Abstract

A resource dilemma, a special case of a social dilemma, simulates a situatiuon in which a group of individuals can "harvest" resources from a common resource pool. But if they overharvest from the common pool, the pool can become "extinct." Thus, each member's decision must consider the future level of the pool as well as the current level. The effects of uncertainty about resource pool size and information about members' harvest decisions were investigated. Groups of four subjects(undergraduate students) were asked to harvest points from a replenishable resource pool. Three factors were crossed in a factoral design : uncertainty(high vs low), penalty for overharvest(high vs low) and feedback information(individual vs aggregated group level). The primary dependent measure was mean group harvest. Results showed that subjects harvested less when uncertainty was high, a finding opposite to the results of previous studies. An uncertainty by penalty interaction showed that members' harvests tended to increase with high uncertainty, and the reverse with low uncertainty.