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Association between Corporate Governance and Corporate Performance in Iran

The Journal of Distribution Science / The Journal of Distribution Science, (P)1738-3110; (E)2093-7717
2013, v.11 no.11, pp.5-11
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.13106/jds.2013.vol11.no11.5.
Moradi, Mahdi
Shiri, Mahmood Mousavi
Salehi, Mahdi
Piri, Habib
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Abstract

Purpose - Considering corporate companies that are continually growing and bearing in mind the theory of agency, how confident can stakeholders be about their benefits in relation to managers' decisions? Previous research has indicated that the type of corporate governance can have an effective impact on companies' performance. The current study aims to investigate the impact of ownership structure on listed companies on the Tehran Stock Exchange. Research Design, Data, and Methodology - Through use of the correlation coefficient, the results indicate a positive correlation among the percentage of common stock held by board members, the percentage of non-executive board members, and separation of the positions of chairperson of the board of directors and managing director. Results - Based on the return on assets index, only the correlation between the proportion of ownership of the managing director and financial investment company ownership is significant. Conclusion -Managers can potentially make decisions that benefit themselves but are detrimental to shareholders' interests. Corporate governance is a factor that can mitigate agency costs. Corporate governance comprises the laws, regulations, structures, processes, cultures, and systems that lead to the achievement of objectives such as accountability, transparency, justice, and stakeholders' rights.

keywords
Corporate Governance, Board Ownership, Tobin's Q, Corporate Performance

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