

Special Feature

The Reality of Military Base and the Evolution of Pacifism: Japan's Korean War and Peace

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Introduction

This article analyzes the reality of Japan as a military “base-state,” at the time of the Korean War as well as Japan’s reaction to the Korean war. It is well established fact that during the Korean War, Japan achieved independence and returned to the international society by signing the Peace Treaty of San Francisco. Meanwhile, by serving as the logistic base providing U.S.-led U.N. troops with aircrafts, facilitating sallying of warships, and supplying munitions, medical care, and a place where the soldiers could recuperate, Japan got itself deeply involved in the war. After Japan’s defeat in the World War II, Japan declared herself to be a “Peace-State,”¹ but during the Korean War, Japan converted to a “base-state,” which was initially given as a basic framework to transition into a “base-state” to sustain Japan’s survival and future after the war. “Base-state” is defined as a state that does not have the military of its own, but guarantees its security by providing military base at a strategic point to its ally state (Nam 2000).

Thus, after the war, Japan was known as “Independent Japan” and associated with keywords like “Logistic Base” and “Pacifism.” Experiencing the Korean War and gaining independence with its role as a “Logistic Base,” after World War II, Japan became well aware of the gap between two roles she held the first role based on Pacifism mandated by Article No. 9 of the Constitution, and the second role as a base-state. Even to this day, this gap difference does not decrease but in fact only widens, and as time goes by.

During the Korean War, the peace issue with Japan was closely linked to the rearmament and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty (military base) issue. So, the resolution of issues of political independence and the U.S. military base issues were characterized by the Yoshida administration’s “light armament” and “the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance” to stay in survival mode for a “state facing the reality of war,” and by the cohabitation of this reality and the “demilitarized pacifism” as national ideology. Afterwards, postwar Japan adopted this odd and distinctive reasoning that reality still exists as reality, ideology as ideology

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1. The word of “Peace-State”(Heiwa-Kokka) appears in Tatsuo Morito’s article “Construction of Peace-State” (*Heiwa-Kokka no Kensetsu*) (January 1946) for the first time after the end of the World War II.

independent of the “fact.” This has enabled the reality of base-state to exist until this day.

In international politics where the nation-state is the traditional actor, such unique form of existence of postwar Japan does cause grounds for conflict. The emergence of “normal state” discourse has raised the possibility of the crash between fact and idea. Meanwhile, postwar pacifist equated the aforementioned nation-state with the prewar Japanese State, and consequently made the contradiction official. Such completion of the post war Japanese state, and the creation of postwar pacifism,² though contradictory in ideology, ironically managed to complete the state formation process. Japan’s state transition can be argued to be the consequences of the process of facing and responding to the Korean War. In the following, focusing on the division of sentiments toward pacifism in Japan during this time, I will go into in-depth analysis of the process of making the state a logistical base and introduction of postwar Pacifism. As Park Myung-lim (2002, 57) pointed out, Korean War studies are limited in that it has studied Japan in relation to peace studies, but this article will attempt to overcome such limitations.

Relevant to this study, the following research studies can be referenced. First, by using the concept of base-state, Nam Kijeong (2000, 2001, 2002, 2012) has carried out research studies over the changes and features in Japan during this period from the perspective of war and peace for a “base-state.” Various Korean scholars are investigating the meaning of the Korean War in postwar Japanese history context, such as the works of Yu Ji-a (2010), Kim Hang (2011), Yi Young-chaе (2013), Im Kyung-hwa (2014), and Rho Myung-ho (2014). But they do not refer to the pacifism in Japan during the Korean War. In Japan, Wada Haruki (2002, 189) mentioned the peace movement in Japan during the Korean War period, and Yoshikawa Yuichi (1995a, 1995b) criticized Wada, which was then followed again by Wada’s counterargument.

To summarize, the argument between Wada and Yoshikawa is over the

2. Pacifism in a narrow sense means the attitude of denying every kind of war including the war for nation or liberation. But here I would like to use the term of pacifism in broader sense, especially in Japan, and define it as mingled and complex anti-war feeling or sentiment, consist of a high regard for the “Peace Constitution,” preferring economic success through cooperation to political righteousness through conflict.

conflicting influence of the pacifism or peace movement of the progressive group of Japan. In order to understand the context of controversy and to capture the history behind it, the reality the two endured needs to be thoroughly understood. Moreover, some research should be done to clearly outline various stances of the Pacifism/Peace movement of during that period.

The Korean War gave Japan the appropriate timing for the serious reflection on the war and peace, in the vacuum of battle made in the reality of a war (Kawamura and Narita, 2012, 657). In this situation, in Japan which was resembled a laboratory of “war and peace,” peace had experienced a typical diversification. First of all, the diversification of rise and fall occurred. On the one hand, fall to war reality occurred, on the other, rise to the vacuum of battle took place. Secondly, the diversification of entry and escape occurred. In the reality of the Korean War, some tried to guarantee peace by entering any one of camps, others tries to realize peace by escaping from all of camps. With the Korean War intersecting the abovementioned rise and fall, entry and escape, pacifism in Japan was diversified into four categories: “constitutional pacifism,” “absolute pacifism,” “camp pacifism,” and “armament pacifism.”

Next, I will reconstruct the reality Japan was in at the time of breakout of the Korean War by shedding light on the U.S. policy and the true picture of the base-state by introducing the four categories of “Peace Initiative” discussed in Japan during the Korean War, and then take a close look at how those initiatives contributed to the reconstitution of Japan’s reality.

Changing U.S. Policy toward Japan

Just before the outbreak of the Korean War in 1949, was the year the “Reverse Course” was finally confirmed and given shape. The realization of the movements started in 1947 when Truman Doctrine was announced, which aimed to fix the basic line of the U.S. military occupation of “Democratization and Demilitarization.” In January of 1948, United States Army General Royall claimed that Japan should be a protective wall against communism, a basic goal of the U.S. occupation policy of Japan and anti-communism, insisting that change should be made in the U.S. occupation policy. In October of the same year, NSC1312, a National Security Council’s advice on the U.S. occupation policy on Japan was adopted, technically stipulating the policy goal’s transition

from “reformation” to “economic boost.” In June 1949, NSC49 put an end to the debate on the strategic importance of Japan in East Asia by saying that Japan has a high strategic importance in the East Asia in terms of America’s security policy in the Far East.

One exemplary case of the Reverse Policy’s realization in Japan was “the Organizations Control Order” announced in April 1949. This act was especially infamous for restricting the freedom of association among many other public peace legislations. In September 1949, the pro-Pyeongyang Federation of Korean residents in Japan (Choren), an organization of Zainichi was disbanded as the first application of the act. The act was succeeded by the Anti-Subversives Law formed in July 1952, which was the kernel of public peace legislations after the ratification of the peace treaty.

In April 1949, the United States saw a significant change in Japan’s defense military strategy. According to Ara Takashi (1995, 1998), right before the Korean War broke out, the U.S. Forces Far East Command had prepared Operation Plan to counteract the three types of emergencies: all-out crisis, civilian crisis, and natural disaster. Civilian crisis was respond with the Tollbooth Operation Plan, a measure created in July 1947, and all-out crisis was defined as a situation in which People’s Republic of China or North Korea took threatening positions would be controlled with Operation Gunpowder. However, the U.S. Forces Far East Command revised the operation plan and worked to establish the Operation Gunpowder-2, taking precaution for an all-out war with the Soviet Union, and by March, 1950, three months before the Korean War broke out, decided on military exercises on the presumption that war could start without any formal declaration. On the other side, Operation Tollbooth was revised to be carried out response to a small/limited scale of emergency by the National Police Reserve in the outbreak of the Korean War, but the measure for abig-scale/all-out emergency still remained uncertain. Therefore, this uncertainty resulted put Japan in a position to demand for rearmament of Japan.

What was the Soviet Union’s view on the change of the occupation policy? According to Wada Haruki (1995, 104-05), the Soviet Union’s policy on Japan was based on the report of Political Advisory Council of the Soviet Mission in Japan. Soviet Union’s view of Japan is shown in the May 20th 1950’s report of the Deputy of Political Advisory Council V.A. Glinkin, “The U.S. Occupation Policy in Japan: Overview of Occupation from the Recent One and a Half

to Two Years.” Soviet Union’s attitude towards Japan was split in two, one for abandonment, the other for defense, but both shared the sense of crisis and found cause for favorable conditions for a revolution. Taking this information, the Soviet Union leaders made the judgment that the Japan Communist Party could escape from U.S. occupation if the party once starts the struggle with GHQ/SCAP and a revolutionary act with the support of an international coalition. This information could be the background of the Cominform’s criticism of the Japan Communist Party on January 6, 1950. A week later, on January 12, U.S. reacted to this by announcing the famous Acheson Declaration.

Right before the Korean War, the front of the cold war in Asia was moving from the Korean peninsula to Japan. Both the USA and the USSR rethought and modified their respective Asian policy, and in this process Japan was granted a strategic location and its security position was upgraded. In this sense, the Korean War was given a greater significance in that it granted Japan the possibility of obtaining or losing a strategic location in Asia during this crucial time of international politics. The leadership of Japan whose foremost aim was peace with Allied Powers understood these changes and quickly took advantage of the situation. For example, the then Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru proposed to the United States the offer of a U.S. military base in Japan (Sakamoto). It is important to keep in mind, the significant role of in these situations.

Japan’s Role in the Korean War

It is noteworthy that, although Japan played very important role by serving as the base-state throughout the Korean War, its response at the time of outbreak of the War was very detached or uninterested. On June 25, Prime Minister Yoshida was staying in Hakone to recuperate, and refused all media interviews. Chief Cabinet Secretary Okazaki made a statement in Tokyo, stating that the war on the peninsula is “not expected to escalate into the Third World War,” and “pull all efforts to ensure domestic security.” Ten days after the outbreak of the war the Japanese government finally “consented on the cooperation with the U.S. forces operating in Korea” based on the decision from the Cabinet meeting, and which was then well-over 6 weeks later, August 19. The

Japanese government released an official announcement about Japan's position. Information Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced the government's view of "The Korean Conflict and Our Position." Subsequently, Yoshida sent a letter to MacArthur, stating that Japanese government is willing to provide any facilities or labor. Thereafter, Japan played one of the key roles in this period by serving as military and logistics base for the sortie orders, repair and procurement station, rest station for the soldiers, and production base. As of January 1953, there were 733 U.S. bases in mainland Japan, and since the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the number of bases has been increasing (Nam 2000, 172-73; Yamazaki 1998).

Japanese vessels and railways were mobilized to transport military supplies, outstanding crewmen were sent to work in the LSTs, and skilled Japanese wharf men enabled smooth transportation of war supplies. In addition, the factories that were put to a stop by the U.S. Forces were revitalized to produce military supplies recover the overall industrial capacity of Japan by war-time special procurement. By the final phase of the Korean War, even the arms industry that was once prohibited to produce weapons during the occupation period was revived (Nam 2012). According to the memoir of Robert D. Murphy, the first postwar American Ambassador to Japan, the Japanese provided as much cooperation as possible voluntarily, and succeeded in rebuilding their industry (Murphy 1964, 340-48). The Korean War was a windfall for Japan.

Japanese leaders called the outbreak of the Korean War, "Kamikaze," or "heaven's aid." The then head of the Bank of Japan, Ichimada Hisato, writes "Japanese industries are saved" (Yamamoto 1985, 96). Economic revival of Japan with the help of the Korean War, however, made Japan dependent on the U.S., resulting in the economic foundation of U.S.-Japan security alliance. However, special procurement demand was not simply limited in the economic effects. It had a huge impact on Japanese mindset, and provided the opportunity to share Yoshida administration's idea that economic boom and growth is the foremost important national goal (Wada 1995, 235; Nam 2012).

However, one of the problems that are pointed out in the course of Japanese participation in the Korean War is the role of Japan as a logistic base. With the outbreak of the war, the air force and the navy of the U.S. Far East command were first mobilized to support Korea. During the Korean War, 15 airports in Japan served as a base for the U.S. Far East command, everywhere in Japan was transformed into a military and logistics base for sortie orders, field

hospitals for the wounded soldiers, and rest stations for returning soldiers to Korea. The neighborhood around the bases was conformed to meet the needs of a military camp town, which provided a one-time pleasure.³ At the beginning of the war, the number of U.S. military soldiers in Japan was 125,000; the number of U.S. military mobilized into Korea's front was 350,000 at its maximum (Wada 1995, 233). They were mobilized to fill in the void of Japanese security from mobilizing Japanese into Korean War, and to defend U.S. military camps in Japan.

Japan's cooperation in the warfare was both indirect and direct. The United States once considered recruiting military strength in Japan and putting them in the Korean War, but there was no official entering of Japanese manpower into the war. If any Japanese manpower entered into the war, it must have been an individual voluntary participation, not an official one. Yet, it is widely known that Mine Sweepers of Japan Coast Guards were dispatched around Wonsan bay to carry out mine sweeping before the U.S. troops' landing in Wonsan, and sweeping work was also done in Pusan, Mokpo, Kunsan, Jinnampo, and other areas as needed. Japan Coast Guard's special mine sweepers secretly departed Moji Port in October 6, 1950 and swept mines in neighboring waters including Wonsan until October 15 when it was disbanded. Twenty-five ships with totally 1,200 people entered into war in Korea. Of those ships, two ships collided with sea mines sunk, resulting in one death and 18 injuries (Suzuki 2005, 26). Also, additional 1,000 Japanese went to Korea to build military barracks for the U.N., for heavy labor such as repairing and fixing military equipment and machineries, as well as carrying and moving equipment (Aeba 1991, 213). In addition, many Japanese were working as crew members of the Landing Ship Tank (LST), which transported the Allied Forces' soldiers and supplies. Their wages were ten times higher than the minimum wage due the dangerous nature of the work (Drifte 1989, 129-30).

In conclusion, Japan was a safer and more reliable logistics base than others in the continental continent for the U.S. Forces, which maintained a dominant position in the region. This is why Japan was called the "hidden combatant nation" (Aeba 1991, 211). What were the responses of the Japanese government

3. See the Hollywood movie *Sayonara* awarded by the Academy in 1957.

and people in this situation? I will look into this question in the next chapter.

Yoshida Shigeru and Japanese Government: Constitutional Pacifism

First of all, under the Korean War, pacifism of article 9 referred to by Japanese peace constitution was formulated by constitutional pacifism. It was the result of the fall to the reality of the Korean War, but at the same time of entering the liberal democracy camp for the upholding of the constitution. However, the U.S.-Japanese alliance was based on the unequal exchange by which Japan offered base and U.S. offered army. It was Yoshida administration which played the leading role in this process.

The first reaction of Yoshida administration to the Korean War was silence. It was said that around the outbreak of the Korean War Yoshida was seriously sick (Yoshida 1994, 721-22), but it could be only pretext for him. It was unconvincing to see that he simply unresponsive to the war due to sickness. It is more plausible to speculate that he spent the days of prudently calculating the situation and the mobilization of U.S. army from Japanese base to the Korean front.

The first movement of Yoshida government breaking its silence was with the holding of cabinet meeting of related departments on July 3. In this meeting the Japanese government confirmed its cooperative policy toward U.S., which was already becoming an established fact.

As mentioned above, the Yoshida administration's first official response was written in the declaration "The Korean Conflict and Our Position," made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on August 19, two months after the war began. The following is the basic outline of the situational awareness and policies of the Japanese government shown in the declaration.

First, it should be noted that the declaration finds the conflict and opposition between democracy and communism inevitable. The government's view starts from the situational awareness that "Democracy that is based on liberty and peace" is in many ways disturbed by "Communism that aims to destruct liberty and peace." There were many signs that Asia was becoming the focal point of the "two worlds" with communist states in Asia preparing for an armed conflict since the spring of 1950. The declaration stipulates that beginning of the war is due to the North Korea's invasion by stating "[f]inally in the dawn of June 25th, North Korean

Troops invaded the South like turbulent waves.” Also the declaration states the communist invasion does not only exist in the peninsula, but also is expanding to “destruct in a clear manner Asia’s peace, and to take our own liberty.” It further responds to the statement the “existence of the two worlds with different ways of thinking on liberty and peace,” with a proactive response of Japan by saying that “[i]t is suicidal that democracy remains a spectator on the war when we are nearing the violence of communism.” However, the declaration says that Japan needs to pay close attention to “ideological warfare” in which the two worlds are fighting over and if the Korean War is the ideological warfare between the two worlds, “[w]e are at war at all fronts as the people living in a democratic world” and “since communists have a special interest in Japan, Japanese are at the center of the warfare. Since “democracy and communism are two forces that cannot exist together, it is impossible not to intervene and remain neutral under the current situation” and “we should take one route out of two” which is “to give up achieving democracy and give in to communism, or to build peaceful democratic Japan under the security assurance of U.N. The final decision was as follows: “[t]he fight to achieve democracy in the Korean peninsula is to keep democracy in Japan. How can we keep the security of Japan without cooperating with U.N. forces?”

What should be noticed here is that as Japan expands its interpretation of the Korean War as an “ideological war,” Japan participates itself into the reality of the Korean War, and take an opposition stance against the groups demanding an overall peace and neutrality. Plus, what is problematic was the degree and the means of cooperation with the United Nations. Right after the start of the war, Yoshida received strong pressure from the U.S. to rearm Japan in the process of pushing the negotiations between U.S. and Japan. However, rearmament issue was only a bargaining chip for Yoshida to have progress in the negotiation, not a serious source of commitment. The reason why Yoshida showed a passive attitude over the issue of rearmament was due to his “anxiety over the revival of militarism,” “anti-military sentiment of the public,” “distrust toward the new military and the danger of becoming an enemy force,” but the major reason was thought to be “financial burden.” Above all, Yoshida kept a cold-hearted attitude toward the war itself and did not seem to think there would be a direct attack by international communists during the Korean War. Yoshida did not regard communist camp as a strong united force like Dulles did, and to Yoshida the onset of world war three was almost impossible. But, at least Providing military

bases to the U.S. seemed to Yoshida to be the precondition for the terms of peace (Dower 1981, 120; 132-34; 218-19). What Yoshida tried to achieve was “peace through bases.” It was inevitable choice for Yoshida who set his aim to build “Meiji State without army” after the thorough defeat in the World War II (Nam 2013).

After all, Yoshida wanted to use the Korean War as a chance to reach the signing of peace treaty and revive its economy. Japan had to appeal to the international society that it had changed to a “peace state” to realize the peace treaty, and made it a policy goal of responding to U.S. demands yet not to participate in the warfare too deeply. In order to carry out these realistic and practical policies, Yoshida utilized the two weapons of postwar Japanese pacifism: public anti-war sentiment, and Article 9 of the Constitution. This prepared the foundation for the idea of the “constitutional pacifism.” Constitutional pacifism refers to the attitude of guaranteeing peace by descending to the reality of the Korean War and joining the liberal democracy camp, by maintaining non-militarization using the Article 9 as a shield, but at the same time offering Japan as a military base to the U.S.

Socialists and Postwar Intellectuals: Absolute Pacifism

In January 1950, the Japan Communist Party fell into a state of confusion after being criticized by the Cominform. Japanese Socialist Party was on the risk of splitting into the left and right wing. The fifth Socialist Party's convention was held for four days from January 16, 1950, and the party adopted three principles of peace: an overall peace, remaining neutral, opposition to providing military bases and conclusion of military-related treaties. The right wing of the socialist party denounced the executive branch for opposing the reconstruction of the party which was based on Marxism. The left wing of the party resisted to this move, and finally the socialist party split. Stop gap measures was taken to fix the split by confirming the three principles of peace in the sixth temporary convention that took place in April, but the unification was only the result of the shared interest of maintaining the majority of the seats in the parliament. Since noreal ideological and political solutions were made, this laid the foundation for conflicts (Koyama 1965, 85-91).

Against this backdrop, the Korean War began. The first response of the

Japanese Socialist party was seen in the report “Our Parties Attitude on The Issue of Korean War.” This report shows the stance of the party in the same line with the United Nations, which denounced the North Korea’s action to unify the two Koreas with military forces. However, in regards to the party’s response, Japan denied the participation in the Korean War by saying “Japan is not in the position to announce its national opinion since it is occupied by the Allied Powers,” the socialist party’s response was the “Japanese government does not need to decide its attitude officially,... We believe there will be no other attitude and response than submitting to the GHQ/SCAP’s orders.” Also the party criticized the North Korean communist party’s peace movement and disassociated with them. Moreover, the party indirectly recognized its cooperation with the U.S. army by stating that “appropriate wages and protection should be given to the worker who works for the U.N. Forces-related jobs” (Otake 1991, 533-34). The right wing recognizes the one-side peace treaty and the left wing claims overall peace and remained neutral. There was a paradox between the idealism of the left wing and the reality, but their theoretical supporters were “postwar intellectuals” and organized their “Peace Issues Discussion Group” (Heiwa Mondai Danwa-kai).

So called “Postwar Intellectuals” who were in charge of “Postwar ideology” shared their sense of necessity to have a new start based on the self-reflection of the past, realizing that they did not respond quickly and responsibly during the World War II. And they organized intellectual community and the representative postwar intellectual Maruyama Masao called it as “reflective community” (Maruyama 1976, 114-15). As a reflective community, Peace Issues Discussion Group gathered together to create a “peace theory not through the leftist revolution, and double standard” in the process of “Reverse Course” (Kuno 1995, 169).

In July 1948, a joint declaration of eight social scientists announced at UNESCO meeting and “A Letter of Plea for Peace from Social Scientists” triggered the formation of aforementioned group of postwar intellectuals. The group has already announced two declarations: “Declaration of Scientists on War and Peace,” and “Declaration on Peace Issues on Peace Treaty” in March 1949 and January 1950, respectively. After the outbreak of the Korean War, the group announced “On Peace for the Third Time” in the September issue of *Sekai* in 1950. The declaration is comprised of a premise and four chapters, and theorized that in the situation where the world entered a nuclear age, “[w]ar...

became the biggest evil,” the two worlds should find a way to coexist, and U.N. should do its role in this, and expresses hope that the two systems will converge since “peaceful coexistence” lasts. There is also the theoretical explanation of the possibility for the disarmament of Japan and remaining neutral.

Although “On Peace for the Third Time” was a response to the Korean War, there was almost no analysis on the Korean War itself. There is a possibility that the issue of the Korean War would have been difficult for the group to discuss at the time (Tsuzuki 1995, 167). However, the attitude of attempting to avoid the reality of the Korean War was the same as those of the Socialist party, and postwar intellectuals can be said to have provided a theoretical support for them. They chose to keep peace not by suggesting workable policies and restoring peace by implementing them, but by rather locking up the concept of peace at the ideological level, and then turning it into a concept at the practical level. This can be called utopian pacifism, an attitude of “Absolute Pacifism.”

Communists and Korean Leftists: Camp Pacifism

The first group to fill the political void after Japan’s defeat was organization of Zainichi: the Federation of Korean residents in Japan, and Japan Communist Party followed it. These two groups were the only forces that continuously resisted against Imperial Japan during World War II, and endured dreadful political suppression. The two groups shared interest in the sense of freedom during this historical backdrop. Furthermore, since many of the Zainichi worked closely to or as a member of Japan Communist party, there was a strong organizational bond between them.

However, the Japan Communist Party was at the risk of splitting after it received heavy criticism from Cominform in January 1950. In 1949, it failed to respond appropriately to the incident of disbandment of the Federation of Korean residents in Japan. On June 6 of the same year, 24 members of the Communist Party were purged from public office, in addition to 17 editorial staff members of *Akahata*. The Korean War broke out in this situation.

On June 28, right after the break of the war, a central meeting of the party’s Ethnic Response Bureau (Minzoku Taisaku-bu) was held and it was decided to set up Central Commission for the National Defense (Tsuboi 1959, 301-02). The interim central executive branch failed to respond immediately

on the outburst of the war and put off the announcement of declaration on the beginning of the war, and finally on June 30, interim central executive gathered executives to decide the policy on the imminent struggle of Koreans (Wada 1995, 124). However, the declaration made on July 5 on “Around the Crisis of the Korean War, We Plea to the Korean People” was the first official response. The declaration included that “Japan should not be involved into the warfare regardless of direct, or indirect connection,” and that “[w]e are completely against the intervention in the Korean War” (Shinobu IV 1967, 1153-54). This line seemed tepid for Korean Communists in Japan. On September 3, the interim executive branch of the communist party of Japan announced an instruction called “On Zainichi Movement.” It provided that “Korean peninsula’s issue is a major ring for Japan’s Revolution,” and called the Korean members of the party not to be connected with the factionalists and internationalists. This is because the internationalists were clear to fight with the United States on the North Korea’s side. However, from around October, the communist leaders like Nosaka Sanzo and Dokuda Kyuuichi converted themselves in rapid progress, opting for the methods of Chinese Revolution. In October, an illegal bulletin of the mainstream faction *Naigai Hyoron* first suggested “armed people’s struggle” and made an armed conflict line official. This went on to be the armed conflict line in the fourth and fifth national conference of Japan Communist Party in February and October 1952, respectively, becoming the support for throwing a Molotov Cocktail in the conflicts. But the Molotov Cocktail conflict was a form of conflict that developed for five months from March to July 1952, and was rather an exceptional form of conflict in terms of the overall conflicts generated by the communist party (Kobayashi 1995).

To sum up, the Zainichi’s communist movement was developed in the nationalistic movement to protect the mother country North Korea. However, it had difficulty finding its place in the process of communist movement in Japan. The Japanese sense of nationality was patched up by class conflict and progressed in the mission to work for the revolution. A report release in April 1952 by Soo bong Baek “Let’s Reject Social Democratic Lines and Trends to Strengthen the Patriotic Line” was to fix that line.

During the Korean War, Zainichi’s communist movement was processed with the consciousness and goal of participating in Japan’s Peace Movement along with engaging in the war and aiming for the Japanese Revolution. However, this was done with the notion that the conclusion

of the peace treaty and withdrawal of the U.S. military from Japan would bring victory to the peaceful line and peace to the Korean Peninsula, in the communists' international perspective. This revolution was the sincere practice of communists' doctrine: peace, and this article refers to this as the "camp pacifism."

But Japanese communist peace movement with Korean residents in Japan in the end, ended in failure. There are several reasons why the peace movement, which the Japanese communist party led, withered with the Korean War: 1) extensive oppression of U.S. occupying power and Japanese government, 2) alienation of people from the risky left military line, 3) uncritical acceptance of the outbreak of war by the Korea-U.S. preemptive attack (Yi 2013, 92).

Meanwhile, a petition was started to support peace by the progressive camp in Japan, which was a representative case showing camp pacifism. They shared the belief that solidarity with progressive groups in the world could create and expand peace, such a unity for a belief in peace could magnify the peace camp and ultimately stop the war. In Japan, this was realized by the solidarity with North Korea (Yim 2014,135-36). Pacifism camp in Japan which had been weakened by the collapse of socialist camp was almost abolished in the upsurge of anti-North Korean public sentiments on a basis of abduction issue after 2002 and it has its own backdrops.

Old Liberals: Armament Pacifism

Old Liberals in Japan were the firm believers of traditional Western parliamentary democracy, and who took a passive but critical stance on the militarism before, and during the process of World War II. However, in terms of international issues, they are adherent of Westphalian nation-state system. In Old Liberals' view, Peace Constitution that denied keeping its own military power was abnormal, so it had to be fixed. For old liberals, the fact that war was chosen as a solution of national unification in Korea was the evidence that the reality of the international politics still remains, and having a standing army regardless of a country's size was considered "a must."

In this situation, old liberals criticized Yoshida from the conservative perspective, and organized into the groups that demanded revisions to the constitution. They were the so-called revisionists, and anti-Yoshida coalition. Their emergence was

in part a result of power struggle. However, I would like to analyze three old liberalists who wanted rearmament and revision of the constitution by focusing that they were gathered around in terms of fundamental realism as opposed to Yoshida's flexible realism which was in conflict with the policies and ideologies.

The first is Ashida Hitoshi. He writes about his interest in the Korean War in his "Ashida Nikki" (Ashida Diary). His first response was on the third day of the Korean War on June 28. He was relieved and impressed by the U.S.' quick response. On July 17, he criticized Japan's neutral position: "[t]here is a danger that the Korean War can spread into a world war. You cannot be saved by demanding neutrality as a Buddhist monk chanting a prayer in a cave. Japanese people should be clear on their stance." On July 20, he expresses his dissatisfaction with Japanese people's confused response. After one month from the beginning of the war on July 25, he writes, "I think Japanese are acting dull and such cowards....Some foolish journalists wrongly lead the public opinion that the war is the fight between the third parties who are not related to the destiny of Japan." There is a parallel between Ashida and Yoshida in a sense that both criticize Japan's neutrality, but the biggest difference between them is that Ashida acknowledges the possibility of the third World War. Ashida also made suggestions to General MacArthur of making a reserve corps, recruiting volunteer Japanese soldiers to the U.N. forces (Ashida 1986, 412). Yoshida was passive and did not act upon the suggestions, but Ashida chose to appeal to public sentiment.

Personally, Ashida gathered forces nationally by forging an organization called "New Arms Promotion Coalition." However, unlike Ashida's intention, he was approached by retronationalists, which made the public to tighten their guards against him. From this it can be inferred that it must have been really hard to distinguish a new nationalism that comes from traditional realism from Japanese traditional nationalism (Otake 1988, 140-41).

Another pro-rearmament, revisionist was Ishibashi Tanzan. What worried Ishibashi the most was the creation of "[t]he fake military as what Yoshida is making" (*Mainichi Shimbun*, October 4, 1952). "I admire the complete abolishment of arms but the worldwide reality does not allow us to. We should increase our arms gradually in the range of our national power. To sum up, "[The Liberal Party] should raise the issue of constitutional revision before the election" (*Mainichi Shimbun*, July 10, 1952). Moreover, Ishibashi continues "[t]he reason why Japanese constitution missed to clearly stipulate the responsibilities of the

people while focusing on enumerating rights, the drafter was absorbed in the old ideas from 18th and 19th century (*Gakushuin Daigaku Shimbun*, September 24, 1953). This is where I strongly feel the need to revise our constitution.”

Finally, there is rearmament theory of Hatoyama Ichiro, a hostile liberalist. He was different from Ashida since he thought that Japan should maintain a kind of self-defense army to prepare for possible civil conflicts even when there was almost no possibility of invasion from the Red Army or Soviet Union, and was more on the same side of Yoshida instead. However, like Ishibashi, Hatoyama, also thought “reserve corps are not patrolmen but a proper army, . . . thus armament is already being made. As long as the self-defense army is an army, constitution should be revised” (*Asahi Shimbun* [evening], September 12, 1952). In addition, for Hatoyama, the goal of self-defense was not only the independence of the nation, but also free democracy (Hatoyama 1952, 281-95).

In addition to such conservative liberals, some socialist who stands on progressive liberalism made a claim for principle fundamental rearmament. Arahata Kanson and Kobori Jinji were representative figures in this movement. They considered that institutionalization of such army is an unnecessary minimum military possession, and expansion of civilian control can restraint excess rearmament. They called the pacifism of socialist party a “professor pacifism” and criticized its impracticality (Arahata 1999, 421-23; Kobori 1952, 5; Nam 2001, 794-95). However, their activities could not form a united front with conservative liberals. Thus, by spreading the rumor of the inflow of U.S. funding, their authority in the progressive camp in Japan was tarnished (Arahata 1999, 466-67).

Above are the self-defense views of the old liberals who were faithful to the fundamental traditional realism. They acknowledged the necessity of “war for peace” and it was not only a theory but a duty of states to prepare for these wars. It can be referred to “peace through armament,” or “armament pacifism.” They were trying to change the policies at the policymaker level, or through calling attention to the public’s interest. However, it did not succeed in showing the general public the distinction between it and supra-nationalism, and thus failed to convince them otherwise. However, these efforts did not halt there, and ultimately became the source of suspicion for Japan as a “peace-state.”

Unfolding of Public Opinion

Opinion poll right after the start of the Korean War, on the issues such as “offer of bases to the U.S. forces” and “pro vs. con on rearmament” reveals following results. Although the different format of questions makes delicate comparison difficult, a rough trend in the public opinion can be distinguished. On the issue of providing military bases, a survey published in the *Yomiuri Shimbun* on August 15, 1950 reveals 37.8 percent were against providing military bases, while 28.5 percent were for providing military bases. In a survey by the *Mainichi Shimbun* in the same month (published on September 3, 1950) showed 40.4 percent against providing military bases, while 31.1 percent were for providing military bases. In the following month, the opinion poll carried out by the *Asahi Shimbun* (published on November 15, 1950) 37.5 percent were against providing military bases, while 29.9 percent were for providing military bases. All three surveys show that the majority of the public were against providing bases. However, the public opinion was reversed, as evidenced by the public polls carried out on December 16-17, 1950 by the *Yomiuri Shimbun* (published on January 3, 1951). 42.5 percent of the nation were for, while 41.2 percent were against providing bases. One can tell the Communist China’s entry into the war seems to have affected the public opinion on the issue. The *Mainichi Shimbun*’s February 1951 public poll (published on March 3) showed that the public opinion for providing bases exceeded 70 percent markup, recording 77 percent. Throughout 1951, the surveys of the *Yomiuri*, the *Asahi*, the *Mainichi*, etc., at least 50 percent to at most 80 percent of survey respondents held the position of tolerating the use of Japanese military bases by the U.S. Forces. Then, in February 1952, there was a temporary upsurge in Japanese public against the use, but soon after, again the pro side stance became the majority (Nam 2001, 816-19).

On the other hand, on the issue of rearmament, the majority of the public seemed to tolerate it. Apart from the base-offer issue, the Japanese citizens were considering the rearmament as something inevitable from the onset of the Korean War. In the survey of the *Yomiuri Shimbun* published on August 15, 1950 the public support for the rearmament, which was 37.5 percent, was slightly ahead of opposition, 32.7 percent. In the case of the *Mainichi Shimbun* published on September 3, 1950, the poll result revealed that the majority, 58.7 percent, of the public was for the rearmament, and that of the

Asahi (November 15, 1950) also showed that 59 percent was supporting the rearmament. Afterwards, the surveys by all the major Japanese newspapers consistently showed that the number of rearmament supporters was higher than the opposing and the public opinion polls done by the 3 major newspaper companies in September 1951 (right after signing the San Francisco Peace Treaty) all showed the same trend in public opinion: majority (*Yomiuri* [51.10.8.], 58 percent; *Asahi* [51.9.20.], 71 percent; *Mainichi* [51.9.16.], 76.3 percent) was for rearmament (Nam 2001, 819-22).

Nonetheless, as will be discussed below, the election did not turn out to be the way the aforementioned trend predicted. In the two general elections during the Korean War, the number of winning candidates among the rearmament supporters or constitutional revisionists was marginal. And after two general elections, the Yoshida line that pursued gradual rearmament under the current Constitution came to be deeply rooted in public support.

The Return of the De-purged and the Choice of the Public

After August 1951, those purged soldiers ranked colonel and below returned to their public life after the purge of the early occupation period. In the middle of heated discussion over rearmament, some among the returned actively joined the young officers. After they were de-purged, and the unofficial meeting, like the Army Academy's class reunion, became frequent throughout the country. In these gatherings, often the debate went on over participation by the National Police Reserve and rearmament initiative. These people argued for release of the war criminals, de-purge of those in the purge-list, protection of disabled veterans, relief aid to the bereaved family from the war, legitimacy of the Greater East Asia War, iniquity of war-crimes trials, and brought forth critical stance on the U.S. occupation policy. The Special Investigation Bureau under the Ministry of Justice at that time divided this group of veterans into 4 categories, and attached following analysis for each (Homu-fu Tokushin-Kyoku 1951, 5-10).

First of the four, the Royalist Group (Kodo-ha) centering around General Masaki Jinzaburo was working together with old-conservatives to push for Emperor-centered rearmament, in other words, revival of the Imperial Army, and to regrow patriotism. Second, Righteous Officers' Group (Seigi-ha) centering around General Shimomura Sadamu. This group was the most

enthusiastic about the rearmament, and had already submitted a proposal to the General Headquarters suggesting reorganization of 20 divisions with ten thousand veterans per division. Third was the Controlled Officers' Group (Tosei-ha) centering around Major General Iwaguro Hideo. This group confronted the Righteous Officers' Group by arguing that Shimomura, who used to serve as the secretary of Tojo Hideki, approached the Allied Forces after the defeat in War, and therefore, forfeited the pure line of descent of Japanese soldier. The last was Baiduan Group centering around Okamura Yasuji and others, and this group called for helping Chiang Kai-shek to restore him to the mainland China. Besides, this group, centering around the former admiral Nomura Kichisaburo, were approaching the General Headquarters with independent rearmament plan based on the command of the sea and the air.

In addition to this, the former conservative figures centering around Asianists were de-purged and argued for rearmament after returning to politics. Among them, an organization that was in relatively active move was Kikuhata-Doshi-Kai. This organization held a national convention in the late September 1951, and decided on its line of activity after the Peace Treaty. Claiming that the establishment of Self Defense Forces for the territorial security is in dire need, and this required mechanized heavy equipment from the U.S., this group hoped to cultivate cooperative relation with the U.S. by refraining from anti-American act, and ensured that it stood on the pro-U.S., anti-Communist line. Those various conservative groups that self-regarded themselves as the legitimate line of descent by calling for anti-Soviet, anti-Communist, and anti-American nationalism before the World War, adjusted themselves to the new reality by reestablishing their position based on pro-American, anti-Communist nationalism (Nam 2001, 782-83).

Similarly, in the middle of active movements by the veterans and conservatives, there appeared a move to gird each and every anti-Communist association for a unified frontier. Soon after the de-purged, Akao Bin was energetically participating in the anti-communist movement by leading a movement to support Chiang Kai-shek from mid-September 1951, and by advocating Asian Anti-Communist Information Council. The coalition front of veterans (former soldiers) and conservatives was also formed. For instance, Colonel Tsuji, who was the center of gatherings by the 36th Class of the Army Academy, gathered the elders of former Far East Union, and established Far East Union Group in August 1952 (Kinoshita 1952, 158). The Group was

working with 11 demands as its slogan which includes neutral self-defense, political independence, new rearmament, nullification of security treaty, and so on. The aforementioned Akao had organized a political party called The Great Japan Patriotic Party (Dainippon-Aikoku-To), and called for rearmament from the pro-America, anti-Communist perspective, and apart from party organization, created National Preparation Committee of National Federation for Rearmament Promotion (Saigunbi-Sokushin Kokumin-Renmai Junbi-Kai), announcing Declaration of Rearmament Promotion (Kinoshita 1952, 38-39).

These people publicly pushed for rearmament demand by running for general election in October 1952 and April 1953, and thus, officially presenting their political views. Their demand for rearmament should be differentiated from the Old Liberals' "Armament Pacifism" in the sense that such demand clarifies anti-Communist position and resolve to fight against Communist China and North Korea on the side of the United States. However, their argument did not buy many advocates among general public because of its emphasis on rebuilding of the Imperial Army.

Moreover rumors that Shigemitsu Mamoru and Hatoyama Ichiro were involved in rearmament movement of ex-soldiers were reported lending realism (Suzuki 1953, 28-31). In the background of those reports, there were Japanese public belief that Shigemitsu, Hatoyama, and ex-soldiers shared anti-Yoshida emotion.

Meanwhile, right wingers or ultra-nationalists of old days started the rearmament movement, and followed ex-soldiers. Once they started to claim the rearmament, they started to lead the argument on the rearmament issue, very soon. Because of that, the difference between conservatives and right wingers were not clear, even though not all the advocates of rearmament were right wingers (Watanabe 1953, 28-29). For example, almost of the rearmament claims contained the traditional or ultra-national elements (Keibi-Keisatsu-Kenkyukai 1955).

The greatest concern and tension had been voiced about the current toward rearmament amongst Japanese people. It is because of the anti-military pacifism which had settled down in Japanese people's mind after the defeat in World War II (Wada 2002, 7-8). Particularly, anti-military movement had a major influence to the formation of absolute pacifism, which was formulated mainly by the pacifist group who published the book, *Listen to the Voices from the Sea (Kike Wadatsumi-no Koe)*, and strengthened just after the outbreak of the

Korean War (Nam 2014a, 104-05).

In this circumstances, almost of the candidates who claimed rearmament could not win the elections held in 1952 and 1953. As a result, Yoshida's line, that is the "peace through military base" was confirmed as a national line after the Korean War in Japan.

Conclusion: Current Implication for Base-State

The notion that the Korean War was "a fire on the other side of the water" to Japan is generally believed by Japanese government, and by Japanese people as well (Akagi 2011, 176). At the same time, the Korean War instilled fears in the Japanese public who had great concerns about the re-installment of emperor army and conscription (Wada 2006, 82-138). Meanwhile, the war meant stable earnings, as Saki Ryuzo described in his novel, *A City of Miracle (Kiseki-no Machi)*.

Considering the theme of this article, it sounds paradoxical that the outbreak of the Korean War was the starting point for rearmament, because the National Police Reserve (NPR) was a result of the war. That is to say, Japan capitalized on the Korean War and Japanese pacifism was distorted. Consequently, scholars of Japanese pacifism or its passive security policy neglect the impact of the Korean War on Japan (Katzenstein 1996; Midford 2011). The Korean War is a theme evaded by the authors who want to evaluate the pacifism in Japan. But the correlation between the Korean War and Japanese pacifism is far more complex than usually conceived, which is verified by this article. In reality, the Korean War had been the origin of many pacifisms in Japan.

Akagi Kanji (2011) analyzed that an internal cold war situation emerged as a result of the strengthening of the anti-American sentiment, which arose from the fear of the entrapment into World War III, instead of the weakening of the idealistic pacifists. This kind of analysis became a common sense among the historians of post war Japanese politics. Sakamoto Yoshikaz is one of them. Akagi and Sakamoto seem to see the confrontation between Liberal Democratic Party and Socialist Party of Japan as the internal cold war. But if the internal cold war means the conflict between pro-American conservatives and anti-American revolutionist, it already ended when the Japanese communist who struggled in line with the hard liner policy was defeated.

So, the confrontation between Liberal Democratic Party and Socialist Party of Japan had been developed within the pacifism which diversified during the Korean War. It was not the opposition between pacifists and non-pacifism (or jingoists), but the opposition, whose premise was built upon the existence of the Peace-State.

This kind of pacifism can be called as a “pacifism in everyday life,” which is defined as “a pacifism developed in life world by ordinary people” (Nam 2014b). It is composed of “constitutional pacifism” and “absolute pacifism,” and deploys a superposition of the two pacifisms. Naturally, the two pacifisms have been inseparable, and they have been unable to exist without the other.

In conclusion, Japanese pacifism has can be seen as acrobatics. While the constitutional pacifism tried to descend, it actually ascended as a canon of Japanese pacifism. Absolute pacifism tried to ascend but descended and became rooted deeply in the minds of Japanese people. “Proactive Pacifism,” which is one of Abe Shinzo’s slogans, seems to be invented to reveal this ingenious mechanism. In the Japanese political sphere, from where the “camp pacifism” disappeared in the early stage of post war history, more and more Japanese people see the “peace through armament” as a fresh and new idea of peace. In reality, it is a result of the optical illusion, generated from the distorted matrix of Japanese pacifism.

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Abstract

This article analyzes the reality of Japan as a military “base-state,” at the time of the Korean War as well as Japan’s reaction to the Korean war. It is well established fact that during the Korean War, Japan achieved independence and returned to the international society by signing the Peace Treaty of San Francisco. After Japan’s defeat in the World War II, Japan declared herself to be a “Peace-State,” but during the Korean War, Japan converted to a “base-state,” which was initially given as a basic framework to transition into a “base-state” to sustain Japan’s survival and future after the war.

The Korean War gave Japan the appropriate timing for the serious reflection on the war and peace, in the vacuum of battle made in the reality of a war. In this situation, in Japan which was resembled a laboratory of “war and peace,” peace had experienced a typical diversification. First of all, the diversification of rise and fall occurred. On the one hand, fall to war reality occurred, on the other, rise to the vacuum of battle took place. Secondly, the diversification of entry and escape occurred. In the reality of the Korean War, some tried to guarantee peace by entering any one of camps, others tries to realize peace by escaping from all of camps. With the Korean War intersecting the abovementioned rise and fall, entry and escape pacifism in Japan was diversified into four categories: “constitutional pacifism,” “absolute pacifism,” “camp pacifism,” and “armament pacifism.”

Postwar pacifism in Japan had been developed as diversification or combination of above mentioned four kinds of pacifism. “Pacifism in everyday life” is the most distinctive type of all them. It is composed of “constitutional pacifism” and “absolute pacifism,” and deploys as a superposition of the two types of pacifisms. Naturally, the two pacifisms have been inseparable, and they have been unable to exist without the other. While the constitutional pacifism tried to descend, it ascended as a canon of Japanese pacifism, and absolute pacifism tried to ascend but descended and rooted deeply in the mind of the Japanese people.

Keywords: The Korean War, Japan, pacifism, U.S. military base, article 9