Abstract

The United Nations collective security was organized and deployed as a coalition force within a unified command system under the overall command of the United States under UN mandate. The US assumed most of the military and economic burdens of UN intervention in Korea, and sought comparable authority and leadership in return. However, this caused conflicts over Korean aid operations and the logistical support of participating UN member states. Such conflicts, however, did not necessarily debilitate the US. With its overwhelming productivity and military strength, the US led the United Nations Command and provided the logistical reservoirs for participating UN states. In addition, participating UN member states that experienced the magnitude of America’s logistical support systems, military supplies, services, and equipment, became potential clients of the American military-industrial complex, just as countries that received American military aid. In a sense, the Korean War experience consolidated the contradictions of a Cold War peace that saw increasing reliance on the powerful economic and military prowess of the United States rather than on collective military action by an international organization. Consequently, the United States neglected the prospect for peace attainable through civil activities by the UN and UN organizations on the Korean Peninsula and in East Asia.