ISSN : 2765-6934
Purpose – This aim of this study is to examine how conglomerates in Korea have evolved from the perspective of institutional economics. The growth of the economy, dominated by large conglomerates, is projected in light of the dynamic equilibrium between government and capitalists. Research design, data, and methodology – The historical formation of big business groups is examined in chronological order. For the analysis, we divide the assessment into three different eras: Japanese colonial rule, liberation up to the civil war, and the fast growing period since the military coup. Each period is viewed as a dynamic equilibrium that is shaped by economic agents. Results and Conclusion – Despite the rise of modern commerce during the colonial era, contemporary conglomerates came into being with the "enemy property" allotted by the government. Around the civil war, the government coexisted with prototype conglomerates through foreign aid. As the external aid decreased, the system could not be sustained anymore, thus the military coup took place. The reinstated strong bond between government and the conglomerates has shaped the forms of the modern conglomerates thereafter.
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