Abstract

Self-interest may at times be the deciding factor in whether the leader of a work group allocates resources to achieve efficiency or harmony. Then, should self-interest and group interest be congruent, efficiency would appear the objective. If group interest were contrary to self-interest, an inefficient allocation may be chosen and defended as fair. Beginning psychology students, 56 females and 56 males in triads, initially all learned, through bogus feedback, that, based on individual performance on a preliminary task, they would be group leader. Leadership was compensated with extra credit toward tickets for a $50 lottery. However, to continue as leader over a series of tasks required constant top performance. On the initial group task each member earned credit from both individual and group performance. At its conclusion half the subjects (noncritical condition) learned they remained top performer, making it likely they would retain leadership throughout the session. The others (critical condition) learned another worker outperformed them, threatening their future position. As leaders, all were then to allocate use of a tool between the other two members (a second tool was for the leader exclusively). The tool could double performance, and it was described as either a resource for power (affecting earnings and leader assignment) or a resource of use (affecting only earnings). As hypothesized, the subjects in the Critical; Power condition more frequently made fair (i.e., inefficient) allocations than did the subjects in each of the other three conditions. Allocating the tool 100% of the time to the better worker would be efficient : while giving the tool 2/3 of the time to the better worker, who did twice the work of the third worker, could be defended as fair. Subjects allocating fairly more often cited harmony, fairness, helping the poor worker, and maintaining leadership as reasons for their allocation. Subjects allocating efficiently cited performance and group earnings. A main effect indicated more subjects allocated consistently with fairness when the resource affected power than when it affected earnings only. The experiment demonstrated "institutionalization of power".