This paper examines the origins of South Korea’s industrial economy in the Park Chung Hee regime’s program for building a “self-reliant national defense” (jaju gukbang). Through independent arms development in the 1970s, Park’s technocrats engineered and launched the modernizing forces that propelled South Korea’s rapid economic growth, referred to as the “Miracle on the Hangang River.” From 1973 to 1979, the regime’s Heavy and Chemical Industrialization Plan (HCIP) systematically merged civilian industries with a state-controlled system of indigenous weapons production built from the ground up. Drawing strength from a defense-related infrastructure, HCIP rapidly advanced civilian technology and developed a highly skilled labor force, while simultaneously promoting private sector growth and exportation. As select civilian industries produced weapons, military technologies were diffused through “spin-off ” effects that built and expanded private-sector, export-based heavy and chemical industries. Deeply intertwined with economic development and export trade, South Korea’s burgeoning defense industry aggressively supported Park’s dual pursuits of “self-reliance” (jaju) in both national security and the economy. The legacy of South Korea’s independent military modernization is seen in the state’s enduring deep ties with what today represent the most technologically advanced and lucrative commercial industries in the Korean economy.
With the idea that it is important to distinguish between institutional mechanisms and informal practices of Protestant militarism, in this article, I examine the relationship between Korean Protestant churches and militarism in two dimensions. Firstly, I focus on institutionalized channels and mechanisms that contribute to militarism’s direct infiltration of the church. This includes military chaplaincy, the Christian doctrine of war and peace, and doctrinal anticommunism. Active support for sending Korean troops to assist in a war of aggression and strong opposition to conscientious objector status can be said to be the result of these three factors working together. Secondly, I focus on informal practices that allow and encourage militarism to rule the daily lives and consciousnesses of Protestant believers. These include the spiritual warfare frame, foreign and North Korea missions, and domestic evangelism and church-building.
This article examines how international Korean male students (de)stabilize their mobility and citizenship by strategically navigating their options and duties for military service in South Korea and/or the United States. Their stories reveal how the “unending” Cold War and the vestiges of US imperialism and militarism continue to impact Korean young adults and their transnational life projects. In particular, this research compares two groups: one composed of upper middle-class and upper-class male students who graduated from boarding schools and attend prestigious colleges in the United States and who are required to return to complete their military service in South Korea; and the other composed of lower middle-class and lowerclass male students who moved to the United States and are seeking to serve in the US military to secure an expedited path to American citizenship after failing to enter prestigious colleges in South Korea. In so doing, we show how two seemingly divergent paths toward militarized citizenship are highly classed. Although the two groups examined come from different class backgrounds and make different choices, they are alike in their decision to undertake military service—and to use that service to secure valuable citizenship. By showing how both groups remain tied to a militarized regime of citizenship during their respective transnational trajectories as international students, this research demonstrates the ongoing effects of the Cold War, not just on the Korean Peninsula but also in the transnational space of citizenship.
Even though the term chemyeon encompasses its own cultural uniqueness, there have only been a small number of attempts to develop a scale which embraces the characteristics of chemyeon. This scale has not been previously fully checked for validity and theoretical applicability. The purpose of this study is to test the validity of the existing scale and to check its theoretical applicability in relation to selfconstrual. This study confirms the previous presumption that chemyeon consists of six factors with ethics, competence, demeanor, social performance, social personality, and social pride. This study also verifies that the concept of chemyeon consists of two dimensions: social chemyeon and personal chemyeon. As the predictive validity of the two-dimension model was anticipated, the correlation between social chemyeon and independent self-construal was found to be negative. However, the correlation between personal chemyeon and independent self-construal was found to be positive.Theoretical implications and ramifications for future study are discussed based on the results.
This paper will show how the Yeonam Group’s perception of the Han Chinese influenced the development of Northern Learning. Previous studies have noted this influence but did not adequately examine its cause. Conservative intellectuals in Joseon regarded the Qing and its subjects as barbaric, even repugnant. The queue hairstyle which the Qing insisted every adult male wear became a focal point for this disdain. The Yeonam Group also made the queue a focal point, but rather than seeing it as shameful, they tried to view it as an indication that the Han Chinese were acting in accordance with Confucian virtues, foremost of which was the loyalty a subject owed his sovereign. The Yeonam Group believed the Qing to be a worthy inheritor of the Mandate of Heaven and that the queue could be seen as a legitimate institution of the new dynasty. This belief did not cause them to abandon the Ming. By focusing on loyalty, the Yeonam Group found a Confucian virtue that allowed them to accept the advances made by the Qing without forsaking their fidelity to the Ming.
By using Lowell Dittmer’s game-theoretical analysis as a method, this article examines how North Korea’s room to maneuver has been affected by Chinese-South Korean, Japan-ROK, and Sino-Japanese interactions, and how the DPRK sought to exploit the various conflicts between Beijing, Tokyo, and Seoul. Placing the period of 2012–2016 into historical context, it emphasizes that North Korea has consistently tried to hinder cooperation between South Korea and the other two Northeast Asian states by creating “romantic triangles.” North Korean propaganda frequently highlighted local territorial disputes, Japanese historical revisionism, and the deployment of US missile defense batteries in South Korea, but it could also abruptly remove these issues from its agenda if Pyongyang’s foreign policy underwent a shift. Still, the DPRK was not necessarily able to benefit from these disagreements, because a Japan-ROK conflict could reinforce China-ROK cooperation (or vice versa). In periods of inter-Korean confrontation, Pyongyang had less chance to take advantage of Sino-Japanese and Japan-ROK friction than in periods of North-South rapprochement. If China or Japan decided to confront Seoul, they could easily have found alternative partners that were more powerful and attractive than the DPRK (like Russia or the United States), which limited their readiness to engage a confrontational North Korea.