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Korean Journal of Social and Personality Psychology

ISSN : 1229-0653

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Vol.25 No.4

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Experimental Research of Multilateral Negotiation with Game Theory

Korean Journal of Social and Personality Psychology / Korean Journal of Social and Personality Psychology, (P)1229-0653;
2011, v.25 no.4, pp.1-26
https://doi.org/10.21193/kjspp.2011.25.4.001

(2011). Experimental Research of Multilateral Negotiation with Game Theory. Korean Journal of Social and Personality Psychology, 25(4), 1-26, https://doi.org/10.21193/kjspp.2011.25.4.001

Abstract

In this study, the method was sought that all the parties of the multilateral negotiation in interest conflict can win together without anyone to take advantage or handicap. The method that used very well in the negotiations is logrolling method that every party in negotiation sticks their most important issues and concedes the less important one to the another party. This method works best, because it gives better outcomes than general bargaining, and is known as a very superior method, is widely used in the actual negotiation also. However, logrolling was being invested and used quite in bilateral relations, but whether it can be applied to multilateral negotiations has not been studied well yet, except for some works (e.g. Binder, 2005, Binder & Diehl,2008). In this study was complemented Binders research and examined the issues through experimental research on the multilateral negotiations and invested under what conditions it can be conduce to optimal resolution. Results of three rounds of the studies of the experiment are as follows:1. Difficulties of multilateral negotiation grows with the increase the number of parties to negotiate and the increasing complexity of the conflict structure, the negotiation results are also suboptimal. 2. The more important than the number of negotiators matters is the complexity of the interest structure. While the main point of logrolling, to yield less important interest to win the more important interest, is relatively easy to understand and also actually well used, the reverse logrolling methods, to yield the most important interest for the benefits of all parties is difficult to understand, not acceptable, and difficult to practice. Information change and accountability for the negotiation’s success enhance the negotiation behavior, but not optimal. 3. It has been tried to reach the optimal results by the ingroup-leader and the mediation by third person. Mediator ist more effective than ingroup-leader of negotiators. Therefore, for the enhancing of the use of reverse logrolling methods it is necessary a variety of ways to try.

keywords
multilateral negotiation, conflicts of interest, cooperation, mediation, decision making in groups, 다자협상, 게임이론, 집단의 의사결정, 경쟁과 협조

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