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Letters of President Rhee Syngman, Declassified in 2012

Tae Gyun Park

General Overview

Overview of President Rhee Syngman's Letters

The Presidential Library in South Korea, located at Seongnam City, Gyeonggi Province, began last year to declassify the letters of President Rhee Syngman, which had been produced and kept by the Gyeongmudae presidential residence since the 1950s. Rhee Syngman's correspondence includes the letters he and the First Lady, Francesca Donner Rhee, wrote and received from 1952 to 1960. Having studied and lived in the United States during the Japanese colonial era, President Rhee corresponded with overseas public figures directly, in English. As for First Lady Francesca, whose Korean was not fluent, most of her letters were written in English. Although this correspondence includes few records of conversation directly pertaining to the policy-making process, these letters include significant information.¹

Among the letters the first couple received, some are of a rather simple nature, such as thank you letters for hospitality and gifts, letters of regard, birthday notes, or congratulatory messages for the president's reelection. Some, on the other hand, reveal the president's and the First Lady's perspectives on the government policies and the political situation in Korea. The letters received by First Lady Francesca are mostly thank-you notes and letters sending regards, but some also discuss the overseas publication of the president's biography and issues on Korean publicity.

The letters that the president and the first lady sent are also about thanking or greeting the other party, but some also include significant contents, as categorized below.

① Letters exchanged between President Rhee and senior government officials

* This article is a translation of the revised version of an introduction to *Collection of Translation in the Rhee Syngman Letters*, published by the Presidential Library in December, 2012.

1. President Yun Bo-seon also had a few English letters written and sent, but most of them were thank-you notes and simple greeting letters. Furthermore, most of his letters were not directly sent by the president but by his secretary. Although President Yun graduated from the University of Edinburgh in the United Kingdom during the colonial period, most of his letters were written in Korean rather than English.

in the United States: Most of his correspondence was with President Eisenhower, Secretary of State Dulles, Vice President Nixon, various Congressmen (including Chaplain of the Senate, Mr. Frederick Brown Harris, and Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson).

- ② Letters exchanged between President Rhee (or the Presidential Secretariat) and UN Forces Generals, UNKRA (UN Korea Reconstruction Agency) staff and American staff from the US Operational Mission in South Korea: mostly the U.S. Embassy in Seoul, government officials related to the U.S. Department of State, UN Forces commander/U.S. Armed Forces officers, and officials from the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.
- ③ Interviews given by President Rhee to the press: the questions were first sent to him and he drafted the answers; some letters were written not by Rhee, but by his staff and friends. There were also responses by the president refuting negative descriptions of Korea in overseas journals and newspaper articles).
- ④ Letters between organizations established abroad for the promotion of Korea and staff members in the Eisenhower administration involved in lobbying on behalf of President Rhee.² Such figures and organizations included the Korea Society, the *Korean Survey*, key lobbyists (including Dr. Robert T. Oliver,³ General Van Fleet,⁴ and O. H. P. King⁵) and other diverse acquaintances in

2. Among them, there are some letters arranging for the distribution of President Rhee's biography to foreign countries through Korean embassies.

3. Robert Oliver was one of the oldest and the best friends of President Rhee since the colonial period. He seems to have been the only friend in touch with Rhee, even after the outbreak of the Korean War, as it is not easy to find President Rhee's personal correspondence with his old friends and lobbyists except for Dr. Oliver during this period. New research on the change of President Rhee's personal network in the 1950s in comparison with the 1940s would be needed in the near future. With regard to the president's old network, Jeong Byeongjun's *Wunam Yi Seungman Yeongu* [Study of Unam Rhee Syngman] deserves attention (2005).

4. General Van Fleet replaced General Matthew B. Ridgway as commander of the U.S. Eighth Army and United Nations (UN) Forces in Korea in 1951. Before the Korean War, he was regarded as an executor of the "Truman Doctrine" when he led 250 military advisers, along with \$400 million of aid, in Greece.

5. Mr. King was a war correspondent for the Associated Press and his friendship with President Rhee seemingly started soon after establishment of the Republic of Korea (ROK) government. According to a Korean newspaper, he accompanied the President in the general election campaign in May, 1950. "Seongeol siljeong eul sical, Yi daetongnyeong geupgeo samname" 選舉實情을 視察 李大統領急遽三南에, *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, May 25, 1950. He also visited

the United States.

- ⑤ Letters exchanged between overseas public figures who visited Korea: e.g., thank-you notes for hospitality and gifts from President Rhee, and regard letters written by President Rhee and Francesca.
- ⑥ Original copies of congratulatory statements sent by the president to international organizations: these were generally related to anti-communist activities and veterans.
- ⑦ Request letters to Korean embassies abroad to purchase goods for use at the Gyeongmudae and at the Bando Hotel.⁶
- ⑧ Reports from Korean military staff or government officials (namely, Ambassadors Yang Yoo-chan, Lim Byung-jik, Chung Il-gwon and General Paik Sun-yeop) to the president. In addition, some letters were exchanged between Korean bureaucrats, including Choi Kyu-hah, and American government officials and generals, which were reported to President Rhee.

Characteristics of President Rhee Syngman's Correspondence Files

The general scholarly consensus on the Rhee Syngman administration is that decision-making power was mainly retained by the president, and such an interpretation is clearly supported through review of his correspondence. Although his correspondence includes simple texts, we can also find letters containing significant information on decision making and Korea's foreign relations at that time.

The correspondence by President Rhee exhibits the following characteristics.

- ① Apparently, the simpler letters were often directly written by the presidential couple, while some were written on their behalf by secretaries. Some of the more important letters were revised by Dr. Robert Oliver.

Pyeongyang with President Rhee when the United Nations Forces crossed over the 38th Parallel in 1950.

6. The ROK government directly managed the Bando Hotel, which was considered the premier facility at the time. Due to this managerial relationship, people incorrectly assumed that the hotel belonged to the First Lady, Francesca. In the letters of President Rhee, several of them contain criticism of the First Lady because of the hotel issues.

- ② President Rhee's letters to major public figures of the United States, in particular to President Eisenhower, Vice President Nixon, Secretary of State Dulles and the U.S. Chiefs of General Staff, were corrected in a number of drafts before the final submission. The files containing President Rhee's correspondence includes all of the first drafts, revisions and the final letters. The revisions were usually made to soften or smooth out aggressive phrasings.
- ③ Among the letters sent by President Rhee and Lady Francesca, some include their personal comments on specific public figures, which allows the readers to understand the relationship between core government officials representing the Rhee administration and the Eisenhower administration.
- ④ Many letters reflect the content of American policies towards Korea and the stance taken by the First Couple on such policies. In particular, there are many details on policies regarding aid to Korea.
- ⑤ Some letters are related to projects that President Rhee designed and carried forward through personal means and without approval of American aid agencies, such as the Office of the Economic Coordinator (OEC). Such plans include the construction of apartments, the construction of farms in Jejudo, the building of oil refineries, and production of PR movies on Korea, among others.

Characteristics of President Rhee Syngman's Letters Translated in 2011

Letters of Thanks and Regards

Letters that were translated to Korean in 2011 comprise a total of 761 letters in 11 boxes. Most of these letters are exchanges between the presidential couple and their acquaintances, through which they conveyed thanks and sent regards. Letters in this category are mostly about thanking the president and the First Lady for their hospitality and gifts during the writers' stay in Korea; correspondence related to the gifts especially draws our attention.

Presents mentioned in the letters include simple items, such as canes, but there are numerous more valuable ones, such as porcelain and paintings. Although the nature of these objects is not clear, it seems that President Rhee was quite keen on the presents to be given to overseas public figures. The letters

are revealing of the personal network of President Rhee.

In addition, President Rhee and the First Lady frequently discuss their life at the Gyeongmudae and a summer house at Jinhae, where the Korean Naval Academy is located. Francesca seemed to enjoy, in particular, mentioning the life of President Rhee at Jinhae. The acquaintances of President Rhee, especially those who visited the president and his wife during their stay in South Korea, sometimes mentioned their experiences with the First Couple in South Korea, which conveyed the sense of hospitality shown to visitors by President Rhee.

Letters Exchanged with the U.S. President and Secretary of State

Among the letters translated in 2011, the most important group of letters is those exchanged with President Eisenhower, Vice President Nixon and Secretary of State Dulles. Some of the contents of these letters do appear in American documents, in newspapers, or in President Rhee's official speeches, but there are also some that have not yet been released, even in American sources.

The significance of these letters lies in the fact that they contain matters that do not appear in the official policymaking record. General documents on policies, especially those that are included in *FRUS*,⁷ can confirm the content of such policies, but it is hard to detect the actual thoughts of the policy makers. Aside from some meeting records⁸ that have been made public, they only contain general policy guidelines.

On the other hand, the content of the letters included in President Rhee's correspondence enclose the actual intentions and thoughts of not only President Rhee Syngman but also those of President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles. Now translated to Korean in 2011, the value of these letters stands out in particular as they reflect the conflict that existed between Korea and the

7. *FRUS* is an abbreviation for *Foreign Relations of the United States*, a book series compiling documents related to the foreign relations of the United States. The series include compilations divided into different themes of U.S. foreign policies, from the establishment of the United States until recent years. The documents are not only from the U.S. Department of State, which is in charge of foreign relations, but also from the National Security Council in the White House and the U.S. Department of Defense.

8. Among the documents contained in the *FRUS* are parts of meeting recordings from the National Security Council (NSC) or the White House. The part devoted to Korea in the 1950s in particular includes quite a significant number of meeting records from the NSC.

United States in the 1950s and how serious the discord was.⁹ Their contents include such issues as the release of anti-communist prisoners of war, the signing of the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Agreement, the conclusion of the ceasefire agreement, President Rhee's unification policy by military means, and the two countries' conflicting stances on American aid to Korea.

Letters Related to Plans for National Recovery

Regarding the matter of U.S. aid to Korea, the Syngman Rhee administration ran into numerous conflicts with U.S. aid agencies. The main complaints voiced by President Rhee reflected his view that too much of the aid funding was being allocated for the management of the agencies in Seoul, and the Korean government's usage of financial aid for national recovery projects was too restricted, due to the complete control of the grant by the American Economic Coordinator, who also was the advisor of economics to the UN Forces Commander. Without approval of the American Economic Coordinator, the Korean government was thus unable to spend the funds where it wanted to invest.

For such reasons, the Rhee administration wanted to pursue its own separate recovery project without going through the American aid agencies. This fact is clearly displayed through the Van Fleet files, which are among the letters that were translated in 2012 (and not yet declassified). Some letters translated in 2011 also include those related to the construction of apartments. President Rhee was in conflict with the Korean branches of the U.S. aid program at the time—in particular, the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) and the Office of Economic Coordinator (OEC). President Rhee saw that while the ICA and the OEC administrators¹⁰ enjoyed complete authority over the usage of counterpart funds, they showed no interest or were negatively responding towards the recovery plans put forward by the Korean government. On the other hand, U.S. aid agencies located in Korea were discontent with the fact

9. The ROK-U.S. conflict during the 1950s was much more serious than has been conventionally portrayed. In relation to this issue, see Park, Tae Gyun, "Jalmot kkiwun cheotdanchu" (2009); Yi, Cheolsun, "(A) Study of American policy toward Korea during the Korea's First Republic" (2000); and Yi, Hyeonjin, "U.S. Economic aid policy toward South Korea 1948-1960" (2009).

10. Mr. Tyler Wood in the early 1950s and Mr. William Warne in the late 1950s.

that the Rhee administration was not efficiently using the aid they provided.

Important Letters for Studies on Controversial Issues

Letters in Conflict over the Release of Anti-communist Prisoners of War

The release of anti-communist prisoners of war (POWs) on June 18, 1953—a month before the Armistice Agreement on July 27—has so far been considered a ‘great achievement’ of the anti-communist policy conducted by the Rhee administration. This is not only a result of the social discourse spread by the ROK government, but also by some scholarly treatments. However, such perceptions were challenged not so long ago by studies showing that the ‘release of anti-communist POWs’ actually led to a rapid deterioration of ROK-U.S. relations, based on American government documents released by the National Archive and Record Administration (NARA) (Hong 1994; Park 2012). In response to this argument, another line of research showed that this incident constituted an important stepping stone in concluding the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty. These contrary research results raised another controversial debate around historical re-evaluation of the release of anti-communist POWs.

However, the letters that were exchanged between Presidents Rhee and Eisenhower in relation to this issue provide the historical facts behind not only the implications of this incident but also the connection between the incident and the conclusion of the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty (Kim 2004). First of all, President Rhee in his letter frequently mentioned “a unilateral action” by South Korean Forces without the UN Forces, of which operational control had been under the UN Forces Commander since 1950. For example, a letter from President Eisenhower soon after the visit of Vice President Nixon to Korea clearly states that President Rhee firmly acknowledged to Nixon that “I said that if everything should go contrary to our expectation and the worse comes to the worst, I would feel compelled to take a unilateral action, which I earnestly hope would never happen. I added, however, that I would inform you before making any such move.”¹¹

11. A letter from President Rhee to President Eisenhower, November 16, 1953. *Collection of*

What was President Rhee's intention in attempting to conduct such an action? Rhee did not agree with the armistice but instead wanted to continue the war to drive out both North Korean and Chinese communist forces until final unification would be achieved under the South Korean initiative. However, President Eisenhower had a different idea: to end the war as soon as possible. It was one of his commitments during the presidential campaign before his inauguration. In that sense, the letter sent by President Eisenhower conveying his idea on June 6, 1953, prior to the release of the anti-communist POWs, has great significance.

In general, Eisenhower had the same strategy with regard to anti-communist POWs as Rhee did: not to send back the anti-communist POWs, even after the conclusion of the ceasefire agreement. He also agreed to President Rhee's suggestion for "a mutual defense treaty along the lines of the treaties heretofore made between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines, and the United States and Australia and New Zealand" soon after the armistice agreement.¹² However, discord emerged over the U.S. policy to sign the Armistice Agreement and to end hostilities, with permission that Chinese communist forces remain stationed in North Korea even after the truce. Furthermore, as soon as the armistice was joined, the U.S. government inevitably accepted the UN plan to invite Indian forces to deal with the anti-communist POWs.

What President Rhee wanted was to sign the agreement and to have Chinese forces withdraw from North Korea before the armistice. Otherwise,

Translation in the Rhee Syngman Letters, pp. 90-91. One significant characteristic of this correspondence is that while President Rhee requested that this exchange not be disclosed in order to placate the conflicts between the two countries involving the release of prisoners, President Eisenhower clearly stipulates that "I cannot, however, as you will well understand, enter into any undertaking to refrain from making the position of the United States on these questions perfectly clear at whatever time it may appear to me to be advisable to do so." A letter from Eisenhower to President Rhee, January 2, 1954, *Collection of Translation in the Rhee Syngman Letters*, p. 95.

12. A letter from President Eisenhower to President Rhee, June 6, 1953, *Collection of Translation in the Rhee Syngman Letters*, pp. 53-58. The letter was transmitted through wireless communication to General Mark W. Clark from President Eisenhower, and sent to President Rhee on June 7, 1953. A letter was also sent by President Eisenhower declaring that the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty will be signed after the armistice agreement, a day before the release of anti-communist POWs by President Rhee, on June 17, *Collection of Translation in the Rhee Syngman Letters*, pp. 62-63.

he would not sign the armistice. He said that he was willing to withdraw South Korean forces from operational control by the UN Forces Commander in order to drive all communist forces' continuous offense out of the Korean Peninsula. He even complained about the Indian involvement in controlling the anti-communist POWs. President Eisenhower accepted President Rhee's request of the mutual security treaty to check Rhee's plan to reach the Yalu River and to resolve the South Korean hostility, despite the U.S.'s inevitable acceptance of Indian engagement subject to the UN's resolution and expulsion of Chinese forces because of UN Forces stationed in South Korea. This is the meaning of the letter dated June 6, 1953.

The settlement of a mutual defense treaty was a significant condition for President Rhee to agree to the signing of the armistice, and most importantly, from his position, it was imperative that the mutual defense treaty be concluded not after the armistice but rather before. However, it was not possible to join the treaty before the armistice, because the armistice would be postponed were the communists to refuse the agreement by possibly claiming the treaty as a flaw.

In the end, the ultimate issue between two parties was about whether the ROK-U.S. mutual defense treaty would be concluded before or after the ceasefire. The South Korean forces' release of anti-communist POWs, by President Rhee's direct order and without approval of the UN Forces commander, was a move to pause the conclusion of the armistice before the signing of the ROK-U.S. mutual defense treaty.

However, the final outcome was the conclusion of ROK-U.S. mutual defense treaty in October 1953, which came after the armistice (July 27, 1953) and was against President Rhee's intention. Moreover, it seems that President Eisenhower was severely disappointed at President Rhee's order to release the prisoners. The day after the release, he conveyed his message through a letter intimating some extreme measures to be taken:

[U]nless you are prepared immediately and unequivocally to accept the authority of the UN Command to conduct the present hostilities and to bring them to a close, it will be necessary to effect another arrangement.¹³

13. A letter from President Dwight D. Eisenhower to President Rhee Syngman, June 19, 1953

The fact that this reference might coincide with the “Plan Everready” (i.e., the plan to remove Rhee Syngman from the presidency), and a direct delivery of this plan to President Rhee through President Eisenhower’s letter, is indeed quite shocking.

In his early November letters, President Eisenhower clearly states that the core issue of the mutual defense treaty is to transfer the Korean army’s operational control under the command of the UN forces and to ensure that President Rhee would not violate the armistice agreement.¹⁴ President Rhee failed to gain what he wanted through the release of the anti-communist POWs, and consequently raised distrust between President Eisenhower and himself.¹⁵ As we have so far seen, the letters from President Eisenhower delivered to President Rhee provide conclusive proof on the debate that ensued within academia concerning the issue of the release of anti-communist prisoners of war.

Letters Demonstrating U.S. Policies towards Korea in the 1950s

U.S. policy towards Korea under the Eisenhower Administration in the 1950s was characterized by reducing aid for Korea in line with its “New Look” policy (Gaddis 1982, Chapter 4). The overall aim of this policy was to relieve the economic burdens of the United States with Korea through the following measures: (1) to downsize South Korean forces as well as U.S. forces in South Korea, both of which were maintained by U.S. assistance; (2) to utilize assistance for recovery rather than for investment in infrastructure and industry in South Korea; (3) and to transfer the economic burden to Japan by concluding agreements between the ROK and Japan (Yi 1995; Park 1999). Although some scholars already pointed out this tendency in U.S. policies, a letter sent by Secretary of State Dulles to President Rhee, dated December 10, 1953, clearly reveals some very critical points.¹⁶

14. A letter from President Eisenhower to President Rhee (highly confidential), November 4, 1953.

15. What deserves attention in President Rhee’s letters to President Eisenhower is the fact that the first line of the letter was changed. In early 1953 soon after inauguration of President Eisenhower, President Rhee called him “my very good friend,” while he used “Dear Mr. President” at the first line of his letter.

16. A letter from Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to President Rhee Syngman, December 10, 1953.

This letter clarifies the position of the Secretary of State in relation to the “Korean-Japanese relations and the economic aid programme.” The U.S. policy towards the ROK at that time focused foremost on the “achievement of peaceful settlement between South Korea and Japan,” and the United States was willing to provide support in the matter. The issue of the custody of detained Japanese fishermen, caused by the “Rhee Syngman Line,” was the most controversial issue between Korea and Japan at that time; other issues included reparation, return of historical relics, legal status of Korean Japanese, and so on. The line was declared by President Rhee, who argued that the line was legal because it was consistent with the “Clark Line,” which was drawn for containing communist naval forces, while the Japanese government considered it illegal under international law. The United States asserted that “as we stated in our note of February 11, 1952, that this government cannot support the concept of a line unilaterally drawn in the high seas to delineate exclusive fishing areas.”

Secondly, in relation to the U.S. aid policy, the letters discuss Tyler Wood, the U.S. Economic Coordinator, whom President Rhee had complained about. It says in the letter that “Mr. Wood enjoys the full confidence of the United States Government, and the position which he has taken on the economic issues has its support,” thereby expressing difficulty in accepting President Rhee’s request of “having Tyler Wood replaced by Tasca”¹⁷ and calling upon President Rhee to abide by Wood’s decision concerning the usage of counterpart funds. From the viewpoint of President Rhee, the reason why the ROK government could not access to the funds was not because of the American policy but rather Mr. Wood’s personal reluctance to cooperate with the Korean president.

In addition, the correspondence makes it clear that the United States could not accept President Rhee’s claim on “the fixed exchange rate.” The issue at point is that while Secretary of State Dulles argues in his letter that the United States has not set a fixed exchange rate with any other country, the U.S. actually had maintained a fixed exchange rate for Japan from 1949 until 1971. The Japanese case provided President Rhee a strong ground for his demand of a fixed exchange rate, but Secretary of State Dulles clarified his refusal to President

17. Tasca visited South Korea in 1953 at the request of the U.S. State Department and established the economic development plan for South Korea. He handed out his plan to the U.S. government in 1953 and President Rhee held it in high esteem.

Rhee.

The correspondence with Dulles reflects well the overall U.S. policies and attitude towards the ROK at that time. In sum, the United States government intended to prevent the South Korean government's unrestricted usage of the counterpart funds, while trying to reduce its burden through the normalization of relations between the ROK and Japan, the 'currency issue' and the 'economic coordinator' system.

President Rhee eventually ended up with a negative evaluation of Dulles, as is evident in the following passage in his letter to Dulles.

As I reread your letter, and I assure you it has had my most earnest and prayerful attention, its text seems to indicate that I am a heartless wretch without gratitude and without any regard for any human values except perhaps the narrow self-interest of our own people. I cannot think that this is a true representation of your feelings. It is true, of course, that we have asked and asked, and that we have received and received.¹⁸

Among the letters of President Rhee translated in 2012, there are a number of indications displaying a negative appraisal of Secretary of State Dulles by the president and the First Lady.

Letters Reflecting President Rhee's Thoughts, Stance and Attitude

Among President Rhee's letters, many of them reveal his personal thoughts and opinions. Existing research reflected on his thoughts through newspaper archives and his speeches (Sin 2004; Park 2010), but his letters provide direct insights into his thinking.

President Rhee claims that South Korea should be accorded consideration as "a strategic power center and as a loyal and effective ally" in the Pacific area instead of Japan. He argues that Japan, a country led by war criminals during World War II, should not be trusted and the American government should consider the antagonism of other Asian countries against Japan. Therefore,

18. A letter from President Rhee to Secretary of State Dulles, June 14, 1953, *Collection of Translation in the Rhee Syngman Letters*, pp. 66-67.

South Korea should be given the role Japan has in Asia as a country playing a crucial role on the front line of the Cold War.¹⁹

Moreover, the draft of a letter²⁰ to be sent to President Eisenhower presents his opinion on ROK-U.S. relations, although the letter was not delivered. President Rhee, despite the severe inflation of the time, demanded the exchange rate to be fixed, but at the same time wanted to receive the aid in U.S. dollars instead of Korean won.

In addition, the draft of this letter exhibits Rhee's open discontent about the fact that much of the monetary aid was spent on managing the aid agencies. This point was made in other letters as well, where President Rhee criticizes the fact that there are 160 people in Korea who were engaged in business related to the aid and that their wages took up about 9 to 16% of the budget.²¹

Other letters reveal President Rhee's thoughts on different issues, such as his criticism of American aid procurement from Japan,²² his complaint against the supervision committee representatives from neutral countries (Czechoslovakia and Poland),²³ his will to directly control the foreign exchange in South Korea,²⁴ and the dispatch of troops to Indochina.²⁵

19. A letter from President Rhee to President Eisenhower, July 11, 1953, *Collection of Translation in the Rhee Syngman Letters*, pp. 73-74.

20. Draft letter related to the economic reconstruction and aid support for South Korea, (undelivered) *Collection of Translation in the Rhee Syngman Letters*, pp. 80-83.

21. A letter from President Eisenhower to President Rhee, November 4, 1953, *Collection of Translation in the Rhee Syngman Letters*, pp. 86-87.

22. Draft to be sent to General Lemnitzer: Request to correct the U.S. policy on material procurement prioritizing Japan (undelivered), June 1, 1957. This letter is not included in the *Collection of Translation in the Rhee Syngman Letters*.

23. This letter mentions that during the negotiation process for the Japan-ROK treaty, a Japanese government officer approached a Korean diplomat residing in Japan, requesting that should Korea withdraw the Rhee Syngman Line, Japan would retract its property claim against Korea, and that the Korean government was adamantly against such suggestion. If this were to be true, this material could be a valuable source for the study of the negotiation processes for the Japan-ROK treaty.

24. A letter from President Rhee to D.Y. Namkoong: A letter from President Rhee to the Consul General in New York D.Y. Namkoong, January 28, 1954; A letter from President Rhee to Ambassador Yang Yoo-chan, January 28, 1954. President Rhee's control over the usage of the dollar is more present among the correspondence translated in 2012. These letters are not included in the *Collection of Translation in the Rhee Syngman Letters*.

25. A letter from President Rhee to Ambassador Briggs, July 13, 1954. The letter includes the willingness to send three army divisions. This letter is not included in the *Collection of Translation in the Rhee Syngman Letters*.

The rest of his correspondence translated in 2011 includes letters that disclose how unaware he was of the gravity of the situation prior to the April Revolution in 1960.²⁶ During the revolutions in April 19 and 26, Rhee showed little anxiety in his letters with his friends. Rhee and his wife even sent thank you letters to those who had sent congratulations and dispatches for his being re-elected in the presidential election on March 15, 1960. This corroborates the rumor that President Rhee did not know much about the serious situation during the April Revolution since his staff did not deliver any objective information at the time.

Others

Some letters pertain to certain social issues of the 1950s, including the smuggling problem through American bases and seriousness of the cases,²⁷ the plan to secretly build the Hyochang Stadium without notice to the bereaved families of independence activists,²⁸ urban planning for the city of Seoul,²⁹ and others. In relation to the construction of the Hyochang Stadium, President Rhee emphasizes that the project has to be carried out secretly because the groundwork required moving of graves pertaining to some patriotic martyrs, especially to Kim Gu. We also notice President Rhee's assertion that Seoul's urban plans should include the building of four-story multi-housing buildings, due to the shortage of flat lands in the capital.

Many of these letters are expected to contribute to continued academic research and analysis on South Korea's situation in 1950s, as well as influencing future scholarship on the Korea-U.S. relationship.

26. A letter from President Rhee to US Secretary of the Army Wilber M. Brucker, April 23, 1960. This letter is not included in the *Collection of Translation in the Rhee Syngman Letters*.

27. A letter from General Lemnitzer to the acting foreign minister Cho Jung-hwan, January 13, 1956. This letter is not included in the *Collection of Translation in the Rhee Syngman Letters*.

28. Business plan for the construction of the Hyochang Stadium-Army Headquarters: Enforcement policy, schedule, no date, 1957, This letter is not included in the *Collection of Translation in the Rhee Syngman Letters*.

29. A letter from William Zeckendorf to President Rhee, December 3, 1953. This letter is not included in the *Collection of Translation in the Rhee Syngman Letters*.

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Tae Gyun Park (tgpark@snu.ac.kr) is an Associate Professor in the Graduate School of International Studies, and the Director of Sochon Center for Korean Studies, Seoul National University. He is an author of *An Ally and Empire* (AKS Press, 2013), and an Advisor for the Korea Foundation.

