Abstract

This study compared the nature of disgust caused by the crime scene with that by the stereotype of the sexual-minority defendant, and compared the effect of each type of disgust on evidence evaluation and legal judgment. A total of 600 participants (300 men, average age of 44.40) were randomly assigned to sources of disgust (crime scene, sexual minorities defendant, control condition), the existence of additional evidence of innocence (o/x), and the existence of judicial directives (o/x). As a result of the study, disgust under the condition of a cruel crime scene with strong physical disgust was significantly higher than that of the sexual minority defendant, interpreted the evidence in a more guilty direction, and was more prone to evaluate that the defendant was guilty. It is noteworthy that evidence evaluation was a significant moderating variable between disgust and probability of guilt under conditions where the source of disgust was a sexual minority, but not under control conditions and crime scene condition. It means that the effect of disgust on legal judgment may not be direct when the defendant is a sexual minority. In addition, the existence of the judicial instruction had a significant inverse effect on the sentence. And simple effect analysis found that presenting judicial instruction lowered probability of guilt only under the control condition. This makes it reasonable to infer that disgust derived from the characteristics of the crime scene and the defendant can be recognized as integral emotions that are difficult to correct with instructions. Finally, pity for the defendant was significantly higher under the conditions of sexual minority which shows that an emotional response of sympathy may occur in addition to disgust for sexual minorities. After examining the nature of disgust (physical & moral), legal judgment according to the source and degree of disgust was reviewed. In addition, the meaning of disgust and sympathy for the sexual minority defendant was discussed.