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Sole Evidence and Legal Judgement of Lay People: Circular Logic and Causal Inference

Abstract

The present study examined whether and how lay people’s verdict would vary as a function of the presence or absence of additional evidence to corroborate a sole evidence. Also, the perceived posterior probabilities of the sole evidence were compared with the Bayesian posterior probabilities. Finally, path models to identify the relationships among legal judgement, probative value of the sole evidence, posterior probability, and recognition of circularity of inference, were tested. In the results, highest rate of guilty verdict was observed in the sole confession evidence condition. The participants being aware of the logical circularity were more likely to make an acquittal decision than those without the awareness, in all experimental conditions. In the sole evidence conditions, the participants overestimated the perceived posterior probabilities of the sole evidence. According to the results of the path model in the sole confession evidence condition, it appeared that the awareness of circular logic had a direct effect on the verdict and the perceived posterior probability of the sole evidence had an indirect effect through the perceived probative value of the evidence on the verdict. We discussed about the risks embedded in trial with sole evidence and proposed a counterplan.

keywords
Sole evidence, Circular logic, Bayesian posterior probability, probative value, admissibility, verdict, 유일한 증거, 순환논증오류, 베이지안 사후확률, 증명력, 증거능력, 유무죄 판단

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