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- KOREAN
- E-ISSN2383-9449
- SCOPUS
E-ISSN : 2383-9449
Vol.11 No.2
Abstract
In the wake of the Arab Spring, the Internet's role in aiding dramatic political transformation has come to the fore. Throughout the Middle East, protestors have employed Facebook, Twitter, Youtube and other popular websites to organize and spread news at home and to the outside world. Chinese authorities have been increasingly nervous about the Arab uprisings, and fear that similar events will inspire unrest in China. The new information and communication technologies make it possible for social movements to initiate novel forms of collective actions. The Internet provides new opportunities for political liberalization. In Chinese society, citizens can now participate in politics uninvited. With each passing day, the online community gets stronger. The digital revolution has the potential for broadening democratic principles and could bring democracy to the collective Chinese mind.
Abstract
Among political scientists, Japan's free trade agreements (FTA) with member nations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been considered to be a political tool that can compete against China for regional leadership in East Asia. However, this paper demonstrates that Japan's so-called FTA diplomacy towards ASEAN nations serves the broad interests of Japanese actors in both the political and economic sectors. Given the attention to Japanese domestic political issues, it is argued that diplomacy primarily facilitates a need for free trade with ASEAN and ASEAN markets for Japanese corporations to compete in the global economy and for the government to nurture Japan's stagnant economy by assisting these corporations. This work also contends that the unclear function of FTA as an economic good is due to the lack of the government capacity to effectively manage FTA diplomacy. This partly results from the conventional view with regard to Sino-Japanese rivalry.
Abstract
Sino-Japanese relations suffered a great setback during the premiership of Koizumi <TEX>$Jun'ichir{\bar{o}}$</TEX> (2001-2006). Although many factors, such as dispute over the resources of the East China Sea or Japan's anxiety about China's growing military expenditures, are accountable for this situation, it was Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni Shrine that became a symbol of the controversies between the two countries. The Yasukuni issue triggered a real eruption of profound anti-Japanese feelings among the Chinese people. While commentators in China accused Koizumi of glorifying militarism and whitewashing the atrocities committed by Japanese soldiers during the Second World War, the Japanese public started perceiving China's "exaggerated" reaction as a convenient diplomatic tool used by China to apply pressure on Japan in other bilateral disputes. On the one hand, spontaneous protests against Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni Shrine constituted a great constraint in China's diplomacy towards Japan, but on the other, they also became an ideal pretext for adopting a tougher stance in Chinese foreign policy. In this paper, I examine different points of view on the Yasukuni issue. After describing the Japanese background of the visits to the controversial shrine, I analyze various interpretations of China's reaction to the problem. Although emotions dominated discourse on the Yasukuni issue both in Japan and China, some pragmatic attempts to use this problem can still be seen. Besides being a side-effect of Koizumi's strong personality, the Yasukuni issue could be used either as a tool of factional struggle in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) or as an instrument of Chinese foreign policy towards Japan.
Abstract
The historical turbulence between China and Japan started from the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895, and culminated in Japan's invasion of China during World War Two (the Second Sino-Japanese War) between 1937 and 1945. A series of wars caused huge human and material losses in both countries, and both experienced comprehensive transformations during and after the wars. The impact of this historical turbulence is so long-lasting that it still influences both countries' social psyche. Moreover, it continues casting a long shadow upon the current Sino-Japanese relations. The recent turbulence in Sino-Japanese relations partly stems from the historical turbulence. It is much less violent but can also be emotional and worrisome. It started from the early 1980s (the Japanese history textbook controversy in 1982 and the 1985 anti-Japanese student protests in China), and culminated in the anti-Japanese mass demonstrations in multiple Chinese cities in 2005 (Bush 2010; Gries 2005; Reilly 2012; Stockmann 2010; Weiss 2008). In addition to dramatic demonstrations on streets, there are also other forms of movements, such as war reparations movements, in which Chinese war victims demand reparations from the Japanese state and companies (Rose 2005; Xu and Fine 2010; Xu and Pu 2010). Although the tension has existed for many years and surfaced from time to time, the eruption of the nationwide anti-Japanese movements in China in 2005 still shocked many outside observers. Many scholars have tried to explain the anti-Japanese sentiment within current Chinese society that underlies and drives these social movements. Through careful reexamination of the existing literature, this article proposes an explanation for the anti-Japanese sentiment from a perspective that stresses the shifting state-society interaction in China's Japan policy. Specifically, the totalitarian Chinese state's neglect and suppression of genuine social concerns regarding Japan in earlier years, followed by a relatively liberalized state that tolerates societal participation in Sino-Japanese relations, are an importance source of the anti-Japanese sentiment recently observed in China.