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ISSN : 1229-0718
This study aimed at examining developmental changes in understanding of second-order mental states. Five-, 7-, 9-, 11-, and 13-year-old children participated in this study. Two second-order false-belief tasks were used. Tasks were modified versions of Perner and Wimmer's(1985) 2nd-order tasks and Sullivan et al.'s(1994) 2nd-order tasks. Children were asked 4 test questions(1st-order true belief, 1st-order false belief, 2nd-order ignorance, 2nd-order false belief) to test their understanding of mental states. The results were as follows: First, 5-year-old children were able to understand 1st-order mental states but not 2nd-order metal states. Second, understanding of false belief occurred later than understanding of knowledge or ignorance(true belief, ignorance). Third, 2nd-order false belief were demonstrated at age 7 and develops by 11 years old.
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