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유일한 증거와 일반인의 법적 판단: 순환논증의 오류와 인과추론 경향성

Sole Evidence and Legal Judgement of Lay People: Circular Logic and Causal Inference

초록

본 연구에서는 검사의 공소사실에 제시된 피고인의 유죄증거가 유일한 재판에서 피고인에 대한 일반인들의 유무죄 판단이 유일한 증거의 종류와 추가증거의 유무 및 순환논증오류의 인식 여부에 따라 달라지는지를 확인하고, 일반인들이 판단한 유일한 증거의 사후확률과 실제 통계자료에 의해 계산된 베이지안 사후확률을 비교하였다. 또한 유일한 증거만 제시된 재판에서의 유무죄 판단이 순환논증오류의 인식 여부 및 인과추론 경향성, 유일한 증거에 대한 증명력 평가의 영향을 받을 것으로 보고, 이들의 관계를 경로모형을 통하여 검증하였다. 연구 결과, 실험조건에 따라 유죄판단 비율이 달랐으며, 모든 실험조건에서 순환논증오류를 인식하고 있는 일반인들은 인식하지 못하는 일반인들보다 무죄판단을 더 많이 하는 것으로 나타났다. 유일한 증거만 제시된 조건들을 선택하여 참가자들이 직접 판단한 유일한 증거의 사후확률과 베이지안 사후확률을 비교한 결과, 일반인들은 유일한 증거의 사후확률을 과대추정하는 경향이 있었다. 경로모형을 분석한 결과에서는 유일한 증거가 자백인 조건에서만, 순환논증오류의 인식여부가 유무죄 판단에 직접적인 영향을 주고 과대추정된 유일한 증거의 사후확률이 유일한 증거의 증명력 평가를 통하여 피고인에 대한 유무죄 판단에 간접적인 영향을 주는 것으로 나타났다. 논의에서는 유일한 증거만 제시되는 재판에 내재된 위험성과 그 대처방안에 대해 논의하였다.

keywords
Sole evidence, Circular logic, Bayesian posterior probability, probative value, admissibility, verdict, 유일한 증거, 순환논증오류, 베이지안 사후확률, 증명력, 증거능력, 유무죄 판단

Abstract

The present study examined whether and how lay people’s verdict would vary as a function of the presence or absence of additional evidence to corroborate a sole evidence. Also, the perceived posterior probabilities of the sole evidence were compared with the Bayesian posterior probabilities. Finally, path models to identify the relationships among legal judgement, probative value of the sole evidence, posterior probability, and recognition of circularity of inference, were tested. In the results, highest rate of guilty verdict was observed in the sole confession evidence condition. The participants being aware of the logical circularity were more likely to make an acquittal decision than those without the awareness, in all experimental conditions. In the sole evidence conditions, the participants overestimated the perceived posterior probabilities of the sole evidence. According to the results of the path model in the sole confession evidence condition, it appeared that the awareness of circular logic had a direct effect on the verdict and the perceived posterior probability of the sole evidence had an indirect effect through the perceived probative value of the evidence on the verdict. We discussed about the risks embedded in trial with sole evidence and proposed a counterplan.

keywords
Sole evidence, Circular logic, Bayesian posterior probability, probative value, admissibility, verdict, 유일한 증거, 순환논증오류, 베이지안 사후확률, 증명력, 증거능력, 유무죄 판단

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