his coronation staff failed to be prepared for the birth of his new empire and also because a mass meeting called “Manmin Gongdonghoe” (People’s Assembly) started on March 10, 1898 and continued all year round, becoming the topic of conversation around the country and also drawing attention from abroad. In particular, in November of that year, the People’s Assembly developed into the Joint Assembly of Officials and People (Gwanmin Gongdonghoe) with the participation of the Independence Club (Dongnip Hyeophoe) members, general citizens, and even government ministers, and...
finally Emperor Gojong accepted the Heonui yukjo (Six Proposals) submitted by the Joint Assembly of Officials and People and concluded the “Gwangmu Contract” consisting of three articles, which is dubbed the “first social contract” in the history of Korea. Kim Hongwoo points out, “The Gwangmu Contract is the first contract in which both the ruler and the ruled were engaged in the history of Joseon” and therefore “it can be compared to the Magna Carta of England (1215)” (Kim Hongwoo 2004: 57). As the situation developed in this way, Emperor Gojong must have been in conflict over which course to take. The problem was whether to take the “road to constitutional monarchy” by accepting the system of “consultation between officials and people” or to get onto the road of absolute monarchy, as insisted by Jo Byeong-sik. In the end, Emperor Gojong took the latter course by issuing an order to arrest the leaders of the Independence Club, using the “Anonymous Poster Incident” as a pretext. Consequently, the “Gwangmu Contract” was cancelled on December 25, one month after it was concluded. On August 17 of the following year, Emperor Gojong promulgated the Daehan jeguk gukje in the form of accepting the proposal by the Legislation Correction Board (Beopgyu Gyojeongso), a special legislative body. By this, he declared the adoption of an absolute monarchy as the polity of the country. The text of the Constitution is as follows:

**Daehanguk gukje (State Law of the Daehan Empire)**

Article I. The Daehan Empire is an autonomous independent empire, officially recognized by all nations in the world.

7. The contract stipulates: (1) The emperor and subjects, or the higher and the lower people, should maintain trust and faith in each other; 2) The emperor shall try to select and appoint wise and capable persons from all over the country; and 3) The emperor shall ask for fair criticism and adopt it.” Prof. Kim Hongwoo calls this mutual agreement the “Gwangmu Contract” (Kim Hongwoo 2004: 60).

8. Kim Hongwoo compares the Gwangmu Contract with the “Oath in Five Articles” promulgated in the first year of the Meiji era. According to him, the “Oath in Five Articles” was the result of a mutual agreement that the sovereign first suggested to the feudal lords, whereas the Gwangmu Contract in Three Articles was a sort of contract between the sovereign and the people, which was concluded “in the presence of the consuls and envoys of the several states and their wives,” while being conscious of “the presence of all the nations”. (Kim Hongwoo 2004: 60).

9. This refers to an incident in which anonymous posters that stated, “The Independence Club is attempting to change the state regime to a republic and wants to nominate Bak Jeong-yang as the new President and Yun Chi-ho as Vice-President,” were posted on the walls outside the Gwanghwamun gate and on other gates (Yun Chi-ho 1926: 59).
Article 2. The Daehan Empire is an autocratic monarchy, which has continued over the past 500 years and will continue unchanged forever.

Article 3. The Great Emperor of the Daehan Empire shall have infinite imperial authority. This is, as in international law, an establishment of the polity in his own exertion.

Article 4. Any citizen who makes any attempt to violate the Great Emperor’s imperial authority shall be regarded as being devoid of citizenship, regardless of whether he actually committed the act or not.

Article 5. The Great Emperor of the Daehan Empire shall have supreme command of the military and naval forces, decide the formation of the forces, and may have the power to proclaim or terminate martial law.

Article 6. The Great Emperor of the Daehan Empire shall enact laws and order the promulgation and enforcement of the laws, and revise them on the model of laws common to all nations in the world. His Imperial Majesty shall also grant general amnesty, special amnesty, reduction of penalties, and restoration of rights based on the criminal code under the conditions as prescribed by international law. This is, as in international law, making-law by self-determination.

Article 7. The Great Emperor of the Daehan Empire shall determine and revise the organization of every bureau and office of the Administration as well as the salaries of civil and military officials. His Imperial Majesty shall also issue ordinances concerning each of these, if necessary, in terms of administration based on the penalty code under the conditions as prescribed by international law.

Article 8. The Great Emperor of the Daehan Empire shall appoint or dismiss civil and military officials and grant or deprive titles, ranks, medals, and honors, under the conditions as prescribed by international law.

Article 9. The Great Emperor of the Daehan Empire shall dispatch and station envoys in treaty countries and shall decide upon declarations of war, negotiations for peace, and the conclusion of treaties, based on the penalty code under the conditions as prescribed by international law (Gojong sillok 36/8/17).
First of all, the reason why the President of the Legislation Correction Board, Yun Yong-seon, did not use the term “constitution” (heonbeop) but instead used “state law” (gukje) for this was because it was not legislated in parliament but was established and proclaimed in the name of the Emperor (Jo 2003:48). As stated in articles 1 and 2, this law clarified that the Daehan Empire was an autonomous independent empire and was an absolute monarchy, in which the Emperor had unlimited monarchical power.

The statement in article 1, “The Daehan Empire is an autonomous independent empire, officially recognized by all nations in the world,” reflects the logic raised by such pro-Gojong figures as Jang Ji-yeon and Jeong Gyo, which was “No Emperor, No Independence.”10 In particular, ex-magistrate Jeong Gyo insisted, “When we consult International Law, we see that each country decides the title of the state leader on its own independent judgment and other countries just willingly recognize it. It is urgent that we should correct our Majesty’s title.” He also insisted, based on the logic of “No Emperor, No Independence,” that the country had to adopt the title “emperor” to be on an equal basis with China and Japan. He added, “While the sovereigns of both the Qing and Japan, two big countries in East Asia, have been using this title, only our sovereign has remained with the title of king. This has not kept up with the present situation in East Asia” (Jeong Gyo 2004: 209).

However, the phrase “autocratic monarchy” in article 2 sounds quite inappropriate. This concept is also condensed in the phrase “unlimited monarchical power” appearing in articles 3 and 4. Certainly, this declared that the Daehan Empire was not a constitutional government in which sovereign authority was restricted by legislation or civil rights. In addition, article 5 and the following articles specify that the Emperor shall be granted full authority over military operations, legislation, appointments, and diplomacy. Nevertheless, the stipulation that “Any citizen who makes any attempt to violate the Great Emperor’s imperial authority shall be regarded as being devoid citizenship,” which was adopted in complete disregard to the mature citizenship observed in the People’s Assembly and the efforts for institutional development, like the

10. Choe Ik-hyeon opposed this, insisting, “To change our dress codes is just like adopting barbarian systems in imitation of Western customs; we have inherited the Sino-centric civilization” (Choe Ik-hyeon 1977: 177-181). On the other hand, Yun Chi-ho claimed, “Since the king’s assumption of the title Emperor is merely a nominal measure, it is more urgent to improve and effectively manage state affairs than to waste the national energy on such an insignificant event” (Yun Chi-ho 1975: 72-75).
establishment of Jungchuwon (Central Council)—Emperor Gojong must have been conscious of that very fact—is never convincing. When Emperor Gojong set up the Gukje, it was probably with the intention to build a rich and strong nation by accepting Western norms on his own initiative after making his sovereignty absolute, just like the Meiji Emperor of Japan had done (Seo Yeong-hui 2006: 69). Still, the Gukje has limitations in that it blocks off the way to communicate with the people, which is necessary to build the “people’s country” (minguk) that Gojong himself had dreamt of, that is, a country in which “the ruler and the ruled are one” (Han 2006: 44).

On October 20, 1897, a week after the proclamation of the Daehan Empire, Gojong issued an edict in which he clarified his policy principle of “adopting the new on the basis of the old” (gubon sincham), by “forming a reasonable compromise between the old and the new” and this principle was concretized into legislation. First of all, based on this principle, he revived the magistrate system. Magistrates were deprived of their rights of determination, as the positions of magistrates and governors were transferred the Home Affairs Ministry in the aftermath of the Reform of 1894 (Gabo Gyeongjang), consequently increasing the clerks’ and petty officials’ schemes. In order to deal with this, Gojong reorganized the administrative divisions of the country from the existing 23 districts to 13 provinces, and the magistrates were supposed to be dispatched directly by the Emperor to the provinces. Besides these, there were other instances to which the principle of “on the basis of the old” was applied, such as the revival of the State Council (Uijeongbu) in 1896—one year before the proclamation of the edict—and the revival of the lunar calendar called “Siheollyeok” (Current Standard Calendar).

Instances of measures for “creating the new” are the re-establishment of the Privy Council (Jungchuwon) within the parliament (1898), the creation of the national flag and the national anthem, the symbols of the modern state, and the establishment of offices directly responsible for the Emperor, such as the Department of Military Affairs (Wonsubu), which aimed at strengthening the Emperor’s military power. Emperor Gojong also greatly expanded the existing imperial offices, such as the Imperial Household Department (Gungnaebu) and the Office of Crown Property (Naejangwon) by establishing the Office of Port and Security Operations (Gyeongwiwon, in November 1901), the Bureau of Communication (Tongsinsa, in June 1899), the Office of National Railroad (Cheoldowon, in April 1900) under the umbrella of the Imperial Household Department, and he also reorganized the Bureau of Crown Property (Naejangsa) into the Office of Crown Property in August 1899. Consequently, the Office of
Crown Property became an enormous administrative organization, taking on such functions as management of government land, red ginseng, and mines, which had previously been carried out by the Ministry of Finance (Takjibu), the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Commerce and Industry (Nongsanggongbu) (Yi Yun-sang 2006). In sum, the political system of the Daehan Empire was reorganized in the direction of maximizing the Emperor’s authority in order to enhance the efficacy of state management.

4. The Main Difference between the Joseon Dynasty and the Daehan Empire

How is the Daehanguk gukje different from the Gyeongguk daejeon system? To begin with, we can compare the provisions of the Gukje, which was established with the birth of the Daehan Empire in 1897, with those of the Gyeongguk daejeon as follows.

First, Gukje states that the Daehan Empire is an independent empire that can make its own decision regarding important matters of the Empire such as the dispatch of diplomats, the declaration of war, and the conclusion of peace treaties. In comparison, Gyeongguk daejeon accepted a junior status to China and scrupulously observed the ritual practices of a tributary state, based on the tradition of “the respect for senior state (sadae) diplomacy”. For example, on New Year’s Day, on the days of the solstice, and on the Chinese Emperor’s birthday, the Joseon King, together with the Crown Prince as well as the civil and military government officials, had to perform a ceremony at the Geunjeongjeon Hall (main hall of the Gyeongbokgung Palace). They were supposed to stand facing Peking—where the Chinese Emperor lived—and bow four times (“Joui” chapter in Yejeon, vol. 3 of Gyeongguk daejeon). The Korean king, queen, and even the crown prince had to receive formal investiture from the Chinese emperor for formality’s sake, and the names of the past and present Chinese emperors were not supposed to be mentioned in diplomatic documents sent to China (“Sadae” chapter in Yejeon, vol. 3 of Gyeongguk daejeon). As clearly stated in the chapters on the “guest rites” (billye; Ch. binli) and the “felicitous rites” (garye; Ch. jiali) in the Gukjo oryeui, the diplomatic principle of “serving the great” was applied on occasions such as the rite of receiving the imperial edict. Such principle, which can be traced back to the Jeugwi gyoseo (Enthronement Decree) proclaimed by King Taejo Yi Seong-gye, reflects the
unequal relationship between China and Joseon, exemplified by the saying, “The Emperor has seven tombs set up, while the King has five tombs set up.” Therefore, in these relations, the Joseon King could hardly exercise independent rights on military or diplomatic matters. Given this, it can be said that the Gukje greatly changed Joseon’s external relations specified in the Gyeongguk dajeon (from a hierarchical order based on the tradition of “submission to the stronger” to a horizontal order based on public law).

Second, another point to be noted is the stipulation that granted unlimited military power to the emperor. According to the Gukje, the emperor had the command of the military and naval forces, the right of enacting and enforcing laws, and even the power to pardon (Article 6). Beside these, he had the right to make decisions regarding the appointment, evaluation, and salary scales of the government officials. In a word, the imperial authority was inviolable and therefore, no one could check or defy it (Article 3). As compared with this, the royal authority prescribed in the Gyeongguk dajeon was relative. Unlike the Gukje according to which the emperor as supposed to assume all responsibilities from the enactment of laws to the appointment of government officials, the Gyeongguk dajeon system made it a principle to entrust all those responsibilities to ministers. For instance, when we look at the functions of the State Council (Uijeongbu), its officials “shall lead all government officials, ensure all government affairs are conducted fairly, maintain a balance between yin and yang, and manage the country” (“Gyeonggwanjik” chapter in Ijeon, vol. 1 of Gyeongguk dajeon). And unlike the Gukje, which prescribed the imperial authority as absolutely inviolable, the Gyeongguk dajeon stipulated various mechanisms for checking and monitoring the king. Representative examples of this were the Office of the Censor-General (Saganwon), which was in charge of “remonstrating against and opposing the King’s misgovernment and absurdities, the Office of the Inspector-General (Saheonbu), which was assigned “to correct social wrongs and unjust sentences, to assess all government officials’ administrative achievements and failures and to prevent them from committing immoral behaviors or being engaged in fraudulent stratagems,” and the practice of “offering lectures on the Confucian classics and literature for the king” (gyeongyeon) (“Gyeonggwanjik” chapter in Ijeon, vol. 1 of Gyeongguk dajeon). These governmental offices served to check the abuse of power of the King and ministers through various practices such as censuring the conduct of the king (ganjaeng), scrutinizing appointments of officials (seogyeong), and investigating the officials’ mismanagement (gyuchal).
The third difference is found in the upgrading of state rituals. Whereas the *Gukjo oryeui* established the norms for state rituals on the level of a feudal country, the Daehan Empire raised all its state rituals to the level of those of an empire and stipulated the norms in the *Daerye uigwe* (*Ceremony Manual for the Grand Rites*). According to the *Daerye uigwe*, on October 11, 1897 (16th day of the 9th lunar month), Gojong visited the Wongudan Altar (also known as Hwangudan Altar) and examined the sacrificial objects to be used in the ceremony, on October 12, ascended to the Imperial throne at the Altar, and proclaimed the investiture of the Empress and the Imperial, Prince and on October 13, proclaimed the Daehan Empire. Certainly, the *Daerye uigwe* assigned to the country a different status from that specified in the *Gukjo oryeui*, which was the counterpart of the *Gyeongguk daejeon*. For example, there was a change in the ranking of sacrificial rites. Previously, the Sajikdan Sacrificial Rite was considered foremost, while the Jongmyo Royal Ancestral Rite was considered second best. But according to the *Daerye uigwe*, the Sacrificial Rite of Heaven (also known as Wonguje) was the most important, and the Jongmyo Royal Ancestral Rite was next (“Seorye” chapter in *Daehan yejeon*, vol. 2 of *Daerye uigwe*). In all probability, this was to demonstrate that the Daehan Empire was equal to China in terms of national status by restoring the Sacrificial Rite of Heaven, which the Joseon dynasty had abstained from holding in consideration of its relations with China, in particular, with the Ming dynasty which was ruled by the son of Heaven (Bak Rye-gyeong 2006, 175; Yi Uk 2003, 185).

Beside these, there were some changes from the *Gyeongguk daejeon* system in terms of actual state management as early as before 1897. The crippled management of the nation in the era of in-law government (1800-1863) may be considered as an indirect cause for the dissolution of the *Gyeongguk daejeon* system. One instance of that was the queen dowagers’ and prince regents’ arbitrary ruling in place of a child king, and another was the control of the nation by the king’s maternal relatives. It can be said that both revealed the limitations of the *Gyeongguk daejeon* system, because the former was the abusive exercise of power by the political actors who were not granted any relevant right to rule the country under the *Gyeongguk daejeon*, while the latter was the phenomenon to which the compilers of the *Gyeongguk daejeon* guarded against most. Let us examine this as follows.

The first thing to be noted is that the role of the queen dowager in the era of “*suryeom cheongjeong*”—which literally means “listening to the politics behind
the blind,” but also came to refer to the regency of a queen mother for her child king. As it happened, all the kings who ascended the throne after the death of Jeongjo (in 1800) were not persons who could normally run the state, being either at the tender age of around ten or having stayed away from politics for a long time (Cheoljong). This is why it became a practice that the former king’s wife, that is, the queen dowager, temporarily took charge of state management. These kinds of regencies were frequent and their duration was also prolonged longer than expected.

Yeongjo’s second lawful wife, Queen Jeongsun (1745–1805), administered the nation instead of King Sunjo for four years from July 1800 to December 1803, and Sunjo’s wife, Queen Sunwon (1789–1857), exercised the regency for around six years during the reign of King Heonjong from November 1834 to December 1840. Moreover, when King Heonjong died in June 1849, 15 years after his enthronement, Queen Sunwon helped the young prince (later King Cheoljong) to the throne and then again governed the nation “behind the blinds” for two years during King Cheongjong’s reign, until December 1851. Besides them, Ikjong’s wife, Queen Sinjeong (also known as Dowager Queen Jo, 1808–1890), ruled the country for three full years during King Gojong’s reign, from December 1863 to December 1866. In sum, three dowager queens exercised regency in place of four kings for 15 years (out of a total of 66 years).

Of course, it was not the first time that the dowager queens ruled the country in place of the actual king. Examples of this can be traced back to the rule of Sejo’s wife, Queen Jeonghui (1418–1483), or to that of Jungjong’s wife, Queen Munjeong (1501–1565), who both played important political roles for a long period of time.11 In this era of in-law government, dowager queens consecutively and intensively intervened in politics, creating a bad impression to the general populace. For example, “the royal Yi clan is so feeble that it is barely maintaining its slender existence, while dowager queens are governing the nation, allowing room for powerful subjects to wield unlimited political power. This only feeds the disorder of state control and people into misery and plunges countless people into distress and misery” (Yi Man-chae 1984, 307). In fact, stipulations on their role cannot be found anywhere in the Gyeongguk daejeon, and therefore, their role

11. Sejo’s wife Queen Jeonghui ruled the country for eight years from the reign of King Yejong to that of Seongjong (September 1468–May 1476), and Jungjong’s second wife Queen Munjeong governed the country for a full eight years during the reign of King Myeongjong (July 1545–July 1553), deciding upon important matters of the state, such as royal succession.
was unofficial and temporary. Customarily, they were only supposed, as seniors in the royal palace, to give their opinion on the selection of a queen or the nomination of a successor to the throne. Notwithstanding this, Queen Jeongsun even staged a hunger protest to control King Jeongjo’s activities—for example, to stop Jeongjo from visiting his natural brother Prince Euneon, and, during her regency in the early days of King Sunjo’s reign, she exercised such a powerful sway on the country as to conduct a massive purge of the Party of Expediency (Sipa) belonging to the Southerners’ Faction (Namin), under the pretext of punishing Catholics.

The second problem was the king’s maternal relatives’ arbitrary control of the nation and the resulting derangement of national affairs. The Gyeongju Kim clan during the regency of Queen Jeongsun, the Andong Kim clan during the regency of Queen Sunwon, the Bannam Bak clan (King Sunjo’s maternal clan), and King Ikjong’s wife’s Pungyang Jo clan all occupied important posts, such as the State Councillor (dangsanggwan) of the Border Defense Council (Bibyeonsa), and asserted full control over the personnel and the national property management, though with some differences according to the period. In this era of in-law government, a small number of royal in-law clans monopolized political power, not only within the palace but also throughout the whole realm. This is unprecedented in the history of Korea. Though even during the regency of Queen Munjeong, the misuse of power by the royal in-laws was a problem, as exemplified in the case of Yun Won-hyeong who wielded arbitrary power during the reign of King Myeonjong, it was not so serious as in the era of in-law government.

When we compare percentages of high-ranking government officials per clan in this era, which can be well represented by the so-called “kinship-based lineage,” we observe that in the transition from Sunjo’s reign to Cheoljong’s reign, the percentage of high-ranking government officials from the Andong Kim clan rose. In the reign of King Sunjo, 23 high-ranking officers were from the Andong Kim clan, 18 from the Bannam Bak clan, 16 from the Daegu Seo clan, and 10 from the Pungyang Jo clan. In the reign of King Cheoljong, 20 high-ranking officers were from the Andong Kim clan, remaining at the

---

12. In the reign of King Sunjo, Jo Deuk-yeong mounted criticism against Bak Jong-gyeong from the Bannam Bak clan, saying: “Bak is wielding all powers concerning administration, military, conscription, currency, fields, grain and credits.” (Sunjo silleok 07/11/12).
previous level, while only 10 were from the Pungyang Jo clan, which had previously occupied the second highest percentage (Korean History Research Institute 1990, appended table-1). In other words, in the reign of King Cheoljong, most of the posts of state councillors, including the above-mentioned position of the State Councillor of the Border Defense Council, were occupied by the Andong Kim clan. This is why such powerful big wigs as Kim Heung-geun, Kim Jwa-geun, and Kim Byeong-gi, all from the Andong Kim clan, could wield their powers largely unchecked. On account of the prevalent nepotism in terms of the appointment of talented youngsters, most core government posts, such as the three councillors of the State Council, were taken by the Old Doctrine (Noron) faction or, very occasionally, by the Old Doctrine (Noron) faction. These higher posts were closed to the Southerners’ faction, even though it temporarily enjoyed the chance to take up such posts during Jeongjo’s reign, though in a limited form (Bak Gwang-yong 1994, 222).

In this manner, the king’s maternal in-laws held a near monopoly of important political offices and took the lead in state administration through mutual alliances. This was manifestly against the intention of the Gyeongguk daejeon, just as much as the royal family’s interference in politics was. The “Ijeon” volume of the Gyeongguk daejeon had separate regulations on the treatment and management of royal family members as well as of the king’s maternal in-laws in order to prohibit their interference in politics. It was also for this purpose that the Office of the Royal Sons-in-Law (Uibinbu), which took charge of the King’s Sons-in-Law, and the Office of the Royal Clan (Donnyeongbu), which was assigned to deal with all affairs concerning the king’s maternal in-laws, were established. In view of the intention of the Gyeongguk daejeon, which aimed to build and institutionalize an order centered around the king and queen and to manage the relations between the king and his councillors as well as his relatives in a clear manner, it can be said that the king’s maternal in-laws’ control over the nation amounted to the distortion of the Gyeongguk daejeon system.

The third problem was that the king’s real father gained a strong political role. As a representative instance, Gojong’s real father, the Regent-Prince Heungseon played a political role that went manifestly against the principle of “prohibition of interference in politics by the king’s paternal and maternal in-laws.” To be concrete, the Gyeongguk daejeon stipulated that, among the king’s offspring, the king’s kinsfolk more distant than great-great-grandsons but with the same surname, and the royal kinsfolk, that is, the king’s paternal relatives, would be granted official ranks below the Chief State Councillor, but should be limited to
non-political offices and fulfill the virtue of “close kinship ties” (chinchin). But the Prince Father, that is the person who was the king’s father but did not ascend to the throne, was not included in this category. Prescriptions regarding the treatment of the king’s collaterals, who had common ancestors not in the king’s direct line of descent, such as brothers, sisters, nieces and nephews, or of the children of royal consorts, who were not the king’s lawful wife, were first discussed in the palace in 1606 (39th year of King Seonjo’s reign). When King Seonjo posthumously honored Prince Deokheung, his father, with the title “Grand Prince,” the status of “Grand Prince” became the subject for discussion and debate (Seonjo sillok [Annals of King Seonjo] 02/09/39). Following this, another two were invested with the title of Grand Prince, but only posthumously. Hence, only the treatment of their “offsprings who were responsible for the memorial services” (bongsason) for them was discussed. This matter, which can be seen as one obvious blind spot in the Gyeongguk daejeon system, was put into question following Gojong’s enthronement in 1863.

On December 13, 1863, Dowager Queen Jo asked to the ministers, “It is unprecedented in the history of the dynasty for the non-ruling father of a King to be endowed with a royal title. So, what should we do?” In response to this question, Jeong Won-yong answered, “It is certainly unprecedented, but needs some discussion. Please allow us to give you an answer in a couple of days.” Nevertheless, Dowager Queen Jo insisted, “Since all ministers are here, it would be better to discuss and decide it now.” Upon this, Kim Heung-geun put himself forward and said, “The etiquette of ministers in the palace is so strict that it is highly unlikely that we would meet the Prince Father, so it seems unnecessary to discuss the treatment befitting his status and make a decision ahead of time” (Sunjo sillok 13/12/00). This is how Dowager Queen Jo’s scheme to engage Heungseon Yi Ha-eung in politics by giving him a royal title was frustrated by the obstinate opposition of the ministers.

13. “Two” refers to King Injo’s real father, Grand Prince Jeongwon, and Cheoljong’s real father, Grand Prince Jeongye.

14. It is in the part on “bongsason” in Sok daejeon (Supplement to the National Code), compiled during the reign of King Yeongjo, that the term “Grand Prince” appeared in a law. It was needed to create a new stipulation on the matters of who would perform memorial services for the offspring of King Gyeongjong, son of the Royal Consort Hui from the Jang clan (also known as Jang Hui-bin)—who was defined as not being a lawful wife of King Sukjong—and whether or not to confer posthumous honors on them. Additional stipulations on this matter can be found in the part on the “Office of the Royal Clan” (Donnyeongbu) in the Daejeon tongpyeon (Comprehensive National Code), compiled in the reign of King Yeongjo.
Notwithstanding this, Yi Ha-eung’s strong will and Dowager Queen Jo’s support for him enabled him to be appointed as a Royal Grand Duke (guktaegong) in May 1865 (second year of King Gojong’s reign). Some officials, including Kim Tae-uk and Bak Gyu-su, submitted a proposal on this to Gojong, citing instances of the Tang and Song installing a Prince Father as a Royal Grand Duke, and Gojong accepted it and announced it to the palace. But in point of fact, Heungseon Yi Ha-eung had already been participating in policy decision-making as an informal regent. All in all, the likes of this kind of regency cannot be found in Gyeongguk daejeon, nor in the total history of Korea. This, along with the king’s maternal in-laws’ arbitrariness, was an obvious deformation and distortion of the Gyeongguk daejeon system.

5. Conclusion

As examined thus far, based on its 500 year-long Gyeongguk daejeon system, the Joseon dynasty, in terms of its external policy, maintained relations represented by the principle of “respecting the senior state” (sadae) with China and domestically pursued respect for Confucian proprieties and conceded only relative sovereignty to the Joseon king. This political system was dismantled in 1897, following the birth of the Daehan Empire, which proclaimed itself as a self-reliant independent nation in the international community and in which unlimited sovereign authority was granted to the emperor. However, as Article 2 of the Daehanguk gukje specifies that the Daehan Empire pursues the polity “which has continued over the past 500 years,” Gojong and his ministers believed that while Joseon went to ruin, it was in fact just dismantled and upgraded. That is to say, they believed even though the Joseon dynasty was upgraded to the Daehan Empire in step with the changed international order as well as due to domestic necessity, the political tradition of the Joseon dynasty would remain viable.

But contrary to their beliefs, the Daehan Empire was lacking in some important political devices, which had been implanted in the Joseon dynasty’s political system. The first of those was the system of checks and balances between the king and his ministers, between high-ranking and low-ranking officials, and between government officials and Confucian scholars out of office. This double- or triple-checking system was inherited in the dynasty, either in terms of prescriptions stipulated in the Gyeongguk daejeon, or in terms of public
opinion or established practices, serving as a contributing factor to the decades-
long continuance of the Joseon dynasty (Park Hyunmo 2004). In contrast, the
Gukje completely removed this checking system and replaced it with a strong
emperor-centered system. However a strong emperor-centered system could be
weaker than a multiple-checking system. In the year 1905, Gojong refused the
sanction by reason of “public opinion.” However Ito Hirobumi forced King
Gojong to ratify the Protectorate Treaty with the following logic: “Your country
is not a republic but an empire. Your excuse, ‘the public opinion’, is
contradictory to your political system” (Kang Man-gil 1984, 209-210). The
second was the system of collecting public opinion. It is known that Gojong
pursued the ideal of an impartial, all-embracing sovereign, on the model of
Yeongjo and Jeongjo (Han 2006, 37). But the difference was that, like their
predecessors, Yeongjo and Jeongjo had channels of communicating with the
people, such as allowing the people to present memorials (sangeon) and
petitions (gyeokjaeng) to the throne or frequently speaking with merchants and
citizens through their trips around the town, whereas Gojong did not set up any
direct system to communicate with the people. Gojong, of course, gave sanction
to the establishment of some newspapers such as The Hanseong Sunbo in 1883,
The Independent(Tongnip Sinmun) in 1896, and the Hwangsong Sinmun in
1898. However they were indirect means of communication with people except
for The Hanseong Sunbo which continued for only 15 months after initial
publication.

Due to the lack of direct communication channels, Gojong failed to
“embrace people of all shades,” for example, breaching the “contract” with the
people, which had been reached with difficulty through the Joint Assembly of
Officials and People. All these led the people, to say nothing of the Confucian
literati, to turn away from Gojong and his ministers, and consequently the nine
year-long test of the new regime (1897—1905) resulted in failure, rendering the
dream of “enriching the nation and consolidating the military” (buguk
gangbyeong) nothing but a dream.

In conclusion, the Daehan Empire showed that if the political leaders did not
make participation channels for the people, however high the grade of state or
king, they would be more vulnerable to attacks from foreign countries and
would be faced with political difficulties. In fact, Restoration movements for the
monarchy barely existed after the collapse of the Daehan Empire. How could
Koreans forgot their monarchy, which had been the most familiar political
system, so soon? Two political experiences, I think, were decisive factors: the
“in-law government” (*sedo jeongchî*) and the Daehan Empire. The royal prerogative was, in the former era, too weak, whereas in the latter period regal power was too strong.

References

*Gojong sillok*
*Sunjo sillok*
*Seungjeong-won ilgi*
*Gyeongguk daejeon*


Seo, Yeong-hui. 2006. “Gukgaron-jeok cheungmyeon-eseo bon daehan jeguk-ui seonggyeok” (Characteristics of the Daehan Empire Examined in Terms of State Theory). In *Daehan jeguk-eun geundae gukga-inga* (Was the Daehan Empire a Modern Nation?), by Han Yeong-u and others. Seoul: Blue History.


Glossary

Beopgyu Gyojeongso 法規校正所
*billey (Ch. binli)* 賓禮
*bongsason* 奉祀孫
*buguk gangbyeong* 富國強兵
*chinchin* 親親
*Daehan jeguk gukje* 大韓帝國國制
*Daehanguk gukje* 大韓國國制
*Daemyeongnyul* 大明律
*Daerye uigwe* 大禮儀軌
*eojeon hoewi* 御前會議
*ganjaeng* 諫諍
*garye (Ch. jiali)* 嘉禮
*gubon sincham* 舊本新參
*guktaegong* 國太公
*Gungnaebu* 宮內府
*Gwangmu* 光武
*Gyeonyang* 建陽
*gyuchal* 糾察
*Heonui yukjo* 獻議六條
*Naejangwon* 內藏院
*sadae* 事大
*Saheonbu* 司憲府
*seogyeong* 署經
*Seungjeong-won ilgi* 承政院日記
*Uijeongbu* 議政府

---

**Park, Hyunmo** is a researcher at the Academy of Korean Studies. He received his Ph.D. in political science from Seoul National University in 1999. His Publications include *Jeong chi ga Jeongjo* (King Jeongjo as a Statesman)(2001).
Email: hyunmo@aks.ac.kr