바로가기메뉴

본문 바로가기 주메뉴 바로가기

ACOMS+ 및 학술지 리포지터리 설명회

  • 한국과학기술정보연구원(KISTI) 서울분원 대회의실(별관 3층)
  • 2024년 07월 03일(수) 13:30
 

logo

Dual Monopolies of New Durables and Their Ancillaries: Exclusive Supply Contracts

Asian Journal of Innovation and Policy / Asian Journal of Innovation and Policy, (P)2287-1608; (E)2287-1616
2018, v.7 no.1, pp.207-234
https://doi.org/10.7545/ajip.2018.7.1.207
Flath, David (Ritsumeikan University)
  • 다운로드 수
  • 조회수

Abstract

A manufacturer of a durable good typically purchases supplies, including parts for assembly - that are also useful for repairs - from independent "original equipment suppliers" with which it contracts. The manufacturer is a branded monopolist of its final assembled product. To put into effect also a monopoly of the replacement parts, it must stipulate in its arrangements with independent suppliers of the parts that they not supply such patented parts to any other buyer. Durable good owners would then only be able to obtain their requirements of replacement parts from the same company that supplied the durable. This would amount to a tie-in of replacement parts to the direct purchase of new durables. And that describes the apparently widespread practice of automobile manufacturers in India, as exposed in a recent case before the Competition Commission of India (Samsher Kataria v Honda Siel Cars India Limited and others). Here, I will argue that such tie-in enabled automotive manufacturers to more fully appropriate consumer surplus, which induced them to lower the price of new cars, sell more cars and also sell more repair parts. The tie-in expanded the auto parts industry and promoted new entry. The main restraint on expansion of India's automotive manufacturing is not monopoly. It is government protection in the form of tariffs on automobiles and auto parts.

keywords
Aftermarkets, durable goods markets, monopoly pricing

참고문헌

1.

Agustin, T.L.D. and Martin, S. (2014) The Indian automotive industry and the ASEAN supply chain relations in research institute auto parts industries, Waseda University, Automobile and Auto Components Industries in Asean: Current State and Issues, 5, 51-114.

2.

Burstein, M.L. (1960) The economics of tie-in sales, Review of Economics and Statistics, 42(1), 68-73.

3.

Cohen, M.A., Narendra, A. and Vipul, A. (2006) Winning in the aftermarket, Harvard Business Review, May, 84(5), 129-138.

4.

Confederation of Indian Industry (2016) Making India a world class automotive manufacturing hub, February 6, Ernst & Young Global Limited, Http://www. ey.co m/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-making-india-a-world-class-automotive-manufactur ing-hub-1/$FILE/EY-making-india-a-world-class-automotive-manufacturing-hub.pd f

5.

Flath, D. (1980) The American can case, Antitrust Bulletin, 25, 169-94.

6.

Flath, D. (2014) Japanese Economy, 3rd edition, Oxford University Press.

7.

Flath, D. (2017) Dual monopolies of new eurables and their ancillaries, part 1: comple-mentarity in Demand, Unpublished Manuscript.

8.

Flath, D. and Nariu, T. (2008) Parallel imports and the Japan fair trade commission, Japanese Economy, Spring, 35(1), 3-28.

9.

Goldfine, D.A.J. and Vorrasi, K.M. (2004) The gall of the Kodak aftermarket doctrine: dying a slow death in the lower courts, Antitrust Law Journal, (1), 209-231.

10.

International Trade Administration (2011) On the road: U.S. automotive parts industry annual assessment, Office of Transportation and Machinery, U.S. Department of Commerce.

11.

Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) (2005) Automobile Aassembly Parts, Japanese Market Report, March, 76.

12.

Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) (2002) Replacement auto parts, Survey on actual conditions regarding access to Japan, March.

13.

Japan Motor Vehicle Association (2015) The motor industry of Japan, Http://www.jam a-english.jp/publications/MIJ2015.pdf

14.

Lang, J.T. (2011) Practical aspects of aftermarkets in European competition law, Competition Policy International, 7(1), 199-241.

15.

Nishitateno, S. (2015) Market structure and entry: evidence from the intermediate goods market, RIETI Discussion Paper Series, July, 15-E-081.

16.

Philip, L. (2014) Why carmakers are joining hands against CCI charge, The Economic Times (India Times), October 23, Http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/why-carmak ers-are-joining-hands-against-cci-charge/articleshow/44913617.cms

17.

Saraf, P. (2016) Automotive in South Asia: from fringe to global, World Bank, October, Https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/25119/108826revdOctober2016.pdf?sequence=5

18.

Samsher Kataria v Honda Siel Cars India Limited and others, Case no: 03/2011.CCI., Http://www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/03201127.pdf

19.

Order of the commission here: case no. 03/2011, Date: 25/08/2014, In re: Shri Shamsher Kataria informant and fourteen opposite parties, Http://www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/032011_0.pdf

20.

Shapiro, C. (1995) Aftermarkets and consumer welfare: making sense of Kodak, Antitrust Law Journal, 63(2), 483-512.

21.

Tirole, J. (1988) The Theory of Industrial Organization, MIT Press.

22.

Uchikawa, S. (2011) Small and medium enterprises in the Indian auto-component industry, Article in Economic and Political Weekly, June, 46(25), 51-59.

23.

Wikipedia, Chicken tax, Https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chicken_tax#Circumventing_t he_tariff

24.

Wikipedia, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image technical services Inc., Https://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/Eastman_Kodak_Co._v._Image_Technical_Services,_Inc

25.

Womack, J.P., Daniel T.J. and Daniel, R. (1991) The Machine that Changed the World, London: Harper Perennial.

Asian Journal of Innovation and Policy