Abstract

Offering an analysis of the twenty years of nuclear negotiations between the international community and North Korea, this paper reveals that North Korea's nuclear weapons development is neither a fabricated nor an exaggerated problem. Does North Korea carry on its nuclear weapons development because of a lack of mutual trust between it and the United States? Is it developing nuclear weapons simply as a means of negotiation? The negotiation records of the past twenty years reveal that the North has consistently pushed ahead with the development of nuclear weapons. For the North Korean regime, nuclear armament can be seen as a means for its survival and negotiation leverage for improving relations with the United States. Since 1993, when the U.S.-North Korea senior officials meetings began, the North has sought a political solution through direct negotiations with the United States on the line that, if the United States tacitly approves its established nuclear capabilities through the freezing of its nuclear facilities, it can resolve U.S. security concerns like nuclear proliferation and long-range ballistic missiles. It remains to be seen if the September 19 2005 joint statement, which declared the dismantlement of all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, will lead to an eventual resolution of the North's nuclear problem or turn out to be nothing more than another agreement to be reneged on like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the joint statement on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, and the Geneva Agreed Framework.