

Special Feature

The Korean War and Koreans in Japan: An Actor Analysis

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Introduction

During the initial years of Geunhae Park administration the Korean peninsula suffered from a rise of tension between its North and South. A missile attack from North Korea aimed at South Korea, seemed imminent and many foreigners sought to evacuate the country fearing the attack. It is intriguing to ask what the responses of Koreans in Japan, especially those belonging to Mindan (Jeilbon Daehanminguk Mindan, Association of Great Republic of Korean's in Japan) and Chongryeon (Jeilbon Joseonin Chong Yeonhabhoe, Federation of Korean Residents in Japan) respectively, were regarding such situation.

On the 26th of March 2013, which marks the third year since the South Korean Cheonanham ship was sunk by North's sudden raid, Central and Tokyo headquarters of Mindan as well as the executive members of the affiliated organizations, adding up to approximately 100 people in total, held an assembly at the Central Hall impeaching North Korea's provocation (of war). Facing the passing of the United Nations Security Council's Resolution on North Korea in response to its 3rd nuclear experiment, North Korea ventured to raise conflict through various threats to abolish the armistice agreement, rescind the mutual non-aggression agreement, violate the Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, set Seoul and Washington on fire, and to resume the state of full-scale war with a preemptive nuclear attack. The participants of the assembly denounced North Korea's such continuous provocations against South Korea (*Mindan Shinbun*, March 3, 2013).

Unfortunately, access to North Korean or Chongryeon websites are restricted here in South due to national security law and thus it was impossible to monitor their responses regarding the event at the time.¹ I cannot but wonder

* The historical facts in this research is based on my previous work Tae Ki Kim, *Sengo nihon seiji to zai'nichi chōsenjin mondai* [The Japanese Politics and Koreans in Japan after World War II: Policy of Koreans in Japan by GHQ 1945-1952], Tokyo: Keisōsyobō, 1997. I would like to thank the reviewers and Dr. Chanmi Ko, the managing editor of *The Review of Korean Studies*. And I would like to express special thanks to Professor Miyoung Kim at the Hiroshima City University-Hiroshima Peace Institute. She encouraged me to write this article and patiently waited for me to finish my work.

1. This, in fact, is a great example showing the reality both North and South is confronting due to their particular situation. National Security Law and other restrictions prevent the scholars from conducting a liberal research.

what the reactions of Chongryeon and the parties concerned were in response to the North's missile threat.

After Korea's liberation national groups in Japan found it hard to be integrated and therefore was separated into communist Jo-ryeon (Jeilbon Joseonin Yeonmaeng, League of Koreans Residing in Japan), and nationalists-pro-Japanese Mindan-line. Separate governments differing in political ideologies were established, and so the nationality of Koreans in Japan differed accordingly.² Due to such establishment of separate governments, Koreans in Japan were more politically split than before but in everyday life individuals interacted with each other regardless of their political affiliations/stances without any harsh classifications. However, it is a common assessment that society of Koreans in Japan completely changed after Korean War which inevitably involved a tragic fratricidal struggle. Hatred among each nation (North and South) arising from the cruel scenes of slaughter in the period of Korean War spread out to the society of Koreans in Japan as well. As a result, after the Korean War, Korean groups in Japan were completely estranged from each other depending on their affiliated groups not only in political but also in daily life. The strained relationship between two groups are much moderate these days, but the inherent trauma still remains.

Although there is no physical border dividing them outside the Korean Peninsula, Korean groups in Japan are segregated from each other despite their common ethnic background. Under such peculiar circumstances what decisions will Mindan and Chongryeon make regarding the political conflict between the South and North Korea? How will the South and North Korean government as well as the Japanese government respond in relation to the actions of Korean groups in Japan? What policies will they be adopting?

This research seeks to take a close look at the complex surrounding situations and follow the changes of the Korean society in Japan against the backdrop of the Korean War. The circumstances and changes to be dealt with include (1) the responses and activities of Korean organizations (Mindan-line and ex-Jo-ryeon-line) in Japan regarding Korean War and afterwards, (2) the relationship between the Korean government (Korean Diplomatic Mission in

2. Of course, many Koreans in Japan chose neither side of the separated governments as their homeland. They were as well stateless people.

Japan) and Mindan, (3) the relationship between ex-Jo-ryeon and JCP (Japan Communist Party), (4) the policies of GHQ (General Headquarters, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers) and Japanese government, and (5) the influence they gave to Koreans in Japan.

Prior Studies and the Subject of Research

The earliest studies of Korean residents in Japan and the Korean War began with *History of Korean Movement in Japan after Liberation (Kaihōgo Zai'nichi chōsenjin wundōshi)* written by Gyeongsik Park (1989). The book, which is a compilation of Park's research, has been understood as the bible of post war studies on Korean residents in Japan. In his research, Park touches upon the pre-Korean War movements of ex-Jo-ryeon (Jeilbon Joseonin Yeonmaeng, League of Koreans Residing in Japan), activities of Minjeon (Jeilbon Joseon Tongil Minju Jeonseon, Korean Unification Democratic Front in Japan) and Jobangdae (Jeil Joseonin Joguk Bangwidae, Korean Fatherland Defense Corps in Japan) regarding the Korean War, and the 2nd Kōbe incident (November, 1950) in great detail. Park's account of the ex-Jo-ryeon-line, as is written in the book, is as follows:

After the outbreak of the Korean War on the 25th of June 1950, Jo-ryeon-line Koreans in Japan actively unfolded campaigns to support the republic and the anti-US, anti-war movement. In January 1951, they legally organized the Korean Unification Democratic Front in Japan (Minjeon) as the succeeding party of the League of Koreans in Japan. They also endeavored to gather and unify the public, unfolded the movement aimed at unifying the nation, supported the ethnic education as well as the living rights of the people.

During the period of Minjeon (1951-1955), Koreans in Japan vigorously participated in anti-US, anti-war movements in defense of their "fatherland." Minjeon's guiding principles were partly flawed because, driven by JCP's extreme leftist adventurism, they somewhat lost their subjectivity. However, we should evaluate their positive and negative aspects based on detailed hard facts gained by looking into both the objective and subjective qualifications. Dogmatic and clearing generalizations must be avoided.

It is not right to think of every movement and guidance in Minjeon

period as an error of extreme leftist adventurism heavily influenced by the instructions of JCP's "4th National Conference" and "5th National Conference." (Park 1989, 267-68)

In other words, Park maintains that Jo-ryeon-line Koreans in Japan basically struggled in defense of their homeland, North Korea, and although their policies were partly influenced by the JCP's extreme leftist adventurism the various movements of Koreans in Japan at the time can by no means be simply judged as an erroneous movement driven by extreme leftist adventurism. Through this assessment, Park counterargues against the voice of "Fatherland group," which came to being after the establishment of Chongryeon in 1955 with Deoksu Han at the center of its organization. Han and the Fatherland group had criticized previous Korean movements in Japan by attributing all the errors from the past to the JCP while drawing a strict line and separating themselves from any connections to the past Korean movements in Japan which was carried out by the guidance of JCP group working under Euncheol Park and JCP's instructions.

Later, Tae Ki Kim (1996), building on Park's preceding research, looks into ex-Jo-ryeon-line and Mindan-line acts in the period of Korean War as well as the policies regarding Koreans in Japan adopted by GHQ and the Japanese government in his dissertation *Origin of Korean Problems in Japan "After World War II": Policy of Koreans in Japan by GHQ 1945-1952* ("*Sengo*" *zai'nichi chōsenjin mondai no kigen: GHQ no tai zai'nichi chōsenjin seisaku 1945-1952*). In his work, Kim makes clear that ex-Jo-ryeon-line activities in the time of Korean War fundamentally conformed to JCP's policies. Moreover, the process of Mindan-line volunteer troops being sent to battle at the Korean Peninsula, and the conflict between the Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan and Mindan is also dealt with. In addition, the work reveals through evidentiary materials that the GHQ and the Japanese government reinforced the censure on Koreans in Japan by revising the immigration law and the Aliens Registration Act.

Simultaneously with Kim, Tomoko Kobayashi (1996a) released his "Koreans in Japan after World War II and 'Fatherland' 1945-1952" (*Sengo ni okeru zai'nichi chōsenjin to "sokoku" 1945-1952*). This thesis reflects the academic influence of Gyeongsik Park by asserting that ex-Jo-ryeon-line Koreans in Japan, during the war, were primarily concerned with defending the fatherland despite the JCP influence. Furthermore, Kobayashi (1996a, 100)

criticizes the Japanese government, GHQ, and most Japanese scholars' point of view on the movements of Koreans in Japan stating that "they have failed to grasp the essence of their true nature by dismissing them as a merely reactionary, exclusively nationalistic act, or viewing them as a part of communist struggle." In other words, because Koreans in Japan have endeavored to establish their homeland since the liberation of Korea and have fought to maintain and defend their country during the war period, many Japanese interpretations do injustice to them by linking their efforts with simple anti-Japanese or anti-US purposes or a communist movement carried out under the instructions of JCP.

Later, Gijeong Nam (2000) published his "Korean War and Korean Movement in Japan" (*Hanguk Jeonjaeng gwa Jaeilhanguk/Joseonin Undong*) in Korea in which he sheds light on the reaction of Korean societies in Japan, the relationship between JCP policies and the Korean movements in Japan, and Mindan's campaign to dispatch voluntary troops. According to Nam's research the advocates of "peace-state theory," who maintains that the Japanese nation has supported a state of peace all along and considered the fierce ex-Jo-ryeon campaigns as a threat to their "peaceful state." The advocates worried that such ex-Jo-ryeon movements were dragging Japan, a nation trying to reflowerish under peace, to get involved in the Korean War. On the contrary, Nam argues that the character of Japan, as a state, was more close to a rear support station assisting the US at the war rather than a peace-state and the ex-Jo-ryeon movements in Japan rather prevented the country from becoming a garrison state—a fate Japan was to face otherwise.

Concerning the active violent struggles by Koreans in Japan at the time, Nam (2000, 127) states that "it seems natural, to find the communists' reason for being in contributing to a revolutionary movement" at such a period and it is too harsh to lay blame on them for the problems that followed. He further argued that their struggles need to be seriously dealt with in the Japanese political history. As for the Mindan-line's campaign for the volunteer army, Nam concluded that "the US must have found relief in realizing that Japan did possess military powers at use when necessary" while on the surface Japan was refusing a remilitarization.

Later in Japan, Choi (2005) presented a hypothesis on the recruitment of the volunteer troops arguing that "not only voluntary recruitments among the Korean youths in Japan but also a forced recruitment of the returnees and the compulsory deportees may have taken place. Mindan's volunteer army

project later takes a less voluntary turn towards wartime mobilization influenced by Syngman Rhee administration and the plan was set out not only by the American occupation forces and the Korean Government but also Japan who actively executed its role as a base-state in the Korean War” (No 2010, 12-13).

Based on primary sources and interviewed materials, Chan Jeong Kim’s *Korean Volunteer Troops did not Repatriate—Unknown History of Korean War (Zai’nichi giyū gun kikan sezu: Chōsen sensō hishi)* (2007) follows the process of Mindan’s voluntary troop dispatchment, their role at the site of war and the treatment they received, as well as their return to Japan with a critical attitude.

Against all odds, 642 Korean youths in Japan volunteered to fight for their homeland, South Korea, when they could barely speak its language but what they faced was unfair treatments and discrimination rather than a systematic accommodation from the receiving party (consisting of the Korean military and Allied Forces). Some were even unable to return back to Japan. Kim’s empirical study evaluates the Koreans in Japan as victims of complicated international politics at the time.

No (2010, 36) organizes his study focusing on the voluntary militia of Koreans in Japan’s participation in the Korean War and the surrounding complications (the participation process, reentry, Korean government’s reaction), not to mention ex-Jo-ryeon’s later self Minjeon-line’s anti-war movement: “[e]ventually, nationalism of Korean societies in Japan in the Korean War period manifested itself as a strengthening of homeland orientation through radical homeland defense movements. This shows that the basic form of existence of the post liberation Korean society in Japan was founded at this particular period. Respectively differing fatherland defense tactics of Mindan-line and Minjeon-line, the former choosing to participate in war while the latter preferred to deter war, however, were all together neglected by both Korean government and Japanese society.”

Excluded from social or academic attention in general, some participants of the militia self published their stories. For instance, Jeil Hakdo Uiyonggun Dongjihoe (Association of Korean Student Militia in Japan) which participated in war as a voluntary troop, published *Jeil donpo hanguk jeonjeng chamjeon sa* (2002), *Eonron ui chang e bichin jeil hakdo uiyong gun ui eol 1950.6.25-2004.4.30* (2004), and *Zai’nichi dōhō 6.25 kankoku sensō sansenshi* (2004), respectively.

Previous researches can be divided into two major streams. First concerns

the ex-Jo-ryeon-line movement during the Korean War. These works have mostly focused on the relationship between JCP and ex-Jo-ryeon-line movement of Koreans in Japan and have evaluated them in differing perspectives. Such evaluations vary particularly in deciding whether the movement was a part of Japanese revolution carried out by JCP's orders or whether it was a fight for the defense of their homeland.

Second stream concerns Mindan's dispatchment of the voluntary militia. The factual existence of the voluntary militia has been somewhat clearly revealed thanks to the preceding studies and autonomously published books by groups like the Jeil Hakdo Uiyonggun Dongjihoe consisting of voluntary militia veterans. The significance of the Mindan's militia dispatchment is yet to be discussed in depth. Moreover, with ex-Jo-ryeon-line previously dominating the Korean society in Japan, past studies were centered mostly on ex-Jo-ryeon-line. However, the growing influence of Mindan calls for a research focusing on Mindan's history and significance.

Therefore, this paper aims to look into these topics. In particular, this research will first pay a careful attention to the the post Korean War Mindan activities. Special focus on the relationship between Mindan and the Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan will reveal how Mindan viewed the Korean War and how they partook in it. Secondly, ex-Jo-ryeon-line movements and their situation after the dissolution of Jo-ryeon (September, 1949) as well as their response to the Korean War and their post war activities will be dealt with. The relationship between ex-Jo-ryeon-line and JCP serves an important role in understanding the situation at the time.

Finally, GHQ and the Japanese government's response to the Koreans in Japan during the Korean War will be reviewed. Facing the particular situation of the Korean War and fundamentally against communism, GHQ held in check the Korean activities in Japan while struggling to establish a system to effectively manage the Koreans in Japan. Making of the Immigration Control Act and the Fingerprinting policy in the Alien Registration Law, as is given in the previous studies, will serve as examples showing the GHQ's response to the growing demand of control.

Pre-Korean War Situations of Korean Organizations in Japan

Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan and Mindan

After the founding of the Korean government, head of the Mindan, the famous anarchist and independent activist Yeol Park sought to invigorate the organization by aggressively supporting Syngman Rhee's (South) Korean government against his opposers who advocated for a (North and South) unified Korea. Syngman Rhee, however, did not quite actively return Park's support and losing his leadership, Park was left to face the organization's financial problems alone. The situation did not get any better as Park's Mindan failed to build a tight cooperative system with KDMJ (Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan) since its establishment in December 1948. In the end, Park resigned his office on the 20th of February, 1949.

Meanwhile, the first ambassador of KDMJ Hangyeong Jeong was summoned by President Rhee on the 14th of February 1949. Less than two months had passed since he started his new position in December the year before. He had to open and run the Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan office without much aid from the Korean government but was struggling due to the lack of support from the Koreans in Japan (Kim 1997, 519-21). Eventually, Rhee summoned him back³ and Yeol Park's resignation took place on the 20th of February, slightly after this summons call (Mindan 30 Nyeonsa Pyeonjib Uiwonhoe 1977, 60-61).

It is unsure whether Jeong feared or could not bear Rhee who had been castigating him, but he refused to return back to Korea. While remaining in Japan, he allied himself with anti-Yeol Park (who were just as much anti-Syngman Rhee) North and South unification advocates. On April 1st, he was voted as the head of Mindan at Mindan's 6th Temporary National Conference

3. Jeong, together with Rhee, had studied in America and had participated in the independence movement. Rhee criticized Jeong for his incompetence. (*Memorandum* from Syngman Rhee to Chief of Korean Mission in Tokyo, Dr. Henry DeYoung, February 2, 1949), [301.Korea], POLAD (Tokyo) Classified General Records 1949, RG 84, Box 43, National Archives at College Park MA. When he received the summons call, Jeong did not return back to Korea and after staying in Japan for a while fled to America refusing the seat at Mindan as well.

and Simchang Won, an anti-Yeol Park advocator of North and South unification, became the vice head of Mindan.

Representative of KDMJ pre and post Korean War			Head of Mindan pre and post Korean War		
Period of term	Representative	Reason of resignation	Period of term	Head	Disposition
1948.12-1949.02	Jeong, Hangyeong	Summon from government	1946.10-1949.02	Park, Yeol	pro Syngman Rhee/ pro Jeong, Han gyeong
1949.02-1950.01	Jeong, Hwanbum	Conflict with Mindan	1949.04-1949.06	Jeong, Hangyeong	anti Syngman Rhee/ anti Jeong, Hwanbum
1950.02-1950.04	Sin, Heung-u	Resigned	1949.06-1950.03	Cho, Gyuhun	pro Syngman Rhee/ pro Jeong, Hwanbum
1950.05-1951.06	Kim, Yongju	Conflict with Mindan	1950.03-1951.04	Kim, Jaehwa	pro Syngman Rhee/ pro Jeong, Hwanbum / anti Kim, Yongju
1951.06-1951.12	Sin, Seongmo	Chronic disease	1951.04-1952.04	Won, Simchang	anti Syngman Rhee/ pro Kim, Yongju
1951.12-1957.05	Kim, Yongsik	Appointed as the Korean Minister in French	1952.04-1952.10	Won, Simchang / Kim, Gwangnam / Kim, Jaehwa	system of group head
			1952.10-1955.04	Kim, Jaehwa	pro Syngman Rhee/ pro Kim, Yongsik

On March 1st, Hwanbum Jeong⁴ was appointed as the new ambassador in succession to Hangyeong Jeong. Syngman Rhee sent Hwanbum Jeong, who was at the time serving as Korea's envoy in China since the November of 1948, to Japan and ordered him to settle the problems related to the Koreans in Japan and the property issues of Koreans in Japan. Rhee also expected Jeong to establish the foundation for the Korean Mission in Japan. Hwanbum Jeong was one of the very few Koreans who had studied in Europe and he had also been an active participant of the Korean independence movement.

When the new ambassador Jeong began his term of office, Hangyeong Jeong had already received a summons from the Korean government but he was still remaining in Japan at his own will. As for Mindan, Yeol Park had just announced his resignation at the time adding much disorder to the Korean

4. Syngman Rhee sent Hwanbum Jeong as a Korean envoy to China in November 1948. Jeong returned to South Korea in January next year. Hwanbum Jeong was a scholar who majored in economics in Switzerland as well as in England and was also a participant of the national independence movement.

society in Japan. Moreover, in April Hangyeong Jeong and Simchang Won, as mentioned above, became the head members of Mindan in opposition to Syngman Rhee administration.

Thus, the newly appointed ambassador Jeong sought to form cooperative ties with Korean businessmen in Japan who were more or less unrelated to Mindan and through their support Jeong was able to establish the Tokyo office and open other branch offices in regions like Ōsaka, Nagoya, Kōbe, and Fukuoka. Armed with his fluent English and expert knowledge, he requested the GHQ, in May, to acknowledge the Koreans in Japan as people of the Allied Forces (and thereby foreigners in Japan) and to change the marking of their nationality on the alien registration certificate, which had been Joseon, to Korea.

In his own way, Jeong endeavored to protect the legal rights of Koreans in Japan and even GHQ gave credit to his efforts but in terms of personal relations he remained in his limited circle of exchange which excluded figures of Mindan. Mindan, consisting of anti-Syngman Rhee members at the time, expressed their discontent against the ambassador by requesting the Korean government to summon him back. However, the Mindan organization had its own issues to deal with. Soon after being elected as the head of Mindan, Hangyeong Jeong left Japan and resided in the US. Inevitably, Mindan held their 7th Temporary National Conference and Gyuhun Cho from Jeju-do who was running a rubber company in Kōbe was voted as the new head with the assistance of figures like Jaehwa Kim. Cho was also serving as the chairman of Baekdu Hakwon (Baekdu School)⁵ at the time where students received unbiased ethnic education that leaned neither towards North or South. At the 8th Mindan National Conference, which took place on October 18 slightly after the dissolution of Jo-ryeon, Cho was again elected as the head of Mindan along with two vice heads, Jaehwa Kim and Hwiwon Lee.

The result of the election may have been a surprise for some but it can be assumed that ambassador Jeong who was supporting the entrepreneur Gyuhun Cho may have heavily influenced Cho's winning. The ambassador maintained a close relation with Cho's Mindan and he aggressively supported the organization. For instance, the registration of Korean nationals residing abroad,

5. Bekdu Hakwon was an institution which carried out unbiased ethnic education that leaned neither towards North nor South. For further details, see *Kokusai kōrai gakkai nihon shibu* 2010, 354.

which began in November, was consigned to Mindan rather than taking place at the embassy and the registration fee of 500yen was used as the expense of Mindan. Jeong's favoring of Mindan caused some serious uprising among his opposers and on December 12, the opposers surrounded ambassador Jeong's residence in protest, imposing threats on him. The Korean government, by this time, realized the gravity of the situation and eventually had to summon Jeong back in January 1950 (Kim 1997, 525-26).⁶

Following Jeong's return, Heung-u Sin, the leading figure of Korean YMCA movement who also had brotherly ties with Syngman Rhee, was appointed to the position on February 10. Six days after Sin's appointment, Rhee pays a visit to Japan in response to McArthur's invitation. During his visit Rhee promises a 2 million loan to the Korean businessmen of Mindan (but the promise was never carried out). Rhee's action seems to reflect his intention to form a close tie with Mindan.

At the 9th temporary national conference in March, Jaehwa Kim takes the position of Mindan's head. He was a conservative man born in Gyeongsangnam-do in 1904 and he started working for the Mindan-line immediately after the liberation. He was also the one who requested all central executives to recede their position at the 2nd temporary Jo-ryeon conference held in February 1946 claiming that there were communists among the representative of Jo-ryeon. Kim's Mindan sustained a cooperative relationship with Rhee administration but his Mindan also retained its unique and particular independence.

In the meantime, ambassador Heung-u Sin (March, 1883-March, 1959) suddenly resigning in mid April, diplomatic minister Yongju Kim took the position in the beginning of May and the seat was left empty during the interval. He was the 4th ambassador appointed in the short period of a year and 5 months. Kim had been involved with the shipping industry dating back to the time of Japan's colonial rule and after liberation he became the chairman of Korea's first government-operated enterprise, Korean Shipping Corp. Ltd.

6. Even inside the Korean Mission itself there were severe conflicts between pro and anti-Ambassador Jeong groups. After Jeong resigned, pro-Ambassador Jeong groups still faced assault incidents targeted on them. See *Special Investigation*, from Director Yoshikawa Mitsusada of Special Investigation Bureau for Major Jack P. Napier, Government Section, Subj.: Various Movements of Koreans in Japan, March 17, 1950, p.5, GS-04274 (GHQ/SCAP Classified microfiche number of Japanese Congress Library, Same as after).

founded in October, 1949. He was sent to Japan while he was still chairing the Korean Shipping Company and thus he held a double position as both a chairman and a minister. It could have been that Korea was suffering from a dearth of talent at the time but their choice of Yongju Kim who had no previous diplomatic experience may as well be the result of acknowledging his prominent role in Korea's getting back the distressed vessels which had been serving under a Japanese company after liberation.⁷ Likewise, Mindan continuously suffered from internal strifes, conflicts with the Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan, and frequent replacement of its executive members. The office of Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan's ambassador also struggled through instabilities caused by frequent changes and replacements, failing to form strong ties with Mindan. It seems almost as if a government organization and a private organization were caught up in a competition for the initiative in Japan. To judge critically, Mindan's lack of effort and activity as private representatives of the Koreans in Japan leaves them with no other reason for existence but only as an opposing right wing organization of the ex-Jo-ryeon-line.

Mindae and the Kamakura Meeting

Abiding by GHQ's instructions, the Japanese government dismissed Jo-ryeon on September 8, 1949. Since their major executives including Cheonhae Kim were banished from the country, ex-Jo-ryeon activities inevitably fell into a dormant state.

Jo-ryeon was led by the Korean section of JCP until its dismissal. After its dissolution, JCP establishes a department within their organization, Mindae (Minjok Daechaekbu, Department for racial measures, the status of Mindae raised to Specialized sector in June 1950) in December. Hereafter, Mindae unofficially organized Korean communist movements in Japan. After Cheonhae Kim, the chief representative of JCP's Korean sector, stowed away to North

7. See *Haeyang Hanguk* Editorial Board 2008. Yongju Kim is the father of Moosung Kim, the main member of South Korea's New world Party (Sae-nuridang). Recently, his pro-Japanese activities have been subject to much controversy. For instance, it is recorded that he proposed to "send consolatory letters to the Japanese Imperial army" at the regional Chosun Imjeon Bokukdan launching event in Daegu on December 7, 1941. He is also said to have served as the organization's executive director (*Maeil Shinbo*, December 9, 1941).

Korea around July 1950, Euncheol Park supervised Koreans in Japan as the chief of Mindae. Due to their intimate ties with the JCP, they were also labeled as the Il-gong-pa or the Japanese communist-line.

Although ex-Jo-ryeon-line Korean activities superficially seem to be divided among Haegu (Joseon Haebang Guwonhoe, Association for the Liberation and Relief of Korean Nationals in Japan) and Yeodong (Jeilbon Joseon Minju Yeoseong Dongmaeng, League of Democratic Korean Women in Japan), Johakdong (Jeilbon Joseon Haksang Dongmaeng, League of Korean Students in Japan) etc. After Jo-ryeon's dissolution, these organizations largely worked under the supervision of Mindae (Kim 1997, 663-66).

The tension at the Korean Peninsula was ever rising after the withdrawal of American armed forces and North Korean Joguk Tongil Minjujuui Jeonseon (Fatherland Unification Democratic Front, Organized in 25th June, 1949 at Pyongyang) called for a rally in defense of the fatherland unification on the 9th of January.

Responding to this call, Mindae directed Haegu, Yeodong, Johakdong to raise an anti-war movement, a fund supporting the anti-Syngman Rhee, a struggle for livelihood. Mindae also ordered them to open a campaign to overthrow Japan's Yoshida cabinet claiming that it was all for the unification of Korea. In addition, these organizations protested against KDMJ's registration project of Korean nationals residing abroad, the confiscation of Daedong hoegwan (Taitou kaikan),⁸ and fought for the Korean student rights to receive an ethnic education within Japanese schools.

Despite its influence over ex-Jo-ryeon-line movements, Mindae faced the limits of an underground organization and because they did not yet possess a solid organizational system, ex-Jo-ryeon-line movements spread as regional activities. In April, rumor had it that Jo-ryeon-line Koreans in Japan were subject to a compulsory repatriation and thus protests against this deportation were developed.⁹ In order to gain more systemicity and unity among their many regional and affiliate movements, ex-Jo-ryeon put together the Council of

8. Japanese government confiscated this building as Jo-ryeon's asset when Jo-ryeon was dismissed forcibly by the Japanese government.

9. *Special Investigation*, from Director Mitsusada Yoshikawa of Special Investigation Bureau for Major Jack P. Napier, Government Section, Subj.: Communist campaign against coercive return of Koreans, April 24, 1950, GS-04250.

Korean Organizations in Japan in May.¹⁰

Ex-Jo-ryeon-line movements changed their color starting from mid April with Mindae at the center of this change. They gathered signatures opposing war, raised fund to support partisan activities in the South and in late May, they started a movement opposing the Japanese production and proliferation of weaponry to South Korea when the conflict between North and South was aggravating (Kim 1997, 677-79).

Adding on to these circumstances, Red Purge was carried out by GHQ on June 6. JCP activated their system of underground activity. Mindae gathered approximately 30 Korean communists in Japan for the first time since the dissolution of Jo-ryoen and held a nationwide event known as the “Kamakura meeting” (Kamakura Kaigi) on June 15. Participants of the meeting agreed to organize a Mindae office in each Huken 府県 and region, to prepare for the advent of Korean Democratic and Racial Front (Joseon Minju Minjok Jeonseon) as the succeeding organization of Jo-ryeon, to raise 300 million won to support the South’s guerrilla, and to oppose Japan’s rearmament (Tsuboi 1975, 297-98; 341-44). Mindae carried out the decision made in the meeting by establishing its regional branches and other decisions of Kamakura meeting was also intactly reflected in later ex-Jo-ryeon-line movements. For example, starting from mid June, ex-Jo-ryeon-line organized a Preparatory Conference of Joseon Minju Minjok Jeonseon and began their activity.¹¹

The Korean War and Mindan

The Volunteer Troop Dispatchment and Its Significance

Outbreak of the Korean War was heralded by North’s sudden raid at dawn on June 25, 1950. The conflict was rising high enough to anticipate war at any

10. *Special Investigation*, from Director Mitsusada Yoshikawa of Special Investigation Bureau for Major Jack P. Napier, Government Section, Subj.: On the ZAI-NICHI CHOSENJIN DANTAI KYOGI KAI (The Council of Korean Organization), June 9, 1950, GS-03726.

11. *Special Investigation*, from Director Mitsusada Yoshikawa of Special Investigation Bureau for Major Jack P. Napier, Government Section, Subj.: Trend of the Koreans (Leftists) in Japan following the Civil War of Korean, July 10, 1950, GS-04254.

time but the actual outbreak of war at their homeland shocked many Koreans in Japan (Park 1990, 371). Hunhaeng Park, a member of Hyōgo Mindan recalls the day as follows:

It was the fatal June 25th. I left home early that day and was working at the Amagasaki Mindan office. I think it was the NHK breaking news around 2pm. At the time, it was the most shocking radio broadcast ever in my life....Finally on *the very day*, June 25th, the tragic Korean War had suddenly broken out. Such a thing was never expected. I was surprised. I was really shocked. Frantically listening to the radio, I could hear of South Korean army hopelessly falling under North's attack.

Right after the outbreak, some regions like Hukuoka 福岡 immediately claimed that they should gather a volunteer army but most others Mindan offices waited for the head office's command while observing the situation.

Mindan led by Jaehwa Kim instantly issued an emergency order stating their plan "on June 26th to call 170 staffs of all the Huken 府県 head offices to Mindan central head office. Mindan's position regarding the War will be discussed and the day's situation does not in any way demand worries. Members should firmly trust their homeland and its national army while being faithful to their given duty in protecting the Mindan organization." Additional orders were given to "prepare for the riot which ex-Jo-ryeon-line may launch, defend one's self thoroughly, notify any illegal intrusion by North, and encourage the South's national army etc" (Shinozaki 1955, 241-42).

The central executives of Mindan decided on the 27th to recruit and dispatch a volunteer troop to the war front. In the morning of the 29th when US military intervention was finalized and McArthur was heading to the cite of war, the recruitment began in Kyōto 京都, Ōsaka 大阪, Kōbe 神戸, etc. Ōsaka had planned to gather 20 thousand people but by the 4th of July only 45 Koreans in Japan and 18 Japanese volunteered.¹² The nation wide count reached 797 (including 150 Japanese) by July 4 and the biggest number of

12. *Special Investigation*, from Director Mitsusada Yoshikawa of Special Investigation Bureau for Major Jack P. Napier, Government Section, Subj.: On the Condition for Being Volunteer Men around the problem of the Korean Internal Warfare, July 12, 1950, p. 5, GS-04254; Nam 2000, 124.

volunteers came from Hanhakdong (Jeilbon Hanguk Haksaeng Dongmaeng, League of Korean Students in Japan), one of Mindan's affiliate organizations. Mindan originally anticipated 60 thousand volunteers, which is equivalent to 1 out of every 10 Koreans in Japan, but only 647 Koreans in Japan volunteered (Kim 2007, 13).

60 thousand, in fact, was an unrealistic number from the beginning. According to the records, in April 1950, 540,000 (91%) people had "Joseon" printed as their homeland on their alien registration form and only 53,000 (9%) marked "Hanguk."¹³ If we consider those 53,000 people as Mindan-line, what is left after excluding the elders, infant, and women, are around 20 thousand men in their 20s and 30s who are eligible for participation in the volunteer military service. The figures show that at the time, Mindan-line was by far outnumbered by ex-Jo-ryeon-line.

Mindan's central head office hosted an informal staff meeting of regional office representatives on July 3. They decided on the issues of requesting both military reinforcements and the support of the SCAP, sending technical experts to Korea, filing a petition to the SCAP, etc. (Nam 2000, 123). Also, Mindan, Geoncheong, Hanhakdong determined on July 5th at the Jeilbon Hanguk Minjok Gweolgi Minjung Daehoe (General Rally of Korean National's in Japan) to "support voluntary troops, raise fund for the defense, collect donated valuables for the reparation of war damage, unite for Mindan-line's defense, cooperate for the public order of Japan and its sustainment, reveal the communist's conspiracy to the public, let no more sudden attacks from North" (*Hanil Sinbo*, July 16, 1950).

Mindan was very willing to dispatch the voluntary militia but GHQ did not share their enthusiasm. GHQ feared that the Jo-ryeon-line, much bigger in size, may begin recruiting their own voluntary army in response to Mindan, causing a greater threat. Therefore, on July 5 GHQ requested the diplomatic minister Yongju Kim to dissuade Mindan from recruiting.

Mindan, however, did not submit to these oppositions. Starting mid July, they filed several petitions to the GHQ asking for permission to dispatch the

13. *Special Investigation*, from Director Mitsusada Yoshikawa of Special Investigation Bureau for Major Jack P. Napier, Government Section, Subj.: Moves of Korean Organizations in Japan, August 11, 1950, p.4, GS-04261.

volunteer troop and on August 8 they set up a headquarters for the volunteers (Zai'nichi dōhō 6.25 kankoku sensō sansenshi hensyū iinkai 2004, 69). Mindan's chance came in mid August, as Charles A. Willoughby the Chief of G2 (General Staff II) asked Minister Kim to draft one thousand volunteers in 10 days before Inchon Landing Operation for they needed people who were well acquainted with Korean geography (Kim 1997, 680-82).

KDMJ later announced an official recruitment and with Mindan's help, almost a thousand people applied. After passing GHQ's screening and a basic training, 642 volunteers were sent to South Korea, grouped in 5 different bands over the period of September 15th to November 10th. The age of the volunteers ranged from 17 to 42 and 130 of them had received college, university or higher education. With 52 casualties and 83 missing, 1 out of 5 volunteers were victimized. Jeil Hakdo Uiyonggun Dongjihoe defended their cause for participation in the volunteer army as follows:

At a time when our fatherland was facing an imminent peril, young Korean students in Japan could not bear with their concern for the country. Thus, they headed to the war front with a firm resolution to fight to the death. . . . Even if we are residing at a foreign land it is only natural that we should inherit the patriotic tradition of our ancestors and fight off those who trespass against our homeland without the fear of death. We, as an army raised in the cause of justice in this late 20th century, are proud and ready to serve our country. (Zai'nichi dōhō 6.25 kankoku sensō sansenshi hensyū iinkai 2004, 63)

Such a patriotic spirit, however, was not entirely common among many Mindan-line Koreans in Japan. Hunhaeng Park, the member of Mindan's Hyogo office, recalls the period with these words:

On hearing such war situations, we the people concerned in Hyogo Mindan felt our heart sink. We thought we had lost. We were depressed. Many people were literally stuck at home observing the situation. Under such circumstances of war, there was no way for people to cheer up. Conversely, ex-Jo-ryeon-line people acted triumphantly thinking that their camp was about to achieve the goal of fatherland unification. Korean community was literally splited into two, one full of light and the other dark. (Park 1990, 371-72)

It was a time when Mindan-line had to observe the war, holding their breath. Although some hundreds of youth auxiliary troop volunteers sent to South Korea worked under the American army giving administrative assistance rather than facing the actual warfront, their case was exceptional.

The participants of the volunteer forces, who had risked their lives in defending their homeland South Korea, may react against Park's evaluation of the whole Mindan-line volunteer militia event as an activity concerning only a limited number of people. The veterans may ask why the other Koreans in Japan only stood watching while they actually defended their country at the risk of their lives. Encountering the situation of war in July and August, in which North Korean attack was much too fierce and the South seemed about to lose all their power to North in any time many Mindan-line Koreans could not but hesitate despite their love of their homeland South Korea. The fear of death, anticipation of South's defeat, repulsion against a fratricidal fight may be some of the reasons which prevented many from joining at the site of war and some may have disapproved of the South Korean government although they were conservatives.

This, however, does not mean that the non-participants of the militia were disinterested in South Korea. When the Inchon landing operation succeeded and the Allied Forces moved up North along with the South Korean army, they were excited at the news even expecting a South-driven unification: “[h]earing what happened at the homeland, I agreed with McArthur that although there were many sacrifices, we will eventually achieve the unification of Korea. This time, I was extremely happy at the recent turnover of events at the war” (Park 1990, 373-74).

In the period of Korean War, Mindan tried what they can do to protect their fatherland “South.” Other than the volunteer militia project, though small in size, they were able to collect a donation of 932,712 won and 2,825 care packages by October (Mindan 30Nyeosa Pyeonjib Wiwonhoe 1977, 64).

Through its response to the Korean War, Mindan was able to define themselves, realize their role, and strengthen the solidarity of their organization. Even after the dismissal of Jo-ryeon, Mindan had stayed a nominal organization with not much activity or expansion. The volunteer troop project and the following movements enhanced their status as an organization of Koreans in Japan representing the South Korea. The experience also had an influence within the Mindan-line Korean community since the members could relate to

South Korea with a greater sense of actuality as compared to a vague concept of homeland they had before.

Despite such changes, Mindan's conflict with the KDMJ continued on during the war—a period in which their home South Korea was confronting a fatal danger—just as complicated as it was before the war.

Advisory Committee of Korean Mission in Japan and Mindan

What would he have felt when Yongju Kim, who had devoted his life to the shipping business and had been working as the chairman of Korean Shipping Co., was appointed to the seat of Korean diplomatic minister to Japan slightly after the war? He refused the seat pointing out his inexperience in diplomacy as well as his lack of proficiency in English but Rhee insisted on his taking the position (Kim 1984, 119-29).

Minister Kim started for his new post in the beginning of May. One of the first things he did was to execute President Rhee's orders by contacting the occupation forces to ask for the expulsion of major ex-Jo-ryeon communists like Deoksu Han. Contact with the people of Jaehwa Kim's Mindan must have been inevitable but it seems that Minister Kim, who had been an entrepreneur all his life, found Mindan much against his grain. His critical attitude towards the organization can be found in the following:

The character of Mindan was more like a political group unmindful to their duty because the organization's central head office members mostly consisted of people who took the work at the organization as their full-time occupation [with no other experience in the job field or other sources of income]. Therefore, wealthy Korean businessmen in Japan or pure intellectuals found it hard to relate to Mindan. As a result, Mindan could not find any other means to secure a stable source for their operating fund but to depend on the extra rations from the Japanese government—they sold these rations at a black market—or coerce the Japanese government for special favors. These means of fund supply was frowned on by the Japanese society not to mention the humiliating loss of face. (Kim 1984, 213-14)

Members of Mindan were no different from full-time (occupational) politicians and as minister Kim indicates, they used their status to claim special rations or favors from the Japanese government in order to run the organization. Even

so, after the liberation of Korea, members of Mindan were as much interested in establishing a new nation at their homeland as the domestic politicians in Korea. Mindan stood at the other end of communist Jo-ryeon as an opposing conservative political organization. The competition as well as the antagonism between the two groups was fierce in their efforts to establish a homeland in accordance with each of their political ideologies. Minister Kim's rather heated harsh evaluation of Mindan as a gang of political conservatives lacking in the ability to self sustain arises from his insufficient calm understanding of the overall situation

Minister Kim was not unaware of the previous conflicts and cooperations between former ambassador Hwanbeum Jeong and Mindan. To avoid such complications, he gave up on setting up a cooperative system with Mindan. Instead of reaching out to the Korean society within Japan via Mindan, he tried to find a way for the KDMJ to directly keep in touch with the prominent Korean figures in Japan. He also found it important that KDMJ directly intervene and initiate a reform in Mindan's system.

What minister Kim did first was installing an advisory committee within the KDMJ consisting of Koreans in Japan under the cause/pretext of reinforcing the democratic camp when the South Korean military was in a unilateral retreat on July 9. The 25th advisory committee members were recruited from the political department and financial department including the directors of each, Il Gwon and Wonman Lee.¹⁴ Most committee members were either disaffected with or unrelated to the Mindan's system and pro-Japanese Il Gwon and Wonman Lee were especially critical towards Mindan.

After the formation of this committee, the achievements by Mindan related to the Korean War such as "contributions for national defense and care packages were sent under the committee's name, not to mention that activities of the guidance office for the Korean volunteer soldiers in Japan were mainly led by the committee representatives" (Mindan 30Nyonsa Pyonjib Wiwonhoe 1977, 64).

As an organization representing the Koreans in Japan in support of South

14. Founder of the Kolon Group Gabho Seo was also a member in the financial department, and in January 1951 he lent the current land where Korean Embassy is standing to the Korean government for free and eventually donated the land in 1962.

Korea, Mindan was not happy with Minister Kim's decisions. Mindan protested that the advisory committee members included criminals and political fence sitters and at the 10th national conference on October 2, decided to request the dismissal of the advisory committee. Additional complaints were filed from the regional offices like Osaka and Fukuoka regarding the qualifications of the committee members and thus minister Kim eventually excluded 11 members that Mindan pointed out while increasing the size of the advisory committee to 40 people.

The conflict between KDMJ and Mindan, however, was not settled yet. After the withdrawal of the Allied Forces further back to Busan, they succeeded in advancing far up north to the frontier with China since the Inchon landing in September but had to retreat down again due to the intervention of communist Chinese army, losing Seoul to the North on January 4, 1951. In the meantime, Minister Kim announces a statement that "the vicious will be deported back home" regardless of their political tendencies on January 12 causing the right-wing Mindan's uproar. Minister Kim had launched a warning to the Mindan executives and Mindan did not stand still watching Kim's action. On February 13, Mindan decided to start a campaign against minister Kim aimed to expel him and planned to promote their anti-Kim campaign at their 11th Temporary National Conference in April.

Kim's response was prompt. Conscious of the criticism on the advisory committee, Kim dismissed them and prepared to strike back at Mindan. Kim changed his plans from promoting Mindan's systematic reform to wielding active intervention on the organization. Advisory committee members such as Il Gwon and Moo Beck began selecting their executive candidates and prepared to overturn the current head officers of Mindan, under Minister Kim's instructions.

Finally on April 3, Mindan's 11th Temporary National Conference took place and 200 delegates coming from regional offices, Hanchung, Hanhakhdong, and Buinhui attended the event. At this conference, Minister Kim stated his case that Mindan need to be reformed and that the current executives of Mindan need to be replaced. Many participants approved of Kim's plan and thus Kim won the fight with Mindan, completely dismissing the contemporary executives of Mindan (Kim 1997, 694-96).

The newly selected executives of Mindan consisted of Simchang Won as the head, Il Gwon and Yeongwhan Ro as the two vice heads, and Moo Beck as the secretary general. Simchang Won was an anti-Rhee, North and South

Unificationist but it can be assumed that he was selected as the head because he was a counter force to Jaehwa Kim who followed after Yeol Park and Gyuhun Cho's steps. Thus an interesting combination of a former fighter of Korean independence Simchang Won and pro-Japanese Il Gwon, Yeonghwan Ro, as well as ex-Jo-ryeon Moo Beck together formed the new administration of Mindan.

Although he succeeded in replacing the Mindan executives with those who he approved of, Minister Kim encountered serious counter attacks from his opponents. Later he recalls:

At the time I was so possessed with the idea that what I was doing was for the sake of my country and its people so I crossed the boundaries as a civic servant. I have nothing to say to animosities from my opponents. I was impatient and was rather rushed due to lack of experience. Now that I think of it, it was wrong for a government official to intervene in the matters of a private organization and I somewhat regret my doings. (Kim 1984, 215)

Tired at the various threats and oppositions, Minister Kim resigns in mid April and returns to Korea that June. Ambassador Seungmo Sin takes his place on June 30. He had just been dismissed due to the embezzlement case of the Territorial Army officers in January and the massacre case in February where innocent people were slaughtered in Geochang. Ambassador Sin began negotiating with the Japanese government via GHQ to arrange a Korean-Japanese conference at President Rhee's request. Though he succeeded in arranging a preliminary conference, Sin could not continue his seat due to his declining health and had to quit his office in December.

Yongsik Kim, who was serving as a consul general at Honolulu succeeded Shin as a minister. He had graduated Gyeongseong Jung-ang Botong Godeughakgyo (Gyeongseong Central Middle High School), went to Japan, graduated Chūō University in 1937 majoring in law and passed the bar test the same year.¹⁵ He started working as a diplomat in 1949 and his excellent

15. Yong sik Kim is included in the list of *Pro-Japanese Names Dictionary (Chinil innmyeong sajeon)*, edited and published by Minzok munjae yeonguso in 2009, to his pro-Japanese activities during Japanese colonial rule of Korea.

interpersonal as well as diplomatic skills enabled him to keep his seat for the long period of 5 years and 6 months in Japan till May 1957 ever since being appointed to the position when he was only 38. His prior studies and experiences in Japan may have helped him to maintain a good relationship with Mindan.

Simchang Won's Mindan was established with the support of Minister Yongju Kim but internal conflicts at the organization continued. Finally, following the wishes of many, Mindan decided on a triumvirate system at their 12th National Conference in April 1952. The members of the triumvirate were Simchang Won, Jaehwa Kim, and Gwangnam Kim but the system only continues from June to October changing back to a one-man system thereafter. Jaehwa Kim again becoming the new head, Mindan announced that they opposed the ceasefire without unification in April 1953.

As it was before the Korean War, the tension between KDMJ and Mindan was not to be settled easily. From the point of its establishment to the truce agreement of Korean War, KDMJ's office went through 6 replacements, the 4 of which resulted from its conflict with Mindan. The story was no different at Mindan who experienced 5 replacements during the same period due to their conflict with KDMJ. What would have been the reason for such a discordance at a time of Korean War when South Korea was struggling?

The question can, by no means, be answered simply but several contributing factors such as the existence of a still prevailing conflict surrounding the establishment of a single government in Korea, the newly established South Korean government's lack of authority, and KDMJ representatives' lack of understanding regarding the Koreans in Japan can be pointed out.

Since the ceasefire, the division of North and South was becoming fixed and many Koreans in Japan had relationship with only one Korean according to their affiliations. The vague picture of the Korean Peninsula crystalized into two separate countries in the minds of Koreans in Japan and by relating themselves to either one of them, they were able to establish their identity. Thus, as for Mindan, they acknowledged the need to accept the South Korean government and closely cooperate with them. The Syngman Rhee administration, however, remained disinterested towards the Koreans in Japan even after the Korean War.

Korean War and the Ex-Jo-ryeon-line

Mindae, Jobangwui, and Jobangdae

How did the ex-Jo-ryeon-line respond to the Korean War? Referring to a newspaper interview with ex-Jo-ryeon participants in Ōita-ken and Ogurasi, Nam argues that on the day of the war, ex-Jo-ryeon-line strived to stay composed, and wished for a peaceful reconciliation between the two Koreas (Nam 2000, 118-19). With no particular guidance coming from their central headquarters would they really have only stood watching the situation as a bystander?

Meanwhile, according to the JCP's bulletin *Akahata*, when the news of North's Southern advancements in the morning of the 25th circulated, ex-Jo-ryeon-line Koreans in Shinagawa 品川 of Tokyo thought that it was North's counterattack against South's invasion: "[w]hen the news of the communist counterattack was herd, all sprang up applauding, and together sang the song of liberation" (*Akahata*, June 26, 1950).

In a situation with no specific orders from the head office, ex-Jo-ryeon responses varied according to the region but soon after they refurbished their organization, formed their own understanding of the war situation, and began their action.

A longtime chair of Chongryeon, Deoksu Han states, "at the dawn of June 25, 1950, American imperialists started a war of aggression with the purpose of completely colonizing the entire Korea. The war was truly a harsh reality to the Korean people with their liberation not yet 5 years ripe and to a newly established administration of the fledgling republic" (Han 1986, 154). He writes as if American armed forces, in reality not even residing in Korea at the time, somehow carried out a preemptive attack at North. Ex-Jo-ryeon, with Mindae at their center, believed that the Korean War broke out from South's first strike and that North Korea was only counter responding to the South's provocation. They defined the Korean War as their chance to accomplish a unification and truly liberate their people.

US-led Allied Forces were formed and sent to Korea in July but as they were underprepared they were defeated in many regions and had to retreat as far down as Busan in August. Also, the Korean military following president Syngman Rhee's orders, executed several millions of Gukmin Bodo Yeonmaeng

(League for People's Lead)¹⁶ members and communists, while North Korean army and the leftist forces slaughtered millions of Daehan-dhongnyon-dan members, leaders of the town, police officers, land owners and their families. The deep resentment and grudge among the brothers against each other were growing thick in the air.

In the early period of the war when the North was marching onward to Busan, ex-Jo-ryeon-line were "relatively optimistic, hosted frequent celebratory parties and praised the People's Republic" (Shinozaki 1955, 239). The situation actually was quite unfavorable for the South considering that in late August when the Southern army was retreating down to Busan, the Korean government sent a telegram to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs hoping to set up a government in exile of a 60 thousand people at Yamaguchi Ken (Yamaguchi-ken 2000, 25).

On June 28 when Seoul fell to the North Mindae decided to form an underground organization Jobangwi (Joguk bangwi wiwonhoe, Fatherland Defense Committee) and its action unit Jobangdae (Joguk bangwi dae, Fatherland Defense Action Corps) in order to systematically respond to the Korean War. In the beginning, these organizations were not nationwide in its scope so the actual activities were carried out via youth groups such as Cheongnyeon Haengdongdae. For instance, at Yamaguchi, Joseon Uiyongdae (Korean Volunteer Corps) was organized as a youth action group and they distributed anti-US leaflets (Syōji 2006, 47). These youth action groups were absorbed into Jobangdae around September, stretching the organization's scale nationwide. The Japanese police estimated the number of participants to be around 3-4,000 people.

The underground organizations like Jobangdae, Cheongnyeon Haengdongdae and legal organizations like Haegu, Yeodong, Johakdong secretly propagated South's invasion of North and spread anti-US, anti-war fliers. They also sabotaged the production or transportation of arms by hindering the recruitment of workers and promoted fund-raising campaigns collecting 30 million won for the guerrillas in South.¹⁷

16. Rhee government put together this conservative group in June 1949 to control the Korean public.

This group was organized by the ex-leftists who were arrested under the National Security Law which took effect in December 1948.

17. See *Special Investigations*, by Director Mitsusada Yoshikawa of Special Investigation Bureau for Major Jack P. Napier, Government Section, on the Activities of Korean Organizations, GS-03893; GS-04250-04259.

GHQ and the Japanese government strictly censored these activities and many Koreans in Japan were arrested on suspicion of violating the the Emperor Ordinance No. 311 (or Government Ordinance No. 325 on anti-US or harmful activities with the purpose of a take over). From the outbreak of the Korean War and until the end of 1951, 2,535 Japanese and 468 Koreans in Japan were arrested under the suspicion (Shinozaki 1955, 244). The significant proportion of Koreans out of those arrested shows the prominent role Koreans played in Japan's communist movements.

Tokuda's JCP ordered Mindae's youth groups (Cheongnyeong Haengdongdae) to be guided by them and warned the Korean members to look out for factionalism (Instruction NO. 415). Within the JCP, however, the conflict between the leading mainstream faction (of Tokuda-line) which favored a moderate movement and the international faction which favored a radical movement was out-blazing since the Comintern criticized Japan's tepid communist movements in the January of 1950. Ex-Jo-ryeon-line held an important position in JCP movements and if they collude with the international faction the leading faction was likely to suffer a blow. According to the Justice Department Special Investigation Bureau (SIB)'s special investigation reports, the mainstream faction outspokenly expressed their concerns to the communist party members at Mindae. Mindae was split into Eunchul Park's JCP-line (Ilgongpa) and Deoksu Han's fatherland/homeland-line (Jogukpa) and internal conflicts intensified while mapping out the plans for Mindae's campaigns. The mainstream JCP-line faction was very conscious of the homeland-line but what they feared eventually did not happen and JCP-line Eunchul Park, who was also in charge of Mindae, led on the communist movement of Koreans in Japan.

The 2nd Kōbe Incident

The Allied Forces succeeded in the Inchon landing operation on the 15th of September, reclaimed Seoul on the 28th, took over Pyeongyang by the end of October, and at one point marched as far as the Amrok river which marks the Korean borders with China. The Chinese people's liberation army began their attack on the Allied Forces in November and on December 5, were able to win back Pyeongyang.

According to the SIB's special investigation report, 20 representatives of nationwide communist Koreans in Japan met with JCP members on September

22 and the JCP ordered them to lift a boycott against tax paying and begin a job placement campaign rather than a deep involvement in Korean War or spy activities.

Tokuda's JCP, however, drastically changes their peaceful revolution agenda in October and began advocating an armed revolution. In order to account for there extreme change of plans, the overall atmosphere at the time needs to be understood first. Since the Korean War, the GHQ occupation army's check on the JCP was intensified. On the 26th, next day of the war outbreak, publication of the organization's bulletins such as *Akahata* was banned and arrestments and deportation of JCP politicians were carried out.¹⁸ Later, "[a]rrestees under the violation of occupation policy counted up to 4,391, and the restriction on rally and demonstration, the dismissal of Zenrōren (Zenkoku rōdō kumiai sō rengō, National Confederation of Trade Unions), expulsion of communists and their advocators from the seat of chief officers and from the labor union (Red Purge, even according to the research conducted by the Ministry of Labour, the number of expelled laborers from July to November was over 12,000)" by GHQ and the Japanese government were continued (Nihon kyōsan tō chūō iinkai 1988, 136).

While they enforced heavy restrictions on the revolutionaries, the Japanese government, abiding by the GHQ's instructions, actively promoted the strengthening of conservative rightist forces by a broad scale pardoning of war criminals ("the 1st deportee" of 19 thousand people on October 13, of Sigemitsu Akira 重光葵 on November 8, of 3,297 ex-soldiers on the 10th). Some of the depurged ex-soldiers were employed as preliminary police executives and the ex-war criminals aggressively sought the revival of right-wing organizations.

After the Red Purge, Tokuda-line (the leading faction) peremptorily dismissed their central committee and founded the temporary central leadership division, activating an underground system. Later, their tension with the international faction who did not approve of such change worsened. While the GHQ occupation army and the Japanese government's were pressing down hard on JCP, China's *People's Daily* wrote in their editorial on September 3 that now is the time JCP should get into action and fight off its enemies. Chinese

18. By October 1951, 14 JCP politicians were arrested or expelled.

communists may have seen that in a situation where they were confronting the American armed forces due to the war in Korea, JCP's violent forming of the common front will be favorable to both themselves and the North Korean army: "Chinese Communist Party (CCP) contacted the Tokuda-line urging them to take on an extreme leftist adventurism. In October, some executives including Tokuda himself sought asylum at Beijing and founding the so called 'Beijing Institution,' continued instructing the JCP through the underground temporary central leadership division in Japan" (Nihon kyōsan tō chūō iinkai 1988, 134-35).

In short, the JCP's change of color to a more pro-radical armed revolution and the influence of this decision on the ex-Jo-ryeon-line was the result of CCP urging JCP to form a common violent front as well as GHQ and the Japanese government intensifying their oppression on JCP's revolutionary forces while aggressively promoting the conservative right-wing movements.

Soon after, perhaps by the order of JCP, ex-Jo-ryeon-line organized a systematic rejection of tax payment and job demand movement. Ex-Jo-ryeon led the movement refusing to pay tax and requesting the enforcement of the livelihood protection law, the offering of jobs, and an ethnic education (increasing the number of Korean faculties teaching the Korean Language in Japanese schools) between the period of late November and early December. Even women and children were involved in the protest aimed at the city halls and district offices requesting job offers.

They trespassed into the government office buildings or staged a sit-in in order to demand their needs and accomplish their mission. The Japanese police ordered dismissal and arrested those who refused to comply charging them with violation of domicile as well as obstruction of justice. The same were done to the people who demanded a release of the arrested.

The most symbolic incident at the time was the, so called, 2nd Kōbe incident.¹⁹ Taking place on November 2, 176 were arrested and prosecuted for sedition as a result of the event. According to the report of Special Investigations Bureau (SIB), Kōbe incident occurred under the command of the mainstream JCP members and following their orders, Korean communists in Japan urged

19. Hanshin 阪神 Educational Incident on April 24, 1948 is called the 1st Kōbe incident.

other Koreans to take part in the event. Similar cases happened in Shiha Ken Otsu city, where 42 were arrested, and in Kyoto, where 7 were arrested, on the 1st day of December (Kim 1997, 684-85).

Japanese papers regarded these consecutive movements in Kansai area as the left wing's premediated commotion and publically criticized them with a sarcastic comment "[i]s next Kantō region?" (*Tsugi wa kantō chiku ka*) (*Asahi Shinbun*, December 3, 1949).

In fact, as if they were responding to the the newspapers, a series of protests in Kantō, including the requesting of tax reduction in Yokohama-si Tatsumiku (with about 40 participants), livelihood protection law application request in Kawasaki-si (with about 30 participants), the release requestment of ex-Jo-ryeon executives in Morioka-si (with about 70 participants). *Asahi Shinbun* (December 5) covered the event with the title "Koreans Fuss Again" (Chōsenjin ra mata sawagu).

In their report of the Kōbe incident, *Asahi shinbun's* editorial "Fuss in Kansai Region" (Kansai chihō no sōran jiken) (December 3) predicated that the events were carried out according to the Korean communist plans. They stated, "disturbing incidents have much occurred centering Kyohanshin 京阪神 and Nagoya 名古屋 areas since the 2nd of last month [November] including the battering of a postmaster in Ōsaka Yao-si 八尾, occupation case concerning the head office of a spinning mill in Kureha 呉羽, incendiary intrusion at Nippou 日紡 in Kaizuka 貝塚."

In short, while the Koreans in Japan claimed an innocent cause of defending their rights to maintain a decent living regarding the character of the events, Japanese society predicated it differently as a disorder instigated by the orders of the JCP.

Furthermore, on the 7th of February 1951 *Mainichi shinbun* editorial titled "Secure Public Order!" (Chian o kakuho seyo) explicitly criticized the Koreans in Japan stating that "Koreans residing in Japan should follow the Japanese law and must take responsibilities for their action according to the law. This is the least they can do if they are to stay in Japan" (Kim 1997, 685-86).

Were the series of events really a result of plotted disorder with JCP as the mastermind behind the veil or were they a result of the struggle for basic living rights carried out by the ex-Jo-ryeon themselves? At least the Japanese government, according to the SIB report quoted above, concluded that the events were a calculated "disorder" designed by the JCP. Unless the reports were

forged, their conclusion seems highly persuasive.

Limiting the discussion to the Kōbe incident, many share the contrary opinion that ex-Jo-ryeon-line was at the center of it driven by their own needs to defend and reveal the severe living conditions of the Koreans in Japan, regardless of any directions by the JCP.

Gyeongsik Park claims that from 1949, many Korean companies in Japan went bankrupt because they could not get any financial support from the Japanese banking institutions due to Japan's fiscal austerity influenced by the US. Also, most Koreans in Japan were either unemployed or half-unemployed and "for this reason, they put out slogans requesting a job, a wage increase, the application of the livelihood protection law, abolishment of discrimination in finance as well as of unreasonable taxation, in order to secure their living rights. Korean members of the JCP were the driving forces behind this nationwide struggle" (Park 1989, 299).²⁰

Meanwhile, communist Koreans in Japan decided to organize a new group, Minjeon (Jeilbon Joseon Tongil Minju Jeonseon, Korean Unification Democratic Front in Japan), in replacement of Jo-ryeon. Mindae took the initiative in actualizing the plan and finally on January 1, 1951, Minjeon was officially established. Not only ex-Jo-ryeons but nationalists like Gang-hun Lee (Association for North and South Unification) who argued for the unification of North and South in opposition to the establishment of a single government also joined the party. Mindae claimed that the character of Minjeon should be more a "propaganda that could bring together the whole nation" as opposed to a "single unitary organization like ex-Jo-ryeon" (Park 1989, 285). In other words, they defined Minjeon not as an exclusive group of communists like Jo-ryeon but a more inclusive organization that could muster the Koreans in Japan regardless of their political colors. Thus, its character was stated quite differently from Minjeon, another organization established after Jo-ryeon. After its establishment, Minjeon organized a protest against the forced deportation of Koreans in Japan in the beginning of 1951, and in midyear, opposed the rearmament. In September they worked on opposing the separate peace and

20. Koreans in Japan suffered from a substantial hardship in their daily lives which was the reason of their active protests against the Japanese government. GHQ or Japanese government was not much interested in the living conditions of Koreans in Japan. See Kim 2012.

in October again opposed the deportation regarding the proclamation of the immigration control law.

The members who conducted these movements in Minjeon included nationalist Gang-hun Lee, who served as their first head. Since they differed in their character from Jo-ryeon, their activities were not influenced by the JPC or Mindae. However, Minjeon also experienced certain disagreements within when the nationalists Gang-hun Lee and Euncheol Park insisted on deleting the article “Defend the democratic people’s republic of Korean” from their agenda while the Fatherland groups including Deoksu Han insisted it that it should remain.

As the disagreement shows, tension among the communists in Mindae, in particular between the JCP group and the Fatherland group was not to be resolved easily. Eventually, Gang-hun Lee withdrew his membership from Minjeon in January 1954 unable to stand the growing power of JCP group within the organization.

JCP’s Extreme-leftist Adventurism and the Fatherland Defense

The Chinese army began their full attack on the Allied Forces in November, 1950. Due to the success of Communist Chinese Army’s human-wave strategy, North Korean Army and the Communist Chinese Army were able to re-occupy Seoul in early January, 1951, and were advancing southward.

In Japan, JCP secretly held the 4th National Conference at the end of February with the leading faction as the driving force behind, and decided on an anti-American, armed struggle policy. Imitating the previous anti-Japanese struggles of the Chinese Communist Party which spread mainly through the farming villages, JCP focused on strengthening their ties with the farming communities in the mountain area.

The “Japan Communist Party’s Basic Course of Action” outlined at the Conference maintains that “the ethnic minorities are our allies in the revolution of Japan,” and that the “Japan Communist Party should actively aid and support the fight for the rights and interests” of the “ethnic minority groups, especially, the Koreans and Chinese” (Kim 1997, 691-92).

The outlined statement can be interpreted in two different ways. First, the Koreans in Japan are defined not as a group of foreigners belonging to another nation but an ethnic minority group forming a part within the Japanese

community (Park 1989, 283). Second, until this point, JCP was passive in acknowledging the Koreans in Japan, often times denying their existence, but here they clearly differentiate the two groups, “the Japanese” and “the Korean minorities” and state their relationship as “allies.” If the second interpretation explains JCP’s intention better, the resemblance enables us to imagine the influence of China’s ethnic minority policies. In any case, abiding by the decision made at the 4th National Conference, the national representatives of Mindae gathered on May 10 to delineate “the upcoming mission of Korean movements in Japan” which will give shape to their course of action.

From March, the Korean War went into a state of standstill and President Truman, seeking an armistice, fired McArthur in April who insisted they advance to the north. The Soviet responded positively to Truman and starting July, truce talks began.

While the Korean Peninsula was seeking a cease-fire, JCP adhered to their armed struggle policy. The split between the mainstream and the international faction ended with the mainstream’s victory as the Cominform bulletin announced their support for the mainstream in August. Securing absolute leadership, the mainstream’s Temporary Central Guidance Body hosted a clandestine 5th National Conference in mid-October. They adopted a new doctrine of extreme leftist adventurism titled “Japan Communist Party’s Present Claims” (*Nihon kyōsantō no tōumen no yōkyū*) and delineated plans to promote guerilla fights in farming villages. Plus, secret organizations such as “Mountain village underground activists” (*Sanson kōsakutai*) or “Core self-defense forces” (*Chūkaku jieitai*) etc. were deployed to carry out the armed fights.

The mainstream’s policies, however, were unsuccessful, lacking effectiveness. They failed with their plans gaining no actual results. In fact, the extreme leftist adventurism drove many members away from the organization and support was low from the Japanese people as well. Later, the Central Committee of the JCP estimated that the mainstream Tokuda-line’s dogmatic decisions and actions occasioned a fatal disunity within the organization. Their decisions based on extreme leftist adventurism were flawed in several aspects: they overlooked a peaceful means of revolution in Japan and ignored the fact that Japan was a highly developed capitalist nation very different from the agricultural society that the Chinese Communist Army dealt with in the past—blindly and mechanically applying the Chinese Communist tactics of the past

without understanding such a difference, they had small chance of winning (Nihon kyōsan tō chūō iinkai 1988, 144).

Furthermore, the doctrine claims that “all people” of Japan, including the Koreans in Japan, must unite to fight against the US. Tokuda’s JCP have been defining the Koreans in Japan merely as an ethnic minority but why, at this point, were they more explicitly acknowledging the identity of Koreans in Japan?

There are three explanations regarding the issue. First, amongst Mindae’s communists, the tension between the Fatherland group who were centered at the defense of their homeland North Korea and the JCP group who followed JCP’s instructions was rising. Thus, in order to obtain support from the members of the Fatherland group who were not cooperative to the mainstream leaders, they may have had to acknowledge the clear independence of the Koreans in Japan. Second, since their agenda was centered at the mustering of all Asian peoples to effectively fight off the US, not at revolutionizing Japan, their perception of the Koreans in Japan shifted accordingly. Third, as mentioned before, the Chinese ethnic minority policy which allows the autonomy of each ethnic group to a certain degree may have influenced them.

The JCP’s armed struggle policy was conveyed to Jobangwui through Mindae. On October 21, Jobangwui issued an order entitled “Present Struggle Policy for Koreans in Japan” (Zai’ nichī chōusenjin tōumen no tōsōu hōushin) asserting that the struggle aims to secure the living rights, to abolish the American imperialism, and to accomplish national liberation and in order to do so, must “put together a core self-defense force, Jobangdae.”

SIB investigations reveal that the Temporary Central Leadership, now pushing forth an armed struggle, was endeavoring to procure Korean communist members and communist sympathizers on their side. They were able to obtain 20,882 members and 132,000 sympathizers by September and Mindae soon instructed them to secure additional 15,600 members from these sympathizers (Kim 1997, 693).

In truth, JCP encountering a situation in which their members were divided into the leading faction and the international faction and the Japanese members were detaching themselves, they counted on Korean residents in Japan to fill in those vacancies. After JCP’s adoption of extreme-left adventurist policy, communist Korean residents in Japan, with Jobangdae at their center, performed armed struggles against imperialism and America together with

Core self-defense forces between late 1951 and mid 1952. Even though it was called an armed struggle, it did not concern serious activities such as attacking American occupation forces and the Japanese policemen or destroying various munitions factories. Their actual activities of the Korean residents in Japan were more like handing out leaflets, throwing Molotov cocktails on streets and engaging in underground activities at the mountain villages. As they admit, JCP's such domestic strategies failed.

If we take a look at the number of Koreans arrested in Japan for the so-called three major disturbance incidents proceeded under the directions of JCP, 130 Koreans (1,232 Japanese) were arrested for the May Day accident *メーデー事件* on May 1, 92 Koreans (250 Japanese) for the Suita accident *吹田事件* on June 24, 150 Koreans (269 Japanese) for the Ōsu incident *大須事件* on July 7 in 1952. Out of these people, only 2 (5 Japanese) were actually sentenced to imprisonment but the great Korean proportion among those arrested show how significant their role was.

The Japanese Government and the Establishment of a Control System against Koreans in Japan by SCAP

The Compulsory Deportation of "Subversive Koreans"

Even before the outbreak of the Korean War, the Japanese government has been closely monitoring the movement of Korean residents in Japan, especially that of the ex-Jo-ryeon-line. The monitoring of the ex-Jo-ryeon-line was all the more important because the US government's policy on the occupation of Japan prioritized the goal of anti-communism. The SIB scrutinized the activities of Mindan's and ex-Jo-ryeon-line's communist activists and secretly reported them in detail to GHQ, and their reports still remain as records. The Japanese government not only monitored the ex-Jo-ryeon-line's communist activists, but also actively took steps to crackdown on the anti-occupation activists who distributed anti-American and anti-war leaflets. The Japanese government also thoroughly investigated on the deportation of Koreans in Japan.

Regarding the second Kōbe incident of November 1950, the Japanese newspaper announced on December 24 that Prime Minister Yoshida, Vice-Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ichiro Oota, Secretary General of

the Democratic Liberal Party Eisaku Satō, etc. stated that they “have decided, as a principle, to deport all those who have created disturbance” in the Prime Minister’s official residence on the 23rd. After receiving the approval of Prime Minister Yoshida, Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Katsuo Okazaki implied the compulsory deportation of “subversive Koreans” after announcing the following statement on the 26th:

Japan and Korea have been maintaining a friendly relationship with one another for a long time. It is therefore unfortunate to see that some pro-communist Koreans in Japan needlessly or intentionally exploit the lacuna of laws and regulations to instigate violence and destructive actions for the purpose of hindering the maintenance of public order. The Republic of Korea and regular Korean residents in Japan are also concerned about these illegal acts. The government is not only going to take action against those who hinder the maintenance of public order according to law, but is also considering to deport them out of the country. (*Asahi Shinbun*, December 27, 1950)

At that time, menacing actions were taken against the Koreans in Japan. Illegal Korean entrants who were kept in the Oomura concentration camp and the Korean residents who were targets of compulsory eviction were deported to South Korea starting from December 11, 1950. Although it was during a particular period, as Korea was in the midst of war, the Syngman Rhee government nonetheless accepted those deported under the condition that they would cooperate with the GHQ.²¹ In any case, the act of deportation was a threat to communist activists, and the regular Korean residents in Japan also felt threatened. It was under these circumstances that the Japanese government made an announcement suggesting the compulsory deportation of communists.

Moreover, boldly claiming that “the Republic of Korea and regular Korean residents in Japan are also concerned about their illegal acts” while saying that “Japan and Korea have been maintaining a friendly relationship with one another for a long time,” shows a glimpse of the fact that there has

21. From December 1950 to March 21, 1952 (7 times total), about 3,600 were deported to South Korea. Most of them were illegal aliens who have entered Japan after the Korean War, but 445 were residents of Japan since before Japan lost the war. See Morita 1975, 178-81.

been an agreement between the Korean government (KDMJ) and the Japanese government concerning the “subversive Koreans.” On January 12, 1951, which was a week after the secretary’s statement, Minister Kim made the following announcement as if approving this fact:

The Korean government faces a situation in which it must severely punish the Korean communist residents in Japan who are destroying the order of the Japanese society, aiming for the violent communist revolution, and the Korean residents in Japan with either left or right wing ideals who are harming the Japanese citizens with violence, fraud, and embezzlement. Thus, I request the General Headquarters and the Japanese government to have those harmful deported to Korea.²² (Kim 1997, 688)

Thus, the Korean and Japanese governments openly declared their common intent to deport not only the Korean communist activists, but also the Korean criminals living in Japan to South Korea. Although the KDMJ constantly requested the GHQ to carry out the deportation of Korean communists in Japan after its establishment, it was the first time that they openly made a declaration on the Korean criminals’ deportation. At that time, Minister Kim’s announcement was considered as being disrespectful towards the rights of Korean residents in Japan, so that oppositions by those in Mindan were strong.

The Japanese government also had never made open declarations on the deportation of Korean communists in Japan, but began doing so after events such as the 2nd Kōbe incident. The government which used to claim that Koreans in Japan possessed Japanese nationalities, planned to use the anti-communist policies related to the Korean War and the Allies as a chance to get rid of the Korean communist activists who were a thorn in

22. The South Korean government’s policy made public by Minister Kim’s announcement was requested several times to SCAP by the Korean ambassador after the KDMJ was established. The reason that Minister Kim made this announcement public was because he had received orders to do so from the president, who misunderstood the Japanese newspaper believing that not only the Korean communists in Japan, but all Korean residents in Japan were being deported. He therefore wanted to underline the willingness to have not all Korean residents in Japan, but only the “malignant communist members” deported and thereby keep the friendly relation with Japan and protect the Korean patriots in Japan.

the side, and started to persuade SCAP to remove Korean communists in Japan.

After the Korean War, SCAP's attitude towards Koreans in Japan became rigorous, and they strengthened the supervision and crackdown on communists through the Japanese government. Many Koreans who posted anti-war leaflets, deliberately interrupted the shipment of arms, and participated in violent protests and guerrilla movements, were arrested. SCAP was not only interested in keeping the activities of Korean communists in check, but also in invigorating the fundamental management system of all Korean residents in Japan. As countries involved in the matter were discussing on the Treaty of Peace with Japan, it was in the best interest of SCAP to set a management system of Koreans in Japan before the occupation in Japan ended.

On April 11, 1951, General McArthur was dismissed and General Matthew B. Ridgway took office. SCAP's anti-communist ambience intensified after the Ridgway system was established. SCAP installed the "The Committee on Counter Measures against Communism in the Far East" (Anti-Communist Committee) on May 31. This committee was centered on G2, held regular meetings with representatives of each nation in SCAP, and discussed about the communist policies in Japan after the occupation of Japan. Thus, their central goal was to establish an anti-communist system in Japan before signing the Treaty of Peace with Japan.

As will be mentioned later, the Anti-Communist Committee deeply engaged in implanting systems on immigration control and alien registration in Japan. They also began discussing about the appropriate measure to take concerning Korean communists in Japan, hence deportation, from mid-June. The JCP decided to engage in anti-American armed struggle, and decided that Mindae would carry this policy out on May 10 ("The duty of the movement of Koreans in Japan"). Furthermore, commemorating the first anniversary of the Korean War, Minjeon and Jobangdae actively engaged in anti-American and anti-war movements by such actions as distributing leaflets criticizing the US and propagating anti-rearmament of Japan.

In December 1950, the Japanese government already began to openly discuss about compulsory deportation, and in January 1951, the Korean government also declared the intention of deportation. Afterwards, there were specific consultations between the Japanese government and SCAP, and the Anti-Communist Committee believed that there could be a deterrent effect

on the North Korean movements in Japan if 200 to 300 communists were repatriated (Kim 1997, 697-98).

Finally in the meeting on July 3, the Planning Committee, incorporated within the Anti-Communist Committee, concluded that repatriating “inappropriate foreigners” was an effective anti-communist measure in the Far East. The Planning Committee’s idea of “inappropriate foreigners” included communist partisans, dissidents, those who seemed inappropriate to Foreign Representatives in Japan, those who seemed inappropriate to the Japanese government because of their violent or criminal acts, and those whom SCAP and other occupying organizations deemed inappropriate. If this absurd step were to be executed, all Koreans in Japan who seemed inappropriate to the Korean government, Japanese government, SCAP, etc. were to become targets of deportation under arbitrary rules that ignored the human rights of Koreans in Japan (such as the right of residence).

The Anti-Communist Committee requested this to the chief of staff, and the chief of staff asked LS (Legal Section) for an opinion on July 11. On the 17th, Alva C. Carpenter, the chief of LS wrote an opposing view on SCAP deporting Koreans on the memo to the chief of staff:

The Korean residents in Japan are legally treated as Japanese citizens, so if SCAP forcefully repatriates them as foreigners, SCAP would be meddling in the issue of their nationality, as well as causing international problems as it violates “the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” Politically, first of all, there is no time to enforce the act as occupation is about to end. Second, SCAP would have to bear all criticisms from within and outside of Japan if it deports numerous Korean residents based on obscure standards such as the Japanese government’s or its own arbitrary judgments without proper trial. Third, SCAP would be liable to take all responsibilities as it would be meddling in problems that should be resolved by the Japanese government’s legislation or by negotiations between the Korean and Japanese government.

Carpenter was arguing that SCAP should not rashly lead the deportations, and that the matter should be left to the Japanese government or to negotiations between the Korean and the Japanese government. He suggested that if it is urgent, SCAP can arrest the most dangerous communist activists while the

Japanese government prepares for legislation regarding deportation.²³

At that time, SCAP only concentrated on the political act of anti-communism, ignoring the Koreans' human or legal rights, and had no time to consider what political and legal consequences its actions could bring about. LS had made an objective judgment. Carpenter's opinion that SCAP did not need to take such an important political and legal responsibility when the occupation in Japan was ending was a realistic decision. The chief of staff heeded LS's counsel and repatriated neither communists nor pro-communists. As LS rightly judged, DS was taking action to hold a Korean-Japanese conference, so that it would have been unwise for SCAP to take part in a problem associated with the nationality of Koreans in Japan. SCAP could have made an impractical decision under the special circumstances of the Korean War, the supreme task of anti-communist policy, and the Japanese government's fostering of the deportation of Koreans in Japan, and it can be said that the opinion of the chief of LS helped SCAP find its objectivity.

The Immigration Control Act and the Fingerprinting Regulation of the Aliens Registration Law

SCAP gradually transferred its rights to the Japanese government from around June 1949, preparing for the end of its occupation. In September, SCAP ordered that all the decisions related to the deportation of illegal entrants should be made on the Aliens Registration Law, transferring the aliens' immigration control rights to the Japanese government, except for those concerning the occupation forces. Meanwhile, the Japanese government's management of foreign residents in Japan at that time was divided into immigration control (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), aliens registration law (Ministry of Justice), compulsory deportation (Inspectorate of the Ministry of Justice), accommodation of the deported (Department of Human Welfare), escort/repatriation (National Police), etc. In September 1950, not long after the onset of the Korean War, SCAP ordered the Japanese government to create a unified immigration control act, and the

23. *Memorandum* for CS from Alvan C. Carpenter, Subj.: Deportation of Subversive Aliens, July 17, 1951, TS-00327

Japanese government established the “Immigration Bureau” (Shutsu nyūkok kanri chō) on October 1, which managed all processes from alien immigration to deportation.

From SCAP’s point of view, especially in terms of anti-communism, the Japanese legal system regarding immigration and foreign residents was inadequate, and modifying the system before the end of the occupation to prevent invasion from communists and subversive aliens into Japan was imperative. Accordingly, SCAP brought Nick D. Collaer in February 1951 to apply concepts of the US Immigration Control Act and the System of Exposure of Illegal Immigrants and Subversive Aliens on the Japanese Immigration Control Act and Aliens Registration Law.²⁴ Collaer continued to meet with SCAP and the Japanese government officials and completed the Immigration Control Act and Aliens Registration Law (Kim 1997, 701-02).

Originally, SCAP requested the Japanese government to draw up a bill unifying the Immigration Control Act and Aliens Registration Law like the US system, but the outcome was that they turned out in different forms. Although the reason of this result is unclear, it may be possible that it is because the Immigration Control Act could not be applied to the Koreans in Japan.

The Japanese government first proclaimed the Immigration Control Act (Ordinance No. 219) on October 4, and executed it on November 1. This act managed the foreigners’ entrance to and departure from Japan, and included all the regulations from the authorization of residence rights to the repatriation of criminals. At the beginning, the Japanese government attempted to control Koreans through the Immigration Control Act by applying the regulation from the Aliens Registration Law that says to “consider these people [Koreans] as aliens for a while.” However, applying such regulation to Koreans who had already received the right to reside in Japan made neither legal nor common sense. If the Immigration Control Act were to be applied to Korean residents in Japan, the Korean general criminals as well as the Koreans whose livelihood were being protected by the Japanese government had to be repatriated and they had to newly apply for residence rights.

24. *Paper* prepared by Nick Collaer, Subj.: Pretical Aspects of Alien Control as Applied to Japan, July 14, 1951, TS-00328.

The Japanese government, which was mostly interested in the repatriation of pro-communist Koreans in Japan, had the intention to apply the Immigration Control Act to the residents using the special circumstances they were under, such as the Korean War and the authority of SCAP. However, even the Anti-Communist Committee which suggested rigorous steps to deport Korean communists in Japan, severely condemned such measure, saying that it cannot be approved by the international law and that the Japanese government is just trying to hand over its responsibilities to SCAP. SCAP pointed out that “considering the Koreans and Taiwanese that have resided in Japan since before September 2, 1945, as foreigners is not right” (Robert Ricketts to “saiban no kai” 1988, 124-25). As a result, the Koreans in Japan were exempted from being targets of the Immigration Control Act. SCAP’s decision was no doubt influenced by the chief of LS’s opinion, mentioned earlier on.

Eventually, although the Japanese government failed to apply the Immigration Control Act to Korean residents during their occupation by the US, the subject resurfaced in the Korean-Japanese Conference of October 1951, when the Japanese government strongly argued that the law should be applied to Korean residents. The Korean and Japanese government fiercely confronted one another at the conference regarding the issue (Kim 1991).

The Immigration Control Act was not the only thing that resulted from SCAP’s anti-communist policy. The Alien Registration Law (Act→Law), and fingerprinting regulation which discriminated and humiliated the Koreans in Japan for a long time was also deeply affected by SCAP. The Alien Registration Law, which was another joint work of SCAP and the Japanese government, was proclaimed on April 28, 1952 and was immediately executed. The most important characteristic of the newly established Alien Registration Law was that the fingerprinting regulation, which was not included in the older version of the Law, had been introduced.

In short, by the Article 14 of the Aliens Registration Act, foreigners in Japan (staying for more than 60 days) had to put their fingerprints on registration forms, certificates, etc. As a result, Koreans in Japan who had different legal positions than ordinary foreigners, had to print their fingerprints as well. Compulsory fingerprinting stated in the Aliens Registration Law symbolized the policy concerning Koreans in Japan during the second half-period of the occupation by SCAP.

In order to understand its background, one must go back to the February

of 1951. As aforementioned, SCAP invited Collaer from the US in February 1951. Collaer introduced the American laws in a letter to the person in charge of the Immigration Bureau on February 16, and in order to strengthen the Japanese immigration control, established the system arranging and classifying the fingerprints of foreign arrestees in Japan, and suggested to make an agreement with neighboring countries to exchange the fingerprints of foreigners involved in subversive activities. With the Immigration Bureau and the Japanese police as the center, the review on the adoption of fingerprints in the Aliens Registration Law was actively undertaken.

Of course, it was not the first time that issues on fingerprinting emerged. Already in November 1949, the chief of judicial affairs of the Nagoya occupation forces, J. B. Sullivan, suggested fingerprinting in order to preclude illegal entry into the country, illegal rationing, tax evasion, crime, etc. However, the Ministry of Justice opposed the idea, believing that fingerprinting should not be used unless for investigation of crime, and predicting the resistance of Koreans in Japan. At the same time, there were discussions concerning recording the fingerprints of all Japanese citizens in the Japanese National Assembly because the establishment of a scientific system of investigation was requested as a result of the Shimoyama, Mitaka, etc. incidents. In January 1950, the recording of fingerprints began by a randomly picked citizen but failed because there was no legal binding force. The recording of fingerprints became an issue again when the JCP's engagement in arms received attention in December. With the National Police Headquarter and Agency creating "Ordinary Citizen Fingerprinting Guidelines," etc. in order to record the citizens' fingerprints, the interest in the issue was resurfaced (Kim 1997, 81).

In this situation, advised by Collaer, the Japanese government contacted SCAP and proceeded with the work of including fingerprints in the Aliens Registration Law, and the aforementioned compulsory fingerprinting was reinforced to Koreans in Japan. Fingerprinting was discussed by the Anti-Communist Party from March to August, and was considered not only as a means to investigate simple crimes, but also important since it was a part of an anti-communist measure. In short, the fingerprinting in the Aliens Registration Law was created for the political purposes of restricting Korean communist activists in Japan, subversive activities, and illegal entry into the country.

Although the Japanese government had to delay the implementation of fingerprinting because of the opposing movements of Koreans in Japan,

the fingerprinting of Koreans in Japan nevertheless began from the fall season of 1956, during the massive exchange of the Aliens Registration Certificates. From thence, the Koreans in Japan (over the age of 14) had to have their fingers printed and carry their Aliens Registration Certificates all the time. The Japanese government used the Aliens Registration Law including such regulation as a means to control the Koreans in Japan (Kim 1997, 704-05).

Conclusion

After the liberation, the organization of the Korean residents in Japan failed to integrate, and was divided into Jo-ryeon, Mindan, etc. Two governments with disparate political organizations were founded, so that the citizenship of the Korean residents in Japan was also divided. Nevertheless, the political division did not affect the everyday life. In everyday life, at least, the residents did not distinguish one another and interacted with one another. Even though their political ideologies were different to each other, most of them were born in southern South Korea.

However, it is generally evaluated that the Korean organization in Japan completely changed after the slaughtering amongst the same race which accompanied the Korean War; the hate within the same race had disseminated into the Korean organization in Japan. As the aftermath of the Korean War, the Koreans in Japan who did not distinguish one another in everyday life despite their different affiliations and beliefs began doing so. Although their relationships are amending, the scars have yet to completely heal.

The Central Head Office of Mindan evaluates on their dispatching voluntary troop—which is said to be a feat of Mindan during the Korean war—in their website: “[t]he 642 Korean students and youths in Japan who volunteered to protect their fatherland when North Korea triggered the Korean War on June 25, 1950, organized the ‘Voluntary Korean Youths Troop in Japan.’ Their spirit of patriotism will be highly regarded for generations to come” (<http://www.mindan.org/shokai/ayumi.html>. Accessed June 30, 2013). On the other hand, the Head Office of Mindan Kyōto regards the conflict between Mindan and ex-Jo-ryeon-line differently:

...and its effect became definite due to the Korean War (6.25 Civil War).

Also called “Joseon Jeonjaeng” in Japan). The war triggered by the North’s attack on June 25, 1950 not only left a big wound to the North and South, but being a fratricidal war, also resulted in giving each Korean compatriot in Japan much grief, trauma and distrust.

At that time Mindan organized a youth voluntary troop, consisting of 641 people (22 from Kyoto), and included them in the Allied force. The troop participated in the Inchon Landing Operation and fought with the North. Later, Mindan and Jochongyeon each acquired their own “fatherland,” and under their differing ideological policies, unfolded barren fights and competitions centering on the Korean compatriots in Japan. (http://www.mindan.kyoto.org/history/sub_01.html. Accessed April 30, 2013)

The Head Office of Mindan Kyōto sees the conflict between Mindan and ex-Jo-ryeon-line during the Korean War as being futile, and regards the Korean War of having left nothing but sorrow, scars, and distrust to the Koreans in Japan. This shows the discordant views of the Central Head Office of Mindan and the Head Office of Mindan Kyōto concerning Mindan’s action during the Korean War.

Meanwhile, KDMJ and Mindan failed to cooperate even in the dire situation of Korean War, and were ceaselessly under conflicts. Firstly, the internal political friction among Mindan members can be considered as the reason of the conflicts. Mindan had many problems from its origin, such as the members’ disagreements surrounding the method of fatherland unification, renunciations resulted by the 4.3 Jeju uprising, discords between pro-Japanese and nationalists, and so on. This element affected Mindan’s relationship with the KDMJ that Rhee’s government had sent. Secondly, neither KDMJ nor Mindan had financial stability, so that they both needed help from wealthy Korean compatriots. While KDMJ had a comparatively easier way to gather Koreans in Japan because of privileges such as government power and the issuing of passports, compatriots were disinclined to aid Mindan whose members were right-wing activists, hanging on special distribution by the Japanese government. Mindan, therefore, saw KDMJ as an organization stealing their pies. Thirdly, the ambassador and the diplomatic minister sent to Japan were neither Japanese expert nor had any relations with Koreans in Japan. Minister Yongsik Kim may have displayed personal acumen, but I believe that he was able to stay as minister in Japan for a long time and keep distance with Mindan because he graduated from a Japanese school and therefore had personal connections in Japan. Lastly,

the systemic characteristic can be considered. The greatest difference between Mindan and ex-Jo-ryeon-line is that Mindan consisted of Koreans in Japan with different ideas and beliefs. On the other hand, ex-Jo-ryeon-line was under the JCP's command system. Thus, in the case of Mindan, if there were no powerful leader, the organization itself could collapse due to the variety of ideas, beliefs and opinions, but in the case of ex-Jo-ryeon-line, since there was JCP's superior authority, the organization itself could remain stable even if there were to be an internal discord.

In any case, the conflicts between the two caused the KDMJ to get involved in the selection of organizations which brought about the division in the Korean organization in Japan. This became precedent, and the objective stance of Korean government official toward private Korean organization was tainted.

How do the communist Koreans in Japan who supported the North by hindering the shipment of arms to the South, and who fought in the front line of demonstrations and violent activities obeying the command of the JCP's mainstream fraction evaluate their past actions? The North, their fatherland, still practices the hereditary succession system. No nation aims to become a communist country, and none sees it as a paradise. What does it mean when many involved in Chongyeon converted, and even though they support the North, they let their children choose the nationality of the South?

In 1953, Tokuda, who guided the military route, died of disease in China. Nosaka returned to his country in 1955 and reconciled with Miyamoto who was anti-Tokuda. In the 6th National Conference, Nosaka defined armed struggle as "an extreme left adventurism" and criticized himself, saying that it was an error of judgment to formulate such a policy. Moreover, in January 1955, the JCP criticized itself regarding the movement of Koreans in Japan stating that "it was a definite error to burden the Koreans in Japan with a part of the Japanese revolution by consciously dragging them into it" ("About the movement of Koreans in Japan" [Zai'nichi chōsenjin undō ni tsuite]). It was thus concluded that the Koreans in Japan during the Korean War took part in an erroneous fight because they were misguided by the JCP. Jae-eon Kang, who was a member of ex-Jo-ryeon-line in connection to the extreme left adventurism, reflects and evaluates as follows:

They were sincerely thinking of participating in the partisan struggle.

According to a recent statement by Kenji Miyamoto 宮本顕治, “the Chinese Communist Party forced this.” In the Chinese Communist Party’s point of view, since it was not long after the revolution, China intentionally asked the communist parties in Asia for this kind of movement. China was trying to disperse the communist power in order to disperse the US power that would otherwise have concentrated toward China alone. After all, to the communist parties in Asia at that time, protecting the Chinese revolution meant international responsibility. It was what Japan was really doing. (Park et al. 1989, 148)

The JCP moved under the guidance of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) whose priority was the Chinese Revolution, and the Koreans in Japan unfolded skill struggle in Japan under the JCP’s guidance. In short, Korean communists in Japan were exploited by the CCP.²⁵

Of course, one cannot only be critical about the struggles of the Koreans in Japan to defend their fatherland during the Korean War. The desire for a newly established home country was greater than anyone else after the liberation from the Japanese colonialism. Furthermore, the obsession for an identity for the liberated fatherland had become an obsession of political ideologies just as the international society moved towards the Cold War, so that it was difficult to yield.

Many of the east-Asian nations liberated from colonialism after the World War II underwent internal conflicts. Religious riots of between the Islam and Hindu swept across India and Pakistan after they were liberated from

25. As already known, the CCP’s request to the JCP to participate in violent revolution is not limited to the period of the Korean War. When Miyamoto had a meeting with Tse tung Mao 毛沢東 in 1966 during his visit to Shanghai, China, Mao requested that the JCP participate in the violent revolution in Japan in line of cultural revolution to Miyamoto. Miyamoto refused, as he remembered how the JCP had been damaged by the extreme left adventurism which was a result of heeding China and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, he and the JCP were vehemently denying extreme left adventurism. When Miyamoto refused, the CCP reported through the Beijing broadcast and the public daily report that violent revolution was the only way for the Japanese revolution. The CCP also pursued a policy to overthrow the JCP, but has failed. Their relationship was severed, but the CCP apologized for violating and meddling in the internal affairs in 1997. A year after Miyamoto retired, the JCP accepted the apology, and their relationship was amended. In short, the CCP failed because they had overlooked the past failure of extreme left adventurism by the JCP and continued forcing a communist movement centered on their own country.

England. Furthermore, in January 1948, M. K. Gandhi was assassinated by a Hindu fundamentalist who was hostile towards the political yielding for Islam. Vietnam was liberated from France and Japan, Philippines from the US and Japan, Indonesia from Holland, Cambodia from France, etc. All these countries experienced internal massacre caused by the desire to build countries with differing political and religious ideals. Behind these nations were the US, China, and the Soviet, who were trying to protect and expand their power under the Cold War. All would have known about the nonviolence of Gandhi, but people took violence for granted for their ideologies and political power. Indeed, it was an “era of extreme ideology and violence that ignored humanity inside the fence called nation.”

It would therefore be reasonable to argue that the distinct characteristic of the North and the South as a newly liberated country and under special international circumstances explains the activities of Jo-ryeon and Mindan’s dispatching of voluntary troop. Of course, one cannot say that Gandhi’s non-violence ideology is unrealistic, but it would have been impossible to preach non-violence to the Koreans in Japan as war had already begun in Korea by the South and Allies, and the North and the Communists.

Considering the situation of that time, another fact that cannot be ignored while evaluating, is the fact that Koreans in Japan were residing in Japan and not Korea. During the Korean War, Mindae transmitted the directions of the JCP to Jobangwi, Jobangdae, Cheongnyon Haengdongdae, etc. Their activities included the right to live, struggles for their livelihood, fund raising, and anti-US and anti-war movements. Many regular Korean citizens in Japan took part in these activities with genuine goals: for their livelihood and to protect their fatherland. However, their movements were under the JCP’s policies, and when the Japanese saw the armed struggle of Koreans in Japan under extreme left adventurism and holding the North Korean flag, the Japanese could no longer say that the Koreans in Japan were doing so to find their national rights or to protect their fatherland. In the Japanese’s point of view, Koreans in Japan under Mindae were not fighting for their “fatherland” but for the communist “organization.”

Accordingly, while the Koreans in Japan and their “fatherland” were scarred, they also gave the Japanese reasons to see them as violent and to distrust and exclude them. Concerning this, Tonomura Masaru writes:

Acts by Koreans in Japan under Korean War not only reinforced the connection between the conscious of Korean people and their fatherland, but also helped the Japanese realize that Koreans in Japan were foreigners with their own fatherland.

Furthermore, after the treaty of San Francisco was put under effect, the Minjeon-line's overall movements were seen as an interference of another country's internal affair under North Korea, so that national education, criminal act, and diverse economic activities were all tied to it in the minds of the Japanese, so that the ostracization of Koreans was intensified. (Tonomura 2004, 444)

Meanwhile, Park (1989) and Kobayashi (1996a) assess not only the period of Korean War, but also the movements of Jo-ryeon and ex-Jo-ryeon-line during the US occupation in Japan through the "foundation of fatherland" and "protection of fatherland" points of view.

Two different evaluations regarding ex-Jo-ryeon-line Koreans in Japan should be done. The first is the evaluation of the stance and activity of communists who led the movements of Koreans in Japan. The second is the evaluation of the stance and activity of regular Koreans in Japan who were active participants in the movement. The former should be seen as having participated in the stance prioritizing the Japanese revolution under the guidance of JCP. Although there was a resistance against this from the fatherland group which claimed that one should prioritize the foundation and protection of the fatherland, the JCP group which accepted guidance by the JCP was leading the movement of Koreans in Japan at that time. The latter should be seen as having engaged in the movement to found and protect the liberated fatherland. In order to do so, Koreans in Japan participated in violent activities such as throwing Molotov cocktails "under the guidance of superior office," and protesting against the Japanese government office for their livelihood.

Lastly, I would like to consider Nam's study (2000) which claims that the anti-war movement by Mindae played a significant role in restraining the rearmament of Japan by keeping in check the activity of conservatives and right-wingers who were pressing for rearmament.

Though it is true that ex-soldiers and right-wingers developed many activities for the rearmament of Japan, the effect was trifling because the Japanese people in general did not agree with the rearmament. If the ex-soldiers and right-wing Japanese were greatly influential and the possibility of

rearmament was high, the anti-US and anti-war movements by Koreans in Japan could be evaluated as the best contributor to blocking the rearmament of Japan.

Furthermore, if Yoshida Shigeru was on the verge to rearm but failed due to the skill struggle of ex-Jo-ryeon-line, the movement of Koreans in Japan should be lauded for having played a crucial role in hampering rearmament. However, there is yet no research which indicates that Yoshida tried to rearm with such intention. The general assessment is that it was Yoshida's firm convictions aiming for an economic state. In short, I believe that the relation between the frustration of Japanese rearmament and the role of Koreans in Japan is worth more research and consideration.

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Abstract

This study aims to investigate the following three questions: (1) how did the Koreans and the Korean organizations in Japan react to the Korean War, and what were their positions to the conflict?; (2) how did the South Korean government, the General Headquarters (GHQ), the Japanese government and the Japanese Communist Party respond to the Korean organizations in Japan, and what were their political goals vis-à-vis the organizations?; and (3) what were the impacts of the Korean War on the Korean residents in Japan? When the Korean War broke out, the activities of right-wing Mindan were stagnant, and the left-wing camp was yet to form an alternative organization since the dissolution of Jo-ryeon. While the officials of these organizations were showing a wide variety of reactions to the conflict that broke out on their homeland, the Mindan supported the capitalist South while the former officials of Jo-ryeon actively supported the communist North. The fratricidal war instilled deep division and mutual hatred not only in the Korean Peninsula, but also among the Koreans in Japan. Until now, many of Korean population in Japan do not interact with each other without lingering animosities even though no borders are dividing them. The Korean Government, the GHQ, the Japanese government, and the Japanese Communist Party prioritized their own political interests over the rights and welfare of Korean residents in Japan. In order to advance their political agendas, various actors interfered with the Korean organizations and mobilized the Korean residents to their respective advantage. In order to control the Korean population, they installed various surveillance systems which violated the ethnic minority's human rights. The devastating legacies of that era continue even today. Most of the control and surveillance systems invented by the GHQ and Japanese government more than 60 decades ago are still in operation which further violates the political, economic, and citizenship rights of Korean residents of Japan.

Keywords: Korean War, Koreans in Japan, Mindan, Jo-ryeon, Minjeon, Japan Communist Party, Chongryeon