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- KOREAN
- E-ISSN2383-9449
- SCOPUS
E-ISSN : 2383-9449
Vol.10 No.2
Abstract
China's proposal of the CAFTA (China-ASEAN Free Trade Area) in 2001 prompted a great debate about whether China was a trade competitor of ASEAN, given their similarity in economic development levels and trade/export structures. That Beijing shifted its focus on economic cooperation from the international level to the regional level led to its proposal of the CAFTA. As the Framework Agreement (Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between China and ASEAN) showed, Beijing's careful consideration for four newer ASEAN members (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) intended not only to help all ASEAN members develop economically, but also to narrow the economic gap existing between them and the six old ASEAN members; in return, China was recognized as a full market economy, which it is not currently recognized within the framework of the WTO. The substantial rise in bilateral trade and the structural changes of the trade in goods between China and ASEAN member nations after 2001 proves that ASEAN benefited more from the CAFTA, particularly when the areas where ASEAN had the comparative advantages were designated as the priority cooperation areas between China and ASEAN. In sum, similarities existing in economic development levels and industrial structures between China and ASEAN made them natural economic competitors. However, closer studies of trade in goods of S1-7, S1-6 and S1-0 reveal that China acted as an increasingly complementary trade partner of ASEAN after 2001.
Abstract
The recent listing of Preah Vihear Temple as a World Heritage Site has awakened a longtime simmering border dispute between Thailand and Cambodia over a few square kilometers surrounding the ancient Khmer Temple. While the listing of the site by UNESCO was expected to revive the economy of the impoverished border towns near the temple due to the increased tourism and funding for the preservation of the archeological site, it has had the opposite effect due to the sharp increase in violent conflict carried out by the armed forces and nationalist activists from both sides. Military skirmishes and violent protests have brought the local economy to a halt in addition to causing considerable physical damage to the local infrastructure and to the local transnational network of ethnic Kui, local business owners, Khmer and Thai villagers. This paper shows how the dispute is viewed and undertaken by three distinct communities involved in the conflict, the militaries, the metropolitan political elites and activists, and the local villagers. The three communities represent three different cultures of conflict with different interests and most importantly with differential access to the media and official representations of the dispute.
Abstract
After the 2006 coup <TEX>$d^{\prime}{\acute{e}}tat$</TEX>, there were many unusual incidents in Thailand, some of which involved considerable bloodshed, which originated from clashes between those in power and dissenters. This article examines how political institutions in Thailand are structured, and the author argues that, in order to effectively assess the state of Thai politics after the coup, an analysis of the structures of political legitimacy in the country is essential. The author will be exploring the way in which political legitimacy is generally determined by the established power holders, especially the monarchy and its allies. The ideologies and beliefs of recent dissenters will also be examined in detail.