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The Impact of An Interaction between Product Quality and Perceived Risk on Seller Profit

융합경영연구 / The Journal of Economics, Marketing and Management, (E)2288-7709
2023, v.11 no.2, pp.23-32
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.20482/jemm.2023.11.2.23
Seung HUH (College of Business Administration, Incheon National University)
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Abstract

Purpose: This study examines the effect of full information disclosure on seller profit when there exists information asymmetry between sellers and buyers, focusing on the risk averseness of buyers. By investigating the interaction between product quality and perceived risk through online sales data, we attempt to figure out the incentive structure of full information disclosure specifically when buyers are risk-averse, so that we can suggest more feasible information disclosure strategy to sellers. Research design, data and methodology: Our empirical model analyzes the sales data of collectible goods from a major online seller using Poisson regression. In our model, we have specifically considered risk-averseness of buyers by estimating the interaction effect between the product quality and perceived risk on seller profit, aiming for a more precise empirical analysis on sellers' incentive structure of full disclosure. Results: Our empirical analysis strongly supports the effect of interaction between product quality and perceived risk, showing that the incentive for full disclosure is much stronger when product quality is higher, and vice versa. Therefore, sellers are strongly encouraged to voluntarily reveal product weaknesses when their product quality is higher than average, while it is more profitable to hide any product defects when quality claim is lower than average. Conclusions: This study supports the related literature by confirming economic incentives for full disclosure, and also supplements and strengthens previous studies by presenting that the effect of interaction between product quality and perceived risk strongly affects seller profit. Our unique finding supports both mandatory disclosure and voluntary disclosure arguments and presents practical implications to marketing managers by suggesting that seller's incentive for revealing weaknesses depends on the level of seller's product quality.

keywords
Information Asymmetry, Lemon Market, Online Auction, Quality Certification, Risk Aversion

융합경영연구