Abstract

The effects of situational context on coalition outcomes, especially on payoff divisions, in coalition bargaining were examined in two different cultures. Male college students were used as subjects, 96 from Seoul National Univ, in Korea and 114 from Univ. of III. at Urbana-Champaign in U.S.A. Subjects in groups of three played three games in which the variance of three players' inputs was varied. Super-additive quota games were used. Coalition situations were depicted as a business transaction or a workgroup situation, or no mention about context. Two main hypotheses made about reward division were : (1)Subjects with business transaction scenario be less egalitarian than those with workgroup scenario, (2)Koreans be less egalitarian than Americans. Results of the experiment supported the two hypotheses. In addition to testing hypotheses about reward division behavior, relative accuracy of several theories of coalition formation was contrasted. Results showed that, in general, equity theory was the most and equal excess model was the least accurate, though there was no single theory that was the best fit for all occasions. Implications for the results of this study and for future research were discussed.