The purpose of this study was to 1) replicate the Wells effect(i.e., reluctance to rule against the defendant solely on the basis of probabilistic evidence) in Korea and 2) examine the validity of an alternative explanation(i.e., perception of risk of wrong verdict). In study 1(n=46), mock jurors in the tire-tracks condition were reluctant to rule against the defendant based on their perceived probability and this pattern was not resulted in the tire-tracks-belief condition. Therefore, the Wells effect was replicated in Korea. In study 2(n=70), we manipulated the participants' perception of risk of wrong verdict. That is, participants who were assigned in the high risk perception of wrong verdict were informed that if the defendant were found guilty, the defendant would get considerable demage both in finance and reputation of the company. Participants in the low risk perception of wrong verdict condition were informed that these demage would not be great. The results revealed that the Wells effect was pronounced in the high risk perception of wrong verdict condition. That is, participants were more reluctant to rule against the defendant when they perceive the significance of the result of wrong verdict as high. Limitations of the study and the directions for future study were discussed.
박광배, 김상준, 한미영 (2005). 가상적인 재판 쟁점에서의 현역판사의 판단과 모의배심의 집단판단에 대한 인지적 방략의 효과. 한국심리학회지: 사회문제, 11(1), 59-84.
서울신문 (2011, 9, 27). 민사도 국민참여재판 도입 검토. http://www.seoul.co.kr/news/ newsView. php?id=20110927001018
연합뉴스 (2012, 9, 15). 춘천지법 네 번째 시민참여 민사재판...조정성립. http://news. naver. com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid= sec&sid1=102&oid=001&aid=0005798667
한국일보 (2012, 2, 1). ‘어린이집 여아 사망’ 민사재판에 첫 모의배심원제. http://news. hankooki.com/lpage/society/201202/h2012020118070821950.htm
Arkes, H. R., Shoots-Reinhard, B., Mayes, R. S. (2012). Disjunction Between Probability and Verdict in Juror Decision Making. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making. 25(3), 276-294.
Denes-Raj, V., & Epstein, S. (1994). Conflict between intuitive and rational processing: When people behave against their better judgment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 66, 819-829.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1972). Subjective probability: A judgement of representativeness. Cognitive Psychology, 3, 430-454.
McCauliff, C. M. A. (1982). Burdens of proof: Degrees of belief, quanta of evidence, or constitutional guarantees? Vanderbilt Law Review, 35, 1293-1335.
Niedermeier, K. E., Kerr, N. L., & Messé, L. A. (1999). Jurors’ use of naked statistical evidence: Exploring bases and implications of the Wells effect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76, 533-542.
Saks, M. J., & Kidd, R. F. (1980). Human information processing and adjudication: Trial by heuristics. Law and Society Review, 15, 123-160.
Sykes, D. L., & Johnson, J. T. (1999). Probabilistic evidence versus the representation of an event: The curious case of Mrs. Prob’s dog. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 21, 199-212.
Wells, G. L. (1992). Naked statistical evidence of liability: Is subjective probability enough? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62, 739-752.
Wright, E. F., MacEachern, L., Stoffer, E., & MacDonald, N. (1996). Factors affecting the use of naked statistical evidence of liability. The Journal of Social Psychology, 136, 677-688.